渐进式改革中我国股票市场的功能缺陷及其反思

本文从中国近20年经济发展的渐进式改革进程的大背景出发,论述股票市场在其中所起到的作用.研究表明,国家主导型渐进式改革背景下对股票市场赋予了控制金融剩余、为国企改革服务的特殊任务,中国股票市场的制度设计抑制了股票市场资源配置功能的实现,而国家、地方、特权阶层、上市公司、机构投资者、散户等分利集团对自身利益的追求又产生了股票市场上种种的非市场化或违规现象.因此,股票市场资源配置失效产生的表面原因虽然常被归结为其自身内部的问题,但实质应是其所处的整个社会大环境的问题.认识这一点,对于我们重新考量中国金融体系的结构设计和布局有一定的现实意义.     

State-owned enterprises in China: A review of 40 years of research and practice

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are important components of the Chinese economy. Although SOEs are generally considered inefficient in operations, China’s economy, which relies heavily on SOEs, has been highly successful over the last four decades. This indicates the importance of SOEs in China’s past and future economic success. Therefore, in this study, we review the literature on economic theories and 40 years of practice of Chinese SOEs and discuss implications for future research. Our review consists of four parts: the theories of SOEs and their reform, the performance and financing strategies of SOEs, corporate governance in SOEs, and corporate social responsibility in SOEs.     

非国有股东治理与国有企业去僵尸化——来自国有上市公司董事会“混合”的经验证据

国有企业是党和国家事业发展的重要基础,如何有效解决部分国企的僵尸化现象是做强做优做大国有企业和实现经济社会高质量发展的关键环节,本文研究新时代全面深化国企混改背景下非国有股东治理对国有企业去僵尸化的影响作用。研究发现:非国有股东参与国企高层治理可以显著降低冗员规模和提升资本密集度,进而降低国有企业的僵尸化倾向,而仅持股等股权结构维度的治理影响较弱;当非国有股东参与国企治理的能力更强时,可以更好地发挥前述治理作用。通过细分僵尸企业识别指标,本文发现非国有股东治理可以在抑制低息贷款获取和改善盈利能力两方面降低相应国企的僵尸化程度,促使其正常经营运转。最后,经过良好治理的国有企业生产能力和市场价值得到显著提升。本文结论表明,非国有股东治理对国有企业去僵尸化和发展壮大具有积极的促进作用,这不仅对僵尸企业治理和国企改革的学术文献进行了有益补充,还为在全面建设社会主义现代化国家新征程中更好地统筹国有企业中流砥柱作用提供了政策参考价值。     

信息披露与国有股权私有化中的盈余管理

国有股权私有化是我国国有企业改革的重要措施。国有股权私有化过程中是否存在影响国有股权转让价格的盈余管理行为,以及如何抑制这种盈余管理,是我国国有企业改革中需要予以回答的重大问题。本文以我国通过控制权转移进行私有化的上市公司为样本,研究了国有股权私有化过程中的盈余管理以及信息披露对盈余管理影响的问题。研究发现,国有企业在国有股权私有化前1年和当年的操控性应计项目显著小于0,而私有化后的第1年显著大于0;及时披露国有股权私有化信息的公司在私有化前的操控性应计项目显著大于滞后披露信息的公司。以上结果表明,国有企业在国有股权私有化前存在降低收益的盈余管理行为,信息及时披露对私有化前的盈余管理有显著的抑制作用。本文的研究结论对规范我国国有企业改制和国有产权转让行为具有重要启示。     

金融发展环境、利率市场化与债务融资决策

采用稳健OLS回归方法对利率市场化与债务融资决策关系进行研究显示,较之国有企业,民营企业债务融资决策受利率市场化影响长期借款比例显著降低;较之利率管制时期,在利率市场化时期处于金融环境较好地区企业无论是债务融资成本还是长期借款比例均显著降低;此外,在利率市场化时期企业的长期借款比例与债务融资成本受地区金融发展环境差异的影响减弱。这说明利率市场化改革起到了赋予金融机构竞争手段、改善金融竞争环境以及削弱地区金融环境差异的政策效应。     

Political governance in China’s state-owned enterprises

State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are both the economic and political bases of the Chinese Communist Party (the Party) and the Chinese state. The overarching principle of SOE reform is to firmly implement the Party’s leadership and the modern enterprise system. This principle creates a political governance system in China’s SOEs—a Party-dominated governance system characterized by Party leadership, state ownership, Party cadre management, Party participation in corporate decision-making, and intra-Party supervision. This survey explains the logic of political governance in China’s SOEs, presents the evolution and current practices of each element of the system, and discusses findings from both academic research and the field.     

改制模式影响董事会特征吗?

