中国股市隐性交易成本影响因素分析

在电子指令驱动的交易制度下,中国股票价格、市场深度、知情交易概率、信息冲击、股价波动和买卖指令的不平衡性,都是影响隐性交易成本的因素;中国股市流动性、波动性和有效性,都对隐性交易成本产生影响,即流动性差、有效性低、波动性高会导致隐性交易成本增大.这一结论从实证上得到了验证.因此,隐性交易成本是衡量股票市场运行效率的一个综合性指标.     

The determinants of bilateral trade

Abstract.  In this paper we present a monopolistic competition model that incorporates asymmetric trade barriers and international differences in production costs. The model implies a highly non‐linear bilateral trade equation. Estimation of this equation yields parameters for the elasticity of substitution and trade costs that are more reasonable than those found in previous studies. A simulation indicates that trade liberalization will shift trade from rich countries to poor countries and from within continental trading partners with preferential trade agreements to intercontinental trading partners. JEL Classification: F1     

Informed manipulation

In asymmetric information models of financial markets, prices imperfectly reveal the private information held by traders. Informed insiders thus have an incentive not only to trade less aggressively but also to manipulate the market by trading in the wrong direction and undertaking short-term losses, thereby increasing the noise in the trading process. In this paper we show that when the market faces uncertainty about the existence of the insider in the market and when there is a large number of trading periods before all private information is revealed, long-lived informed traders will manipulate in every equilibrium.     

Germany's New Insider Law: The Empirical Evidence after the First Year

Abstract. This paper investigates insider trading activities in German stocks during the first year following implementation of the new Insider Law on 1 July 2002. It can be observed that insiders act as contrarian investors. They buy stocks after prices have fallen and sell stocks after prices have risen. In general, insider trades are very profitable. A typical stock purchased by an insider yields an abnormal return of almost 3 per cent during the 25 days following the transaction. In contrast, a typical stock that has been sold by insiders achieves an abnormal return of nearly −3 per cent over the same time period. Outsiders who copy the transactions of insiders can achieve nearly the same abnormal returns. Abnormal returns remain substantial even after transaction costs. The results suggest that prices of stocks in which insiders trade do not seem to be semi-strong efficient.     

卖空机制、股价信息含量与暴跌风险--基于融资融券交易的经验证据

文章利用我国逐步推出融资融券交易的自然实验机会,运用双重差分的研究设计,考察了卖空机制对股价反映负面消息效率的影响。文章以2007-2012年的数据为样本研究发现：相对于非标的股票,融资融券标的股票在成为标的之后,其股价对市场的向下波动及时做出了调整,使得股价对市场正负向波动反应之间的不对称性显著降低,表明标的股票更加及时和充分地吸收了有关公司价值的负面信息;同时,相对于非标的股票,融资融券标的标的股票在成为标的之后,其股价暴跌风险显著降低。文章结果表明,我国股市推出融资融券交易后,卖空机制提高了市场对标的股票负面消息的定价效率。     

Informed trade,uninformed trade and stock price delay

The probability of informed trading (PIN), a measure of information-based trading risk, has been broadly applied to empirical studies on asset pricing. However, it is still controversial whether PIN measures exclusively the risk of firm-specific private information or it also captures the private interpretation of market wide public information. This article examines the relevance of PIN to the delayed response of stock prices to market-wide information. We find that PIN significantly explains individual stock price delay even controlling for size, liquidity and risk, and low-PIN stock prices adjust to market information more rapidly not only because of a notably high level of informed trading but also an even much higher level of uninformed trading. Our findings support the notion that PIN also captures the private skilled interpretation of public common factor information by sophisticated investors, and provide new empirical evidence on how information-based trading affects the speed at which stock prices adjust to information.     

Liquidity Dynamics Across Small and Large Firms

In this paper, we analyse cross‐sectional heterogeneity in the time‐series variation of liquidity in equity markets. Our analysis uses a broad time‐series and cross‐section of liquidity data. We find that average daily changes in liquidity exhibit significant heterogeneity in the cross‐section; the liquidity of small firms varies more on a daily basis than that of large firms. A steady increase in aggregate market liquidity over the past decade is more strongly manifest in large firms than in small firms. Absolute stock returns are an important determinant of liquidity. We investigate cross‐sectional differences in the resilience of a firm's liquidity to information shocks. We use the sensitivity of stock liquidity to absolute stock returns as an inverse measure of this resilience, and find that the measure exhibits considerable cross‐sectional variation. Firm size, return volatility, institutional holdings, and volume are all significant cross‐sectional determinants of this measure.
(J.E.L.: D82, G10, G14).     

