On the welfare implications of firing costs

This is a paper on the theory of institutions. It provides a rationale for the presence of firing costs in OECD countries based on a market failure that takes the form of an externality. Workers have firm-specific and industry-specific skills, and in each period there is a nonzero probability that a worker quits. The quitting probability makes the private discount rate (used by firms in making decisions about firing workers) higher than the social discount rate. This generates a “quitting externality”, where firms lay off too many workers in a recession. Firms are too quick to dispose of their human capital in a cyclical downturn because it is of less value to them than it is to society. State-mandated redundancy payments become a second-best remedy to overcome the market failure.     

A model of banknote discounts

Prior to 1863, state-chartered banks in the United States issued notes—dollar-denominated promises to pay specie to the bearer on demand. Although these notes circulated at par locally, they usually were quoted at a discount outside the local area. These discounts varied by both the location of the bank and the location where the discount was being quoted. Further, these discounts were asymmetric across locations, meaning that the discounts quoted in location A on the notes of banks in location B generally differed from the discounts quoted in location B on the notes of banks in location A. Also, discounts generally increased when banks suspended payments on their notes. In this paper we construct a random matching model to qualitatively match these facts about banknote discounts. To attempt to account for locational differences, the model has agents that come from two distinct locations. Each location also has bankers that can issue notes. Banknotes are accepted in exchange because banks are required to produce when a banknote is presented for redemption and their past actions are public information. Overall, the model delivers predictions consistent with the behavior of discounts.     

Bundled discounts: Strategic substitutes or complements?

Bundled discounts by pairs of otherwise independent firms play an increasingly important role as a strategic tool in several industries. Given that prices of firms competing for the same consumers are strategic complements, one would expect their discounts levels also to be strategic complements. However, in this paper we show that under some circumstances bundled discounts may be strategic substitutes. This occurs under vertically differentiated products where a low quality pair of producers may indeed prefer to lower its discount after an increase in the discount offered by a high quality pair of producers.     

Alberta and the 200-year present

This article was written as background for a presentation to the conference “Reflections on Caring,” held in Edmonton, Alberta, from April 28 to May 1, 1986, under the auspices of Edmonton Catholic School Services. In it, I tried to summarize what seemed to me the more important long-term influences on Alberta's future in general and of one of its social institutions in particular. Some might be surprised by the relatively little space allocated to energy markets, given Alberta's extreme dependence on the petroleum industry. The deemphasis of this subject was deliberate and was driven by a desire to talk about values, rather than economics, to an audience for whom values are the more important subject. I also chose the emphasis on values because in our day and age they are so seldom discussed. We rely in our discussions of public policy so much on the “value- free” social sciences that we have quite lost sight of the crucial role that values play in determining what are public issues and how they should be discussed and addressed. More particularly, we have lost sight of the value set that underlies the sciences, social and otherwise, and in consequence we have lost our ability to be discriminating in our choice of subjects to which the sciences are capable of rendering a useful answer. I would argue that that value set is no longer a reliable guide for the future—that it identifies the wrong issues and cannot deal with the real ones even if it could identify them. In one sense, the article is an attempt to justify that viewpoint, although I did not set out to write the article with that in mind.     

What crises could teach us about complexity and systemic management: The case of the Nestucca oil spill

In this article we attempt to uncover some systemic management principles for the better management of complex issues. Taking a pragmatic approach we have expanded the case methodology proposed by John Dewey to the case study of a major crisis. By proposing that crises allow for a better apprehension of complexity, we study the changes which were carried out or not, to this day, after the 1988 Nestucca oil spill that occurred in Canada only three months prior to the Exxon-Valdez disaster. After conducting a linear and systemic analysis of the crisis, we propose that the changes institutionalized thus far spring mostly from what we call “behavioral” and “paradigmatic” learning which are weak for addressing complex issues. Proposing that 15% of the people we have interviewed where able to derive a “systemic learning” from this crisis, we suggest several unlocking strategies that allow these systemic lessons to be institutionalized.     

Can Japan succeed in “Chigyo-ka” (intelprise-formation)?

