基于演化博弈的和谐社会构建模型分析

经济学在社会科学中的主导性地位决定了经济和谐是和谐社会构建的基础。以"理性经济人"假设为基础的正统经济理论与和谐社会的本质内容存在着一定程度的差异性,因而不能够为和谐社会的存在性构建起科学的理论体系,而行为经济学为和谐社会的实现提供了现实性的理论依据。互惠性偏好是行为经济学的基础性假设之一,基于互惠性偏好的个体行为博弈可以改善博弈双方的经济利益,从而为演化博弈环境下群体经济行为从自利型向互惠型的演化创造了条件,最终为经济学视角下和谐社会微观经济理论体系的构建提供了坚实的理论基础。     

基于偏好分层理论的个体行为选择分析框架

传统经济理论假定个体服从理性判断,遵循选择逻辑,并据此演绎出个体行为选择分析的两种方法.但无论是基于偏好法的效用理论还是反其道而行的显示偏好理论,本质上均无法解释清楚现实中的个体选择何以是丰富多彩的.本文引入偏好分层理论,构建“偏好-行为”分析框架,认为个体偏好可以分为内核层、基本层、表象层和行为层四个层次,该分层的偏好体系决定了个体的知识结构,而特定的知识结构将对个体行为进行损益分析,促使个体做出策略选择并付诸行动.这一理论重新解释微观行动主体在不同场景下的行为选择问题,能够较好地解释现实经济活动中个体的目标驱动行为和规则遵循行为,从而避免新古典经济学效用分析法和显示偏好法在解释个体行为上的局限.     

基于偏好、偏好演化的偏好融合及其经济学意义

作为经济学的硬核假设,自涉、外生给定、同质且稳定不变的偏好假定几乎被应用于所有的经济分析中。由于其对真实世界中个体行为解释的牵强与矛盾从而面临着理论困惑与现实困境,走出困境的一个有效途径是偏好的融合。本文研究表明:偏好的融合必须囊括自涉偏好与他涉偏好的统一、偏好异质与内生对偏好同质与外生的扬弃、偏好稳定的特殊性与偏好演化的一般性三个方面。从而融合后的个体偏好是自涉偏好与他涉偏好的统一;是情景依存的,内生于社会制度之中;是异质的;是演化的。偏好的融合无论是对于经济学的理论研究还是对于现实经济政策的制定都具有深远的意义。     

正统经济学微观理论基础的解构

正统经济学的微观理论范式隐含了三个基础性假设:偏好的内涵不变性、偏好的外延无关性和经济资源的完全可替代性.行为经济学研究揭示了选择行为的结构化效应、引出效应、占有效应.这些研究表明,偏好关系在决策者与其身处的环境之间高度随机的互动过程中被塑造,并动态演进,偏好的内涵不变性和外延无关性假设受到了致命的质疑.思维会计原理作为多元的结构化过程,取消了经济资源的完全可替代性.正统经济学微观理论基础遭到了行为经济学的系统解构,经济学的关系论转向基本形成.     

农民收入多元化与农地产权偏好:约束与动态选择——理论框架与来自赣、苏、桂三省578份农户问卷调查的经验

基于多重约束条件下农民经济行为不确定性和动态选择性的特征,构建了当前中国农民收入多元化与农地产权偏好的理论框架;应用赣、苏、桂三省578份农户问卷调查资料,采用multinomial模型初步检验农民农地产权偏好与收入多元化的相关性.最后提出有关政策建议.     

涉他偏好效用理论研究述评

"最后通牒"等一系列行为博弈实验显示,人们在追求自身收益的同时也会关注其他人的收益。而在此基础上发展的涉他偏好效用理论,成功解释了大量传统经济理论所不能解释的实验结果和经济现象,并能更为准确地预测经济行为。该文对目前涉他偏好效用理论的主要模型——互惠意图模型、不公平厌恶模型和社会福利偏好模型进行研究、比较和分析,为解决我国经济改革和经济转型中公平、互惠和社会效率等方面问题提供所需的理论依据。     

