Determinants of hedge fund performance during ‘good’ and ‘bad’ economic periods

We analyse the drivers of hedge fund performance, focusing simultaneously on fund size, age, lockup period, fund strategies, business cycles and different market conditions, dealing with the omitted variable bias. We use exogenous break points and a switching Markov model to endogenously determine different market conditions. We find that HFs deliver positive alpha only during “good” times, irrespective of their fundamentals. During “bad” times, they minimise their systematic risk. Small and young funds, and those with redemption restrictions deliver higher alpha compared to their peers during “good” times. Finally, specific strategies deliver significantly negative alpha during “bad” times.     

Are mutual funds sitting ducks?

We find that patient traders profit from the predictable, flow-induced trades of mutual funds. In anticipation of a 1%-of-volume change in mutual fund flows into a stock next quarter, the institutions in the same 13F category as hedge funds trade 0.29–0.45% of volume in the current quarter. A third of the trading is associated with the subset of 504 identified hedge funds. The effect is stronger when quarterly mutual fund portfolio disclosure is required and among hedge funds with more patient capital. A one standard deviation higher measure of anticipatory trading by a hedge fund is associated with a 0.9% higher annualized four-factor alpha. A one standard deviation higher measure of anticipation of a mutual fund's trades by institutions is associated with a 0.07–0.15% lower annualized four-factor alpha. The effect is stronger for more constrained mutual funds.     

Highwaymen or heroes: Should hedge funds be regulated?: A survey

There are increasing calls for the regulation of hedge funds, both for consumer protection and systemic reasons. We argue that the consumer protection arguments for direct regulation are not convincing, but find that the systemic concerns are sufficiently serious to warrant some forms of regulation. Existing regulatory methods, disclosure and activity restrictions, are unsuitable for hedge funds. Any future regulation must reduce the likelihood and potential costs of the failure of systemically important hedge funds while at the same time preserving the wider market benefits of hedge funds’ ongoing activities.     

Arbitrage crashes and the speed of capital

The imminent failure of prime brokers during the 2008 financial crisis caused a sudden decrease in the leverage afforded hedge funds. This decrease resulted from the asymmetrical payoff to rehypothecation lenders—the ultimate financiers, through prime brokers, to hedge funds. Seemingly long-term debt capital became short-term capital creating a duration mismatch between left-hand side arbitrage opportunities and right-hand side liabilities. Consequently, arbitrageurs became unable to maintain similar prices of similar assets. Mispricing magnitudes, and the time required to correct them, reflect the role of arbitrageurs in maintaining accurate prices during normal times and offer an estimate of discounts at which assets transact during crises.     

Pairs trading

‘Pairs Trading’ is an investment strategy used by many Hedge Funds. Consider two similar stocks which trade at some spread. If the spread widens short the high stock and buy the low stock. As the spread narrows again to some equilibrium value, a profit results. This paper provides an analytical framework for such an investment strategy. We propose a mean-reverting Gaussian Markov chain model for the spread which is observed in Gaussian noise. Predictions from the calibrated model are then compared with subsequent observations of the spread to determine appropriate investment decisions. The methodology has potential applications to generating wealth from any quantities in financial markets which are observed to be out of equilibrium.     

Trades of the living dead: Style differences, style persistence and performance of currency fund managers

We make use of a new database on daily currency fund manager returns over a three-year period, 2005–2008. This higher frequency data allows us to estimate both alpha measures of performance and beta style factors on a yearly basis, which in turn allows us to test for persistence. We find no evidence to support alpha persistence; a manager’s alpha in one year is not significantly related to his alpha in the prior year. On the other hand, there is substantial evidence for style persistence; funds that rely on carry, trend or value trading or with a long/short bias toward currency volatility are likely to maintain that style in the following year. In addition, we are able to examine the performance of managers that survive through the entire sample period, versus those that drop out. We find significant differences in both the investment styles of living versus deceased funds, as well as their realized alpha performance measures. We conjecture that both style differences and ineffective market timing, rather than market conditions, have impacted performance outcomes and induced some managers to close their funds.     

