The effects of cross-regional free trade agreements under a vertical industry structure

This paper examines the effects of a cross-regional free trade agreement (FTA) on tariffs, welfare, and the incentives for multilateral free trade in a three-country model with a vertical industry structure. We show that the FTA induces member countries to reduce their tariffs on nonmember countries. On the other hand, a nonmember country lowers its tariff on final-good imports, but raises its tariff on intermediate-good imports. Also, the FTA makes member and nonmember countries better off. After the FTA is enacted, member and nonmember countries have an incentive to support multilateral free trade, so an FTA acts as a building block for multilateral trade liberalization.     

Bilateralism, multilateralism, and the quest for global free trade

We develop an equilibrium theory of trade agreements in which both the degree and the nature (bilateral or multilateral) of trade liberalization are endogenously determined. To determine whether and how bilateralism matters, we also analyze a scenario where countries pursue trade liberalization on only a multilateral basis. We find that when countries have asymmetric endowments or when governments value producer interests more than tariff revenue and consumer surplus, there exist circumstances where global free trade is a stable equilibrium only if countries are free to pursue bilateral trade agreements. By contrast, under symmetry, both bilateralism and multilateralism yield global free trade.     

Endogenous free trade agreements and the multilateral trading system

I evaluate in this paper the impact of free trade areas (FTAs) on the world trading system. I use an oligopolistic-political-economy model where the external tariffs of FTA members, as well as the decision to form FTAs, are endogenously determined. In this context, I show that FTAs are primarily beneficial to the multilateral trading system. This conclusion is based, first, upon the finding that FTAs induce their member governments to lower their external tariffs, and to do so deeply enough to enhance trade even between FTA members and non-members. While this ensures gains for the latter, in general FTA members may not gain. I show, however, that governments will endorse only welfare-improving arrangements, in spite of their political motivations; as a result, FTA members benefit from ratified arrangements as well. Finally, I find that FTAs, by reducing the role of special interests criteria in governments' trade regime decisions, also tend to enhance support for further liberalization at the multilateral level.     

Do free trade agreements actually increase members' international trade?

For over 40 years, the gravity equation has been a workhorse for cross-country empirical analyses of international trade flows and — in particular — the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on trade flows. However, the gravity equation is subject to the same econometric critique as earlier cross-industry studies of U.S. tariff and nontariff barriers and U.S. multilateral imports: trade policy is not an exogenous variable. We address econometrically the endogeneity of FTAs. Although instrumental-variable and control-function approaches do not adjust for endogeneity well, a panel approach does. Accounting econometrically for the FTA variable's endogeneity yields striking empirical results: the effect of FTAs on trade flows is quintupled. We find that, on average, an FTA approximately doubles two members' bilateral trade after 10 years.     

EU Anti‐dumping and Tariff Cuts: Trade Policy Substitution?

The world trading system in its current form aims at reducing multilateral trade barriers across the board. Indeed, the last successfully concluded multilateral trade negotiations led to substantial tariff concessions on the part of most developed economies. What, however, happened to other forms of import protection? Have substantial tariff concessions subsequently been replaced by the use of alternative forms of import protection? In this paper we empirically investigate the relationship between negotiated external tariff cuts and the subsequent use of anti‐dumping actions by the EU. Evidence is found for larger Uruguay Round tariff cuts increasing the probability of subsequent anti‐dumping investigations.     

Multilateral stability and efficiency of trade agreements: A network formation approach

We study the endogenous network formation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements by means of hypergraphs and introduce the equilibrium concept of multilateral stability. We consider multicountry settings with a firm in each country that produces a homogeneous good and competes as a Cournot oligopolist in each market. Under endogenous tariffs, we find that a multilateral trade agreement governing the rules and norms of tariff setting, that is the WTO/GATT regime itself, together with a bilateral preferential trade agreement (PTA) is multilaterally stable. We also find that the existence of the WTO is necessary for the stability of the trading system. We further analyse the impact of PTAs on multilateral tariffs within the WTO. We find that the formation of PTAs increases countries' incentives for multilateral tariff reduction.     

Trade-diverting free trade agreements,external tariffs,and feasibility

There has been a proliferation of preferential trade agreements within the last two decades. This paper analyzes the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on external tariffs in small economies where protection decisions are made politically. Our model determines tariff rates endogenously instead of assuming they are fixed during or after the formation of FTAs as commonly done in the literature. We show that when an FTA is established, the tariff rates that apply to non-members essentially decline. More importantly, we investigate the interaction between endogenous tariff determination and the feasibility of an FTA. We find that the expectation of tariff reductions under endogenous tariffs could make an otherwise feasible FTA if tariffs were fixed become infeasible. However, if domestic import-competing sectors are relatively smaller and the government places a significant weight on political contributions relative to social welfare, an FTA with endogenous tariffs may be more likely to be feasible than an FTA assumed to fix external tariffs.     

