From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence

We consider a sequential two-party bargaining game with uncertain information transmission. When the first mover states her demand she does only know the probability with which the second mover will be informed about it. The informed second mover can either accept or reject the offer and payoffs are determined as in the ultimatum game. Otherwise the uninformed second mover states his own demand and payoffs are determined as in the Nash demand game. In the experiment we vary the commonly known probability of information transmission. Our main finding is that first movers’ and uninformed second movers’ demands adjust to this probability as qualitatively predicted, that is, first movers’ (uninformed second movers’) demands are lower (higher) the lower the probability of information transmission. JEL Classification C72 · C78 · C92     

An experimental analysis of cooperation and productivity in the trust game

In the standard trust game the surplus is increased by the risk taking first mover while cooperation by the second mover is a one-to-one transfer. This paper reports results from experiments in which the reverse holds; the first mover’s risky trust is not productive and the second mover’s cooperation is productive. This subtle difference significantly lowers the likelihood of trust but increases the likelihood of cooperation conditional on trust. Evidence is presented that the change in trust is consistent with first movers failing to anticipate the later result. Drawing upon the analogy that the trust game represents a model of exchange, the results suggest that markets should be organized so that the buyer moves first and not the seller as in the original trust game.

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Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk

We present a model featuring irreversible investment, economies of scale, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm’s output price according to the cost structure of a hypothetical replacement firm. We show that a replacement firm has a fundamental cost advantage over the regulated firm: it can better exploit the economies of scale because it has not had to confront the historical uncertainties faced by the regulated firm. We show that setting prices so low that a replacement firm is just willing to participate is insufficient to allow the regulated firm to expect to break even whenever it has to invest. Thus, unless the regulator is willing to incur costly monitoring to ensure the firm invests, revenue must be allowed in excess of that required for a replacement firm to participate. This contrasts with much of the existing literature, which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of replacing its existing assets. We also obtain a closed-form solution for the regulated firm’s output price when this price is set at discrete intervals. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm’s owners, and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital.     

Strategic incentive in mixed oligopoly

This paper develops a two stage game model with two competing firms in a mixed oligopolistic market, a public firm and a private firm, and only the public firm giving its manager an incentive contract. The paper presents three types of public firm owner’s objective function and each objective function corresponds to three types of delegation, either of a profit-revenue type, or of a relative performance, or, finally, of a market share one. In an equilibrium, the public firm owner has a dominant strategy to reward his manager with an incentive contract combining own profits and competitor’s profits. Different from Manasakis et al. (2007), this paper suggests that the dominant strategy of the public firm owner is to reward his manager with a profit-revenue type of contract or a market-share type of contract, that is to say profit-revenue is identical with market-share. Using relative-performance type of contract will move the manager away from the owner’s true objective function when the public firm owner only pursues maximizing the social welfare. The private firm will be crowded out and the public firm is the only producer of the market. Under profits-revenues type of contract, the owner’s objective of maximizing the summation of the profit and consumer surplus leads the manager more aggressive. Different combinations give us different results. By comparing the results, each type of incentive contract is an owner’s best response to his decision.     

Imperfect legal unbundling of monopolistic bottlenecks

We study an industry with a monopolistic bottleneck supplying an essential input to several downstream firms. Under legal unbundling the bottleneck must be operated by a legally independent upstream firm, which may be partly or fully owned by an incumbent active in downstream markets. Access prices are regulated but the upstream firm can perform non-tariff discrimination. Under perfect legal unbundling the upstream firm maximizes only own profits; with imperfections it is biased and to some extent accounts also for the incumbent’s downstream profits. We show that increasing the incumbent’s ownership share increases total output if the upstream firm’s bias is sufficiently small, while otherwise effects are ambiguous. Stronger regulation that reduces the bias without changing ownership shares generally increases total output. We also endogenize the bias and show that it can depend non-monotonically on the ownership share.     

Validity of the “Principle of Maximum Product Differentiation” in a unionized mixed-duopoly

Developing a location-price spatial model in a unionized mixed-duopoly, we find that the welfare-maximizing nature of the public firm implies a lower degree of product differentiation such that, in contrast to the private duopoly, the “Principle of Maximum Product Differentiation” is not reproduced. Considering two different wage-regimes for the public firm, this paper examines the effects of wage regulation imposed on civil servants. It is shown that, when a public firm’s union is prohibited from collective bargaining, the firm is more competitive, and the degree of differentiation is less. Moreover, regulation always reduces both the private firm’s profit and the level of social welfare.     

