Equilibrium among local jurisdictions: toward an integrated treatment of voting and residential choice

In models of local public goods with mobile consumers, existence of equilibrium is problematic. Difficulties with existence of equilibrium that arise in models with discrete locations and in models with voting are compounded when both features are introduced into the same model. We present conditions under which equilibrium exists in a model where freely mobile households choose community of residence and amount of housing consumption, and vote on the level of public goods provision. These conditions involve restrictions on preferences and the technology of public goods supply. At least some of these conditions appear consistent with empirical observations. We discuss the implications of the conditions, and their role in assuring existence of equilibrium. A series of computational examples provide illustrations of the way these conditions interact, and the difficulties that must be confronted if they are to be relaxed.     

Homeownership,Mobility, And Local Income Redistribution

Regions are characterized by different homeownership rates. Homeowners and renters differ in their mobility costs, renters having lower mobility costs. This paper analyses how the presence of those different types of households affects income sorting and tax differences between local jurisdictions. To this aim, we analyze a model of local income redistribution with mobile (renter) and immobile (homeowner) households. Linear income taxes finance a lump sum transfer. Policies are determined endogenously through voting. In such a framework, if there are no or only few homeowners, no income‐sorting equilibrium exists. Above a certain threshold for the homeownership rate we find an inverted U‐shaped relationship between tax differences and homeownership rates, such that tax differences between jurisdictions are highest for intermediate homeownership rates.     

Existence of equilibrium and stratification in local and hierarchical Tiebout economies with property taxes and voting

Summary. This paper present the first fully closed general equilibrium model of hierarchical and local public goods economies with the following features: (i) multiple agent types who are endowed with both some amount of private good (income) and a house, who are mobile between houses and jurisdictions, and who vote in local and national elections; (ii) multiple communities that finance a local public good through property taxes which are set in accordance with absolute majority rule; and (iii) a national government that produces a national public good financed through an income tax whose level is determined through majority rule voting. In contrast to previous models, no overly restrictive assumptions on preferences and technologies are required to prove the existence of an equilibrium in the presence of property taxation and voting. Thus, the existence of an equilibrium is proved without any of the major restrictions used in the past, and sufficient conditons for stratification of agents into communities based on their public good preferences and their wealth levels are found. This model lays the groundwork for a positive applied analysis of local public finance and intergovernmental relations. It furthermore builds the foundation for the first parameterized computable general equilibrium model of local public goods and fiscal federalism. Received: February 1, 1996; revised version August 9, 1996     

An equilibrium voting model of federal standards with externalities

This paper proposes a framework for studying policy making in a federal system in the presence of spillover externalities. Local jurisdictions choose local policies by majority rule subject to standards that are set by majority rule at the federal level. We characterize the induced preferences of voters for federal policies, prove existence of local majority rule equilibrium, provide an example of non-existence of global majority rule equilibrium, and explore the welfare properties of federal standards in the presence of spillovers.     

Income,distance and amenities. An empirical analysis

This paper analyses the income distribution of households in Barcelona metropolitan area. For this purpose we use the monocentric model. As the basic model does not have direct implications for this distribution, we survey the extensions of the model that have been used in empirical literature. One of the most promising ways is to introduce externalities in the decision process; they can result directly from exogenous amenities (given traits of urban area) or be created by other agents’ decisions. We first test the simple model relating income to distance. Then we introduce and test the model with exogenous amenities; recreational areas, transportation systems, health, educational and cultural infrastructure. In the third stage we test the model with spatial effects. We present evidence that any model with spatial effects improves significantly the empirical results.     

A comparative study of environmental amenity valuations

The paper reports on a comparative study of direct and indirect approaches to valuing environmental amenities (i.e., public goods), specifically, air quality in terms of its human health effects. The application of three indirect valuation methods (via market goods) is reported here: the health production method, a consumer preferences (for nonmarket goods) model, and the cost of illness method. The first and second methods are (economic) behavior-based approaches where willingness to pay for an environmental good is derived by exploiting relationships in consumption between the public good and market good(s). The third method is based on a physical relationship—a dose-response function—between the environmental good and health. The direct valuation approach encompassed three contingent valuation elicitation formats: open-ended, modified iterative bidding game, and referenda-style binary choice. The application of all four methods was based on data from a survey of a large, stratified sample of households from the Haifa metropolitan area in northern Israel. The estimates of welfare change derived by the various methods are discussed and compared.     