There are two aspects in today's information revolution that started in the late 1970s. The first is an aspect referred to as “the third industrial revolution,” which triggers the transition to the “21st century system of Industrialization.” The information revolution in this sense brings the creation of new “breakthrough industries (new multimedia industries).” And the second aspect of the information revolution possesses the characteristics of both a technological revolution and a social revolution and brings about the arrival of the third phase of the historical evolutionary process of the modern civilization, which proceeds through three phases, namely “militarization, industrialization, and then informatization.”If the bearers of modern industrialization are a “group of enterprises” that have been engaged in the race in order to gain “wealth” (generalized means of exchange/exploitation power), and if these enterprises' activities have been exercised in the world market where their products have been sold, then it is appropriate to call the bearers of informatization a “group of intelprises.” They will be engaged in the race to gain “wisdom” (generalized means of persuasion/induction power), then stages of their activities can be called a “global intelplace” where “sharables,” that is, information and knowledge, will be disseminated. And now, toward the 21st century, the third phase of modernization, which can be called the “informatization/intelprise formation” or the “wisdom game” (intellectualism), is about to begin.Japan's “ie society (a society based on the ie principle—literally, it means “house” but here it is interpreted as cultural principle for organizing a society), which has been going through the process of evolution on the Japan Archipelago, has developed a network-based organization with little stratification within its infrastructure. In this sense, Japanese society can be characterized as a “network-oriented society” in which intelprises and an intelplace in the broad sense have functioned as the essential components of the society since Middle Ages. In general, an intelplace and intelprises that operate actively within this framework serve as the flexible bases for different types of social relations and institutions, such as states and markets and eventually integrate these into the society to a certain extent. In fact, it took place quite regularly during the modernization “in the narrow sense,” or Westernization of Japanese society after the Meiji Restoration. There exist some problems, however. Some of the characteristics found in Japanese society may become obstacles to activities aimed at the sharing and promotion of information and knowledge in the global intelplace and Japanese participation in the “wisdom game.” Badly needed are serious efforts for Japanese intelprise-formation to reduce these obstacles as much as possible.     

Tax tilting and politics: Some theory and evidence for Latin America

A government budget deficit can exist for at least two possible reasons: tax smoothing and/or tax tilting. Under tax-smoothing, deficits are temporary phenomena resulting from the decision not to vary the tax rate in response to fluctuations in government spending (as a share of output). This is done in order to minimize the distortionary cost of taxes. Tax tilting occurs whenever the government has an incentive to discount the losses to society from taxes at a higher rate than society discounts them; hence it delays taxes or advances spending introducing an upward trend in total government debt. This paper develops a model that implies that tax-tilting tends to increase with political risk. An increase in political risk, measured by the probability of losing power, increases the rate at which the government discounts the future, causing government policy to be relatively more myopic. Hence it delays taxes or advances spending and its deficit increases. Using data from a panel of 19 Latin-American countries for the period 1984–2009, the paper presents estimation results that strongly support the proposition that an increase in political risk increases the degree of tax-tilting.     

The evolution of socio-economic modeling in Canada

For the past 15 years the authors have been associated with a research program concerned with the development of structural economic models that had their origins in the input-output models of Leontief. This program has produced a set of conceptual tools embracing a new approach to socio-economic modeling which we term the “design approach.” This approach draws on general systems theory and control theory in application to large social systems. Also emerging from this program as its test prototype is a particular set of models designed for society wide resource analysis and a set of software tools within which design approach models can be designed, implemented, and operated. The design approach provides a new method of assessing technologies in regard to their overall socio-economic resource impact. The objective of this paper is to describe the unique institutional setting and the particular issues which provided the setting and the motivation for embarking on a large scale modeling program. The paper is organized chronologically, describing first of all the evolution of the program approach, the software tools, the Socio-Economic Resource Framework (SERF), which is the prototype set of models that have been implemented, and some results obtained from it.     

Punishment paths and cartel size

Using a ‘Dominant-group-fringe’ model, we show that the choice of a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) punishment path in the event that unilateral defection occurs depends upon the common discount parameter, and that when the discount parameter is given the punishment path may depend upon the size of the dominant group. The choice of punishment path is thus endogenous. A striking result is that only for sufficiently small dominant groups in sufficiently small industries are there cases where costs affect these choices. Consequently, costs are irrelevant to the choice of punishment in industries with a large number of firms.     

An institutional approach to national development planning

The increasingly turbulent and unstable international environment requires new approaches to development planning. Current methods need to be reformulated, perhaps by employing an “institutional approach.” Three possible directions are discussed: the need to enlarge the scope of anticipatory decisions covered by the planning process; the need to reinterpret and redefine the concept of the planning horizon, transcending the limitations of the distinctions between short-, medium-, and long-term planning; and the imperative of dispersing planning capabilities throughout society.     