Intraday trade in dealership markets

We develop and test a structural asymmetric information transaction model to characterize the price impact of information when markets are thin. Since orders are accepted individually, the model allows for transaction costs and brokerage fees. Equilibrium demands mixed entry strategies on the part of potentially informed traders. Estimation of the structural parameters is performed using a maximum likelihood procedure on NYSE data. The structural model is rejected primarily because the nonlinear restrictions do not allow for sufficient correlation between price movements and pricing errors. This leads to unreasonably low estimates of the probability of informed trade relative to an unrestricted alternative. The price impact of information is found to be positive and significant, but economically small. This is because although the amount of private information is substantial, the quality of the information signals is poor, particularly in the middle of the trading day. Informed agents do not trade small quantities, which suggests that their ability to divide orders is limited by transaction costs.     

Public capital, asymmetric information, and economic growth

Abstract.  We investigate the provision of public capital in an endogenous growth model with asymmetric information. In a credit market with costly screening, we show that the equilibrium contracts are characterized by the self‐selection of borrowers. Through identifying an additional adverse effect of taxation on growth, we show that the optimal tax rate in our model is smaller than the output elasticity of public capital. Therefore, our analysis justifies a more conservative tax policy in the presence of asymmetric information. Furthermore, our model suggests a number of implications that appear to be well supported by preliminary evidence in cross‐country data. JEL classification: D82, H21, O41     

Commissions Matter: The Trading Behavior of Institutional and Individual Active Traders

We examine how commissions influence trading behavior by analyzing a unique data set of the equity trades of both individual and institutional active traders. Individual traders pay higher trading costs than institutional traders. As a result, they engage in more risky trading behaviors in order to cover these costs. Individual traders also trade significantly less because of their higher cost of trading. Individual traders tend to trade higher-priced stocks, hold their trades longer, and they experience much larger price swings than institutional traders. This leads individual traders to realize more dramatic gains and losses on their round-trips.     

Dynamic signaling and market breakdown

We consider the effects a public revelation of information (e.g. rating, grade) has on trading in a dynamic signaling model. Competing buyers offer prices to a privately informed seller who can reject them and delay trade. Delay is costly and the seller has no commitment to its duration. The external public information allows for signaling in equilibrium. More interestingly, we characterize the dynamics of trade and prices. If signals are noisy, no trade takes place just before the revelation of external information. If signals are fully revealing, then trade occurs even close to revelation, however, transaction prices are discontinuous.     

IPO股票上市初期投资者交易行为研究

区别于国内以股票价格为对象揭示IPO股票特征的研究,文章以投资者为研究对象,研究中国IPO股票上市初期机构和个人投资者的交易行为差异。IPO交易研究是目前IPO研究的一个前沿领域。文章利用沪深股市2002年IPO股票的账户交易数据建立Logistic回归模型发现,中国IPO股票上市首日的高成交量与高换手率由投资者逐利行为造成;在上市后3日的交易中,个人投资者由于资金限制和信息获取能力不足等原因,对股票收益的判断能力明显弱于机构投资者,在交易中被机构投资者所利用。     

Direct sale of information when precision is unobservable

Abstract.  This paper studies the incentives of an information seller to provide precise information when precision is not observable and investors with rational expectations can extract information from the equilibrium asset price. I show that the seller can verify her precision by employing a non‐linear contract. I derive the equilibrium fee for information as a function of the seller's incentives, the sales volume, and buyers' trading intensity. I also analyse the implications of allowing the seller to trade on her own account for truthfulness and precision choice. JEL Classification: G11, G14, D42     

Speculative dynamics

We develop a method for solving for equilibrium outcomes in stationary strategic settings in which speculators are informationally large and understand how their actions affect the information content of prices. This allows us to characterize speculation by institutional investors who receive private long-lived information on a recurring basis, and trade strategically. When the underlying asset value process has a stationary autoregressive structure, we develop a contraction mapping argument to solve for the stationary linear equilibrium. We derive analytically and numerically how the characteristics of private information—its quantity, persistence and correlation, and division among speculators—affect trading profits, pricing and trading strategies. Our central finding is that what matters for equilibrium outcomes are the most recent signals that speculators receive. Speculators trade so much more aggressively on new information than old that the bulk of their profits come from their two or three most recent private signals. Trading on past prices drops off faster yet; effectively only the most recent price matters.     