理性的边界与个体主义方法论的局限性

本文致力于弄清三个方面的问题：（1）通过梳理在确定性和不确定性条件下理性偏好的最新研究成果,指出理性的边界,揭示主流经济学个体主义方法论的局限性。（2）通过考察阿罗不可能性定理的条件,提出阿罗不可能性定理的逆否命题,探索摆脱阿罗不可能性定理的途径和社会福利函数存在的条件。（3）根据阿罗不可能性定理,指出个体主义方法论在分析个人理性和集体理性、微观经济学和宏观经济学、个人效用和社会福利之间的关系时遭遇的困难,进而提出用整体主义方法论解决此类问题的思路。本文认为,制度和规则是社会的灵魂,在规则的语境下新古典经济学和制度经济学不是对立而是互补的。     

偏好颠倒现象对理性行为的挑战

在经济学中,所谓“理性行为”是指最大化一个具有一致性的效用函数。我们可以用一种理性模型或定义的方式,给经济学家、统计学家和决策论专家所称之为的“效用函数”提供一种精确的陈述:一个行动者A的偏好是理性的,当且仅当:A的偏好满足完备性、     

时间偏好不一致的行为经济学解释

行为经济学摆脱了传统理论抽象的完全理性人假设的束缚,利用实验经济学和心理学的相关知识,提出基于有限理性的行为人的假设,在此基础上,从人们的不耐心递减、有限意志力、估测偏见、参照点依赖四个方面的特性来说明行为经济学对人们时间偏好不一致的解释。     

偏好反转对协同知识创新决策的影响

基于协同知识创新决策风险性,引入行为经济学偏好反转理论,从知识积累视角构建偏好反转影响下的知识创新模型。将协同知识创新决策从单纯的选择决策拓展为选择/放弃决策,在不同决策背景下对模型进行演算。结果发现,当协作方对创新资源投入分摊比例较低时,主体对未来收益的不确定性预期较低,而在偏好反转的影响下,放弃决策对预期收益的退出定价可能较高,从而使背离放弃决策相比进入选择决策更有利于协同创新。研究结论解释了当前较多的协同知识创新联盟尽管没有实现科技政策调整的预期效果,但未大规模解体且力趋稳定合作的现象。     

Estimating the public's social preference function between inflation and unemployment using survey data: The survey research center versus Gallup

Economists often use Gallup Poll data on presidential performance to analyze the interaction between politics and the state of the macroeconomy. The household survey undertaken by the Survey Research Center (SRC) of the University of Michigan provides an alternative data base. The SRC asks respondents about the government's performance specifically with respect to inflation and unemployment. We compare whether the Gallup or SRC data are the more useful for estimating the public's social preference function between inflation and unemployment for the Carter, Reagan, Bush and Clinton presidencies. The estimates that use Gallup Poll data are unsatisfactory because for two of the periods the coefficients of inflation and unemployment are not well estimated and for one period there is serial correlation of the residuals. The estimates using the SRC data set are satisfactory and the results are consistent with economic theory. We conclude that a researcher using survey data to estimate the public's reaction to varying rates of inflation and unemployment should prefer the SRC series when it is available. First version received: October 1995/final version received: July 1998     

不公平对待对努力水平的影响——基于三阶段锦标模型的研究

行为经济学研究认为,人们在自利偏好之外还存在公平偏好,不公平对待将导致额外效用;而心理学实验又表明,不公平对待会使人们产生相对剥夺感并增加努力成本。基于公平偏好理论及相对剥夺观点,构建了三阶段晋升锦标模型,研究不公平对待对代理人努力水平的影响。结果表明,代理人的努力水平选择取决于对未来的预期,并且工资差距、努力成本、嫉妒和自豪心理以及监管精度都会影响代理人的努力水平。这一结论有利于预测代理人的行为规律,为建立最优激励机制提供更符合现实情况的理论依据。     

Strategy-proof preference aggregation: Possibilities and characterizations

An aggregation rule maps each profile of individual strict preference orderings over a set of alternatives into a social ordering over that set. We call such a rule strategy-proof if misreporting one's preference never produces a different social ordering that is between the original ordering and one's own preference. After describing two examples of manipulable rules, we study in some detail three classes of strategy-proof rules: (i) rules based on a monotonic alteration of the majority relation generated by the preference profile; (ii) rules improving upon a fixed status-quo; and (iii) rules generalizing the Condorcet–Kemeny aggregation method.     

