Lucas on involuntary unemployment

The aim of this paper is to examine critically Lucas' argumentsagainst Keynes's General Theory and in particular against Keynes'sconcept of involuntary unemployment. It comprises two main parts.In the first part of the paper, the author questions Lucas'sclaim that Keynes betrayed the equilibrium discipline by freeinghimself from the postulates of optimising behaviour and marketclearing. In the second part, Lucas’ three arguments againstthe involuntary unemployment concept are discussed—first,that there is no rationale for drawing a distinction betweentwo sorts of unemployment; second, that every economic outcomefeatures the voluntary and the involuntary jointly; and third,that alternatives to unemployment are always present.     

Comment: Lucas on involuntary unemployment

Keynes distinguishes three concepts: voluntary, frictional and(Keynesian) involuntary unemployment. Frictional unemploymentis a Classical form of involuntary unemployment (not voluntary,as Lucas suggests), and reflects the Marshallian, rather thanWalrasian, treatment of time and equilibrium. Lucas contradictsboth Keynes and Pigou in asserting that there are always immediatevacancies for unskilled labour, and abstracts from the veryproblem that Keynes seeks to address. If voluntary unemploymentis re-defined appropriately, as De Vroey helpfully suggestselsewhere, the prefix ‘involuntary’ is dispensable,not because all unemployment is voluntary, as Lucas would haveit, but because it is all involuntary.     

Keynes, Lucas and involuntary unemployment: a reply to Hayes

In this response to Mark Hayes's criticism of his article, ‘Lucason involuntary unemployment’, the author insists on theneed to draw a distinction between labour rationing (a marketoutcome) and unemployment (the activity of job seeking). Economictheory is mainly concerned with the former. Yet the issue ofthe voluntarity versus the involuntarity of unemployment pertainsto unemployment as an activity. Failing to make this distinctioncannot but lead to semantic confusion.     

The Hahn-Solow macro model

The Hahn-Solow macromodel is characterized by fixed nominal wages, increasing returns on capital and pricesetting under an imperfect competitive environment. It proposes that a fall in unemployment is always accompanied by a rise in real wages. The two authors demonstrate that involuntary unemployment is compatible with equilibrium in the goods- and labormarket but they can hardly explain the macroeconomic records of the recent three decades in the US and in Europe.     

Price equilibrium in address models of product differentiation: unit-elastic demand

Summary. I present a class of address models of product differentiation with unit-elastic individual demand and show the existence of Nash equilibrium in prices under assumptions on utility functions and the taste and income heterogeneity across consumers. This paper complements the work by Caplin and Nalebuff (1991, Econometrica), who analyze unit demand models of product differentiation. Received: December 28, 1998; revised version: September 5, 2001     

Stabilisation, Policy Targets and Unemployment in Imperfectly Competitive Economies

This paper argues that the rate of equilibrium unemployment depends on the objectives of the Central Bank. In a model where the Central Bank uses monetary policy to stabilise the economy, we show that unemployment and inflation will be lower with an inflation target than with targets for output, money or nominal GDP. The intuition for this is that the elasticities of demand in both the product and the labour markets are greater when there is an inflation target; we show that this leads to a lower mark-up of price over marginal cost and makes wages more sensitive to unemployment.     

Re-employment probabilities of unemployment benefit recipients

This article studies transitions out of unemployment for benefit recipients in Spain. We analyse the duration of unemployment, distinguishing between spells that end in recall (workers returning to the previous employer) and spells that end in exit to a new job. This distinction allows us to find that the recall hazard rate increases around the time of exhaustion of benefits. However, this happens only for workers receiving Unemployment Insurance (UI). Because we are unable to replicate this result for workers receiving Unemployment Assistance (UA), we believe the finding lends support to the hypothesis that in Spain firms and workers make a strategic use of UI.     

Non-existence of Duopoly Equilibria: A Simple Numerical Example

We give a simple example to the non-existence of duopoly equilibrium in pure strategies in an economy with two goods and two types of consumers. This extends also the discussion on the incentive for trade in an oligopolistic framework initiated in Cordella and Gabszewicz (1998).     

The impact of unemployment on inequality and poverty in OECD countries

The purpose of this research is to examine the contribution of unemployment to income inequality and poverty in various OECD countries. These relationships have been explored using Luxembourg Income Study micro-data. Considerable differences across OECD countries are revealed through the use of within-household unemployment distributions. These differences help to explain most of the observed divergences in the relationship between unemployment and income distribution, in conjunction with the heterogeneous influence of social benefits on the economic position of the unemployed in these countries. A sub-group decomposition analysis corroborates the limited effect of unemployment on income distribution in most of the considered countries. However, it seems clear that the unemployed are among those with the highest risk of experiencing poverty.
JEL classification: D31, I32, J31.     

Outsiders' threat and consecutive offers

Summary. We study the effects of outsiders' threat and consecutive offers in the two-person bargaining model of Shaked and Sutton (1984). In our first model, there are no outsiders and the firm can make two consecutive offers for every given number of periods. Our first model has the same unique equilibrium as in Shaked and Sutton (1984). In our second model, the firm can switch between rival partners but cannot change the alternating proposing sequence. Our second model has the same perfect equilibrium as in Rubinstein (1982). So the key factor that leads to the equilibrium of Shaked and Sutton (1984) is the possibility of firm's consecutive offers, not the outsiders' threat. Received: 23 December 1998; revised version: 21 May 1999     

Measuring the severity of unemployment

A social-welfare (illfare) function framework is applied to compare two demographic groups as to the severity of their unemployment experience. This is based on the assumption that for each individual the disutility of unemployment is an increasing and convex function of spell length. The very concept of spell length and its distribution, however, is not unambiguous. In contrast to previous literature which focuses exclusively on the interrupted spell length in a stock of unemployed, we stress the usefulness of the concept of complete spell length in a cohort of unemployed. We establish an equivalence relationship between second-degree dominance in the cohort and first-degree dominance in the stock. For specific illfare functions the disutilityU(x) when applied to the cohort and the disutilityU(x) when applied to the stock will produce the same value of aggregate welfare (illfare).     

