Founders versus non-founders in large companies: financial incentives and the call for regulation

This paper is intended to question some of the premises in the ever increasing calls to regulate executive pay. We focus on founders, and extend Shleifer and Vishny’s (1989, Journal of Political Economy, 94, 461–488) manager-specific investments model by explicitly modeling managerial effort and pay performance sensitivity. Tests of this model on a data set of large companies, controlling for the endogeneity of managerial compensation, indicate that founders tend to be less responsive to performance incentives and generally more entrenched. At the same time, founders’ led firms are more valuable, supporting our predictions. This suggests that for founders, regulation of compensation may not be very effective.      

Efficiency and Equity in School Funding: A Case Study for Kansas

This study measures cost inefficiency of Kansas public school districts and applied both mathematical programming and stochastic frontier approach. The empirical study uses two-stage data envelopment analysis model and the cost inefficiency effects model proposed by Battese and Coelli (Empirical Economics 24:325–332, 1995) and applied to a panel data. The results found mean inefficiencies from these two models are very close. The results indicate that Kansas school districts, on average, exhibit cost inefficiency in their operations, however, there is a tendency for inefficiencies to decline over time. The study does not find any strong evidence for lower efficiency due to lower expenditure per-pupil. Instead, we found inconclusive evidences where lower efficiency for certain school districts could be assigned to unfavorable environmental cost conditions.

Benchmarking and firm heterogeneity: a latent class analysis for German electricity distribution companies

In January 2009, the German Federal Network Agency introduced incentive regulation for the electricity distribution sector based on results obtained from econometric and nonparametric benchmarking analysis. One main problem for the regulator in assigning the relative efficiency scores is unobserved firm-specific factors such as network and technological differences. Comparing the efficiency of different firms usually assumes that they operate under the same production technology, thus unobserved factors might be inappropriately understood as inefficiency. To avoid this type of misspecification in regulatory practice, estimation is carried out in two stages: in the first stage observations are classified into two categories according to the size of the network operators. Then separate analyses are conducted for each subgroup. This article shows how to disentangle the heterogeneity from inefficiency in one step, using a latent class model for stochastic frontiers. As the classification is not based on a priori sample separation criteria it delivers more robust, statistically significant, and testable results. Against this background, we analyze the level of technical efficiency of different subgroups from a sample of 200 regional and local German electricity distribution companies for a balanced panel data set (2001–2005). Testing the hypothesis if larger distributors operate under a different technology than smaller ones, we assess if a single step latent class model provides new insights to the use of benchmarking approaches within the incentive regulation schemes.     

The effects of rate-of-return regulation on the intensity of use and durability of capital

It has been suggested that rate-of-return regulation reduces the incentives for technically efficient management, because regulation eliminates much of the gain firms might normally expect to realize from such efficiency. Rather than relying upon notions of managerial slack or X- inefficiency, this paper demonstrates that under-utilization of existing capital and a sub-optimal choice of the capital stock's durability can be explained as rational profit-maximizing responses to the regulatory incentives.     

Endogenous timing in a mixed oligopoly with semipublic firms

An endogenous order of moves is analyzed in a mixed market where a firm jointly owned by the public sector and private domestic shareholders (a semipublic firm) competes with n private firms. We show that there is an equilibrium in which firms take production decisions simultaneously. This result is strikingly different from that obtained by Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998), who shows that when a public firm competes with n private firms all firms producing simultaneously in the same period cannot be sustained as a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium outcome. Our result differs from that of Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998) for two reasons: firstly, we consider that there is a semipublic firm rather than a public firm. Secondly, Pal (Econ Lett 61:181–185, 1998) considers that the public firm is less efficient than private firms while in our paper all firms are equally efficient.     

Local Transportation Policy and the Environment

The paper introduces a simple framework for analyzing the environmental effects of local transportation policies, and it reviews some evidence. In several cases, subsidies for local public transportation have led to substantial reductions in road transportation and have thereby reduced externalities. Some but not all estimates suggest positive overall welfare effects of such policies. In the rare cases where road pricing has been applied, it has helped to reduce automobile transportation, and it has led to environmental improvements. The experience with specific driving restrictions like “days without cars” and “low emission zones” has been mixed. Local transportation policy can have a useful role to play as a complement to national policy instruments, but neither efficiency nor effectiveness can be taken for granted.     

