Multi-agent bilateral bargaining and the Nash bargaining solution

This paper studies a bargaining model where n   players negotiate how to share a pie through (n−1)$(n-1)$ bilateral bargaining sessions. In each session, two players bargain for a partial agreement that specifies who exits and who moves on to the next session (if there is any) via the alternating-proposal framework of Rubinstein [Rubinstein, A., 1982. Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model. Econometrica 50, 97–109]. We consider two bargaining procedures under which the subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes converge to the Nash [Nash, J., 1950. The bargaining problem. Econometrica 18, 155–162] bargaining solution for the corresponding bargaining problem as the players’ discount factor goes to one. Hence, the model studied here provides a non-cooperative foundation for the Nash cooperative bargaining solution in the multilateral case.     

Strategy and HRM in nonprofit organizations: evidence from Canada

Unlike other sectors, human resources (HR) of nonprofit organizations cannot be replaced with investment in physical capital. Moreover, the importance of HR has been further heightened by changes in the operating environment of the sector. Using the Miles and Snow (1978 Miles, R.E. and Snow, C.C. 1978. Organizational Strategy, Structure, and Process, San Francisco, CA: McGraw-Hill.  [Google Scholar]) strategic typology, this paper explores strategic HRM in public service nonprofits by examining the importance attached to HRM based on their strategic types. The results of a survey of 79 nonprofits and 7 case studies suggest that strategic HRM was not evident in nonprofit organizations. Defenders, analysers, and prospectors were not different from reactors in the importance they attach to recruitment, compensation and labour relations. However, training was found to be more important among defender than prospector nonprofits. The lack of alignment between HRM and strategy highlights the need for nonprofits to find a way to address their HR capacity challenges and enhance effectiveness of strategy.     

Strategic substitutes or complements? The game of where to fish

The “global game with strategic substitutes and complements” of Karp et al. (2007) is used to model the decision of where to fish. A complete information game is assumed, but the model is generalized to S>1$S>1$ sites. In this game, a fisherman’s payoff depends on fish density in each site and the actions of other fishermen which can lead to congestion or agglomeration effects. Stable and unstable equilibria are characterized, as well as notions of equilibrium dominance. The model is applied to the Alaskan flatfish fishery by specifying a strategic interaction function (response to congestion) that is a non-linear function of the degree of congestion present in a given site. Results suggest that the interaction function may be non-monotonic in congestion.     

A knowledge transfer perspective of strategic assignment purposes and their path-dependent outcomes

Our research not only addresses the strategic purposes of expatriate assignments within multinational corporations but, unlike most earlier studies, extends the investigation to include their path-dependent outcomes. Adopting a knowledge transfer perspective we first re-define the principal assignment purpose categories of Edström and Galbraith (1977a Edström A Galbraith JR 1977a Transfer of Managers as a Control and Coordination Strategy in Multinational Organizations Administrative Science Quarterly 22 June 11 22 [Crossref] , [Google Scholar]) as business applications, organization applications and expatriate learning. These purpose categories are then conceptually related in terms of a four-part typological matrix based on individual-level knowledge-flow direction and role focus. Following a review of prior assignment purpose studies we posit that strategic expatriate assignment purposes should be considered not in isolation but relative to their potential outcomes. Adopting a single-case research design with multi-method data collection, we demonstrate the emergent nature of strategic assignment outcomes. It is shown for our transnational case organization that knowledge acquisition or learning by expatriates is an underestimated strategic assignment outcome, more so than either business or organization-related knowledge applications.     

Shrinkage estimation of <Emphasis Type="Italic">P</Emphasis>(<Emphasis Type="Italic">X</Emphasis><<Emphasis Type="Italic">Y</Emphasis>) in the exponential case with common location parameter

We consider the problem of estimating R=P(X<Y) where X and Y have independent exponential distributions with parameters and respectively and a common location parameter . Assuming that there is a prior guess or estimate R₀, we develop various shrinkage estimators of R that incorporate this prior information. The performance of the new estimators is investigated and compared with the maximum likelihood estimator using Monte Carlo methods. It is found that some of these estimators are very successful in taking advantage of the prior estimate available.Acknowledgments. The authors are grateful to the editor and to the referees for their constructive comments that resulted in a substantial improvement of the paper.     