本文考察了不同改制模式对于董事会特征的影响。通过分析1997—2000年我国285个国有企业首次公开发行后三年的数据,我们发现控股股东控制上市公司和董事会的动机及监管层政策规定是影响董事会领导层两职状态的重要原因。非完整改造公司中,控股股东更容易违反监管层的有关规定,委派本公司人员在上市公司同时兼任董事长和总经理职位。同时,非完整改造公司董事会的规模较大,董事会的活动强度较低,其激励程度也较低。     

国企混合所有制能治疗僵尸企业吗？ —— 一个混合所有制类啄序逻辑

本文使用1998-2013年中国工业企业数据库,采用国际前沿方法识别出僵尸企业,然后比较了国企控股、国企参股以及转制民企这三种混合所有制改革策略治疗僵尸国企的效果。实证结果表明:相对于纯国企,混合所有制改革对僵尸国企具有显著的治疗效果;在多种混合所有制改革策略中,转制民企优于国企参股,国企参股优于国企控股,这形成了一种“国企混改类啄序”现象;然而,上述“啄序”现象并非对所有国企都适用,对于那些所处行业垄断程度高、企业政治级别高的国企,单纯民营化导向的混改对僵尸企业治愈的效果较差;最后,混合所有制改革治疗僵尸国企的主要渠道,是降低了国企的期间费用(主要是管理费用)。本文的结果为处置僵尸企业和渐进式改革提供了重要的理论依据。     

“营改增”与企业金融化--来自制造业的经验证据

本文利用2010-2018年A股制造业上市公司数据,考察"营改增"对不同产权性质企业金融资产配置结构的影响。研究发现:在"营改增"影响下,国有企业的长期金融资产配备增加,实体投资"挤出"效应明显存在,说明国有企业配置金融资产以利润最大化为动机;非国有企业的短期金融资产持有量明显减少,融资约束有所缓解,说明非国有企业配置金融资产以资金储备为动机。     

Public sector reforms, privatisation and regimes of control in a Chinese enterprise

The Chinese economic reform has recently become a major focus of attention around the world. The underlying rationale for the Chinese government's privatisation and public sector reforms is the view that reformed state enterprises and privately managed firms will demonstrate superior management control and better performance, and hence encourage economic growth and employment. There are very few intensive case studies published in English journals studying whether firms privatised in China have reversed previous losses and introduced better management controls, leading to increased investment, productivity, and overall organizational effectiveness and efficiency. The researchers do not seek to deny the control problems of Chinese SOEs, but question the consequences of the new controls installed during the post-privatisation period. The paper also reveals a declining tendency in employment; altered distributions of wealth – especially to the state – and labour, and a lack of improvements in the accountability of privatised companies. Overall, the paper argues, the aims of reform policies in China, including better control, increased profitability and an improved working life for Chinese people, have not materialized. The paper calls for more research on the above issues in the Chinese context.     

State ownership and the cost of debt: Evidence from corporate bond issuances in China

Corporate credit risk can be reduced through implicit government guarantees. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China provide a distinctive setting to investigate government roles in corporate debt financing. We find that non-SOEs’ corporate bond issuance costs are significantly higher than those of SOEs. We also observe relatively lower bond issuance costs for firms controlled by the central government (CSOEs) than those controlled by local governments (LSOEs). In addition, we demonstrate that compared with SOEs, non-SOEs’ financial constraints are mitigated to a larger extent after the bond issuances. Overall, we show that state ownership plays an important role in determining corporate bond issuance costs.     

Does privatization reform alleviate ownership discrimination? Evidence from the Split-share structure reform in China

This paper investigates the institutional origins of ownership discrimination in bank lending through a staggered quasi-natural experiment: China's Split-share Structure Reform. State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs) have an advantage over non-SOEs in securing external financing to protect investment opportunities from cash flow fluctuations. This financing privilege declined significantly after the reform, which mandatorily converted SOEs' non-tradable state-owned shares into tradable shares, sharply increasing the likelihood of further privatization. Consistent evidence also exists in terms of bank lending behaviors. Further, we show both direct and indirect evidence that the effects were more pronounced among SOEs under higher threats of privatization (e.g., firms with larger increases in tradable shares, smaller workforce, and in industries peripheral to national strategy). The evidence suggests that banks proactively prefer SOEs for the perceived safety of loans under implicit government guarantee; when this privilege disappeared after the reform, banks reacted by allocating credits more fairly. This paper provides new evidence on the bright side of share structure reforms in mitigating credit misallocation and enlightens policy makers to practical resolutions to the financing inefficiency in emerging capital markets.     

金融变革中的中国国债市场功能定位与发展策略

国债市场发展与金融可持续发展具有十分密切的关系,中国金融改革的深化更是离不开国债市场金融功能的完善及有效发挥。但转型背景中确立的中国国债市场,其定位存在着重财政筹资和轻金融调控的功能扭曲。因此金融变革对于中国国债市场的发展提出了更为迫切的要求。一方面完善包括立法在内的国债运行与管理制度;另一方面完善国债市场体系。这对于中国国债市场发展而言,至关重要。     

Regional Unemployment and the Restructuring of Distressed State-owned Enterprises: Evidence from China

Abstract:

Using Chinese listed companies as the sample, we investigate the effects and corresponding consequences of regional unemployment rates on the restructuring behavior of distressed state-owned enterprises (SOEs). We find that layoffs and asset downsizing of local SOEs will be limited greatly when the unemployment rates of the areas where SOEs are located are high, even though these firms are already in distress. Additional evidence shows that this kind of limitation causes these firms to show a long-term decline in performance. The CEOs of these firms, however, are not easily dismissed after the distress. These results provide empirical support for the “grabbing hand“ theory.     

