The Gender Wage Gap in Offered,Observed, and Reservation Wages for Spain

The literature on the gender wage gap and wage discrimination has exclusively analyzed observed wage differences, ignoring inactive or unemployed individuals. In order to obtain a more complete overview of gender wage differences, this paper analyzed inactive or unemployed individuals in terms of offered and reservation wages in Spain in the years 1994, 2000, and 2006. The results show that the observed wages give a more positive perspective of the gender wage gap than offered ones. Furthermore, the existence of an important gender wage gap for reservation wages has been noted, which is possibly because women take charge of household and family caregiving tasks to a greater degree than men. The results show that Spanish women had higher reservation wages and lower offered wages than men, which explains their lower participation in the labor market.     

Caste discrimination and transaction costs in the labor market: Evidence from rural North India

This paper is an empirical attempt to quantify caste-based discrimination in the labor market using household data taken from rural North India. In the regression analysis, transaction costs associated with entry into the labor market and reservation wages are estimated simultaneously along with market wages. The estimation results provide evidence of the existence of transaction costs in the labor market and discrimination against backward classes with regard to access to regular employment. In line with previous studies, the results suggest that the achievements of India's reservation policy so far have at best been limited. In addition, a comparison between the estimates from the model employed in this paper and conventional (reduced-form) approaches shows that discrimination in labor market entry is likely to be underestimated in the conventional reduced-form approaches.     

THE DECREASING INFLUENCE OF DOMESTIC MARKET STRUCTURE ON RACIAL EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS: 1984 TO 1996

This study investigates the market concentration/racial earnings discrimination relationship in two periods: 1984–90 and 1991–96. In each period, the racial wage gap and the residual wage gap are compared for union and nonunion workers in monopolistic and competitive industries. The authors find no evidence of market structure–driven discrimination for union workers in either period. However, from the first to the second period they find evidence of increased racial earnings differentials for nonunion workers, yet market structure–driven discrimination decreases. The authors suggest that concentration has become a less effective measure of market power and firms' latitude to discriminate. (JEL J31, J71 )     

EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: ANTIDISCRIMINATION POLICIES IN THE LABOR MARKET

Some have criticized government antidiscrimination programs for causing efficiency losses both by devoting public resources to monitoring and enforcement and by distorting personnel decisions. This paper examines the efficiency consequences of such programs when discrimination is caused by a market failure and when regulators are imperfectly informed about individual firms' personnel policies.
This paper outlines a simple model of "statistical discrimination" and shows that an equal opportunity rule, which constrains employers from offering different wage schedules to different groups, will improve the efficiency of this economy. Employers will attempt to evade such regulation, and the paper describes an evasion strategy in which employers search for worker "qualifications" that can act as proxies for race or sex. The paper discusses problems involved in monitoring and enforcing compliance, and considers two possible responses by the regulatory agency. The first is analogous to "disparate impact" judgments in which the type of information that employers can use in personnel decisions is regulated. The second is an affirmative action-type policy that monitors the outcomes, rather than the process, of hiring and compensation decisions. Affirmative action policies have some advantages since they permit employers to use information more efficiently than do policies that attempt to regulate personnel decisions directly. However, affirmative action policies are likely to lead to charges of preferential treatment.     

Good News and Bad News: Search from Unknown Wage Offer Distributions

The largest market in national economies is the labor market. Labor market contracting is characterized by job search, often from unknown wage offer distributions. This paper reports experimental tests of finite horizon models of job search in which the wage offer distribution is unknown. Theoretically-optimal search from an unknown wage offer distribution can have the seemingly paradoxical property that some offers will be accepted that are lower than other offers that will be rejected in the same period of the search horizon. Thus the reservation wage property (or lowest acceptable wage path) may not exist. This can occur because an offer that is a priori relatively high (good news) can imply that it is highly probable that search is from a favorable distribution, and such an offer can look unattractive when it is an a posteriori relatively low offer from a favorable distribution (bad news). This paper reports results from experimental treatments for search from unknown distributions in which the reservation wage property does exist and treatments in which it does not exist. We find that the consistency of search behavior with search theory reported in earlier papers is robust to the presence or absence of the reservation wage property and to whether the draws come from known or unknown distributions.     

Labor markets and mating markets: Using taxes to reduce the male–female pay gap

Recently, Frank and McKenzie (J Bioecon 8(3):269–274, 2006) pointed out that beside discrimination, there is a further reason for a wage gap between males and females: If females value partner wages more than males in the mating market, this would increase the pay gap. In this paper, it is analyzed whether there exist policies that may improve the position of females and males from a distributional point of view without destroying the signal females want about the labor market success of males. First-best redistribution policies require the knowledge of the male and female wage preferences. Because this information is not available, a first-best redistribution policy seems infeasible. As an alternative policy, a differentiated wage tax is considered which is less information demanding than a first-best policy. It is shown that a welfare increasing wage tax scheme does exist and that an adequately chosen wage tax scheme may decrease the gender wage gap without destroying the desired signal of wages for labor market success.     