ICT Investment, Productivity and Efficiency: Evidence at Firm Level Using a Stochastic Frontier Approach

We analyze the determinants of ICT investment and the impact of information technology on productivity and efficiency on a representative sample of small and medium sized Italian firms. In order to test the most relevant theoretical predictions from the ICT literature we evaluate the impact of investment in software, hardware and telecommunications of these firms on a series of intermediate variables and on productivity. Among intermediate variables we consider the demand for skilled workers, the introduction of new products and processes and the rate of capacity utilization. Among productivity measures we include total factor productivity, the productivity of labor, and the distance from the best practice by using a stochastic frontier approach. Our results show that the effect of ICT investment on firm efficiency can be more clearly detected at firm level data by decomposing it into software and telecommunications investment. We find that telecommunications investment positively affects the creation of new products and processes, while software investment increases the demand for skilled workers, average labor productivity and proximity to the optimal production frontier. We interpret these results by arguing that ICT investment modifies the trade-off between scale and scope economies. While software investment increases the scale of firm operations, telecommunications investment creates a flexibility option easing the switch from a Fordist to a flexible network productive model in which products and processes are more frequently adapted to satisfy consumers taste for variety.     

Nash bargaining in ordinal environments

We analyze the implications of Nash’s (Econometrica 18:155–162, 1950) axioms in ordinal bargaining environments; there, the scale invariance axiom needs to be strenghtened to take into account all order-preserving transformations of the agents’ utilities. This axiom, called ordinal invariance, is a very demanding one. For two-agents, it is violated by every strongly individually rational bargaining rule. In general, no ordinally invariant bargaining rule satisfies the other three axioms of Nash. Parallel to Roth (J Econ Theory 16:247–251, 1977), we introduce a weaker independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) axiom that we argue is better suited for ordinally invariant bargaining rules. We show that the three-agent Shapley–Shubik bargaining rule uniquely satisfies ordinal invariance, Pareto optimality, symmetry, and this weaker IIA axiom. We also analyze the implications of other independence axioms.     

Organizations and overlapping generations games: Memory,communication, and altruism

This paper studies the role of memory and communication in overlapping generations (OLG) games between ongoing organizations. In each organization, each individual, upon entry into the game, replaces his predecessor who has the same preferences and faces the same strategic possibilities. An individual has no prior memory - that is, he does not directly witness the events that occur before his tenure. Instead, each individual relies on information about the past from his predecessor via cheap talk. This paper highlights the role of communication as a surrogate for memory.It has been shown elsewhere that Folk Theorems hold in OLG games with long enough lived individuals who can perfectly observe the past. However, the Folk Theorem fails for many games when individuals have no prior memory. We show that for OLG games without prior memory but with costly communication, a Folk Theorem holds only when there is some altruistic link between cohorts in an organization. Our main result asserts that if communication costs are sufficiently small, or if altruistic weights on successors are sufficiently large, then a strongly stationary Folk Theorem (i.e., equilibrium payoffs are time invariant) obtains if a managers message is public information. The equilibria in this Folk Theorem require a special form of intergenerational sanctions. In these sanctions, punishment is sometimes carried out long after both victim and perpetrator have left the game. Without this special structure, altruism may in fact destroy cooperation when it would otherwise be possible.Received: 18 April 2003, Accepted: 20 October 2003, JEL Classification: C72, C73, D74, D82We have benefitted from helpful comments and conversations with Luca Anderlini, Kirk Bailey, Hans Haller, Matthew Jackson, and Takashi Shimizu, and numerous seminar participants. This research is partially supported by the National Science Foundation, and by grants-in-aid for scientific research of the Ministry of Education of Japan. Of course, any remaining error is our own.     

