当前美联储货币政策工具简介

2007年8月次贷危机爆发以来,美联储又陆续推出拍卖式融资便利（TAF）、主经纪商融券便利（TSLF）、主经纪商融资便利（PDCF）等货币政策工具向市场注入流动性。该文通过对联储货币政策操作层面较为细致的分析,详细介绍了美联储所推出的创新型货币政策工具,廓清相关事件的内在联系,并对政策背后的真实含义进行探究。     

美联储创新型货币政策工具——基于机制安排的视角

金融危机管理中,美联储对创新型货币政策工具的运用在缓解金融市场流动性方面发挥了重要作用。然而,创新型工具的运用也带来了新的问题。本文在介绍美联储创新型货币政策工具的同时提出了新工具可能引发的若干问题,在此基础上从机制安排的角度分析了美联储的对策。     

美联储应对疫情的直达性货币政策工具研究

本文梳理了自2020年3月份以来美联储为应对新冠肺炎疫情采取直达性的货币政策工具,并以其中主街贷款为例,详细分析其通过具体条款、借款人资格限制、利率定价等方式圈定目标企业的范围,促进资金流入实体经济,分析研究发现:美联储系列直达性货币政策工具,一定程度上行使了"准财政"职能,核心目的在于通过短期内大量流动性对冲防止疫情...     

金融危机中美联储的货币政策工具创新及启示

2007年8月美国次贷危机爆发以来,美联储针对金融动荡、信贷收缩和经济减速在常规货币政策的基础上采用了一系列诸如TAF、PDCF、TSLF、AMLF等货币政策工具创新,向金融市场注入流动性。这些货币政策工具的创新和应用对提供额外流动性,稳定市场信心,改善金融市场功能起到了一定的作用,也给其他国家中央银行实施货币政策、进行货币政策工具创新提供了借鉴。     

美联储货币政策工具变量对有效利率的影响

本文使用了结构向量自回归模型对2003年1月-2012年10月美国次贷危机前后美联储基础货币供给量、存款准备金月度余额和公开市场业务对美联储有效利率的影响进行了实证分析。经过模型实证分析可知,美联储这三大基础货币工具的变动对美联储有效利率的影响方向和力度都发生了变化,这些变化正说明美国经济目前已经进入"流动性陷阱"当中,同时金融机构的"惜贷"较为严重,美联储在次贷危机之后的公开市场业务是有效的。     

美联储应对疫情货币政策评述

为应对前所未有的疫情冲击,美联储综合运用利率、公开市场操作、资产购买、流动性支持等常规和非常规货币政策工具来稳定金融市场和支持实体经济.美联储非常规货币政策工具的运用呈现出资产负债规模大幅增长、直接支持经济的职能大幅扩充、与财政政策联系更为紧密等特点.美联储应对疫情的货币政策尽管取得了短期成效,但同时面临理论支撑不足、...     

美联储应对次贷危机的货币政策工具

在次贷危机的应对中，美联储的货币政策激进、灵活，与正常时期的渐进主义策略大相径庭。文章在对次贷危机以来美联储的货币政策操作进行梳理的基础上，研究美联储应对危机的货币政策机理，发现在危机时期，美联储始终坚持其担负的目标，货币政策体现为及时的、决定性的和灵活的。最后，文章探讨了美联储的危机时期政策对我国央行货币政策操作的启示。     

美联储退出非传统货币政策的工具选择与影响

文章在提炼非传统货币政策定义和回顾美联储实践的基础上,分析了菲传统货币政策退出进程中的工具选择,强调退出的总体规划、时机、力度选择的重要性,进而分析退出非传统政策对美国、其他发达经济体、新兴经济体以及中国可能带来的风险。     

新货币政策工具SLF的现实意义

11月6H,央行网站在货币政策工具栏目新增一项“常备借贷便利（StanclingLendlngFacility,SLF）”。     

金融危机前后的美联储货币政策调控方式演变

2008年国际金融危机前后,美联储的货币政策调控方式发生了明显变化.从金融危机之前准备金短缺下的公开市场操作调控转变为金融危机之后准备金充裕下的利率走廊与公开市场操作相结合的调控方式.本文详细分析了危机前后美联储货币政策调控方式的变化情况,这对于理解和预测未来美联储货币政策调控具有重要意义.     

