Disinflation programs under policy uncertainty

This paper uses a model with endogenous labor supply to study exchange rate-based inflation stabilization programs under uncertainty regarding the duration of the program. The paper finds that the output and consumption dynamics induced by these programs are extremely sensitive to whether the programs are perceived to have a chance of continuing permanently or whether they are expected to end in finite time. It is shown that the business cycle dynamics for output that are typically associated with these programs arise only when the policy is expected to collapse in finite time. Furthermore, for the purposes of rationalizing the stylized facts, the uncertain duration channel appears to induce a fundamental tension between the consumption dynamics and the current account dynamics. These results raise doubts regarding the explanatory power of the uncertain duration channel in particular and the credibility channel in general.     

Production uncertainty and trade policy commitment

Agricultural markets are characterized by production and marketing lags. Uncertainty is also an inherent feature of agricultural markets. This paper investigates if two policy active importers will choose to commit to their import levels or keep the flexibility to revise their ex-ante import levels once production decisions are made and the uncertainty is resolved. This is the constant dilemma faced by prospective WTO members. We assume production in both importing countries is subject to an asymmetric random shock. We show that a government will not want to commit to its import level when there is a high degree of uncertainty in production. However, an importing country is likely to commit to a trade policy in equilibrium although the equilibrium may be Pareto dominated. Under certain conditions, an equilibrium in which one country commits to its ex-ante import level while the other chooses the flexibility option can emerge. In this setting, international trade agreements play an important role.     

Non-traded goods and optimal trade policy in a cash-in-advance economy

This paper develops a standard trade model of a small open monetary economy with two traded and one non-traded goods. Money is introduced through a generalized cash-in-advance constraint where the share of goods purchases that must be made using cash, varies across sectors. We find that free trade may be harmful so that alternative policy instruments may be considered to improve welfare. In addition, we study and compare the optimal tariff formula and the optimal consumption tax structure. In the presence of a monetary distortion of the non-traded good, a consumption tax may not Pareto dominate a tariff although the latter bears an additional production burden. This corroborates the theory of second best.     

Ten Years of China＇s Accession to the WTO and Changes of Global Multilateral Trading System

China＇s accession to the World Trade Organization has been for ten years. This paper reviews the reform and development after China＇s accession to the World Trade Organization. In the past ten years, C...     

中国入世10周年与全球多边贸易体制的变化

本文回顾了中国加入世界贸易组织10年来的改革与发展历程,指出中国对全球多边贸易体制的主要贡献在于推动国际经贸发展、反对贸易保护主义、忠实履行多边贸易规则、努力协调多边贸易谈判、积极参与多边贸易机制建设以及切实维护发展中国家利益。10年来,多边贸易体制的变迁主要表现为力量结构、议题结构及外部透明度的变化。展望未来,多边贸易体制的改革应重在制度建设与反对贸易保护主义。基于加入世界贸易组织以来的实践经验,本文得出了我国参与全球经济治理的几点启示。     

The determinants and consequences of across-the-board trade restrictions in the U.S. economy

This paper examines the effect of macroeconomic fluctuations in the determination of across-the-board trade restrictions in the U.S. economy.

The empirical results reported show that generalized trade intervention is most immediately affected by wealth transfer abroad through the trade balance and not by a slowing in employment growth. Furthermore, trade restrictions are associated with a decline in the stock market and aggregate employment.     

The effects of loss aversion on trade policy: Theory and evidence

We study the implications of loss aversion for trade policy determination and show how it allows us to explain a number of important and puzzling features of trade policy. Some important questions concerning trade policy are why a disproportionate share of protection goes to declining industries and why trade policy has an anti-trade bias. We show that if individual preferences exhibit sufficient loss aversion, higher protection will be given to sectors in which profitability is declining. We also show that if the coefficient of loss aversion is large enough, there will be an anti-trade bias in trade policy. Using a nonlinear regression procedure, we find support for the model and the estimates of the loss aversion parameters are very close to those obtained by Kahneman and Tversky (Kahneman, D., Tversky, A., 1992. Advances in Prospect Theory: Cumulative Representation of Uncertainty. Journal of Risk and Uncertainty 5, 297-323.) with experimental data. Protection is found to be more responsive to losses than to gains, and the estimates of the coefficient of loss aversion are about 2. We also find evidence of loss aversion in lobby formation.     

Inequality and endogenous trade policy outcomes

An enduring puzzle in international economics is why trade interventions are biased in favor of import-competing rather than export sectors and therefore restrict trade. In this paper, we show that if the government's objective reflects a concern for inequality then trade policy generally exhibits an anti-trade bias. Importantly, under neutral assumptions, the mechanism that we analyze generates the anti-trade bias independently of whether factors are specific or mobile across sectors. The mechanism also generates an anti-trade bias between large countries even after they sign reciprocal trade agreements that eliminate any terms-of-trade motivation for the use of trade protection.     

Exporting behavior of foreign affiliates: Theory and evidence

Firms have increasingly conducted different stages of production in different countries. In particular, they may set up operations in low-cost countries (those operations are referred to as foreign affiliates in those countries) either as platforms for export or serving the growing markets there. What is the exporting behavior of foreign affiliates? In this paper, using data from China, we find that among foreign affiliates exporters are less productive than non-exporters. We then offer a theoretical explanation by incorporating into the standard firm heterogeneity model the possibility that firms could have different stages of production in different countries.     