Investing equally in risk

Classical optimal strategies are notorious for producing remarkably volatile portfolio weights over time when applied with parameters estimated from data. This is predominantly explained by the difficulty to estimate expected returns accurately. In Lindberg (Bernoulli 15:464–474, 2009), a new parameterization of the drift rates was proposed with the aim to circumventing this difficulty, and a continuous time mean–variance optimal portfolio problem was solved. This approach was further developed in Alp and Korn (Decis Econ Finance 34:21–40, 2011a) to a jump-diffusion setting. In the present paper, we solve a different portfolio problem under the market parameterization in Lindberg (Bernoulli 15:464–474, 2009). Here, the admissible investment strategies are given as the amounts of money to be held in each stock and are allowed to be adapted stochastic processes. In the references above, the admissible strategies are the deterministic and bounded fractions of the total wealth. The optimal strategy we derive is not the same as in Lindberg (Bernoulli 15:464–474, 2009), but it can still be viewed as investing equally in each of the n Brownian motions in the model. As a consequence of the problem assumptions, the optimal final wealth can become non-negative. The present portfolio problem is solved also in Alp and Korn (Submitted, 2011b), using the L ²-projection approach of Schweizer (Ann Probab 22:1536–1575, 1995). However, our method of proof is direct and much easier accessible.     

Throwing good money after bad

An “investment bubble” is a period of “excessive, and predictably unprofitable, investment” (DeMarzo et al. in J Financ Econ 85:737–754, 2007). Such bubbles most often accompany the arrival of some new technology, such as the tech stock boom and bust of the late 1990s and early 2000s. We provide a rational explanation for investment bubbles based on the dynamics of learning in highly uncertain environments. Objective information about the earnings potential of a new technology gives rise to a set of priors or a belief function. A generalised form of Bayes’ rule is used to update this set of priors using earnings data from the new economy. In each period, agents—who are heterogeneous in their tolerance for ambiguity—make optimal occupational choices, with wages in the new economy set to clear the labour market. A preponderance of bad news about the new technology may nevertheless give rise to increasing firm formation around this technology, at least initially. To a frequentist outside observer, the pattern of adoption appears as an investment bubble.     

The Role of Firm-Specific Incentives and Country Factors in Explaining Voluntary IAS Adoptions: Evidence from Private Firms

Abstract

This paper investigates voluntary adoptions of International Accounting Standards (IAS) by private enterprises, and builds on prior research which posits that higher quality financial reports through IAS adoption can reduce information asymmetry and facilitate contracting with external parties. Specifically, we pursue the following questions. First, do firm-specific incentives matter in the IAS adoption decision after controlling for country-level institutional factors? Second, does the relative importance of firm vs. country factors vary across institutional settings? Using a sample of 3,722 small and medium-sized private enterprises from 56 countries, we report two primary findings. First, both firm and country factors matter in the voluntary IAS adoption decision. Second, when we focus on sub-samples of countries partitioned by the level of economic development, we find that firm factors dominate country factors in more developed countries, while in less developed countries, country factors dominate firm factors in explaining IAS adoptions. This result is consistent with the argument in Doidge et al. (Journal of Financial Economics, 86(1), pp. 1–39, 2007 Doidge, C., Karolyi, A. and Stulz, R. 2007. Why do countries matter so much for corporate governance?. Journal of Financial Economics, 86(1): 1–39. [Crossref], [Web of Science ®] , [Google Scholar]) that firm incentives are more important in explaining governance choices (including accounting) in more developed countries where the benefits from better governance are more likely to exceed the attendant costs. Collectively, our results suggest that less developed countries can enhance the benefits from IAS adoptions by developing institutions which facilitate private contracting.     