Federal Reserve financial crisis lending programs and bank stock returns

We use an E-GARCH model to estimate the wealth effects of Federal Reserve lending during the financial crisis to Investment banks (I-Banks), “Too Big to Fail” (TBTF) banks, and “traditional” commercial banks. Borrowing from the Term Auction Facility program has negative wealth effects for all banks and I-banks in particular. We also find that the market view of the liquidity programs changed across the sample sub-periods. I-Bank and TBTF bank borrowing from the discount window is initially viewed positively, however continued use of the discount window and the Term Auction Facility was generally (though not universally) viewed negatively. Commercial Paper Funding Facility program participation is consistently positive only for traditional banks and programs that focus on the purchase of specific securities (e.g., commercial paper) to address specific problems also appear to primarily benefit traditional banks. The inconsistency of results across the time periods of the crisis is telling as market participants struggled to discern what access to these programs meant.     

美国货币市场与联储救市政策工具的实施效果

金融危机爆发后,美国货币市场流动性几近枯竭,为重启和恢复货币市场功能,美联储新增多种政策工具向金融机构提供了大量流动性。该文重点分析了这些政策工具的设计意图及实施效果,指出实施救助后,美国货币市场运行趋于正常,但除短期国债市场外,其他子市场的融资量尚未恢复到危机前水平;美国货币市场的表现再现了美国实体经济的问题,而要解决这些问题,单靠联储的货币政策是远远不够的。     

The impact of monetary policy announcements on the stock price of large European banks during the financial crisis

Since 2007, the European Central Bank responded decisively to the challenges posed by the global financial crisis, reducing key policy interest rates to unprecedented low levels and intervening with non-standard policy measures (i.e., monetary easing and liquidity provision). This paper aims to assess the impact of ECB monetary policy announcements on the stock price of large European banks. As a first step, an event study is conducted in order to measure cumulated abnormal returns (CARs) around the announcements over June 2007–June 2013; the second step is a regression analysis aimed at identifying the determinants of CARs. Results show that banks were more sensitive to non-conventional measures than to interest rate decisions, and that the same type of intervention may have a different impact depending on the stage of the crisis. In addition, banks with weaker balance sheets and operating with high-risk were more sensitive to monetary policy interventions.     

O.M.W. Sprague (the man who “wrote the book” on financial crises) and the founding of the Federal Reserve

O.M.W. Sprague was America's leading expert on financial crises when America was debating establishing the Federal Reserve. His History of Crises under the National Banking System is the most enduring intellectual legacy of the National Monetary Commission; a still frequently cited classic. Since the Commission recommended a central bank, and its recommendation after some modifications became the Federal Reserve System, it might be assumed that Sprague was a strong supporter of establishing a central bank. But he was not. Initially, Sprague favored far more limited reforms, a position that he did not abandon until the Federal Reserve became a fait accompli. Here I discuss the sources of Sprague's opposition to a central bank and the relationship of that opposition to his understanding of the history and structure of the American banking system at the turn of the nineteenth century.     

Monetary policy and financial stability: What role for the futures market?

This paper examines interactions between monetary policy and financial stability. There is a general view that central banks smooth interest rate changes to enhance the stability of financial markets. But might this induce a moral hazard problem, and induce financial institutions to maintain riskier portfolios, the presence of which would further inhibit active monetary policy? Hedging activities of financial institutions, such as the use of interest rate futures and swap markets to reduce risk, should further protect markets against consequences of unforeseen interest rate changes. Thus, smoothing may be both unnecessary and undesirable. The paper shows by a theoretical argument that smoothing interest rates may lead to indeterminacy of the economy's rational expectations equilibrium. Nevertheless, our empirical analysis supports the view that the Federal Reserve smoothes interest rates and reacts to interest rate futures. We add new evidence on the importance for policy of alternative indicators of financial markets stress.