浅析吉林省非正规金融的发展

非正规金融是指非法定的金融机构（非正规金融部门）所提供的间接融资以及个人之间、个人和企业之间的直接融资。近年来,随着吉林省农村经济结构和产业结构的不断调整与变化,农村经济日益活跃,农民对贷款的需求也在增加。但由于受吉林省农村信用社贷款的范围和额度的限制,很多农户对资金的需求不能得到充分满足,这促使非正规金融在农村的快速发展。规范吉林省非正规金融的发展,对全面推进新农村建设具有重要意义。     

浅析吉林省非正规金融的发展

非正规金融是指非法定的金融机构(非正规金融部门)所提供的间接融资以及个人之间、个人和企业之间的直接融资.近年来,随着吉林省农村经济结构和产业结构的不断调整与变化,农村经济日益活跃,农民对贷款的需求也在增加.但由于受吉林省农村信用社贷款的范围和额度的限制,很多农户对资金的需求不能得到充分满足,这促使非正规金融在农村的快速发展.规范吉林省非正规金融的发展,对全面推进新农村建设具有重要意义.     

论农村正规金融与非正规金融的竞争与合作

非正规金融一直都作为一股强劲的草根力量活跃在金融市场,特别是农村金融市场.如何正确看待农村正规金融与非正规金融之间的竞争,并且利用非正规金融的优势发展正规金融,成为一个值得研究的新问题.本文在调查基础上,从非正规金融对正规金融的冲击入手,分析了非正规金融的相对优势,阐述了两种金融的几种合作模式以及效果.     

信息、非正规金融与中小企业融资

各种形式的非正规金融在发展中国家和地区广泛存在。本文认为,由于中小企业信息不透明,且常常不能提供充分的担保或抵押,正规金融机构难以有效克服信息不对称造成的逆向选择问题,而非正规金融则在收集关于中小企业的“软信息”方面具有优势。这种信息优势是非正规金融广泛存在的根本性原因,金融抑制只是一个强化因素,同时非正规金融市场的各种特征也都源于其存在的根本逻辑。本文构建了一个包括异质的中小企业借款者和异质的贷款者(具有不同信息结构的非正规金融和正规金融部门)的金融市场模型,证明非正规金融的存在能够改进整个信贷市场的资金配置效率。     

正规金融与非正规金融合作会提高农户期望收益吗?——理论分析和实证检验

文章区分三种不同的市场结构从理论上分析了农户、正规金融机构和非正规金融机构三个主体的决策行为和期望收益,认为只有在正规金融部门与非正规金融部门共存且实现合作的市场中,农户的融资需求才能得到有效满足,农户的期望收益才能最大化。文章还利用遍布我国东、中、西部地区近10 000家农户的实地调研数据进行实证检验,为建立正规金融与非正规金融间的合作机制提供了经验证据。     

正规金融、非正规金融对家户福利的影响——来自中国农村的证据

金融抑制是发展中国家所面临的重要约束,其可能给家户福利和生产活动带来损失。金融约束不仅来自于正规金融,也来自于非正规金融。利用区域转换模型,本文从两个方面论证了正规金融与非正规金融对家户福利的不同作用。实证分析表明,正规金融约束的家户采用新的农业生产技术受到限制,非农经营的效应也更低,而社会资本在一定程度上对正规金融形成了替代,弥补了其部分功能。受到非正规金融约束的家户,社会资本的功能被弱化,但采用新的农业生产技术的作用以及参与农业生产合作组织的作用由于得到正规金融的支持而更强。正规金融与非正规金融大致存在一种替代关系,农村正规金融在满足生产发展尤其是非农业生产发展的需要方面发挥着重要作用,而基于社会资本的非正规金融主要对于缓冲收入冲击起着更重要的作用。     

农户信贷市场的正规部门与非正规部门:替代还是互补?

