Economists as subjects: Toward a psychology of economists

Economists can reflect on their own field of research and themselves in a number of ways. The philosophy of science has long been the dominant way to reflect on the work of scientists, to be joined in more recent times by both the sociology of science and the rhetoric of science. In this paper I do not argue that these approaches are wrong, but I do argue that they should be complemented with a study of the individual scientist. A psychology of economists, in other words, is called for. One important theory in recent psychological literature (social learning/cognitive theory) is introduced as an instance to indicate what kind of suggestions concerning the reflective position of individual scientists might be derived. It would be preferable from this perspective that scientists set high standards for themselves, have an open mind to what happens in different disciplines, and set high standards by which to judge others. Then follows a discussion where some potential objections to the approach in general, or to the specific psychological theory in particular, are refuted.     

Social Relations and Endogenous Culture

The current state of economics as a science is critically evaluated in view of its lack of emphasis on sociological and psychological factors. In particular, I argue that humans are embedded in social structures and that they choose actions taking account of the social contexts in which they live and the social interactions to which they belong. Preferences then should be considered not as exogenously given but as endogenously evolved, allowing for bounded rationality and psychological factors. I provide a brief sketch of the possible model formulation for a more desirable theory, invoking network theory and an indirect evolutionary approach. JEL classification numbers: A12, A13, B40.     

一般均衡中的利率、确定性与最优规则

利率规则理论是以短期利率作为货币政策工具而发展起来的一套新的理论,它体现了货币经济学家在货币政策领域内的新的尝试和努力。在利率规则理论中,货币经济学家试图解决两个问题:利率规则冲击对非政策经济变量的短期影响是什么,以及一个好的利率规则应当具有怎样的性质。利率规则将短期利率作为非政策经济变量的内生反应函数,使得货币经济学家可以在一般均衡模型中探讨这两个问题。然而,由于利率规则从一开始就是出于一种偏好的设定,因此,讨论的结果并不符合稳健性和科学性的要求,这就削弱了理论预言的可靠性。在某种意义上,利率规则理论若想成为一门真正的"科学的艺术",它就必须为内生利率规则寻找到一个坚固的微观基础。本文梳理评述了利率规则理论在经验上和理论上的成就和不足。     

A characterization of perfectly competitive economies with production

This paper answers the question, what do you need for perfect competition with production? The answer given is that you need to realize an allocation in which no individual contributes a surplus to anyone else. This essentially amounts to giving each individual his “marginal product.” In the model of perfect competition, profits are competitively determined rents: they reflect the marginal product of entrepreneurs. And the competitive theory of value derives from the competitive theory of distribution.     

Temptation-Driven Preferences

"My own behaviour baffles me. For I find myself not doing what I really want to do but doing what I really loathe." Saint Paul
What behaviour can be explained using the hypothesis that the agent faces temptation but is otherwise a "standard rational agent"? In earlier work, Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) use a set betweenness axiom to restrict the set of preferences considered by Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) to those explainable via temptation. We argue that set betweenness rules out plausible and interesting forms of temptation including some which may be important in applications. We propose a pair of alternative axioms called DFC, desire for commitment , and AIC, approximate improvements are chosen . DFC characterizes temptation as situations in which given any set of alternatives, the agent prefers committing herself to some particular item from the set rather than leaving herself the flexibility of choosing later. AIC is based on the idea that if adding an option to a menu improves the menu, it is because that option is chosen under some circumstances. From this interpretation, the axiom concludes that if an improvement is worse (as a commitment) than some commitment from the menu, then the best commitment from the improved menu is strictly preferred to facing that menu. We show that these axioms characterize a natural generalization of the Gul–Pesendorfer representation.     

Principles of economic justice: Marketplace and workplace applications

Mainstream economics argues that ethical standards are essentially relative, that they differ from one person to the next, and are entirely outside the limits of legitimate inquiry for economic science. Our view is that there are certain objective ethical standards to be applied that parallel the three modes of human interaction in economic affairs: person to person, superior to subordinate, and member to group. Those standards are given by the principle of equivalence, principle of distributive justice, and principle of contributive justice. The key to integrating those standards into mainstream economic thinking is to begin with what happens in every exchange involving economic agents who are well-informed and free to act. What is gotten in the exchange is more highly valued than what is given up. However, there must be limits to that gain—identified in mainstream economics as profits, consumer surplus, and economic rent—in order to prevent one party from taking advantage of another and to assure that market exchange serves all economic agents fairly and effectively and not just those with the power and will to turn gain into excess. Mainstream economists argue that sufficient limits are imposed by the “invisible hand.” We argue instead that limits must be imposed more deliberately and directly by human economic agents and that those limits are supplied by the three principles of justice.     

