Preferences,rent destruction and multilateral liberalization: The building block effect of CUSFTA

If a free trade agreement (FTA) is characterized by the exchange of market access with a large and competitive trading partner, the agreement can cause a leakage of protectionist benefits to domestic industry from lobbying against external tariff cuts. This rent destruction effect of an FTA can free policy makers to be more aggressive in multilateral tariff cuts. We argue that the Canadian–US free trade agreement (CUSFTA) provides an ideal policy experiment to link this mechanism to the data. Exploring the determinants of Canada's tariff cuts at the 8-digit HS product level, we find that CUSFTA acted as an additional driver of Canadian multilateral tariff reductions during the Uruguay Round.     

Policy choice: Theory and evidence from commitment via international trade agreements

Why do governments employ inefficient policies when more efficient ones are available for the same purpose? We address this puzzle in the context of redistribution toward special interest groups (SIGs) by focusing on a set of important policies: tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs). In our policy choice model a government can gain by committing to constrain tariffs through international agreements even if this leads to the use of less efficient NTBs; commitment has political value because it improves the bargaining position of a government that is weak relative to domestic SIGs. Using detailed data we find support for several of the model's predictions including: (i) tariff commitments in trade agreements increase the likelihood and restrictiveness of NTBs but not enough to offset the original tariff reductions; (ii) tariff commitments are more likely to be adopted and more stringent when the government is weaker relative to a SIG. Thus, the results can explain the use of inefficient policies for redistribution and suggest that the bargaining motive is an important source of the political value of commitment in international agreements.     

Do tariffs matter for the extensive margin of international trade? An empirical analysis

With disaggregate tariff data we study the impact of changing tariffs on the range of goods countries export to the United States. Our probits with country and good effects show tariffs tend to have a statistically significant but small impact: at best 5% of the increasing extensive margin for 1989-1999 and 12% for 1996-2006 is explained by tariff reductions. This suggests the extensive margin has not amplified the impact of tariffs on trade flows to such an extent that the relatively moderate tariff reductions since WW II can explain the strong growth of world trade.     

Exporting out of poverty: Provincial poverty in Vietnam and U.S. market access

Can a developing country reduce poverty by gaining increased market access to a large, rich country? The 2001 U.S.–Vietnam Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA) provides an excellent opportunity to examine this question as, unlike other bilateral trade agreements, the U.S. tariff cuts were not influenced by Vietnamese industries. Using variation in the structure of the labor force across provinces prior to the trade agreement, I construct provincial measures of U.S. tariffs. To address concerns over confounding trends between changes in provincial poverty and changes in provincial tariffs I follow two approaches: controlling for trends based on observable initial conditions and differencing away time invariant trends using pre-BTA data. I find that provinces that were more exposed to the U.S. tariff cuts experienced faster decreases in poverty between 2002 and 2004. Additionally, I document that the movement of workers across provinces is limited in scale, particularly for those with low levels of education. Finally, I show that the most exposed provinces experienced faster wage growth for workers with low levels of education, but not for highly educated workers.     

Tariff wars in the Ricardian Model with a continuum of goods

This paper describes strategic tariff choices within the Ricardian framework of Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1977) using CES preferences. The optimum tariff schedule is uniform across goods and inversely related to the import demand elasticity of the other country. In the Nash equilibrium of tariffs, larger economies apply higher tariff rates. Productivity adjusted relative size (≈ GDP ratio) is a sufficient statistic for absolute productivity advantage and the size of the labor force. Both countries apply higher tariff rates if specialization gains from comparative advantage are high and transportation cost is low. A sufficiently large economy prefers the inefficient Nash equilibrium in tariffs over free trade due to its quasi-monopolistic power on world markets. The required threshold size is increasing in comparative advantage and decreasing in transportation cost. I discuss the implications of the static Nash-equilibrium analysis for the sustainability and structure of trade agreements.     

