国际税收情报交换:最新动态和中国对策

OECD反有害税收竞争计划的失败,致使OECD将工作重点放在更为务实的加强国际税收情报交换方面。近年来,OECD围绕情报交换频频修订其税收协定范本中的第26条,并出台了一系列新的报告。分析这些条款与报告的特点,我国在今后的国际税收情报交换工作中,应更多地从被请求国的立场维护自身权益,没必要盲目追循OECD的激进做法,并应特别注意保护纳税人的权利。     

国际税收情报交换的最新动态和启示

近年来,国际社会在税收情报交换领域采取了一系列重大行动,主要表现在:谈签税收情报交换协议成为国际税收合作的新趋势;OECD全面修订情报交换条款;税收情报交换成为全球税收论坛主题等。我国也应遵循国际惯例,谈签税收情报交换协议,维护国家权益并用好税收情报交换手段,提高国际税源管理质量。     

税收透明度和情报交换国际标准的建立及中国的应对

由于OECD反有害税收竞争运动的相关措施太过激进,因此在各国的普遍反对下,该运动的重心转为增强税法透明度和促进税收情报交换.2002年OECD全球税收论坛公布的《税收情报交换协议范本》确立了税收透明度和情报交换的高标准,这一标准后来因得到20国集团及联合国的认可而成为税收透明度和情报交换的国际标准.我国应审时度势,不进行可能有损我国利益的超出国际标准要求的情报交换,同时应尽量扩大情报交换网络,谈判修改双边税收协定中的情报交换条款.     

欧盟税收情报交换制度及启示

欧盟建立的税收情报交换法律制度基本上和OECD税收协定范本保持一致,而且更加细化和具可操作性。其特点是建立了丰富的情报交换方式,并实现了税收情报交换的电子化。它对在我国内地与香港、澳门地区间构建完善的税收情报交换制度提供了参考。     

OECD《税收透明度的阶跃提升》报告介绍与借鉴

税收情报交换和提升税收透明度是国际税收征管合作的重要形式之一,正日益引起世界各国税务当局的高度重视并取得了很大进展。2013年6月,经济合作与发展组织(OECD)发布《税收透明度的阶跃提升》研究报告。报告概述了世界多个国家和地区利用自动情报交换加强国际税收征管合作的情况,重点介绍了多边自动情报交换范本的要点及实施步骤。本文介绍了报告的主要内容,并提出了加强我国税收情报交换工作的建议。     

税收情报交换制度中的纳税人权利保护

税收情报交换制度作为各国间合作的主要机制之一,在国际反避税领域发挥了重要的作用,然而在此过程中,主管机关对纳税人的权利保护往往略显不足。本文在简要介绍我国税收情报交换中保护纳税人权利现有规定的基础上,介绍了OECD的有关经验,并有针对性地对我国加强税收情报交换中纳税人权利保护提出了建议。     

OECD将利比里亚和马绍尔群岛从避税地黑名单中撤出

鉴于利比里亚和马绍尔群岛已承诺提高税收透明度,并建立有效的税收情报交换制度,OECD于2007年8月7日宣布,将上述两国从不合作避税地的黑名单中撤出。据悉,     

后BEPS时代国际税收情报交换与反避税治理研究

自BEPS行动计划实施以来，国际税收情报交换进入全新发展阶段，成为打击跨境避税和偷逃税的重要工具。全球100多个国家（地区）之间形成了大规模信息交换关系，为开展国际反避税共同行动提供了有益支持。但是，鉴于税收情报交换自身的局限性以及实践中的各类偏误，国际税收情报交换存在的多种现实问题仍有待进一步解决。在参与国际税收情报交换的过程中，我国既迎来国际反避税治理机遇，也面临税收情报交换合作的现实挑战。基于此，本文从构建境内外一体化税收情报分析体系、综合协调税收情报交换与其他国际反避税措施、共建“一带一路”税收情报交换反避税合作三个方面，为我国加强国际税收情报交换反避税治理提出建议。     

关于我国国际税收情报交换工作的思考

目前,国际税收情报交换在跨国税收征管工作中发挥着越来越重要的作用,成为遏制跨国纳税人避税行为的有效手段之一。本文首先简单地介绍了国际税收情报交换的概念和作用,然后分析了我国国际税收情报交换工作中存在的一些问题,最后得出完善我国国际税收情报交换工作的一些建议。     

OECD修改情报交换条款的介绍及简要评价

经过两年努力,OECD财政事务委员会第8工作组完成了对税收协定范本第26条即情报交换条款及其注释的全面审议和修改,以反映经济全球化的最新发展,为国际税收合作提供更合理更有效的法律平台。这次修改不仅面广,而且体现了一些新的理念,对今后情报工作的开展必然会产生深刻的影响。     

美国税收情报交换的经验与借鉴

税收情报交换是国际税收征管合作的重要形式之一,对经济全球化背景下打击跨国偷、逃税具有积极的意义。本文详细介绍了美国税收情报交换的机构设置、人员职责以及操作程序,并提出了学习借鉴美国经验以改进我国情报交换工作的建议。     

With which countries do tax havens share information?