Alternative Specifications of the Institutional Constraints to Economic Growth - Or Why is there a Shortage of Electronic Engineers and Computer Scientists in Sweden?

There is a shortage of engineers and scientists, in particular, electronic engineers and computer scientists, in Sweden. This shortage is argued to be one factor behind the structural weakness of Swedish industry in the 'high tech' area. The conventional explanation of the imbalance in the supply and demand for electronic engineers and computer scientists is focused on the incentives for the individual to demand higher education. These are argued to be low due to the relatively equal income distribution in Sweden and to high taxation. We find that the evidence given in support of this specification of the institutional problem is not convincing. Instead, we specify the institutional problem as having been a lack of opportunities to study electronics and computer science. With recent institutional changes in higher education, this problem is currently being tackled. Looking ahead, we see a new institutional problem emerging with a distinct gender bias. In order to increase the number of degrees awarded in electronics and computer science further, we will need to raise the interest of women in science and technology studies. This requires major institutional changes with regard to both the form and content of the educational programmes.     

ISO9000的应用对企业管理模式及人际关系带来的变革

ISO9000质量管理体系的口号是“写你所做的,做你所写的,提出证据”。实施ISO9000管理体系往往会对企业中人际关系和管理模式带来深刻的影响。“写你所做的”让企业的每个人制定规范来约束自己;“做你所写的”使主宰企业运作的不再是人的意志,而是一种客观的、不带个人情感的规范;“提出证据”使企业的管理由别人的监督逐渐变为自我负责。     

Foundational explorations for a normative theory of political economy

I set out an individualistic and pragmatic choice framework for a normative theory of political economy, and argue that, given pluralism with respect to individual ends, a consensus on any political or economic institution presupposes that it is perceived to serve as a public means to private ends. Concerning the crucial question of the distribution of the benefits that political and economic cooperation can make possible, I argue that the various models typically employed—those pertaining to competitive market interaction, decision making under uncertainty, bargaining theory, and social choice theory—fail to provide for a stable consensus, i.e., one that is resistant to non-compliance and renegotiation. Since, however, such instabilities are mutually disadvantageous, these approaches fail to establish how rational individuals can capture all the gains that cooperation makes possible. Appealing to a modified version of the social-psychological construction that Rawls introduces in chapter 8 ofA Theory of Justice I argue that stability is a function of a perceived sense of mutual concern. I conclude by arguing that Rawls own egalitarian/efficiency principle gives natural expression to such a concern, and thus can serve as the object of a stable consensus.     

On evaluating scientific research: The contribution of the psychology of science

This paper critically discusses the nature various schemes for evaluating scientific research. Through the use of Jungian personality theory, it attempts to explicate the psychological forces and assumptions underlying the vast majority of evaluation schemes. The paper argues that most schemes are greatly restricted in their choice of an underlying psychological basis. It is argued that science administration, evaluation, and technological forecasting all require a greater ability to appreciate, and even more important to integrate, the psychological functions described in this paper.“It has been lately fashionable in some quarters to think that physical science iormally progresses by moving on the whole fairly calmly in one direction, and that such progresses is interrupted only at certain periods of great upheaval in science.“But this can be true only in a limited sense. Not far below the surface, there have coexisted in science, in almost every period since Thales and Pythagoras, sets of two or antithetical systems or attitudes, for example, one reductionistic and the other holistic … “Science has always been propelled and buffeted by such contrary or anithetical forces. Like vessels with draught deep enough to catch more than merely surface current, , scientist of genius are those who are doomed, or privileged, to experience these deeper current in their complexity. It is precisely their special sensitivity to contraries that has made it possible for them to do so, and it is an inner necessity that has made them demand nothing less for themselves [5, pp. 375–376].”     

The Ethics of Swearing: The Implications of Moral Theories for Oath-Breaking in Economic Contexts

Many readers will share the judgement that, having made an oath, there is something morally worse about consequently performing the immoral action, such as embezzling, that one swore not to do. Why would it be worse? To answer this question, I consider three moral-theoretic accounts of why it is ‘extra’ wrong to violate oaths not to perform wrong actions, with special attention paid to those made in economic contexts. Specifically, I address what the moral theories of utilitarianism, Kantianism and a new communitarian-relational principle entail for the wrongness of oath-breaking. I argue that the former two do not adequately capture why it is extra wrong to perform an immoral action that one swore not to do, but that the latter appeal to a morality of communal relationship offers a promising account.     