Work and Wage Dynamics around Childbirth

In this paper, we investigate how the wage processes of women who are well established in the labour market are affected by having children. We estimate a flexible fixed‐effects wage regression model extended by post‐childbirth fixed effects. We use register data on West Germany, and we exploit the expansionary family policy during the late 1980s and 1990s for identification. On their return to work after childbirth, the wages of mothers drop by 3–5.7 per cent per year of leave. We find negative selection back to full‐time work after childbirth. We discuss the policy implications regarding statistical discrimination and the results concerning the family gap.     

Does Equal Pay Legislation Reduce Labour Market Inequality?

This paper considers a labour market model of monopsonistic competition with taste-based discrimination against minority workers to study the effect of equal pay legislation on labour market inequality. When the taste for discrimination is small or competition is weak, the policy removes job segregation and the wage gap completely. However, with a bigger taste for discrimination or stronger competition, equal pay legislation leads to more job segregation, and sometimes minority workers end up earning less than before. Profits of discriminating firms might increase, and discrimination can persist in the long run, although it would have disappeared without the policy.     

Analysis of the 1980 Sydney Survey of Work Patterns of Married Women: Further Results*

Using cross-section data from the 1980 Sydney survey of the work patterns of married women, this paper contributes to the very scarce Australian stock of disaggregate econometric studies of the labour market activities of married women. Labour force participation, hours of work and wage functions (reservation wage as well as market wage) are estimated in a second-generation static labour supply framework. Unique features of the study include the availability of direct data on previous market experience, a formulation of the impact of children on the participation decision which permits testing for the presence of economies of scale in child-minding activities, estimation of the reservation wage function, and a data base which permits a clear distinction between earnings and other forms of income.     

我国工资差异变化及影响因素分析——基于家计调查的实证研究

尽管中国在经济转型过程中取得了令世人瞩目的经济增长速度,但随之而来的是不断扩大的工资收入差异和持续扩大的工资收入差距引发了广泛关注.一般认为,工资差距过大对社会公平和正义造成伤害,并直接影响中国经济和社会的可持续发展.基于家计调查数据并使用经济计量模型分析方法,本论文对中国在过去二十年日益增长的工资差距进行实证分析并探讨影响工资差距的主要因素.研究表明,政府对劳动力市场机构特别是工资政策改革是引发工资差距不断扩大的原因之一.本论文指出,劳动力市场机构的变化不是造成工资差异扩大的唯一因素;其它重要因素包括劳动力市场歧视以及制度性障碍,如中国现行的户口政策造成的劳动力市场分割等.本论文还从政策层面对减少工资差异提出建议.     

Unemployment Risk, Labour Force Participation and Savings

This paper analyses labour force participation and precautionary savings in the presence of risks of being fired or failing to secure a job offer when out of the labour market. We use a finite horizon framework with two employment states and a stage utility function which is CARA in consumption but non-separable in leisure. The results are that there is precautionary labour force participation: employment risk lowers the reservation wage; generally it also reduces consumption. However due to the non-separability assumption, precautionary savings, as usually defined, may not be positive. We characterize the reservation wage and contrast the results with those in which the stage utility is additive in leisure and consumption. We extend the analysis to study the effects of cyclical variation in employment risk, of stochastic future wage rates, and of adding a third employment state of search.     

Increasing urban wage inequality in China

Two strictly comparable cross‐section household datasets, relating to 1988 and 1995, are used to analyse the increase in wage inequality from an initially low level in urban China over this period of labour market reform. The institutional background and the evolution of policy are described. The rapid growth of wage inequality and the sharp widening of wage structure are quantified. Earnings functions are compared, and the increase in both the level and the inequality of wages are decomposed into their constituent elements. Quantile regression analysis is conducted to throw light on the relationships between the observed and the unobserved determinants of wages. Distinctions are made between the variables likely to represent human capital, discrimination, and segmentation. The evidence suggests that productive characteristics were increasingly rewarded as marketization occurred, but that discrimination and segmentation also grew. The move towards a fully‐fledged labour market was by no means complete.     

Employment Protection Versus Flexicurity: On Technology Adoption in Unionised Firms*

We analyse how different labour‐market institutions – employment protection versus ‘flexicurity’– affect technology adoption in unionised firms. We consider trade unions’ incentives to oppose or endorse labour‐saving technology and firms’ incentives to invest in such technology. Increased flexicurity – interpreted as less employment protection and a higher reservation wage for workers – unambiguously increases firms’ incentives for technology adoption. If unions have some direct influence on technology, a higher reservation wage also makes unions more willing to accept technological change. Less employment protection has the opposite effect, as this increases the downside (job losses) of labour‐saving technology.     