Every member of the core is as respectful as any other

We strategically separate different core outcomes. The natural counterparts of a core allocation in a strategic environment are the α-core, the β-core and the strong equilibrium, modified by assuming that utility is transferable in a strategic context as well. Given a core allocation ω of a convex transferable utility (TU) game \(v\), we associate a strategic coalition formation game with \( \left( {v, \omega } \right) \) in which ω survives, while most other core allocations are eliminated. If the TU game is strictly convex, the core allocations respected by the TU-α-core, the TU-β-core and the TU-strong equilibrium shrink to ω only in the canonical family of coalition formation games associated with \( \left( {v, \omega } \right) \). A mechanism, which strategically separates core outcomes from noncore outcomes for each convex TU game according to the TU-strong equilibrium notion is reported.     

Key Sectors,Industrial Clustering and Multivariate Outliers

In this paper a reflection is made on the problems that can arise in key sector analysis and industrial clustering, due to the usual presence of outliers when using multidimensional data related to the sectors in an input–output table. Multidimensional outliers are considered as being not only linked to the low number of clusters usually observed in this kind of study, but probably causing invalid results in most of the works involving multivariate statistical techniques, such as cluster and factor analysis. Actually, by comparing the key sectors of the Spanish economy obtained in Díaz et al. (2006) Díaz, B., Moniche, L. and Morillas, A. 2006. A fuzzy clustering approach to the key sectors of the Spanish economy. Economic Systems Research, 18: 299–318. [Taylor & Francis Online] [Google Scholar] to the ones we get taking into account the problem the outliers pose, one can realize they greatly distort the results. On the other hand, it is shown that identification of outliers can be considered as a good and new procedure to help select the most important sectors in an economy.     

Well-posedness of measurement error models for self-reported data

This paper considers the widely admitted ill-posed inverse problem for measurement error models: estimating the distribution of a latent variable $X^1$ from an observed sample of $X$, a contaminated measurement of $X^1$. We show that the inverse problem is well-posed for self-reporting data under the assumption that the probability of truthful reporting is nonzero, which is supported by empirical evidences. Comparing with ill-posedness, well-posedness generally can be translated into faster rates of convergence for the nonparametric estimators of the latent distribution. Therefore, our optimistic result on well-posedness is of importance in economic applications, and it suggests that researchers should not ignore the point mass at zero in the measurement error distribution when they model measurement errors with self-reported data. We also analyze the implications of our results on the estimation of classical measurement error models. Then by both a Monte Carlo study and an empirical application, we show that failing to account for the nonzero probability of truthful reporting can lead to significant bias on estimation of the latent distribution.     

Iterated Kalai–Smorodinsky–Nash compromise

In this paper, we introduce a new two-person bargaining solution, which we call iterated Kalai–Smorodinsky–Nash compromise (IKSNC). For its characterization, we present an axiom called \(\varGamma \)-Decomposability which is satisfied by any solution that is decomposable with respect to a given reference solution \(\varGamma \). We show that the IKSNC solution is uniquely characterized by \(\varGamma \)-Decomposability whenever \(\varGamma \) satisfies the standard axioms of Independence of Equivalent Utility Representations and Symmetry, along with three additional axioms, namely Restricted Monotonicity of Individually Best Extensions, Weak Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, and Weak Pareto Optimality under Symmetry.     

Locally robust contracts for moral hazard

We consider a moral hazard problem in which the principal has a slight uncertainty about how the agent’s actions translate into output. An incentive contract can be made robust against an $ϵ$ amount of uncertainty, at the cost of a loss to the principal on the order of $\sqrt{ϵ}$, by refunding a small fraction of profit to the agent. We show that as $ϵ$ goes to zero, this construction is essentially optimal, in the sense of minimizing the worst-case loss, among all modifications to the contract that do not depend on the details of the environment.     

Investment and dynamic DEA

A dynamic version of data envelopment analysis (DEA) is developed in the present paper. Our model introduces investment in traditional DEA and imposes intertemporal cost minimization. Adding an intertemporal adjustment constraint into the cost minimization problem, we derive the relation between the DEA variables of the variable cost function and those of the primary production frontiers’ coefficients. The augmented DEA model can be solved using standard linear programming. This dynamic framework enables computing the production frontiers, measuring the productive efficiencies and evaluating the potential economies all in the presence of adjustment costs.