A flexible time-varying specification of the technical inefficiency effects model

The temporal pattern of technical efficiency in the technical inefficiency effects model, as modeled by Battese and Coelli (Empir Econ 20:325–332, 1995), is rather restrictive. Specifically, it a priori imposes a common pattern upon all firms in the sample, which in addition is monotonic over time. Obviously this is an undesirable implication of the model especially when there is evidence of strong firm heterogeneity and/or a long time span. To overcome this shortcoming, the present paper incorporates the Cornwell et al. (J Econom 46:185–200, 1990) flexible specification of the temporal pattern of technical efficiency into technical inefficiency effects model. The proposed formulation is then applied to the agricultural sector of the EU and US, during the period 1973–1993. The empirical result support the proposed formulation as quite different temporal patterns of technical efficiency have been found for the ten countries included in the analysis. We would like to thank an anonymous referee and an associate editor for valuable suggestions in an earlier version of the paper.     

On the choice of functional form in stochastic frontier modeling

This paper examines the effect of functional form specification on the estimation of technical efficiency using a panel data set of 125 olive-growing farms in Greece for the period 1987–93. The generalized quadratic Box-Cox transformation is used to test the relative performance of alternative, widely used, functional forms and to examine the effect of prior choice on final efficiency estimates. Other than the functional specifications nested within the Box-Cox transformation, the comparative analysis includes the minflex Laurent translog and generalized Leontief that possess desirable approximation properties. The results indicate that technical efficiency measures are very sensitive to the choice of functional specification. Perhaps most importantly, the choice of functional form affects the identification of the factors affecting individual performance – the sources of technical inefficiency. The analysis also shows that while specification searches do narrow down the set of feasible alternatives, the identification of the most appropriate functional specification might not always be (statistically) feasible. First version received: November 1999/Final version received: July 2001 RID="*" ID="*"  The authors wish to thank Almas Heshmati, Robert Romain, and an anonymous referee for insightful comments and suggestions. Special thanks go to the associate editor who handled the paper, and whose careful reading and suggestions have improved the paper substantially. The second author wishes to acknowledge the financial support from “President SSHRC” from the University of Saskatchewan. The usual caveats with respect to opinions expressed in the paper apply. Senior authorship is shared. This is University of Nebraska-Lincoln Agricultural Research Division Article No. 13270.     

Winners, Losers, and the Nuclear-Waste Dilemma

This paper explores how property-right assignment affects social efficiency when a public program has both “public good” and “public bad” components. We show that when willingness to accept a public bad exceeds the willingness to pay, the net benefit is unambiguously lower when the property right supports the status quo institutional structure. Thus, Kaldor–Hicks efficiency tests tend to favor public programs and mitigation over the status quo even when mitigation negatively affects another group. To illustrate the result, we develop social-cost estimates for moving nuclear waste from current temporary-storage facilities to a permanent central repository at Yucca Mountain, NV, USA. For a representative city with a population of 226,195, the present value of the external cost of shipping waste is $1.42 billion when those living near temporary nuclear-waste storage facilities are assigned the property right to “health and safety.” That number swells to $5.95 billion when those living near the transport route are assigned the property right. Thus, property-right assignment affects the efficient level of nuclear-waste, and thus nuclear energy, produced.     

APPLICATION OF PANEL DATA MODELS IN BENCHMARKING ANALYSIS OF THE ELECTRICITY DISTRIBUTION SECTOR*

ABSTRACT ** : This paper explores the application of several panel data models in measuring productive efficiency of the electricity distribution sector. Stochastic Frontier Analysis has been used to estimate the cost‐efficiency of 59 distribution utilities operating over a nine‐year period in Switzerland. The estimated coefficients and inefficiency scores are compared across three different panel data models. The results indicate that individual efficiency estimates are sensitive to the econometric specification of unobserved firm‐specific heterogeneity. This paper shows that alternative panel models such as the ‘true’ random effects model proposed by Greene (2005) could be used to explore the possible impacts of unobserved firm‐specific factors on efficiency estimates. When these factors are specified as a separate stochastic term, the efficiency estimates are substantially higher suggesting that conventional models could confound efficiency differences with other unobserved variations among companies. On the other hand, refined specification of unobserved heterogeneity might lead to an underestimation of inefficiencies by mistaking potential persistent inefficiencies as external factors. Given that specification of inefficiency and heterogeneity relies on non‐testable assumptions, there is no conclusive evidence in favour of one or the other specification. However, this paper argues that alternative panel data models along with conventional estimators can be used to obtain approximate lower and upper bounds for companies' efficiency scores.     