Tariffs and formation of free trade agreements networks

This paper examines the formation of bilateral free trade agreements (FTAs) on the basis of country heterogeneity in the tariff level. We demonstrate that a country's unilateral incentive to form an FTA depends on the relative magnitudes of the (negative) market concession effect and the (positive) market expansion effect, both of which are determined by the tariff levels of the two FTA partner countries. Global welfare is maximised when all country pairs form FTAs. Two countries in equilibrium are more likely to form an FTA when their tariff gap is smaller or when their tariff levels are neither very high nor very low. This finding is robust to several extensions of the model. Our preliminary empirical analysis provides some evidence for the finding.     

Dispensing with NAFTA Rules of Origin? Some Policy Options

The objective of this paper is to use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) methodology to estimate the economic gains, for both Canada and Mexico, of: (1) adopting a North American customs union (CU) that would also liberalise rules of origin (ROO); and (2) reviving the WTO scenario of multilateral free trade, thereby eliminating preferential commerce and thus the need for preferential ROO across free trade agreements (FTAs). Such a CGE methodology is useful as the approach permits computation of an efficiency (or ex post) cost of ROO that might, in some contexts, be more relevant than the existing ex ante indices of ROO restrictiveness, which are unable to account for the fact that the use of preferential access in an FTA (and the concomitant ROO compliance) is an option, not an obligation. The paper shows that the erosion of NAFTA tariff preferences at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, which resulted from a different phasing of the NAFTA and Uruguay Round measures, has reduced the efficiency cost of NAFTA ROO, making these rules economically less relevant, especially for Canada, and therefore limiting somewhat the gains from liberalising them through a CU. Given this, the WTO scenario of multilateral free trade remains the approach that would deliver the largest economic gains in terms of GDP and welfare, while making preferential commerce and ROO obsolete.     

Trade policy of a free trade agreement in the presence of foreign lobbying

This paper studies the effect of foreign lobbies on trade policy of a country which is a member of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). It uses a monopolistically competitive political economy model in which the government determines external tariffs endogenously. The effect of foreign lobbying under the FTA is examined empirically using Canadian industry-level trade data that allow differentiating of lobby groups by the country of origin. The analysis suggests that the presence of foreign lobbying has a significant effect on the domestic trade policy. The heterogeneity of foreign lobbies is also important: the presence of an organized lobbying group in an FTA partner country tends to raise trade barriers while an organized lobbying group of exporters from outside of the FTA is associated with less protection.     

Formula Approaches for Market Access Negotiations

Most of the large tariff reductions achieved in multilateral trade negotiations have involved tariff–cutting formulas such as the ‘Swiss’ formula. However, wide variations in initial tariff rates between active participants call for new approaches under the Doha Development Agenda. This paper surveys a range of formula options and examines both targeted and flexible applications of the Swiss formula that target tariff escalation and peaks, and would allow policy makers to directly target how far they will move towards free trade, while providing some flexibility for trading off reductions in peak tariffs against reductions in lower–tariff sectors.     

Foreign direct investment and customs union: Incentives for multilateral tariff cooperation over free trade

The present article examines the implications of a customs union (CU) on the pattern of tariffs, welfare and the prospects for free trade when the non-member firm has an incentive to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). First, I show that upon the formation of a bilateral CU, the non-member firm has greater incentives to engage in FDI. However, when FDI becomes a feasible entry option for the non- member firm under a CU, member countries have incentives to strategically induce export over FDI by lowering their joint external tariff. When fixed set-up cost of FDI is sufficiently low, this tariff falls below Kemp–Wan tariff and CU leads to a Pareto improvement relative to no agreement. Moreover, using an infinite repetition of the one-shot tariff game under a CU, I show that the presence of FDI incentive of the non-member firm makes the member countries more willing to cooperate multilaterally over free trade while the opposite is true for the non-member country. Finally, I find that, unless fixed cost of having an additional plant is sufficiently low, multilateral cooperation over free trade is easier to sustain when FDI incentive is present.     

Exporting out of poverty: Provincial poverty in Vietnam and U.S. market access

Can a developing country reduce poverty by gaining increased market access to a large, rich country? The 2001 U.S.–Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) provides an excellent opportunity to examine this question as, unlike other bilateral trade agreements, the U.S. tariff cuts were not influenced by Vietnamese industries. Using variation in the structure of the labor force across provinces prior to the trade agreement, I construct provincial measures of U.S. tariffs. To address concerns over confounding trends between changes in provincial poverty and changes in provincial tariffs I follow two approaches: controlling for trends based on observable initial conditions and differencing away time invariant trends using pre-BTA data. I find that provinces that were more exposed to the U.S. tariff cuts experienced faster decreases in poverty between 2002 and 2004. Additionally, I document that the movement of workers across provinces is limited in scale, particularly for those with low levels of education. Finally, I show that the most exposed provinces experienced faster wage growth for workers with low levels of education, but not for highly educated workers.     