基于2013年浙江省987尸农户调查数据,本文采用四元probit模型在同时控制住农户信贷需求及另一个部门信贷供给影响的基础上,实证考察农户信贷市场中正规与非正规部门之间的关系。研究发现:(1)正规部门与非正规部门存在互补关系,且这种关系在贷款对象为富裕群体时更加明显。(2)互补关系具体体现在农户同时参与正规与非正规两个信贷部门,两个部门同时提供生产性贷款与消费性贷款以及共同支持某一借款者。(3)两个部门实现互补的内在原因是它们各具比较优势,且能够策略性地利用对方行为所反映出的信息来制定贷款决策。上述发现为认识农户信贷市场部门之间的关系,并在此基础上设计、完善相关农村信贷政策提供了新的思路和经验证据。     

浅析我国农村的非正规金融

我国的农村金融可以分为正规金融、非正股金融和准正规金融三个类别,在有正规金融的情况下农户为什么要选择非正规金融？非正规金融存在的理由和作用又是什么？本文从非正规金融与正规金融的关系和非正规金融地位以及作用等方面阐述了非正规金融存在的必然性。     

浅析我国农村的非正规金融

我国的农村金融可以分为正规金融、非正股金融和准正规金融三个类别,在有正规金融的情况下农户为什么要选择非正规金融?非正规金融存在的理由和作用又是什么?本文从非正规金融与正规金融的关系和非正规金融地位以及作用等方面阐述了非正规金融存在的必然性.     

经济增长受企业寻租及非正规金融的影响研究——基于金融管制的分析

本文通过将金融部门和政府部门纳入罗默的内生增长模型来研究企业寻租、非正规金融及金融管制对经济增长的影响。结果表明:非正规金融的存在提高了企业的融资能力和利润率;加强正规及非正规金融部门的竞争程度有利于存贷利差的缩小和经济增长率的提升;而设租寻租行为会给经济带来负面影响,且租金的增加将阻碍金融竞争。因此,要促进经济增长,应严厉惩治寻租,引导非正规金融健康发展并增强金融体系的竞争程度。     

Interaction of formal and informal financial markets in quasi-emerging market economies

The primary objective of this paper is to investigate the interaction of formal and informal financial markets and their impact on economic activity in quasi-emerging market economies. Using a four-sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with asymmetric information in the formal financial sector, we come up with three fundamental findings. First, we demonstrate that formal and informal financial sector loans are complementary in the aggregate, suggesting that an increase in the use of formal financial sector credit creates additional productive capacity that requires more informal financial sector credit to maintain equilibrium. Second, it is shown that interest rates in the formal and informal financial sectors do not always change together in the same direction. We demonstrate that in some instances, interest rates in the two sectors change in diametrically opposed directions with the implication that the informal financial sector may frustrate monetary policy, the extent of which depends on the size of the informal financial sector. Thus, the larger the size of the informal financial sector the lower the likely impact of monetary policy on economic activity. Third, the model shows that the risk factor (probability of success) for both high and low risk borrowers plays an important role in determining the magnitude by which macroeconomic indicators respond to shocks.     

Vertical Links Between Formal and Informal Financial Institutions

The paper investigates vertical linkages between formal and informal financial institutions. Specifically, it studies a policy that expands formal credit to informal lenders, in the hope that this will improve loan terms for borrowers who are shut out of the formal sector. Special attention is paid to the Philippines. It is argued that the effects of stronger vertical links depend on the form of lender competition. In particular, if the relationship between lenders is one of strategic cooperation (sustained by threats of reprisal in a repeated setting), an expansion of formal credit may worsen the terms faced by informal borrowers.     

金融腐败:非规范融资行为的交易特征和体制动因

本文以改革进程中的非规范融资交易为研究对象 ,通过银行 -借款企业动态博弈和经验研究 ,归纳如下主要结论 :第一 ,在金融交易中 ,金融机构的腐败体现为利用资金配置权进行的两类寻租行为 ;第二 ,银行的寻租程度取决于改革进程中中央银行和财政对银行的转移支付和内控制度建设的相对力度比较 ,因而遏制融资腐败的方法是严格转移支付纪律 ,加强内控制度 ;第三 ,企业借款行为是在自筹资金和银行借款间进行的相对成本比较 ,企业被动选择行贿 (交租 ) ,因而其真实融资成本远远高于名义法定金融机构贷款利率 ;第四 ,由于存在转移支付机制 ,企业与银行的非规范金融交易的实质是对中央银行和财政转移支付的分割 ;第五 ,根据以上结论 ,民间借贷与正规金融价格实际是均衡的 ,不能简单定义民间借贷是高利贷 ,如果如此定义 ,则正规金融也同样具备高利贷特征。     

Economic liberalization, capital mobility and informal wage in a small open economy: A theoretical analysis

Empirical evidence suggests that the size of the informal sector in the developing countries has increased considerably during the liberalized economic regime. The present paper purports to analyze the consequences of economic reforms on the wellbeing of the informal sector workforce using a three-sector general equilibrium model with two informal sectors. The theoretical analysis finds that different liberalized policies produce diverse effects on the informal wage and that these results are independent of the nature of capital mobility between the informal and the formal sectors. It also shows that labour market reforms, contrary to the common wisdom, are likely to produce favourable effects on the informal wage.     

