股权激励与代理成本

传统以管理费用率作为代理成本的替代不能恰当地反映管理者在职消费和职务侵占的真实水平,本文用经过Jones模型纠正的费用率作为代理成本的替代,考察了所有权性质、总经理持股与否及持股比例对代理成本的影响。本文提供了私有制下总经理适当持股有利于降低代理成本的可靠证据,为中国上市公司即将展开的股权激励计划提供证据的支持。     

公司治理中的代理成本问题研究综述

代理成本是公司治理要解决的基本问题,公司的内部治理结构和外部环境均会对代理成本产生影响。代理成本可以解释不同国家的融资方式和宏观经济表现,应从内、外部两方面来控制代理成本。中国国有企业问题的根本症结在于多重委托代理关系,应简化这种关系,明确权利与责任。进一步研究应考察代理成本在公司层面和宏观层面的外溢效应。     

Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise

This article analyzes the effect of the cost that an agencymust incur to adopt a new regulation (the "enactment cost")on the agency's incentive to invest in expertise. The effectof the enactment cost on agency expertise depends on whetherthe agency would regulate if it fails to acquire additionalinformation about the regulation's effects. If an uninformedagency would regulate, increasing enactment costs increasesagency expertise; if an uninformed agency would retain the statusquo, increasing enactment costs decreases agency expertise.These results may influence the behavior of an uninformed overseer,such as a court or legislature, that can manipulate the agency'senactment costs. Such an overseer must balance its interestin influencing agency policy preferences against its interestin increasing agency expertise. The article discusses the implicationsof these results for various topics in institutional design,including judicial and executive review of agency regulations,structure-and-process theories of congressional oversight, nationalsecurity, criminal procedure, and constitutional law.     

Monetary Policy, Agency Costs and Output Dynamics

This paper examines the role of financial market imperfections for output reactions to nominal interest rate shocks. Empirical evidence shows a hump-shaped impulse response function of output and suggests that credit supply co-moves with output. A monetary business cycle model with staggered price setting is presented where the firms' outlays for capital and labor must be covered by the sum of net worth of entrepreneurs and loans in the form of debt contracts. These properties are shown to generate a hump-shaped impulse response of output, which takes on the smooth and persistent appearance of the empirical output response when nominal wages are set in a staggered way, too.     

媒体监督、公司治理与代理成本

文章以2001-2009年沪深两市上市公司为样本,考察了媒体监督、公司治理与代理成本之间的关系。研究发现,媒体监督能够降低企业的代理成本、提高代理效率;在降低代理成本和提高代理效率的具体问题上,媒体监督与公司内部治理机制表现出不同的作用和关系。这意味着要有效降低代理成本、提高代理效率,应当综合考虑中国当前的市场环境,结合企业具体存在的问题,配合使用不同的治理机制。     

代理成本、管理层持股与审计质量

所有权和经营权相分离的现代企业制度导致了股东和管理层之间严重的代理冲突。上市公司降低代理冲突的主要途径是激励与监督,其中,管理层持股和审计分别是内部激励和外部监督的重要方式。会计师事务所的规模和审计费用在一定程度上反映了审计质量。文章基于代理成本的角度,采用2005-2009年中国A股非金融类上市公司非平衡面板数据,运用Logistic二元逻辑回归模型和稳健最小二乘法研究了代理成本、管理层持股与审计质量之间的关系。研究发现:代理成本高的公司会寻求高质量的外部审计,倾向于聘请大规模的会计师事务所;管理层持股能起到完善公司内部治理机制的作用,减少代理冲突,从而降低公司对外部审计质量的需求。     

企业债券期限结构研究——基于交易成本和代理成本视角

发行长期债券可以降低交易成本．但债券期限越长，代理成本就越高。企业在发行新债券时必须对交易成本和代理成本进行权衡．寻求最优债券期限结构。模型证明，发行企业债券时运用提前赎回条款、卖回条款、偿偾基金条款和转换权等债券契约条款可以同时达到降低发债总成本和延长企业债券融资期限的目的。     

外部监督、股权激励与股权代理成本

基于股权代理成本角度,采用2010年中国沪深两市发行A股的非金融类上市公司截面数据,并运用最小二乘法和logistic二元逻辑回归模型,研究了外部监督、股权激励与股权代理成本之间的关系。研究发现,股权代理成本高的公司更加倾向于寻求有效的外部监督,聘请高质量的会计师事务所;股权激励并不能起到完善公司内部治理机制的作用,反而会提高股权代理成本;股权激励会提高公司对外部审计质量的要求。     

公司治理、盈余质量与经理人代理成本

高质量的会计信息有助于降低委托人与代理人之间的信息不对称,从而对公司治理产生重要影响。本文以工具变量和面板数据模型等方法考察了盈余质量对股东—经理人代理关系的影响。以应计质量为盈余质量的度量,研究发现,盈余质量高的上市公司经理人代理成本较低,盈余质量改善的上市公司经理人代理成本发生了显著下降。本文的研究结论为会计信息的公司治理效应提供了新的证据。     