The role of a large trader in a dynamic currency attack model

This paper studies the role of a large trader in a dynamic currency attack model based on Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), who study stock market bubbles and crashes in a dynamic model with a continuum of rational small traders. We introduce a large trader into their model and apply it to currency attacks. In an attack against a fixed exchange rate regime with a gradually overvalued currency, traders lack common knowledge about the time when the overvaluation starts and need to coordinate to break a peg. Both the inability of traders to synchronize their attack and their incentive to time the collapse of the regime lead to the persistent overvaluation of the currency. We find that the presence of a large trader with perfect information induces small traders to attack sooner and leads to an accelerated collapse of the regime. But the presence of a large trader with noisy information may delay the collapse of the regime ex post. Moreover, a large trader with precise information tends to be at the rear of an attack. With noisy information, he could attack earlier or later than small traders. In both cases, the large trader affects market dynamics of the attack substantially.     

A fully parametric approach to return modelling and risk management of hedge funds

This paper examines the empirical properties of hedge fund returns and proposes a fully parametric model capable of adequately describing both univariate and multivariate return properties. The suggested model is based on the multivariate extension of the Normal Inverse Gaussian (NIG) distribution and will be shown to be capable of capturing the characteristic distributional features of hedge fund returns. Drawing on recent research in the area of Generalized Hyperbolic distributions and their calibration, we will elaborate on the application of the NIG-model for risk management purposes, and highlight the differences between the NIG and the Gaussian model.      

Blessing or curse? Government funding of deposit insurance and corporate lending

A key policy to limit the possibility of bank runs is an explicit deposit insurance scheme, which can be either privately or government funded. Using syndicated loans from 63 countries during the period 1985–2016, we study the effect of government involvement in deposit insurance funding on price and non-price characteristics of loans. We show that changes from purely private-funded to either government-funded or jointly funded deposit insurance increase all-in-spread-drawn by approximately 4.6 %, further increase loan fees, decrease loan maturity, and increase the use of performance pricing provisions. Our findings are consistent with the moral hazard problem behind government-funded deposit insurance schemes.     

Performance measurement of hedge funds using data envelopment analysis

Data envelopment analysis (DEA) is a nonparametric method from the area of operations research that measures the relationship of produced outputs to assigned inputs and determines an efficiency score. This efficiency score can be interpreted as a performance measure in investment analysis. Recent literature contains intensive discussion of using DEA to measure the performance of hedge funds, as this approach yields some advantages compared to classic performance measures. This paper extends the current discussion in three aspects. First, we present different DEA models and analyze their suitability for hedge fund performance measurement. Second, we systematize possible inputs and outputs for DEA and again examine their suitability for hedge fund performance measurement. Third, two rules are developed to select inputs and outputs in DEA of hedge funds. Using this framework, we find a completely new ranking of hedge funds compared to classic performance measures and compared to previously proposed DEA applications. Thus, we propose that classic performance measures should be supplemented with DEA based on the suggested rules to fully capture hedge fund risk and return characteristics.      

A unique view of hedge fund derivatives usage: Safeguard or speculation?

We study the common equity and equity option positions of hedge fund investment advisors over the 1999–2006 period. We find that hedge funds' stock positions predict future returns and that option positions predict both volatility and returns on the underlying stock. A quarterly tracking portfolio of stocks based on publicly observable hedge fund option holdings earns abnormal returns of 1.55% through the end of the quarter. Net of fees, hedge funds using options deliver higher benchmark-adjusted portfolio returns and lower risk than nonusers. The results suggest that hedge fund positions reflect significant timing and selectivity skill.     

Empty voting and the efficiency of corporate governance

We model corporate voting outcomes when an informed trader, such as a hedge fund, can establish separate positions in a firm's shares and votes (empty voting). The positions are separated by borrowing shares on the record date, hedging economic exposure, or trading between record and voting dates. We find that the trader's presence can improve efficiency overall despite the fact that it sometimes ends up selling to a net short position and then voting to decrease firm value. An efficiency improvement is likely if other shareholders’ votes are not highly correlated with the correct decision or if it is relatively expensive to separate votes from shares on the record date. On the other hand, empty voting will tend to decrease efficiency if it is relatively inexpensive to separate votes from shares and other shareholders are likely to vote the right way.