A multi-stage race model with strategic interaction: An agent-based simulation approach

We consider a multi-stage race characterized by technological uncertainty and winner-take-all stakes. A number of studies have found that players in such a race tend to behave strategically by adjusting their effort levels according to their relative ranks. The aim of the present study was to examine the dynamics and the results of such interaction. For this purpose, we employed an agent-based computational approach that enabled us to better understand the dynamics of a race, particularly those in which players exhibit heterogeneous behaviors. The results found that strategic interaction decreases the total cost but also results in delaying the completion of a race. Also, it was discovered, larger budgets rather than strategy differences have more significant effects on the probability of players winning a race. Finally, our study suggested that early preemption is an effective strategy that can improve the probability of winning races substantially.     

Self-fulfilling expectations,history, and big push: A search equilibrium model of unemployment

We set up a search equilibrium model with general matching technologies to study the phenomenon of large-scale and persistent unemployment. Our emphasis is on dynamics. We find, in addition to self-fulfilling expectations, history or initial level of employment plays a nonnegligible role for selecting the equilibrium converging to the steady state with large unemployment. We also discuss some policy implications. We propose a method similar to the idea of big push in economic development for the economy trapped in the state of large unemployment to escape from it.     

Renewable energy and unemployment: A general equilibrium analysis

Using a three-sector general equilibrium model, the impact of renewable electricity support policies on the rate of equilibrium unemployment is analyzed. In a simple two-factor version of the model, the paper shows analytically that renewable electricity support policies lead to an increase in the rate of unemployment. A numerical analysis is conducted with an expanded three-factor model. In this version, most scenarios analyzed also lead to an increase in equilibrium unemployment. However, the paper identifies conditions in which renewable energy support policies can decrease the rate of equilibrium unemployment. In particular, when the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is low, when capital is not mobile internationally, and when the labor intensity of renewable generation is high relative to conventional generation, renewable electricity support policies may reduce the rate of equilibrium unemployment. The model is parameterized to represent the US economy, such that the magnitudes of quantities can be observed. Although there is some variation in the results depending on parameters, the findings suggest in general that reducing electricity sector emissions by 10% through renewable electricity support policies is likely to increase the equilibrium unemployment rate by about 0.1–0.3 percentage points.     

The impact of tax reforms on unemployment in a SMOPEC

This paper analyzes revenue-neutral tax reforms for a small open economy which is constrained to a balanced current account and whose producers have market power on the world market. We consider origin-based and destination-based commodity taxes as well as taxes on income, the payroll, and on an imported factor of production. Our main findings are the following. First, the strength, and for some parameter constellations, even the sign of the employment effect of tax reforms varies with the degree of openness of the economy. Second, the indeterminacy of the sign of the employment effect crucially hinges on the presence of an internationally mobile factor. The central mechanism underlying our results are adjustments of the real exchange rate which have repercussions on wage and price setting and therefore on employment.     

Long-term unemployment, the invention of 'hysteresis' and the misdiagnosis of structural unemployment in the UK

This paper investigates the empirical basis for the belief thatunemployment makes people less ‘employable’, andthat the existence of a pool of long-term unemployed peopleis therefore in itself a barrier to full employment. Drawingon data for Great Britain from the 1940s to the present day,it shows that this idea has arisen through misinterpretationsof the statistical evidence. The resulting policies, besidesdiverting resources from the demand-side programmes appropriateto the true situation of structural unemployment, appear tohave created a problem of the kind they were intended to address,by encouraging unemployed people to move onto sickness benefits.     

Involuntary unemployment and inventories: An exploratory model of equilibrium and pure competition

We build up a model where the combination of labor supervision costs and non-uniform tastes results in a perfect-foresight equilibrium with positive involuntary unemployment and inventories even when prices and wages are assumed to be perfectly flexible. We show that the model could explain a positive association between the real wage and the level of employment (contrary to the standard post-Keynesian model), and a negative one between inventories and employment.     

Skilled-unskilled wage inequality and unemployment: A general equilibrium analysis

The paper develops a static three sector competitive general equilibrium model of a small open economy in which skilled labor is mobile between a traded good sector and the non-traded good sector and unskilled labor is specific to another traded good sector. Capital is perfectly mobile among all these three sectors. We introduce involuntary unemployment equilibrium in both the labor markets and explain unemployment using efficiency wage hypothesis. We examine the effects of change in different factor endowments and prices of traded goods on the unemployment rates and on the skilled-unskilled relative wage. Also, we introduce Gini-Coefficient of wage income distribution as a measure of wage income inequality; and show that a comparative static effect may force the skilled-unskilled relative wage and the Gini-Coefficient of wage income distribution to move in opposite directions in the presence of unemployment.     

Rationing rule, imperfect information and equilibrium

Summary. The impact of imperfect information on the price setting behaviour of firms is analysed. Specifically, consumers support an information cost to become informed about prices. Firms are endowed with U-shaped average cost curves. If a firm does not supply more than its competitive supply as determined by its marginal cost schedule, then we show that the existence of a pure strategy equilibrium is conditional on the rationing rule employed. If uninformed consumers are served first then the monopoly price is the sole equilibrium whenever consumers' information costs are high enough. Otherwise, a pure strategy equilibrium fails to exist contrary to the results of Salop and Stiglitz (1977) or Braverman (1980) who implicitly suppose that firms supply all the demand at a given price. Received: May 17, 1999; revised version: September 15, 2000