Using data envelopment analysis approach to estimate the health production efficiencies in China

By using Data Envelopment Analysis approach, we treat the health production system in a certain province as a Decision Making Unit (DMU), identify its inputs and outputs, evaluate its technical efficiency in 1982, 1990 and 2000 respectively, and further analyze the relationship between efficiency scores and social-environmental variables. This paper has found several interesting findings. Firstly, provinces on frontier in different year are different, but provinces far from the frontier keep unchanged. The average efficiency of health production has made a significant progress from 1982 to 2000. Secondly, all provinces in China can be divided into six categories in terms of health production outcome and efficiency, and each category has specific approach of improving health production efficiency. Thirdly, significant differences in health production efficiencies have been found among the eastern, middle and western regions in China, and among the eastern and middle regions. At last, there is significant positive relationship between population density and health production efficiency but negative relationship (not very significant) between the proportions of public health expenditure in total expense and efficiency. Maybe it is the result of inappropriate tendency of public expenditure. The relationship between abilities to pay for health care services and efficiency in urban areas is opposite to that in rural areas. One possible reason is the totally different income and public services treatments between rural and urban residents. Therefore, it is necessary to adjust health policies and service provisions which are specifically designed to different population groups. __________ Translated from Jingji Yanjiu 经济研究 (Economic Research Journal), 2006, (7): 92–105     

Measuring environmental efficiency of industry: a case study of thermal power generation in India

Technical and environmental efficiency of some coal-fired thermal power plants in India is estimated using a methodology that accounts for firm’s efforts to increase the production of good output and reduce pollution with the given resources and technology. The methodology used is directional output distance function. Estimates of firm-specific shadow prices of pollutants (bad outputs), and elasticity of substitution between good and bad outputs are also obtained. The technical and environmental inefficiency of a representative firm is estimated as 0.06 implying that the thermal power generating industry in Andhra Pradesh state of India could increase production of electricity by 6/ while decreasing generation of pollution by 6%. This result shows that there are incentives or win–win opportunities for the firms to voluntarily comply with the environmental regulation. It is found that there is a significant variation in marginal cost of pollution abatement or shadow prices of bad outputs across the firms and an increasing marginal cost of pollution abatement with respect to pollution reduction by the firms. This result calls for the use of economic instruments like pollution taxes instead of command and control regulation used currently in India to reduce air pollution.

The Production of Eco-Labels

Eco-labeling is a market-based technique for conveying information about consumers’ demands for environmental protection. Most criticisms of eco-labeling have concentrated on demand-side issues – the potential for firms or countries to use eco-labels to manipulate market power – and the difficulty of creating credible labels. In this paper, we argue that fundamental problems also arise on the production side. Specifically, we argue that both increasing returns to scale and complexities in production imply that it will be possible to market only a small percentage of environmental attributes through the use of eco-labels. We present evidence for our hypotheses from a detailed survey of 100 randomly-selected consumer products.      

Measurement of technical and allocative efficiencies using a CES cost frontier: a benchmarking study of Japanese transmission-distribution electricity

This paper estimates the technical and allocative inefficiencies of the transmission-distribution sector of Japanese electric utilities using a panel data during the 1981–1998 period. A stochastic production frontier of the CES form is jointly estimated with input demand equations. Taking advantage of the self-duality, we retrieve the cost frontier by which the impacts of technical and allocative inefficiencies on costs and input demands are measured. The estimated elasticity of substitution is significantly different from unity in favor of the CES specification over the Cobb–Douglas. The results show that observed costs are 9 to 48% higher than the efficient level; technical inefficiency raises costs by 1 to 28%, while allocative inefficiency does so by 8 to 30%. Although their impacts on costs are similar, technical inefficiency more fluctuates so the differences in the performance of utilities are mainly due to technical inefficiency. We also find a substantial over-utilization of capital for all utilities.

Harvesting in an integrated general equilibrium model

Harvesting of prey biomass is analyzed in an integrated ecological-economic system whose submodels, a predator–prey ecosystem and a simple economy, are microfounded dynamic general equilibrium models. These submodels are interdependent because the ecosystem responds to harvesting—through the reactions of optimizing individual organisms—by changing the provision of public ecosystem services to consumers. General analytical results are derived regarding the impact of harvesting policies on short-run equilibria of both submodels, on population dynamics, and on stationary states of the integrated model. A key insight is that prey biomass carries a positive ecosystem price which needs to be added as a tax mark-up to the economic price of harvested biomass to attain allocative efficiency. Further information on the dynamics is gained by resorting to numerical analysis of the policy regimes of zero harvesting, laissez-faire harvesting and efficient harvesting.