Contracts and externalities: How things fall apart

A single principal interacts with several agents, offering them contracts. The crucial assumption of this paper is that the outside-option payoffs of the agents depend positively on how many uncontracted or “free” agents there are. We study how such a principal, unwelcome though he may be, approaches the problem of contract provision to agents when coordination failure among the latter group is explicitly ruled out. Two variants are considered. When the principal cannot re-approach agents, there is a unique equilibrium, in which contract provision is split up into two phases. In phase 1, simultaneous offers at good (though varying) terms are made to a number of agents. In phase 2, offers must be made sequentially, and their values are “discontinuously” lower: they are close to the very lowest of all the outside options. When the principal can repeatedly approach the same agent, there is a multiplicity of equilibria. In some of these, the agents have the power to force delay. They can hold off the principal's overtures temporarily, but they must succumb in finite time. In both models, despite being able to coordinate their actions, agents cannot resist an “invasion” by the principal and hold to their best payoff. It is in this sense that “things [eventually] fall apart”.     

Theories of choice under risk: Insights from financial markets

To date, the plausibility of theories of choice under risk hinges are mainly on experimental evidence. This paper devises and implements an approach amenable of assessing the performance of three families of models (expected utility, rank-dependent expected utility, and the cumulative prospect theory) using information from financial asset markets. Our findings unequivocally support reference-point dependence, diminishing marginal sensitivity, loss aversion, and nonlinear weighting of (gain and loss) physical probabilities. The empirical observations are found to be robust to, inter alia, the parameterization of the utility and probability weighting functions, “day-of-the-week effects”, the choice of a reference point, and the introduction of possible, low-probability market crashes (peso component).     

Structure and understanding: Some observations on current activities in the field of structural modeling

Structural modeling has been under study in recent years as a method for dealing with complex societal problems, and is growing in acceptance as a tool for understanding complex social phenomena. Structural models demonstrate the interactions of the separate elements of a system and their combined overall effect. Thus, the nature of the problem for which this method of analysis is appropriate is different from complex problems of the traditional disciplines which lend themselves to reductionist approaches. This is because complex policy problems of society cannot be “solved” with precise analysis. Kenneth Boulding suggests that there are two ways to cope with a complex policy problem, either to “slice” the problem into partial equilibrium sections or “squeeze” it by aggregating numerous variables into a single index or macho variable. Structural modeling is an approach which comes under the general strategy of squeezing the problem and is promising because of the ability to include a range of macro variables which provide insights about social change. The articles in this issue treat several interesting aspects of this approach. In this article we wish to recall for consideration a central purpose for developing such methods. We have taken a historical approach to indicate some of the roots of the concern for the effect of technological process on social change. Within this context, we discuss the nature of the contributions made by the articles in this issue and what promise the methods offer to addressing the historical concern.     

Convex Time Budgets and Individual Discount Rates in the Long Run

The purpose of this study is to use experimental data to estimate individual discount rates and test for hyperbolic discounting over a long time horizon. To do this, we employ the convex time budget experimental approach with cash payments over a 20 year time horizon. To date, there are few experimental studies that explore discount rates beyond a 1 year time horizon. Previous experimental studies that focus on short time horizons find high discount rates, which may not be applicable to decisions that affect outcomes in the distant future. Our findings are quite similar to the average rate of 4.9% found by Grijalva et al. (Environ Resour Econ 59:39–63, 2014), who similarly use a 20 year time horizon, but use the multiple price list elicitation method along with payment via government savings bonds. We find annual discounts rates in the range of 1.9–5.5%, depending on the specific model used. We also find evidence for declining discount rates, and that this hyperbolic pattern of behavior is related to the confidence subjects have in receiving distant-future payments.     

Optimal redistricting under geographical constraints: Why “pack and crack” does not work

We show that optimal partisan redistricting with geographical constraints is a computationally intractable (NP-complete) problem. In particular, even when voter's preferences are deterministic, a solution is generally not obtained by concentrating opponent's supporters in “unwinnable” districts (“packing”) and spreading one's own supporters evenly among the other districts in order to produce many slight marginal wins (“cracking”).     

中国的社会团体、公民社会和国家组合主义：有争议的领域

20世纪90年代中期以来学术界展开了一场争论：一派认为,应该用公民社会概念来研究中国团体;另一派通过调查研究认为,中国几乎所有团体的生活在本质上是国家组合主义。公民社会和组合主义都关注国家和社会之间的社团和其他机构。但不同的是：公民社会站在社会的角度,发展自治社团,维护“公共领域”的能力,以界定和制约国家权力;组合主义则相反,从国家的角度,为实现政府自己的目的,与选定的社团发展一种特殊的关系。在深入细致的实证研究基础上,学者们考察了中国不同类型社团的活动,得出了不同的结论,同时他们也超越了国家、社会和组合主义以及公民社会的框架,阐明了别的一系列重要的问题。