The Male-Female Pay Gap Driven by Coupling between Labor Markets and Mating Markets

Synopsis Males often get paid more than females for the same work. This male-female pay gap has been observed throughout the world over many years. The most commonly cited explanations focus on gender oppression and workplace discrimination. We agree that discrimination contributes significantly to the pay gap; however, other factors may play important roles in how the sexes compete in the labor market. We use observations from psychology and concepts from biology to show how aspects of mate choice may influence labor markets. With a mathematical model, we analyze how mating preferences for partner wages affect the differences in wages between males and females, and in turn how wage differences affect mating preferences. If some extrinsic force, such as discrimination, creates an initial bias in wages, then coupled feedback between mating preferences and wages creates and maintains excess mating preference and wage biases. This model demonstrates how coupling between labor markets and mating markets can lead to outcomes that do not occur when analyzing either market in isolation from the other.     

GENDER DISCRIMINATION ESTIMATION IN A SEARCH MODEL WITH MATCHING AND BARGAINING*

This article develops a search model of the labor market with matching, bargaining, and employers' taste discrimination in which—under necessary but standard distributional assumption—it is possible to separately identify gender discrimination and unobserved productivity differences. The equilibrium shows that both prejudiced and unprejudiced employers wage discriminate. Maximum likelihood estimates on CPS data indicate that half of the employers are prejudiced, average female productivity is 6.5% lower, and two‐third of the gender earning differential may be explained by prejudice. An affirmative action policy is implemented resulting in a redistribution of welfare from men to women at no cost for employers' welfare.     

Market wages,reservation wages,and retirement decisions

The paper is an empirical cross-section study of the retirement decisions of American white men between the ages of 58 and 67, predicated on the theoretical notion that an individual retires when his reservation wage exceeds his market wage. Reservation wages are derived from an explicit utility function in which the most critical taste parameter is assumed to vary both systematically and randomly across individuals. Market wages are derived from a standard wage equation adjusted to the special circumstances of older workers. The two equations are estimated jointly by maximum likelihood, which takes into account the potential selectivity bias inherent in the model (low-wage individuals tend to retire and cease reporting their market wage). The model is reasonably successful in predicting retirement decisions, and casts serious doubt on previous claims that the social security system induces many workers to retire earlier than they otherwise would. The normal effects of aging (on both market and reservation wages) and the incentives set up by private pension plans are estimated to be major causes of retirement.     

Multiple Equilibria and Minimum Wages in Labor Markets with Informational Frictions and Heterogeneous Production Technologies*

It is often argued that a mandatory minimum wage is binding only if the wage density displays a spike at it. In this article, we analyze a model with search frictions and heterogeneous production technologies, in which imposition of a minimum wage affects wages even though, after imposition, the lowest wage in the market exceeds the minimum wage. The model has multiple equilibria as a result of the fact that the reservation wage of the unemployed and the lowest production technology in use affect each other. Imposition of a minimum wage may improve social welfare.     

Equilibrium unemployment with outsourcing and wage solidarity under labour market imperfections

We evaluate the effects of outsourcing and wage solidarity on wage formation and equilibrium unemployment in a heterogeneous labour market, where wages are determined by a monopoly labour union. We find that outsourcing promotes the wage dispersion between the high- and low-skilled workers. When the labour union adopts a solidaristic wage policy, it will dampen this tendency. Further, higher outsourcing will increase equilibrium unemployment among the high-skilled workers, whereas it will reduce it among the low-skilled workers. Overall, outsourcing will reduce economy-wide equilibrium unemployment under the reasonable condition that the proportion of high-skilled workers is sufficiently low.     

THE MINIMUM WAGE, WAGE SUBSIDIES, AND POVERTY

In an attempt to augment the lowest wages, the United States and several other countries utilize legal minimum wages. However, the minimum wage has potentially adverse employment effects. The analysis here suggests that an alternative policy that combines a minimum wage and a wage subsidy is superior to either by itself. Such a combination can assist the low wage worker, avoid disemployment effects, and maximize market efficiency.     

Search and Knightian uncertainty

Suppose that “uncertainty” about labor market conditions has increased. Does this change induce an unemployed worker to search longer, or shorter? This paper shows that the answer is drastically different depending on whether an increase in “uncertainty” is an increase in risk or that in true uncertainty in the sense of Frank Knight. We show in a general framework that, while an increase in risk (the mean-preserving spread of the wage distribution that the worker thinks she faces) increases the reservation wage, an increase in Knightian uncertainty (a decrease in her confidence about the wage distribution) reduces it.