Free trade areas,the limit of Rules of Origin,and optimal tariff reductions under international oligopoly: A welfare analysis

In this article we analyze the economic effects associated with preferential Rules of Origin (RoO) in a free trade area (FTA). By presenting a stylized three-country model of trade under oligopoly, we show that there exists a maximum limit of RoO below which forming an FTA is welfare-improving. In examining external tariff reductions under FTA, we take into account the constrained conditions that optimal tariffs set by member countries effectively induce the intrabloc exporters to comply with RoO. This approach rules out trade regime switches and helps identify the economic determinants of establishing an effective and welfare-improving FTA with RoO. We further examine whether an FTA with RoO increases total trade or whether the extra trade arises at the expense of nonmembers. Our simple model has implications for economic factors that foster or impede regional economic integration under imperfect completion.     

Tokyo round tariff reductions and the less developed countries

This paper presents new evaluations of the multilateral trade negotiations from the perspectives of (1) the objectives established by GATT signatories in the Tokyo Declaration, and (2) the LDCs’ goals for the negotiations. It also attempts to resolve some of the controversy over the gains and losses which MFN tariff reductions would generate for LDC exports, some but not all of which receive preferential access to advanced-country markets. The analysis indicates that even minor improvements in tariff preferences would have been superior to or have compensated for MFN tariff cuts.     

Heterogeneous firm-level responses to trade liberalization: A test using stock price reactions

This paper presents novel empirical evidence on key predictions of heterogeneous firm models by examining stock market reactions to the Canada–United States Free Trade Agreement of 1989 (CUSFTA). I derive testable predictions for a class of models based on Melitz (2003). Using the uncertainty surrounding CUSFTA's ratification, I show that the pattern of abnormal returns of Canadian manufacturing firms was strongly consistent with predictions related to export (U.S.) tariff reductions, but less so with predictions related to import (Canadian) tariff reductions. Lower Canadian tariffs did have an effect through the implied reduction in intermediate input tariffs, however.     

On the Path to Trade Liberalisation: Political Regimes in Trade Negotiations

The number of free trade agreements (FTA) has increased substantially since 1990 despite efforts to promote multilateral trade liberalisation. While there is evidence on the determinants of FTA formation, still little is known on the processing of trade agreements, particularly regarding the pre‐implementation duration. This paper fills the research gap by using event data on the negotiation, the signing and the implementation of trade agreements. Duration analysis is employed to examine the connection between regime types and the lengths of the negotiation and the ratification stages. The results support the claim that higher levels of democratisation are associated with shorter negotiations, while political constraints lead to delays. Moreover, the depth of an agreement matters: a higher number of WTO‐X and WTO+ provisions do not only prolong the negotiation stage, but also the subsequent ratification. Against the background of potential anticipation effects of trade agreements, these results are of interest for exporting firms that assess the timing of implementation.     

Chile's Trade and Regional Integration Policy: An Assessment

This paper examines the economics, politics and political economy of Chile's trade and regional integration (RI) policies, and reaches the following conclusions. First, Chile is likely to obtain static and dynamic benefits from a free trade agreement (FTA) with the US, though the benefits depend crucially on the extent to which its market access to the US improves and on the costs of implementing the intellectual property rights agreement and of enforcing the rules of origin. Second, potential benefits are more doubtful with respect to FTAs with MERCOSUR and the Andean Pact and Central American countries.Third, Chile should complement its ongoing negotiations with the EU by negotiating FTAs with key Asian countries.Fourth, Chile should bind all its tariffs at the WTO at the applied MFN uniform tariff rate. Fifth, the uniform MFN tariff should be reduced below six percent after 2003.     

中韩自由贸易区建立对两国贸易影响的实证分析

文章以局部均衡为基础,建立校准模型,从产业层面测算了中韩自由贸易区的建立对两国贸易流量的影响。模拟的结果表明:如果中韩不建立自由贸易区,那么中韩贸易将会较大程度的受到韩美自由贸易区贸易转移带来的影响;如果中韩建立自由贸易区则更有利于两国比较优势的发挥。     

自由贸易与贸易保护主义——公平与效率问题

当今世界 ,贸易自由化成为世界经济发展的主流 ,降低关税和非关税壁垒成为各国双边和多边谈判的主要议题。自由贸易与贸易保护主义的争论由来已久 ,自由贸易的效率以及产生的不公平问题用“补偿原则”来解决是存在局限性的 ,所以 ,自由贸易和贸易保护主义之间政策的权衡十分必要。解决贸易自由化中不公平的问题应从政府制定规则、完善社会保障和建立社会道德标准三方面加以着手。