A field experiment to estimate the effects of anchoring and framing on residents’ willingness to purchase water runoff management technologies

Watersheds throughout the world have been severely polluted by nutrient-laden runoff that comes from industrial, agricultural, and residential sources. Efforts to reduce this runoff have focused on industrial and agricultural sources, while little attention has been paid to encouraging residents to reduce runoff from their properties. To study residents’ willingness to adopt landscaping practices that reduce runoff, we conducted a field experiment in the Delaware River watershed. In the experiment, over three hundred adults participated in a series of random-price auctions that revealed their willingness to pay (WTP) for five products that reduce nutrient runoff. To study how WTP can be influenced by attributes of the choice architecture, we randomized the starting bid values (anchors) and the way in which the external benefits of the five practices were framed. Compared to a neutral framing, a positive framing (using the product can improve water quality) increased average WTP by about one-third, while the estimated effect of a negative framing (failing to use the product can worsen water quality) was also positive, but smaller and not statistically different from zero. The estimated effect on average WTP from the anchor depends on how bids of $0 are modeled, but the results imply that higher anchors lead to higher WTP. Although we believe the magnitudes of our results should be considered suggestive and we recommend replications with higher statistical power, the results add to the evidence base that environmental programs can achieve policy-relevant gains in program performance through a series of small changes to the decision environment.     

基于公平心理偏好的投资博弈——敲竹杠问题的一个行为解决

敲竹杠问题是不完全合约理论的中心话题,经典文献认为,如果合约是不完全的,当事人的专用性投资会引发敲竹杠风险从而导致无效率的专用性投资。但是,关于敲竹杠问题的文献通常假定事后谈判结果对事前投资成本不敏感。通过在雇佣双方的投资博弈中引入投资成本相关性这种合作的谈判方式,将传统敲竹杠模型中影响谈判力的因素与当事人对公平偏好的行为因素二者融合,本文证明:与传统的投资博弈相比,在投资成本影响企业(雇员)谈判力的情况下,双方有更强的专用性人力资本投资激励。雇佣双方所面临的敲竹杠风险取决于双方的初始谈判力,且双方有可能在事前做出社会最优甚至过度的投资。这也从一个方面解释了现实中大量存在的有效投资现象。     

Demographic versus expenditure flexibility in Engel curves

We consider the effects of demographic and expenditure variables on consumer demand in a system of Engel curves using a smooth coefficient semiparametric model where the expenditure effects on the budget shares vary nonparametrically with demographic variables such as the age of head and number of children in the household. Our findings, based on UK micro data, suggest that with a smooth coefficient semiparametric model there is no need for nonlinear logarithmic expenditure effects in the budget shares. Furthermore, we find evidence of a trade-off between demographic and expenditure effects in Engel curves and that a rank-2 system of Engel curves where the logarithmic expenditure effects are allowed to vary with demographic characteristics either nonparametrically or as a third degree polynomial function cannot be rejected against a rank-3 (quadratic logarithmic) model. The implications on household behavior and welfare are also examined. We would like to thank an anonymous referee and Baldev Raj, the editor, for useful comments and suggestions. We would also like to thank the University of Cyprus for financial support, Theofanis Mamuneas for stimulating discussions and the Office of National Statistics for making available the UK Family Expenditure Survey data through the ESRC Data Archive. The last author would also like to acknowledge the financial support from SSHRC of Canada.     

偏好、技术与工业化

Krugman(1 991b)的两地区模型解释了报酬递增的制造业企业为实现规模经济和降低运输成本而定位于需求较大的市场区域。本文通过引入部门间人口流动成本和地区间技术差异 ,认为新兴制造业可以在外围地区形成 ,并缩小地区间差异。     

市场化转型、风险偏好与中国商业银行的盈利性

在控制了影响银行盈利性的主要宏观经济及其他个体特征变量的条件下,本文考察了样本期间内全要素生产率变化、国有控股、公开上市、市场势力及风险偏好等因素对中国商业银行盈利性的影响程度与方向。研究发现:在当前金融制度安排下,商业银行向以提升全要素生产率为核心的内涵式发展模式的转变,反而轻微地降低了银行的盈利性;国有控股与公开上市对银行的盈利性均具有正向影响;随着多元化竞争体系的形成,商业银行的盈利能力获得了大幅提升;而中国商业银行在经营活动中的风险态度越是谨慎,风险承担越是适度,其盈利性就表现得越好。在推进商业银行市场化转型的进程中,需要关注国家整体金融制度的顶层设计问题,同时有效控制银行的经营风险,以实现其盈利性的可持续增长。