装备工业的发展在我国新型工业化中的作用

党的“十六大”报告提出,在新的历史时期和经济社会条件下,我国要走一条新型的工业化道路,以实现跨越式的发展。装备工业作为物质财富的基础生产部门以及生产生产资料的部门,发展水平的高低决定着我国工业化的进程,也决定着我国新型工业化能否顺利实现。一、装备工业的发展在我国实现新型工业化中的作用装备工业作为主要为国民经济和国家安全提供技术装备的部门,一般包括普通机械制造业、专用设备制造业、交通运输设备制造业、电气机械及器材制造业、电子及通信设备制造业、仪器仪表及文化办公用机械制造业六大部门,但有的观点也认为还应包…     

An Agency Perspective on the Costs and Benefits of Privatization

This paper proposes a unified theoretical framework to discuss the costs and benefits of privatization using the recent advances of Incentive Theory. I begin by presenting a simple model in which the State (the principal) delegates a task (e.g., the production of a public good) to the private sector (the agent). I give and discuss conditions for the “Irrelevance Theorem” due to Sappington and Stiglitz [Sappington, D., & Stiglitz, J. (1987) Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 6, 567–582] to hold under complete contracting. I then show how various contract incompletenesses can make either public or private ownership optimal. Finally, I provide critical assessments of these results. I thank Patrick Rey and Wilfried Zantman for useful comments on an earlier draft. The excellent comments of two referees have also improved substantially the presentation and organization of the paper. I am deeply indebted to Denis Gromb for his extremely detailed comments.     

Dynamic Costs of the Draft

Abstract. We propose a dynamic general‐equilibrium model with human capital accumulation to evaluate the economic consequences of compulsory services (such as military draft or social work). Our analysis identifies a so far ignored dynamic cost arising from distortions in time allocation over the life cycle. We provide conservative estimates for the excess burden that arises when the government relies on forced labor rather than on income taxation to finance public expenditures. Our results suggest that eliminating the draft could produce considerable dynamic gains, both in terms of GDP and lifetime utility.     

交易成本与西部经济的发展

实施西部开发是解决中国区域经济发展不平衡问题的一项重大举措,但目前东西部的差距在进一步增大,西部经济发展面临着诸多障碍,交易成本高昂是其中一项重要原因,降低交易成本是促进西部经济快速发展的重要路径。     

Adaptive Economic Models

The growth literature has identified four channels of transmission by which the abundance of natural resources can negatively affect economic growth. In this article, I suggest ideology as a fifth transmission channel. To test this hypothesis, I exploit the geography of Bolivia whose western regions have natural resources that differ considerably from its eastern regions. I find that regions with predominantly extractive natural resources tend to choose redistributive and interventionist rather than laissez-faire policies. Additionally, I identify two effects on growth depending upon the type of natural resource that a region possesses in abundance.     

家族企业高管薪酬机制对代理成本影响的实证分析

本文利用我国338家上市家族企业2006年的数据,研究高管人员薪酬机制对上市家族企业代理成本的影响,得出以下结论:(1)高管人员薪酬机制对降低上市家族企业代理成本有显著作用;(2)高管人员家族化背景对薪酬机制效果有负向调节效应,职业经理人薪酬机制的效果比家族管理者更明显;(3)家族自利倾向对薪酬机制效果也有负向调节效应,家族自利倾向越明显,薪酬机制的效果越差。     

Incentives, Risk, and Agency Costs in the Choice of Contractual Arrangements in Agriculture

The author develops a theory of the choice of contractual arrangements in agriculture by analyzing the incentives, risk-premia, and agency (supervision and shirking) costs under different contracts using the principal–agent framework. The theory is able to explain many tenancy-related issues, such as why sharecropping can be the optimal contract even in the presence of considerable shirking by the tiller, the predominance of sharecropping and of the 50*T*:*T*50 output share, the coexistence of sharecropping with other contracts, and the tenancy ladder.     

Earnouts: The Effects of Adverse Selection and Agency Costs on Acquisition Techniques

We examine the effects of adverse selection and agency costson the structure of the consideration offered in an acquisition.Specifically we investigate factors affecting the benefits arisingfrom use of earnouts. We find that when targets have greaterprivate information, consideration is more likely to be basedon the future performance of the target. We also find an earnoutis more likely to be used in an acquisition if the target isa smaller, private company in a different industry than theacquirer. In addition, earnouts are more likely to be used whenfewer acquisitions take place within an industry and when targetsare service companies or companies with more unrecorded assets.Finally, we compare the use of earnouts with the use of stockand find that financing considerations are a more importantfactor in the use of stock.     

Non-scale Models of Economic Growth

Growth models that incorporate non-rivalry and/or externalities imply that the size of an economy may influence its long-run growth rate. Such implied scale effects run counter to empirical evidence. This paper develops a general growth model to examine conditions under which balanced growth is void of scale effects. The model is general enough to replicate well known exogenous, as well as endogenous, (non-) scale models. We derive a series of propositions that show that these conditions for non-scale balanced growth can be grouped into three categories that pertain to (i) functional forms, (ii) the production structure, and (iii) returns to scale.     

沉淀成本、跨国公司与政府经济政策选择

如果跨国公司投资没有沉淀成本，无论东道国实行什么样的经济政策，跨国公司都会很自由地进出该国；但如果跨国公司投资有沉淀成本，尽管东道国实行硬经济政策获取大部分经济剩余，但跨国公司就会将产品的生产与销售转移到软经济政策的国家。在现实生活中，由于跨国公司的投资具有沉淀性，此时，国家之间为了吸引跨国公司的投资在经济政策方面的竞争将会促进跨国公司的发展，从而带来整个世界经济福利水平的提高。