Communists Among Us in a Market Economy: Accountancy in the People's Republic of China

China is undergoing a unique experience. Its strategy to move the country to a market economy is based on “marketization” instead of “privatization.” The state-owned enterprises (SOEs) are intended to continue to be the mainstay of the economy. The recent accounting reform, a 16-point economic stabilization policy, and the decision to maintain the dominance of the SOEs were all promulgated in the same month. To put the recent accounting reform in perspective, four stages in the development of accounting theory since the Communist Revolution are identified. The first stage is Mao Tse-Tung's initial society, where the control function of accounting, in its narrowest sense, was emphasized. The Counter Revolution with the Post-Revisionist Era relaxed, at the macroeconomic level, the notion of control. The third stage of opening up the Chinese economy to outside capital combines allocative techniques, albeit limited, with Western accounting concepts, all blended with Chinese cultural values. The current stage of macroeconomic liberalization of state enterprises, which accompanied a major macroeconomic stabilization program, is a result of a number of demonstration effects that has further exposed the Chinese economy to various outside factors. Accordingly, such recent accounting reform introduces the concept of equity capital, provides a relatively sharper distinction between product cost and period cost, realistically incorporates the capital maintenance concept and allows a limited number of Westernized accounting standards, mostly adapted to accommodate traditional Chinese values. Accounting forms an indispensable component of an overall economic policy.     

中国金融中介增长与农业劳动力转移

农业劳动力向非农业的转移是经济发展的主要标志和内容。本文分析了中国金融中介增长对农业劳动力转移的影响。研究认为,中国的金融制度安排是内生于转轨时期政府为给予利益受损集团以利益补偿的政府意愿,导致了金融中介的信贷配置具有明显的国有企业和城市化倾向,以及农村金融资源的外流。这将会通过作用于城乡资本积累差异,导致农村信贷约束,以及城市就业岗位的创造等多种渠道影响到农业劳动力转移。我们以各省1996-2004年的面板数据进行了计量分析,结果表明,控制城乡收入差距及其它因素后,中国金融中介增长显著地制约了农业劳动力的转移。     

民营化、融资约束与企业创新——来自中国工业企业的证据

本文研究国有企业民营化对企业创新的影响及其影响机制。利用中国工业企业数据库,以民营化企业为实验组、以国有企业为对照组进行双重差分检验,结果发现,国有企业民营化显著抑制了企业创新,而融资约束是抑制民营化企业创新的重要因素。进一步检验发现,融资约束对民营化企业创新的抑制作用主要存在于金融发展水平较低的地区,而在金融发展水平较高的地区,这种抑制作用并不明显。本文的研究结果从融资约束的角度拓展了民营化影响企业创新的相关研究,且从民营化的角度为金融市场如何影响企业创新提供了新的视角。此外,本文有助于澄清有关民营化的争议,为进一步深化混合所有制改革、加强金融对民营企业的支持以促进民营企业的创新和发展提供理论依据和政策参考。     

运用债务重组化解中国金融资产管理公司不良资产有关问题探析

国际经验和中国金融资产管理公司运作两年来的实践都充分表明 ,设计缜密的不良资产重组模式 ,可以加快重组速度、有效地化解金融风险、增强整个金融体系的安全性。否则将事倍功半 ,甚至有可能导致重组的失败。本文根据中国的实际情况 ,对运用债务重组方式处置中国金融资产管理公司不良资产的优劣、适用性等进行了探讨     

Economic policy uncertainty,corporate investment decisions and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China

We examine the relationship between economic policy uncertainty (EPU) and stock price crash risk via the corporate investment in Chinese listed firms. Results show that higher EPU is associated with lower crash risk. Firms increase financial asset holdings and reduce overinvestment when EPU rises, leading to lower future crash risk. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and firms with lower management incentives tend to reduce overinvestment, whereas non-SOEs tend to increase financial asset holdings. Thus, firms tend to be cautious in their investments when EPU is high, which reduces crash risk. Our study provides new insights into the validity of the Lucas critique in China.     

我国经济结构调整与经济增长的实证研究

经济结构不合理已成为制约我国经济可持续发展的主要瓶颈。本文在分析经济结构调整内涵基础上,整理分析经济结构调整与经济增长的基本逻辑关系,选取消费结构、产业结构、金融结构以及所有制结构作为分析指标,构建VAR分析模型,得出结论：从长期来看,我国经济增长与消费结构、产业结构以及金融结构调整呈正方向变化,与所有制结构呈反向变化;从短期来看,在消费结构、产业结构以及金融结构的冲击下,经济增长呈现波动式变化,所有制结构的不平衡对经济增长呈负反应。