Structural estimation and solution of international trade models with heterogeneous firms

We present an empirical implementation of a general-equilibrium model of international trade with heterogeneous manufacturing firms. The theory underlying our model is consistent with Melitz (2003). A nonlinear structural estimation procedure identifies a set of core parameters and unobserved firm-level trade frictions that best fit the geographic pattern of trade. Our estimation model is consistent with the specified general equilibrium model, and we conduct general equilibrium counterfactual analyses to illustrate model responses. We first assess the economic effects of reductions in measured tariffs. Taking the simple-average welfare change across regions the Melitz structure indicates welfare gains from liberalization that are four times larger than in a standard trade policy simulation. Furthermore, when we compare the economic impact of tariff reductions with reductions in estimated fixed trade costs we find that policy measures affecting the fixed costs are of greater importance than tariff barriers.     

The impact of trade liberalization on productivity: Evidence from India's formal and informal manufacturing sectors

Despite a large literature investigating the impacts of trade on firm productivity, there is almost no evidence on how small firms react to trade liberalization. Using a unique dataset of firm-level surveys that are representative of the entire Indian manufacturing industry, I show that India's unilateral reduction in final goods tariffs increased the average productivity of small, informal firms, which account for 80% of Indian manufacturing employment but have been excluded from previous studies. In contrast, the increase in productivity among larger, formal firms was driven primarily by the concurrent reduction in input tariffs. By examining the effect of the tariff liberalization on the distributions of productivity and firm size, I find evidence consistent with the exit of the smallest, least productive firms from the informal sector. In addition, I find that although the decline in final goods tariffs did not significantly impact average formal sector productivity, it did increase productivity among the top quantiles of the distribution.     

Do safeguard tariffs and antidumping duties open or close technology gaps?

This paper examines how the country-breadth of tariff protection can affect the technology adoption decisions of both domestic import-competing and foreign exporting firms. The contribution of the analysis is to show how firm-level technology adoption changes under tariffs of different country-breadth. I show that a country-specific tariff like an antidumping duty induces both domestic import-competing firms and foreign exporting firms to adopt a new technology earlier than they would under free trade. In contrast, a broadly-applied tariff like a safeguard can accelerate technology adoption by a domestic import-competing firm, but will slow-down technology adoption by foreign exporting firms. Because safeguard tariffs can delay the foreign firm's adoption of new technology, the worldwide welfare costs associated with using them may be larger than is generally believed.     

The asymmetric effects of tariffs on intra-firm trade and offshoring decisions

This paper studies the effects of tariffs on intra-firm trade. Building on the Antràs and Helpman (2004) North–South theoretical framework, I show that higher Northern tariffs reduce the incentives for outsourcing and offshoring, while higher Southern tariffs have the opposite effects. I also show that increased offshoring and outsourcing imply a decrease in the ratio of Northern intra-firm imports to total imports, an empirically testable prediction. Using a highly disaggregated dataset of U.S. (the North) imports and relevant U.S. and foreign tariffs, I find robust evidence to support the model's predictions.     

Trade, wages, and the political economy of trade protection: evidence from the Colombian trade reforms

Worker industry affiliation plays a crucial role in how trade policy affects wages in many trade models. Yet, most research has focused on how trade policy affects wages by altering the economy-wide returns to a specific worker characteristic (i.e., skill or education) rather than through worker industry affiliation. This paper exploits drastic trade liberalizations in Colombia in the 1980s and 1990s to investigate the relationship between protection and industry wage premiums. We relate wage premiums to trade policy in an empirical framework that accounts for the political economy of trade protection. Accounting for time-invariant political economy factors is critical. When we do not control for unobserved time-invariant industry characteristics, we find that workers in protected sectors earn less than workers with similar observable characteristics in unprotected sectors. Allowing for industry fixed effects reverses the result: trade protection increases relative wages. This positive relationship persists when we instrument for tariff changes. Our results are in line with short- and medium-run models of trade where labor is immobile across sectors or, alternatively, with the existence of industry rents that are reduced by trade liberalization. In the context of the current debate on the rising income inequality in developing countries, our findings point to a source of disparity beyond the well-documented rise in the economy-wide skill premium: because tariff reductions were proportionately larger in sectors employing a high fraction of less-skilled workers, the decrease in the wage premiums in these sectors affected such workers disproportionately.     