Policy uncertainty and FDI: Evidence from national elections

This paper examines the impact of policy uncertainty on FDI among 126 countries from 1996 to 2015. Using the timing of national elections as a proxy for policy uncertainty, we find that FDI drops significantly in election years, when policy uncertainty increases. The negative effect of policy uncertainty on FDI also depends on the degree of democratization and the political system. In democracies and countries with the Assembly elected president, the decline of FDI in election years is far more pronounced. Our results highlight the role of policy environment and institution in economic development.     

电子商务中我国物流业的发展

电子商务在知识经济中将对一个国家的国民经济起着决定性的作用 ,而电子商务在我国的发展受到不发达的物流业的瓶颈限制。因此 ,只有先启动物流才能带动电子商务的飞速前进 ,我国经济在新时代才能腾飞。物流业在我国发展时间短 ,存在着问题 ,同时也蕴藏着潜力。认清不足 ,发扬优势 ,政府与企业连手运用现代化技术与理念 ,一定会使我国物流业在国际竞争中站稳脚跟 ,从而推动信息产业的发展。     

Time,uncertainty and trade flows

This paper quantifies the impact of international transport time on bilateral trade flows in goods using previously unexploited information drawn from a large data set on international parcel delivery times. In line with previous work, we find that an extra day spent in international transit reduces bilateral trade by just under 1% at the sample median. In addition, and for the first time in the literature, we examine the impact of time-related uncertainty, which requires traders to hold costly inventories or build costly redundancies into supply chains. We find that a one day increase in international transport time uncertainty reduces bilateral trade flows by just over 1%. Splitting the sample into developing and developed countries shows that international transit time matters primarily for south–south trade, whereas uncertainty is relatively more important for north–north trade. Using new data on trade in intermediate versus final goods, we also find some evidence that time and uncertainty both matter more for movements of intermediates of the type that takes place within global value chains.     

Pro-poor trade policy in Sub-Saharan Africa

This paper examines the presence of a pro-poor bias in the existing structure of protection of six Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, and Madagascar. We build on a simple agricultural household production model and we propose an extension to include adjustments in labor income. Our approach, which can be implemented without repeated cross-sections of household level data, suits well the data constraints in SSA. It also allows us to capture the heterogeneity in trade protection at the tariff line level. The pro-poor bias indicators suggest that SSA's trade policies tend to be biased in favor of poor households, as these policies redistribute income from rich to poor households. This is because protection increases the agricultural prices of goods that are sold by African households and this effect dominates both the impacts of higher consumption prices and the strong Stolper–Samuelson effects that benefit skilled over unskilled workers.     

Reciprocated unilateralism in trade policy

Using the menu-auction approach to endogenous determination of tariffs and allowing additionally for lobby formation itself to be endogenous, this paper analyzes the impact of unilateral trade liberalization by one country on its partner's trade policies. We find that such unilateral liberalization may induce reciprocal tariff reductions by the partner country. Intuitively, unilateral liberalization by one country has the effect of increasing the incentives for the export lobby in the partner country to form and to lobby effectively against the import-competing lobby there for lower protection.     

Keiretsu and relationship-specific investment: implications for market-opening trade policy

This paper considers the implications of relationship-specific investment within keiretsu for policies aimed at opening the Japanese market for intermediate goods, such as auto-parts. Both VIEs applied to parts and VERs restricting Japanese exports of autos cause the keiretsu to import a wider range of parts, but of a relatively unimportant type, such as seat covers. Since keiretsu investment and output fall, the total value of US parts exports may actually fall. For a given value of these exports, a VIE is less costly for US consumers and Japanese producers, but a VER is preferred by US automakers.     

Influence of International Trade Agreements on International Business: A Conceptual Model

The article provides a conceptual model, developed from analyzing over fifty trade agreement related research studies published during the last decade, which allows international business scholars to explore the influence of trade agreements (custom unions, free trade agreements, preferential trade agreements, regional trade agreements) on foreign market entry strategies. This model is an attempt to develop IB theory to address the current research gap in this very narrow but important allied field. Empirical findings generated by interviewing dairy produce exporters in New Zealand reveal a remarkable connection between TAs and IB, with TAs found to influence the regulative environment of participating countries, which may in turn reduce the regulative distance between member nations. The contribution provides a basis for IB researchers to explore this connection in multiple industries/countries.     

Voting for pollution policy: the importance of income inequality and openness to trade

This paper analyzes how openness and the distribution of factor ownership interact to determine individual and aggregate demand for pollution policy. Analysis of voter preferences in autarky shows that an increased stake in either the dirty or the clean industry can induce an individual voter to prefer stricter environmental policy. Similarly, the paper shows that poorer voters may be the greener voters within an electorate. The model also reveals that the incidence of pollution policy depends upon a country’s trade regime, with consequences for the direction in which income inequality influences aggregate demand for pollution policy.     

论市场全球化条件下的竞争政策

经济全球化使市场空间已经超出国家竞争政策①的管辖空间,健全的全球经济竞争政策对于保证国际经济关系的稳定性和多边贸易体制的有效性是十分重要的。本文首先分析市场全球化与世界垄断形成之间的关系,然后分析了现有多边贸易体制和国家竞争法②域外适用面对企业限制竞争行为的局限性,最后分析了世界贸易组织在竞争政策中的应有作用。     

Trade Negotiations in the Americas and What They Mean for You

The United States is engaged in two huge trade negotiations—the Trans-Pacific Partnership and the Trans-Atlantic Trade and Investment Partnership—that will have a profound impact on our economy and on the world trade system. These agreements can be an important template for new rules governing world trade, and they address some important new areas, such as regulatory issues. However, if they are to be a good template, U.S. negotiators have to alter some of their proposals, and these new agreements have to prohibit predatory trade practices, such as currency manipulation.