Species Being in the Twenty-First Century

ABSTRACT

In this article, I focus on what is implicitly the more humanist aspect of Marx’s work. That is, species being and alienation. I do so informed by a commitment to pluralism and based on a background in social ontology. I argue that species being and alienation continue to provide insight into the nature of the modern world. They are integral components to Marx’s exploration and constructive critique of capitalism and help to make sense of how potential is shaped for a social entity who can be harmed and who can flourish. However, the way in which one relates to Marx as still relevant regarding these matters can cover a range. I then set out how species being provides useful insight in the twenty-first century at a time of anticipated major social and economic change.     

Against representative agent methodology

Garnett and Boettke both seek to identify the appropriate behavior for the representative scientist. The social structure of science is better represented, however, with a heterogeneous agent model. Social epistemology and epistemological naturalism provide context for the argument against representative agent methodology. Asking whether individual scientists should “commit themselves to an approach and pursue it doggedly” or make “a professional commitment to intellectual tolerance, openness, and broad-mindedness” is like asking whether it is better to be a bouncer or a bookkeeper. The question depends on particulars that vary from person to person. Down with representative agent methodology. Up with diversity.     

Killing for Money and the Economic Theory of Crime

There is a large literature on the economics of crime and punishment, yet surprisingly little attention is paid to the receipt of money for crime. “Contract killing” is surprisingly neglected not only by economists but also by social scientists in general. In this paper, I look at the case not of professional gangster “hitmen” but of individuals who have found themselves in a position where they wish to have a killing carried out. This discussion does not condone the practice any more than an economic analysis of suicide is an inducement to individuals to kill themselves. To the lay reader, the cases where an individual feels the need to pay for killing may seem to be such that rationality is not a likely form of behaviour. However, the economics of crime has adopted the use of the rationality postulate as a heuristic for all types of crime.     

Order-Dependent Knowledge and the Economics of Science

Economists approaching the study of science typically assume the applicability of a market analogy, but then base their analysis on the presumption that science constitutes an area of pervasive market failure. Given the interactions that are actually observed to occur between scientists, we suspect that the failure is in the analogy, not in the putative market. In considering how one might better apply the economic way of thinking to the understanding of science as an activity, we suggest that it is necessary to specify exactly how scientific interaction differs from market interaction, and to be clear about how the behavior of interacting scientists might be modeled in terms of the general pursuit of self-interest in a noncatallactic context. Our model of science portrays an institutionalized mode of interaction between scientists involving the publication, use, and citation of scientific papers, and it is in the exploration of the individual incentives thrown up by this arrangement that the interesting empirical implications arise. We give a short exposition of the possible lines of investigation that could be followed based on this approach.     

Positive public economics: reinterpreting ‘optimal’ policies

The standard positive/normative divide fails to capture the way economists use ‘optimal’ taxation models. This paper argues that the better way to understand public economics is through a three-part division between positive, normative, and instrumental models. An instrumental model is about means and ends. Once this additional dimension is acknowledged, one can see that ‘optimal’ taxation models are closely connected to what are generally seen as purely positive models. I argue that economists have been using similar standards to assess ‘optimal’ taxation models as they use to assess positive models. Recent advances in optimal taxation theory have embraced the positive aspects of models, even about social welfare functions, something that is generally classified as a normative.     

Contrived desires,affluence, and welfare: J.K. Galbraith's Pigovian redistribution argument reconsidered

I argue that John Kenneth Galbraith's theory of the “dependence effect” in The Affluent Society provides a way to rescue A.C. Pigou's argument for wealth redistribution from a powerful objection. The objection is based on the unprovability of statements making interpersonal comparisons of utility. Galbraith's dependence effect theory allows him to present a version of the Pigovian argument that requires no such statements to be made. I argue that Galbraith's main piece of advocacy in The Affluent Society was for income redistribution, despite the fact that he claimed to be in favour of greater spending in the public sector rather than redistribution as such. I then show how my reading of the dependence effect theory helps to defend it against objections from Hayek and Rothbard. I end by discussing what improvements in economics a proper test of the theory would require and showing how my reading of it helps to reveal the ongoing importance of The Affluent Society to the understanding of political economy.     

Exploitation,international taxation,and global justice

Abstract

I investigate the central principle that underlies the OECDs tax base erosion and profit shifting initiative. The principle claims that (corporate) profits should be taxed where economic activities deriving the profits are performed and where value is created. First, I argue that its plausibility depends on establishing that states have an entitlement to the productive factors in their territory, and therefore to a share of the value created by employing those factors. Second, I maintain that this cannot presently be established. If states fail to discharge duties requiring wealth redistribution, they do not have an unqualified right to the productive factors in their territory. Even if they are not subject to such duties, states can only legitimately claim a share in the fair value of the goods created. I show that given widespread exploitation in global value chains, the market prices of (intermediary) goods do not reflect their fair value.