Trade policy of a free trade agreement in the presence of foreign lobbying

This paper studies the effect of foreign lobbies on trade policy of a country which is a member of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). It uses a monopolistically competitive political economy model in which the government determines external tariffs endogenously. The effect of foreign lobbying under the FTA is examined empirically using Canadian industry-level trade data that allow differentiating of lobby groups by the country of origin. The analysis suggests that the presence of foreign lobbying has a significant effect on the domestic trade policy. The heterogeneity of foreign lobbies is also important: the presence of an organized lobbying group in an FTA partner country tends to raise trade barriers while an organized lobbying group of exporters from outside of the FTA is associated with less protection.     

Trade-diverting free trade agreements,external tariffs,and feasibility

There has been a proliferation of preferential trade agreements within the last two decades. This paper analyzes the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on external tariffs in small economies where protection decisions are made politically. Our model determines tariff rates endogenously instead of assuming they are fixed during or after the formation of FTAs as commonly done in the literature. We show that when an FTA is established, the tariff rates that apply to non-members essentially decline. More importantly, we investigate the interaction between endogenous tariff determination and the feasibility of an FTA. We find that the expectation of tariff reductions under endogenous tariffs could make an otherwise feasible FTA if tariffs were fixed become infeasible. However, if domestic import-competing sectors are relatively smaller and the government places a significant weight on political contributions relative to social welfare, an FTA with endogenous tariffs may be more likely to be feasible than an FTA assumed to fix external tariffs.     

Did US safeguards resuscitate Harley-Davidson in the 1980s?

This paper examines US safeguards applied to the motorcycle market in the 1980s. After receiving temporary protection by means of a maximum tariff of over 45%, Harley-Davidson sales recovered dramatically. Simulations, based on structural demand and supply estimates, indicate that while safeguard tariffs did benefit Harley-Davidson, they only account for a fraction of its increased sales. This is primarily because consumers perceived that Harley-Davidson and Japanese large motorcycles were poorly matched substitutes for each other. Our results provide little evidence that safeguard provisions triggered restructuring in Harley-Davidson.     

The biggest losers (and winners) from US trade liberalization

Many development experts worry that continuing reductions of tariff levels in high-income countries will limit trade flows from developing countries that benefit from preferential trade programs because of ‘preference erosion.’ Using a panel of US import data between the years of 1997 and 2005, I find that reductions in preference margins will significantly diminish imports of some products, particularly from lower-middle and low income countries; for example, a 1% reduction in the US tariff on a product that is currently imported duty-free from developing countries will decrease imports of that product from lower-middle income countries by an average of 2.6%. However, many products produced by developing countries fail to qualify for preferential tariffs, thus a gradual reduction in all US tariff rates is expected to have only a modest impact on trade flows from developing countries.     

Exporting under trade policy uncertainty: Theory and evidence

I provide novel evidence for the impact of trade policy uncertainty on exporters. In a dynamic, heterogeneous firms model, trade policy uncertainty will delay the entry of exporters into new markets and make them less responsive to applied tariff reductions. Policy instruments that reduce or eliminate uncertainty, such as binding trade policy commitments at the WTO, increase entry. The predictions are tested on disaggregated, product-level Australian imports with model-consistent measures of uncertainty. The estimates show that growth of exporter–product varieties would have been 7% lower between 1993 and 2001 without the binding commitments implemented after the WTO was formed in 1996. If Australia reduced all its tariffs and bindings to zero, more than half of predicted product growth is accounted by removing uncertainty. These results illuminate and quantify an important new channel for trade creation.     