The firm-level employment effects of innovations in high-tech US manufacturing industries

We focus on four two-digit manufacturing industries that are known for their high patenting activity. We then use Principal Components Analysis to generate a firm- and year-specific ‘innovativeness’ index by extracting the common variance in a firm’s patenting and R&D expenditure histories. To begin with, we explore the heterogeneity of firms by using semi-parametric quantile regression. We then move on to parametric regressions that include a weighted least squares (WLS) analysis, which explicitly takes into account the different job-creating potential of firms of different sizes. As a result, we investigate the effect of innovation on total number of jobs, whereas previous studies have focused on the effect of innovation on firm behavior. Indeed, previous studies have typically taken the firm as the unit of analysis, implicitly weighting each firm equally according to the principle of ‘one firm equals one observation’. Our results suggest that firm-level innovative activity leads to employment creation that may have been underestimated in previous studies.     

Why are firms sometimes unwilling to reduce costs?

This paper identifies the environments in which it does not pay for a multiproduct firm to engage in small cost reductions. Specifically, it shows that a multiproduct Bertrand firm’s profits will decrease in response to a small reduction in one product’s marginal cost if and only if the output share of the cost-reducing unit is below a threshold. Because cost reductions by a single-product firm or by a multiproduct Cournot firm always increase the firm’s profits, this result is unique to multiproduct Bertrand firms.     

The devil dwells in the tails

This paper explores firm growth rate distribution in a Gibrat’s Law context. It is novel in two respects. First, rather than limiting the analysis to a focus on the conditional mean, we investigate the entire shape of the distribution. Second, we show that differences in the firm growth rate process between large and small firms are highly circumstantial and depend on the industry dynamics. The data used include more than 9,000 Danish manufacturing, services and construction firms. We provide robust evidence indicating that firm growth studies should concentrate less on explaining means and instead focus on other parts of the firm growth rate distribution.     

Commitment and excess capacity with licensing: an old debate with a new look

The theoretical literature demonstrates that excess capacity is not an equilibrium phenomenon if each firm’s marginal revenue decreases with the competitor’s output. We show that such a conclusion can be overturned in the presence of technology licensing. We show that in the presence of technology licensing, a firm may hold excess capacity because it increases the benefit from technology licensing.     

Strategic manipulation of a pollution permit market and international trade

We consider a framework where firms which compete in an international product market are not all submitted to a pollution permit market. Using the Brander and Spencer’s framework (J Int Econ 18:83–100, 1985), we seek to determine the optimal strategies of both a dominant firm in the pollution permit market and the regulator in a such context. We first show that the dominant firm pursues a strategic manipulation to increase its profit. We also find that the regulator uses a sophisticated strategic policy to increase the domestic welfare by using two instruments: the initial allocation of pollution permits and the pollution cap.     

A Note on Market Power in an Emission Permits Market with Banking

In this paper, we investigate the effect of market power on equilibrium path of an emission permits market in which firms can bank current permits for use in later periods. In particular, we study the market equilibrium for a large (potentially dominant) firm and competitive fringe with rational expectations. We characterize the equilibrium solution for different permits allocations and discuss the large firm’s stock-holding constraints needed for credible market manipulation.     

Coevolution of product quality and consumer preferences

This paper seeks to analyze the self-reinforcing coevolutionary process of innovation on the basis of the framework of evolutionary ecology and population genetics. Particularly central to this analysis is “Fisher’s runaway process,” which explains the coevolution of product quality and consumer preference in the supply–demand context. This paper puts forward the following main points. First, we can conclude from a matching model of supply and demand that when a consumer who prefers high-quality products discovers such a product in the market, he/she will certainly purchase that product. Second, taking into account both the high survival rate of a firm that supplies a high-quality product and the cost incurred by the firm in improving product quality, we arrive at an evolutionarily stable Fisher’s process. The third point, however, considers the disutility of a consumer with an inordinately high quality preference; in this case, Fisher’s process disappears. Fourth, it is possible to recover Fisher’s process if we consider the existence of power users or the effect of the negative bias of innovation.     

Cournot competition and endogenous firm size

The paper studies the dynamics of firm size in a repeated Cournot game with unknown demand function. We model the firm as a type of artificial neural network. Each period it must learn to map environmental signals to both a demand parameter and its rival’s output choice. However, this learning game is in the background, as we focus on the endogenous adjustment of network size. We investigate the long-run evolution of firm/network size as a function of profits, rival’s size, and the type of adjustment rules used.