In recent years tax havens and offshore financial centres have come under increasing political pressure to cooperate with other countries in matters of taxation and efforts to crowd back tax evasion and avoidance. As a result many tax havens have signed tax information exchange agreements (TIEAs). In order to comply with OECD standards tax havens are obliged to sign at least 12 TIEAs with other countries. This paper investigates how tax havens have chosen their partner countries. We ask whether they have signed TIEAs with countries to which they have strong economic links or whether they have systematically avoided doing this, so that information exchange remains ineffective. We analyse 565 TIEAs signed by tax havens in the years 2008–2011 and find that on average tax havens have signed more TIEAs with countries to which they have stronger economic links. Our analysis thus suggests that tax havens do not systematically undermine tax information exchange by signing TIEAs with irrelevant countries. However, this does not mean that they exchange information with all important partner countries.     

国际税收情报交换:发展与困境的思考

本文回顾了国际税收情报交换各种规范和内容的发展变化,对存在的问题及原因进行了分析,指出除了情报交换的技术性障碍以外,最根本的是情报交换中政府与企业之间、主权国家之间以及国家个体和国际组织之间的利益冲突,也即情报交换存在效率与公平问题。最后,文章对如何通过创新情报交换的制度和组织形式解决上述问题提出了构想。     

我国税收情报交换中存在的主要问题及建议

税收情报交换是目前跨国税收征管合作中最重要和最有效的手段之一,对发现和查处跨国偷避税行为具有不可替代的作用。本文首先介绍了我国税收情报交换工作的特点,然后对存在的问题提出了有针对性的解决方法。     

Incentives and Information Exchange in International Taxation

The exchange of taxpayer-specific information between national tax authorities has recently emerged as a key and controversial topic in international tax policy discussions, most notably with the OECD's harmful tax practices project and the EU's savings tax initiative. This paper analyzes the effects of information exchange and withholding taxes, recognizing that countries which agree to exchange information do not forfeit the ability to levy withholding taxes, and also focusing in particular on the effects of innovative revenue-sharing arrangements. Amongst the findings are that: (i) the transfer of withholding tax receipts to the residence country, as planned in the European Union, has no effect on equilibrium tax rates, but acts purely as a lump-sum transfer; (ii) in contrast, allocating some of the revenue from information exchange to the source country—counter to usual practice (though no less so than the EU agreement)—would have adverse strategic effects on total revenue; (iii) nevertheless, any withholding tax regime is Pareto dominated by information exchange combined with appropriate revenue sharing; and, in particular, (iv) sharing of the additional revenues raised from information provided, while efficiency-reducing, could be in the interests of large countries as a means of persuading small countries to provide that information voluntarily. JEL Code: H77, H87, F42     

Exchange-of-Information Clauses in International Tax Treaties

This paper examines bilateral double taxation treaties, with an emphasis on information exchange among tax authorities. A major objective is to understand which countries are more likely to sign a tax-relief treaty and when information-exchange clauses will be added to a treaty. A simple model with two asymmetric countries and repeated interactions among governments is used. The paper shows that no information exchange clause may be added to a tax treaty when there is a reciprocity requirement, when there is a high cost of negotiation, when there is a cost of providing information, or with one-way capital flows. It is also shown that an information clause increases the gains from a tax relief treaty, but may make it less sustainable.     

Residence-Based Capital Taxation in a Small Open Economy: Why Information is Voluntarily Exchanged and Why it is Not

The issue of capital tax competition is viewed to be unproblematic if residence-based capital-taxation exists. However, the sustainability of residence-based capital taxation depends on the exchange of information about foreign financial investments between tax authorities. This paper analyzes the incentives of tax authorities to voluntarily provide information. We show that voluntary information exchange is an equilibrium in a standard small-country model of tax competition, whereas it may not be an equilibrium when the size of the financial sector has a positive impact on the wage structure of an economy.     

非处罚性监管与公司税收规避——基于财务报告问询函的证据

本文基于税收规避视角研究中国制度背景下问询函性质非处罚性监管的经济后果。实证结果发现:财务报告问询函可以抑制公司税收规避行为,且财务报告问询函总数越多、针对同一财务报告问询次数越多、财务报告问询函问题数量越多,意味着问询函监管强度越高,公司税收规避降低幅度越大。同时,从细分特征来看,当财务报告问询函涉及税收或研发相关内容时,公司税收规避程度更低。进一步地,在融资约束程度较低和税收征管强度较高的公司中,税收规避程度较低,问询函的监管效果较好。     

The distribution of information in speculative markets: a natural experiment

We use a unique natural experiment to shed light on the distribution of information in speculative markets. In June 2011, Betfair – a UK betting exchange – levied a tax of up to 60% on all future profits accrued by the top 0.1% of profitable traders. Such a move appears to have driven at least some of these traders off the exchange, taking their information with them. We investigate the effect of the new tax on the forecasting capacity of the exchange (our measure of the market's incorporation of information into the price). We find that there was scant decline in the forecasting capacity of the exchange – relative to a control market – suggesting that the bulk of information had hitherto been held by the majority of traders, rather than the select few affected by the rule change. This result is robust to the choice of forecasting measure, the choice of forecasting interval, and the choice of race type. This provides evidence that more than a few traders are typically involved in the price discovery process in speculative markets.