Rationally mispriced assets in equilibrium

We present a simple model of trading in a financial market where agents are asymmetrically informed and information is transmitted through the price system. We characterize the equilibrium for this economy and show that ‘rational mispricing’ of assets occurs if the price system fails to reveal the insider information accurately. It is argued that the communication of wrong information through equilibrium prices is compatible with full rationality on the part of the investors and may explain deviations from the efficient markets hypothesis.     

Rational expectations,difference of opinions and asset pricing

This article applies the concept of relative overconfidence (the measure of how heavily investors depend on others’ information) to combine the rational expectations equilibrium (REE) and difference of opinions (DO) models. And we discuss the effects of relative overconfidence on asset price efficiency and trading volume. We find that when investors hold assets to maturity, relative overconfidence has no effect on price efficiency and trading volume; however, when investors speculate, relative overconfidence reduces price informativeness and trading volume, because investors will reckon asset prices as more noisy and find it meaningless to speculate on capital gains based on their private information. Our results highlight the role of speculation in differentiating REE and DO models and influencing the effects of overconfidence.     

Market for Information and Identity Disclosure in an Experimental Open Limit Order Book

This paper analyses the effects of pre‐trade transparency on market quality in an experimental open limit order book preceded by a market for information. The design of the trading game is akin to the system in use in an increasing number of financial markets. We find that the disclosure of traders' identities reduces the incentive to acquire information, liquidity and volatility. We also show that a positive relation exists between the proportion of traders buying information and liquidity. The results are consistent with a standard model of price formation where the number of informed traders is endogenous .     

Distribution Dynamics and Cross‐Country Convergence: A New Approach

Distribution dynamics is a method for studying the evolution in time of an entire cross‐section distribution and has been initially employed to assess cross‐country convergence of per capita incomes. It has subsequently seen a widespread application in many different economic areas. When describing the law of motion of the distribution as a Markovian stochastic process, working in a discrete state‐space set up has several advantages, but the arbitrary discretisation of a continuous state‐space process has the undesired effect of removing the Markov property. This paper outlines a rigorous method for discretising a continuous state‐space Markov chain. The method is then applied to the distribution of per capita income across countries to reassess the (non‐) convergence phenomenon. It is found that the long run polarisation of per capita incomes across countries emerges even more dramatically than in previous studies.     

Trading Behavior and Asset Returns: Evidence from the Interday Serial Correlations of Intraday‐to‐Intraday Daily Returns of Taiwan

This paper sheds light on the importance of trading behavior in the determination of asset prices by examining the interday serial correlations of intraday‐to‐intraday daily returns of the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSEC). The TSEC exhibits positive serial correlation in the beginning and the end of the week and negative serial correlation in the middle of the week. The interday serial correlation is not a result of non‐synchronous trading, bid‐ask bounce in transaction price, or price limits. The serial correlation is positively related to trading volume and similar to the pattern in the US. We suggest that trading behavior seems to be an important determinant of asset prices.     

融券制度与内部人寻租——来自准自然实验的经验证据

内部人寻租一直以来是理论与实务界关心的重点,如何有效抑制内部人寻租行为是资本市场的重大课题。本文以内部人交易度量内部人寻租,分析了融券制度对内部人寻租的影响。研究发现:(1)融券制度对内部人寻租有显著抑制作用,并且融券规模越大,内部人寻租越少。(2)相比于国有企业,非国有企业当中融券制度对内部人寻租的抑制作用更加明显。本文还将内部人交易分方向进行回归,结果显示融券制度对内部人寻租的抑制作用主要体现在卖出方向上。本文进一步分析了融券制度影响内部人寻租的路径,发现“竞争效应”和“信息效应”是融券制度影响内部人寻租的两条重要路径。本文考虑了竞争性解释——分析师关注的作用,发现分析师关注并不能影响本文结论的正确性;本文还利用反面事实推断、倾向得分匹配、反向因果检验等方法,确保实证结论的稳健性。本文的研究结果,丰富了内部人寻租的特征及影响因素研究,有利于市场监管部门加强对内部人寻租行为的控制;扩充了有关融券制度的文献,为卖空制度的推行及完善提供理论依据。