Optimal ownership in joint ventures with contributions of asymmetric partners

This paper addresses two questions concerning Joint Venture (JV) agreements. We first study the formation and the performance of a JV when the partners’ contribution has a different impact on the JV profits. Then, we check whether the JV is more likely as well as the welfare level improves when the decision on JV profit sharing among partners is delegated to an independent JV management (Management sharing) rather than jointly taken by partners (Coordinated sharing). We find that the firm whose effort has a higher impact on the JV’s profits should have a larger profit share. Moreover, at least in some cases, Management sharing increases both welfare and the probability that the JV is formed.      

Price cap regulation of a dominant firm facing competition

Price cap regulation is typically applied to natural monopolies operating with subadditive costs. Price caps are known to provide superior incentives for the regulated monopoly to pursue cost reduction and, in a multiservice/product context, undertake welfare enhancing price discrimination. It is well known that capping a Laspeyres index of the firm’s prices induces the monopoly to charge socially optimal “Ramsey” prices in the long run. This paper examines the suitability of the Laspeyres form of regulation when the regulated firm faces competition in the market for one of its services (outputs). We present the appropriately modified Ramsey pricing rule for the regulated dominant firm and demonstrate that capping a Laspeyres index of the dominant firm’s prices leads to prices that satisfy this pricing rule in the long run.     

A modified yardstick competition mechanism

This paper expands Shleifer’s (Rand J Econ 16:319–327, 1985) theory of yardstick competition and develops a modified yardstick competition mechanism (MYC), where the yardstick employed consists of a tariff basket and total costs. This mechanism has a significant information advantage: the regulator “only” needs to observe total costs, prices and output of all firms. The MYC mechanism can ensure a socially optimal outcome when allowing for spatial and second degree price discrimination. We also introduce regulatory lags to the model. In addition, we compare the two approaches for the case of unobserved firm heterogeneity, and provide numerical estimations of the effects. The MYC mechanism fares better in the case of unobserved heterogeneity, and may thus be a useful extension of Shleifer’s yardstick mechanism.      

Bad Eggs,Learning-by-doing,and the Choice of Technology

We model long-run economic development through technology adoption under scientific uncertainty about environmental effects. There are four possible long-run equilibria in a socially planned economy: ‘High-growth’, adopt rapidly, but abandon damaging technologies once revealed (DDT, CFCs); ‘Cautious’, brake the introduction of new technologies to avoid mistakes (genetically modified organisms); ‘No-growth’, halt technological progress to preserve secondary knowledge; and ‘Collapse’, adopt rapidly without ever abandoning damaging technologies. In the base parameterization a short-sighted social planner chooses the cautious strategy. A far-sighted planner chooses the high-growth strategy, unless damages are irreversible in which case the cautious strategy again dominates. Regulatory options in the market economy are investigated. Pollution taxes do not affect the firm’s level of precaution if they can only be applied after the adopting firm has reaped the benefits; however, they do encourage the abandonment of damaging technologies. Liability rules do affect precaution, but may lead to excessive caution, or even a no-growth trap.     

Corporate Expenditure on Environmental Protection

We examine the determinants of firm’s current environmental expenditure and firm’s capital investment in equipment for pollution control in Irish manufacturing industries using a Heckman selection model. The main determinants for the two types of expenditure are similar: larger, exporting and energy-intensive firms are more likely to spend. Being subject to environmental regulation also has an effect. Once the decision to commit resources has been taken, larger, older, foreign-owned, exporting and energy-intensive firms incur higher environmental expenditure. For the amount of capital investment only firm size and age play a role. This suggests that the economic and regulatory incentives in place are such that it is the largest and most polluting firms that do most to reduce pollution.     

Regulating a risk-averse firm under incomplete information

We examine the optimal regulatory policy for a risk-averse firm when the firm is imperfectly informed about its efficiency parameter for a project at the time of contracting. The firm’s risk aversion shifts the optimal regulatory policy from a fixed-price contract to a cost-plus contract. The optimal regulatory policy entails undereffort by an inefficient firm as in Laffont and Tirole (J Polit Econ 94(3):614–641, 1986) and the effort distortion increases as the firm becomes more risk-averse. Further, the regulator benefits from sequential contracting with the firm where the firm chooses contract terms gradually as it acquires information, albeit the benefit diminishes as the firm becomes more risk-averse.