On modeling the agricultural sector in developing economies: An integrated approach of micro and macroeconomics

The paper introduces a theoretically consistent and empirically implementable method for the construction of general equilibrium models of the agricultural sector in a developing economy. The point of departure is the agricultural household, for which the microeconomic behavioral relations are formulated based on the assumption of utility and profit maximization. These relations are estimated from microeconomic data. In the second step the estimated microeconomic behavioral relations are aggregated across households into the macroeconomic behavioral relations, i.e., the supply and demand functions for the agricultural sector. Third, the linkage equations between the agricultural sector and the rest of the economy are specified on the basis of alternative assumptions on environmental and institutional characteristics and they are estimated from macroeconomic data. Finally, the macroeconomic behavioral relations and linkage equations are combined to provide a general equilibrium solution of the agricultural sector. The solution of the alternative equilibrium models can be used for comparative statics analysis of government policies and of changes in other exogenous variables. The illustrative application of the model is based on Indian data.     

Using Angler Characteristics and Attitudinal Data to Identify Environmental Preference Classes: A Latent-Class Model

A latent-class model of environmental preference groups is developed and estimated with only the answers to a set of attitudinal questions. Economists do not typically use this type of data in estimation. Group membership is latent/unobserved. The intent is to identify and characterize heterogeneity in the preferences for environmental amenities in terms of a small number of preference groups. The application is to preferences over the fishing characteristics of Green Bay. Anglers answered a number of attitudinal questions, including the importance of boat fees, species catch rates, and fish consumption advisories on site choice. The results suggest that Green Bay anglers separate into a small number of distinct classes with varying preferences and willingness to pay for a PCB-free Green Bay. The probability that an angler belongs to each class is estimated as function of observable characteristics of the individual. Estimation is with the expectation–maximization (E–M) algorithm, a technique new to environmental economics that can be used to do maximum-likelihood estimation with incomplete information. As explained, a latent-class model estimated with attitudinal data can be melded with a latent-class choice model. Edward Morey and Jennifer Thacher are equal authors and rotate authorship across articles.     

Local public good provision: Voting,peer effects,and mobility

Few empirical strategies have been developed that investigate public provision under majority rule while taking explicit account of the constraints implied by mobility of households. The goal of this paper is to improve our understanding of voting in local communities when neighborhood quality depends on peer or neighborhood effects. We develop a new empirical approach which allows us to impose all restrictions that arise from locational equilibrium models with myopic voting simultaneously on the data generating process. We can then analyze how close myopic models come in replicating the main regularities about expenditures, taxes, sorting by income and housing observed in the data. We find that a myopic voting model that incorporates peer effects fits all dimensions of the data reasonably well.     

And the winner is... An empirical evaluation of unitary and collective labour supply models

An empirical evaluation is presented of two competing flexible labour supply models. The first is a standard unitary model, while the second is based on the collective approach to household behaviour. The evaluation focuses on the testing of the model’s? theoretical implications and on their ability to identify structural information, like preferences and the intrahousehold allocation process. Models are applied to Dutch microdata from the DNB Household Survey. The unitary model cannot be rejected for male and female singles, while it is rejected for a sample of couples. The alternative collective model cannot be rejected for the same sample, allowing identification of individual preferences and an intrahousehold sharing rule that can be used as a basis for welfare economic policy evaluations.     

Epstein–Zin Utility,Asset Prices,and the Business Cycle Revisited

This paper discusses the advantages of Epstein and Zin (1989) (EZ) preferences when building dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models that are consistent with well‐known stylized facts of both the business cycle and asset markets. To this end, we combine EZ preferences with several building blocks from the DSGE literature that has tried to solve the equity premium puzzle and to replicate characteristic statistics of the labor market. Our goal is to guide researchers in this area to useful modeling devices and to discuss EZ preferences vis‐a‐vis the standard time‐additive expected utility function. EZ preferences separate the attitude toward risk from the attitude toward intertemporal substitution. We demonstrate that this additional degree of freedom allows us to closely match the empirical facts already in a frictionless production economy with endogenous labor supply. Our study follows Heer and Maußner (2013). We examine models that consider adjustment costs of capital accumulation, consumption habits, and frictions in the allocation of labor. Our empirical targets are estimated from German data.     

Does endogenous formation of jurisdictions lead to wealth-stratification?

Conditions under which endogenous processes of jurisdiction formation entail wealth-stratification are examined in a model where unequally wealthy households with identical preferences form jurisdictions in order to produce a public good financed by proportional taxation. We define a stable jurisdiction structure to be a partition of the households into jurisdictions that is immune to individual deviations. We define a jurisdiction structure to be wealth-stratified when each jurisdiction is composed of households who form an interval with respect to the ordering of their wealth. We show that a necessary and sufficient condition for the stratification of any stable jurisdiction structure is for the individual preferences for the public and the private good to exhibit a relation of gross substitutability/complementarity between the public good and the private good that is independent from prices and wealth.     