It “... is a matter of weighing costs and benefits of taking action, whether the action is the “inert” one of leaving resources alone in order to conserve them, or whether it involves exploiting a resource ... for so-called material ends”. Pearce (1976, p. 320)

Helpful comments from an anonymous referee are gratefully acknowledged. Remaining errors are the authors’ sole responsibility.     

The Zilcha criteria for dynamic inefficiency reconsidered

We reconsider necessary and sufficient conditions for dynamic inefficiency given in Zilcha (J Econ Theory 52:364–379, 1990, J Econ Theory 55:1–16, 1991) and a critique by Rangazas and Russell (2005). First, we show that the characterization given in Zilcha (1990) for nonstationary economies is correct and correct Zilcha’s proof. Second, using this insight, we complement Rangazas and Russell’s (Econ Theory 26:701–716, 2005) discussion of the counterexamples to Zilcha (J Econ Theory 55:1–16, 1991). Third, we discuss consequences of our results for applied tests of (in-)efficiency based on the Zilcha criteria. We would like to thank Itzhak Zilcha, and in particular Peter Rangazas and Steve Russell for detailed and very helpful comments.     

累积创新中的内生许可证

This paper analyzes the endogeneity of licensing arrangements in cost-reducing cumulative innovation. There exists the following results. First, for the first-generation patentee, ex post licensing matters for rent extraction while ex ante licensing matters for efficiency. Second, if the second-generation innovator does not exit, then the firms’ profits as well as social welfare are all irrelevant to whether ex ante licensing is allowed. Third, costly litigation can occur on the equilibrium path and its occurrence is also irrelevant to ex ante licensing. Interestingly, the conditional probability of the first-generation patentee winning litigation first decreases and then increases in patent breadth. Fourth, optimal patent breadth depends on the tradeoff between litigation costs and antitrust effect. Translated from Shijie Jingji Wenhui 世界经济文汇 (World Economic Papers), 2006, (6): 1–29     

Environmental determinants of banking efficiency in Austria

The great majority of Austrian banks operate on a regional or local basis and only a few banks provide their services on a national or even international scale. Obviously, the market environments regional or local banks face are different from that of nationwide operating banks. Casual evidence suggests that local markets condition is a very important external determinant of banking efficiency. Thus, not controlling for market conditions may substantially bias the measurement of managerial efficiency particularly of locally operating banks. In this paper we assess the internal technical efficiency (or X-efficiency) of the Austrian banking sector with the focus on environmental and non-controllable factors critical to banking markets. Analytically, we apply a multiple-stage approach based on a slacks-based DEA model (SBM) and a censored regression model, respectively. In order to cope with the inherent dependency problem of DEA-based efficiency analysis when incorporated into regression analysis we apply a Bootstrap estimator. In so doing we attempt to overcome the dependency problem which plagues the power of standard regression analysis based on DEA processed data. The empirical analysis is based on an unbalanced panel of data covering more than 800 Austrian banks ranging over 1995–2002.

Regulation and efficiency in transition: the case of Romanian banks

Using disaggregated panel data for the period 1996–2002, this paper estimates the cost efficiency of Romanian banks and relates it to regulation implemented by the National Bank of Romania. We estimate efficiency using a model that combines the frameworks of both stochastic frontier analysis and shadow cost functions. Our results indicate that, for all types of banks, the cost of technical inefficiency decreases in the years following tightening of regulation. A significant part of this decrease can be attributed to the policy change. Overall, the short-run increase in cost due to additional regulation exceeds the benefits from reduced technical inefficiency. However, our model does not account for other benefits, besides changes in X-inefficiency, such as stability of the banking system, which may be significant.      

State-owned enterprises as indirect instruments of entry regulation

In the context of mixed markets, Matsumura and Kanda (J Econ 84(1): 27–48, 2005) show that social welfare in free entry equilibrium is maximized when there exists a public firm in the market. En passant, these authors state that this outcome is connected to the entry-deterring influence of a public firm. In this way, they counter-act the excess entry problem of Mankiw and Whinston (Rand J Econ 17(1): 48–58, 1986). We explain this result arguing that the state-owned firm can be an indirect instrument to regulate entry. In fact, under free entry equilibrium welfare may be greater with the presence of a public firm than with a social planner.