Corruption in a model of vertical linkage between formal and informal credit sources and credit subsidy policy

The present note develops a model of vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets highlighting the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit. The existing dominant moneylender, the bank official and the new moneylenders move sequentially. The existing moneylender acts as a Stackelberg leader and unilaterally decides on the informal interest rate. We show that there may arise a case where an increase in the supply of formal credit results in an increase in the informal interest rate under reasonable parametric restrictions. This shows that apart from (i) asymmetric information on the part of informal sector lenders (Bose, 1998), (ii) an increase in the probability of default of all informal sector lenders (Hoff and Stiglitz 1997), and the (iii) possibility of informal lenders to collude (Floro and Ray 1997), the presence of corruption in the distribution of formal credit might be another factor responsible for the policy of vertical linkage to break down.     

信用与经济增长关系实证研究——基于多层次视角的VAR分析

信用与经济增长之间存在复杂的内在联系。文章利用1990-2007年中国经济数据,实证分析了信用规模及结构与经济增长的关系。结果表明:不同层次的信用规模与经济增长之间存在长期均衡关系且为正相关关系;与非金融部门相比,金融部门信用规模的变化对实际GDP增长的正向影响更大;各层次信用规模与经济增长之间只存在单向因果关系,即经济增长对各层次信用规模的变化有显著的正向效应,而各层次信用规模的变化均未显著影响经济增长。     

Informality,enforcement and growth

This paper develops a two-sector growth model with formal and informal sectors for an economy that cares about redistribution and illustrates its relationship with the enforcement level. The technology gap and labour rigidity explicate the duality. The state can tax the formal sector to subsidise informal income and finance public infrastructure. Alternatively, enforcement, which is costly and corresponds to a variety of discrete components from the security of property rights and integrity of contracts to control of corruptions, can be chosen to favour the formal sector and discourage the informal sector. It is observed that weaker enforcement required to accommodate some degree of informality, which releases tax burden from the formal sector needed for redistribution, can accelerate growth rate. However, sufficiently weaker enforcement dampens the formal sector expansion and growth rate. The growth rate registers an inverted-U shaped relationship against the enforcement level. The optimum enforcement can, however, be higher without formal labour union and subsidisation. This must be higher for welfare maximisation than that of growth rate, especially when the consumer cares about the quality of enforcement.     

我国农村正规金融与非正规金融效率分析

高效率的金融制度对经济发展提供强有力的资金支持,可以提高经济的总体竞争力,促进经济增长。对农村信用社、农业银行、农业发展银行和邮政储蓄银行等正规金融机构和村镇银行、小额贷款公司等非正规金融组织的效率进行调查,从资金配置效率、适应性效率和运行效率方面进行分析,结果显示：正规金融制度的效率偏低,非正规金融组织的效率偏高;两种金融制度的效率有各自的空间,在规模和范围较小时,非正规金融制度效率更高,而超出一定的发展范围和规模,正规金融制度的优越性则进一步凸显。     

International factor mobility,informal interest rate and capital market imperfection: A general equilibrium analysis

This paper makes an attempt to provide a theory of determination of interest rate in the informal credit market in a less developed economy in terms of a three-sector static deterministic general equilibrium model. There are two informal sectors which obtain production loans from a monopolistic moneylender and employ labour from the informal labour market. On the other hand, the formal sector employs labour at an institutionally fixed wage rate and takes loans from the competitive formal credit market. We show that an inflow of foreign capital and/or an emigration of labour raises (lowers) the informal (formal) interest rate but lowers the competitive wage rate in the informal labour market when the informal manufacturing sector is more capital-intensive vis-à-vis the informal agricultural sector. International factor mobility, therefore, raises the degrees of distortions in both the factor markets in this case.