Testing the taxmimicking versus expenditure spill-over hypotheses using English data

Spatial interaction among local governments in tax setting and public spending decisions is receiving increasing attention in the applied public economics literature. Spatial interaction models rely on the presence of an externality from local budget making: in traditional public finance models, external effects originate either from interjurisdictional resource flows due to tax competition for a mobile base, or from local public expenditure spill-overs into neighbouring jurisdictions. However, the recent political agency/yardstick competition literature has stressed the role of ‘informational’ externalities between neighbouring jurisdictions, and predicted tax mimicry at the local level. The actual relevance of the above hypotheses clearly needs to be assessed empirically. In this paper, an attempt is made at discriminating between alternative sources of local fiscal interaction, by using data on the English municipal authorities' budgets. While both public spending levels and local property tax rates exhibit considerable positive spatial autocorrelation, maximum likelihood and instrumental variables estimation results suggest that the interdependence among local governments can be attributed to mimicking behaviour in local property tax setting.     

The ABC mechanism: an incentive compatible payoff mechanism for elicitation of outcome and probability transformations

When it comes to experiments with multiple-round decisions under risk, the current payoff mechanisms are incentive compatible with either outcome weighting theories or probability weighting theories, but not both. In this paper, I introduce a new payoff mechanism, the Accumulative Best Choice (“ABC”) mechanism that is incentive compatible for all rational risk preferences. I also identify three necessary and sufficient conditions for a payoff mechanism to be incentive compatible for all models of decision under risk with complete and transitive preferences. I show that ABC is the unique incentive compatible mechanism for rational risk preferences in a multiple-task setting. In addition, I test empirical validity of the ABC mechanism in the lab. The results from both a choice pattern experiment and a preference (structural) estimation experiment show that individual choices under the ABC mechanism are statistically not different from those observed with the one-round task experimental design. The ABC mechanism supports unbiased elicitation of both outcome and probability transformations as well as testing alternative decision models that do or do not include the independence axiom.

     

Global welfare comparisons

Abstract To provide a normative foundation for transfers between different economies, one needs information on their ‘per capita welfare.’ This paper considers various methods for doing this and reaches the following conclusions: (i) Such global welfare comparisons are more demanding than usually thought. (ii) The ranking of methods differs from that of local (over‐time) comparisons, with real comprehensive per capita NNP being the least impractical method. The lesson is that global welfare comparisons should be performed with great care. The comparisons must be made in local real prices calculated according to ‘purchasing‐power‐parity,’ where non‐traded environmental amenities play an important role.     

Further evidence on the law of factor proportionality in multiple households closed CGE models

This article provides additional evidence that factor contents of different consumers’ consumption bundles computed from multiple households closed Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models are approximately proportional. This empirical regularity has been observed up to now for a total of 11 CGEs for very diverse countries, and we therefore state it as law. It implies that these models display price rigidity with respect to endowment re-allocations, an observation which has broad implications for their capacity to capture general equilibrium effects.     

Implicit amenity prices and the location of retirees in England and Wales

General equilibrium models in which compensation for local amenities occurs in both housing and labour markets have been widely used to generate implicit amenity prices and regional quality of life indices. An implication and prospective test of such models is that individuals who are outside the labour market have an incentive to locate in regions where amenities are capitalized into wages. In this article we construct a measure of the extent of amenity capitalization into wages for each county in England and Wales. We then test the multimarket amenity model by applying this measure to county-level data on the location of retirees. Our results provide strong support for the model.     

An econometric model of tenure choice and demand for housing as a joint decision

This paper models a household's choice of tenure and demand for housing services as a joint decision imposing the restriction that both discrete and continuous decisions are derived from a single preference ordering. The utility index for households is the translog form of the reciprocal indirect utility function allowing for random preferences. Each household chooses between the two main tenures, the owner-occupied and subsidised rental sectors, but households may be rationed in either or both of these sectors and refused admission, in which case they are assumed to enter the third sector, uncontrolled rental. The model is estimated on UK data for 5895 households.     

Does 401(k) eligibility increase saving?: Evidence from propensity score subclassification

By comparing 401(k) eligible and ineligible households’ wealth, this paper estimates that, on average, about one half of 401(k) balances represent new private savings, and about one quarter of 401(k) balances represent new national savings. Responses to eligibility vary considerably, however, with households who normally save the most largely contributing funds they would have saved anyway. This paper improves on previous research by: (1) employing propensity score subclassification to control more completely for observed household characteristics, (2) controlling for more household characteristics, including several correlated with unobserved savings preferences, and (3) adjusting the observed measure of households’ wealth to reduce measurement error.