Trade liberalization and the evolution of skill earnings differentials in Brazil

Skilled labor earnings differentials decreased during the trade liberalization implemented in Brazil from 1988 to 1995. This paper investigates the role of trade liberalization in explaining these relative earnings movements. We perform several independent empirical exercises that check the traditional trade transmission mechanism, using disaggregated data on tariffs, prices, earnings, employment and skill intensity. We find that: i) employment shifted from skilled to unskilled intensive sectors, and each sector increased its relative share of skilled labor; ii) relative prices fell in skill-intensive sectors; iii) tariff changes across sectors were not related to skill intensities, but the pass-through from tariffs to prices was larger in skill-intensive sectors; iv) the decline in skilled earnings differentials mandated by the price variation predicted by trade was even larger than the observed one. The results are compatible with trade liberalization accounting for the observed relative earnings changes in Brazil. They also highlight the importance of considering the effects of differentiated pass-through from tariffs to prices.     

Formula Approaches for Market Access Negotiations

Most of the large tariff reductions achieved in multilateral trade negotiations have involved tariff–cutting formulas such as the ‘Swiss’ formula. However, wide variations in initial tariff rates between active participants call for new approaches under the Doha Development Agenda. This paper surveys a range of formula options and examines both targeted and flexible applications of the Swiss formula that target tariff escalation and peaks, and would allow policy makers to directly target how far they will move towards free trade, while providing some flexibility for trading off reductions in peak tariffs against reductions in lower–tariff sectors.     

Efficient barriers to trade: A sequential trade model with heterogeneous agents

This paper studies the choice of tariffs and other type of consumption taxes and subsidies in a flexible price version of the Prescott [Prescott, Edward C., 1975. Efficiency of the Natural Rate. Journal of Political Economy 83, 1229-1236.] hotels model. It is shown that a country with unstable demand may benefit from a tariff on imports. More surprisingly, the exporting country may also benefit from the tariff. In general, I consider the problem of a world planner who chooses country specific consumption taxes and subsidies. I show that buyers in countries that tend to consume relatively more in the high demand state should be taxed and buyers in countries that tend to consume relatively more in the low demand state should be subsidized.     

Short‐term Consequences of Trade Reform for Industry Employment and Wages: Survey of Evidence from Colombia

Recent research has focused on the short‐ to medium‐term implications of trade reforms for the labour market outcomes and poverty in poor economies. This article summarises the evidence on the short‐term consequences of the Colombian trade reform initiated in 1985 for industry employment and industry wages. Although the reform reduced manufacturing tariffs on average by 40 percentage points from 1984 to 1994, tariff declines were not significantly associated with labour reallocation across sectors. The reform, however, was associated with bigger declines in relative industry wages in sectors that experienced bigger tariff cuts. This evidence is in line with the predictions of short‐ to medium‐run models of trade in which labour is not mobile across sectors. It is also consistent with the predictions of models where imperfectly competitive industries share rents with workers and trade reduces the firms’ profit margins and thus workers’ rents.     

Tariff Liberalisation and Increased Administrative Protection: Is There a Quid Pro Quo?

Theoretical models and intuition suggest that the amount of non‐traditional protection such as anti‐dumping duties will increase as more traditional forms such as tariffs are lowered under multilateral trade agreements. This paper is the first empirical study of the role of tariff liberalisation in the spread of anti‐dumping. Through both correlations and regression approaches we analyse the relationship between tariff concessions made during the Uruguay Round trade negotiations and the filing of anti‐dumping petitions, with particular interest in whether multilateral trade reductions have spurred the recent growth in new users of anti‐dumping policies. We find that, at least for developing economies, tariff reductions agreed to under the Uruguay Round not only increased the likelihood of a country using anti‐dumping protection but also the total number of anti‐dumping petitions filed by countries.