Economic determinants of free trade agreements

The purpose of this study is to provide the first systematic empirical analysis of the economic determinants of the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) and of the likelihood of FTAs between pairs of countries using a qualitative choice model. We develop this econometric model based upon a general equilibrium model of world trade with two factors of production, two monopolistically-competitive product markets, and explicit intercontinental and intracontinental transportation costs among multiple countries on multiple continents. The empirical model correctly predicts, based solely upon economic characteristics, 85% of the 286 FTAs existing in 1996 among 1431 pairs of countries and 97% of the remaining 1145 pairs with no FTAs.     

Do free trade agreements actually increase members' international trade?

For over 40 years, the gravity equation has been a workhorse for cross-country empirical analyses of international trade flows and — in particular — the effects of free trade agreements (FTAs) on trade flows. However, the gravity equation is subject to the same econometric critique as earlier cross-industry studies of U.S. tariff and nontariff barriers and U.S. multilateral imports: trade policy is not an exogenous variable. We address econometrically the endogeneity of FTAs. Although instrumental-variable and control-function approaches do not adjust for endogeneity well, a panel approach does. Accounting econometrically for the FTA variable's endogeneity yields striking empirical results: the effect of FTAs on trade flows is quintupled. We find that, on average, an FTA approximately doubles two members' bilateral trade after 10 years.     

Formation of interdependent regional trade agreements and production networks

Production networks (PNs) can be defined as a determinant of trade partnership. Deepening PNs may generate positive welfare effects and lead to a proliferation in the formation of interdependent regional trade agreements (RTAs). This paper theoretically develops the link between PNs and the formation of RTAs and empirically investigates the link by applying a qualitative choice model estimation methodology (probit) with panel data that covers bilateral country‐pairs among 147 countries between 2000 and 2010. We find that the RTA formation has been strongly driven by deepening PNs between members as well as with third countries. We also find that production network‐driven RTA interdependence is member specific.     

Overlapping free trade agreements and international trade: A network approach

In our work, we have analysed the effect of the hub‐and‐spoke nature of free trade agreements (FTA s) on trade. Contrary to previous analyses, we have considered the effects of the country's position in the FTA network on the bilateral trade of the hub country. We have conducted an in‐depth analysis of the global network of FTA s, focusing particularly on its evolution in the last 15 years. We have utilised a panel data set covering the period 1960–2010 to investigate the effects of the hub‐and‐spoke on trade. Our results show that the countries that are more connected to FTA s export more than those that are less involved, although not all the partner countries you can connect with are the same. An increase in the number of spokes that have no link between them has, on average, a negative effect on the trade of the hub, which indicates that signing FTA s with every country is not the optimal strategy for increasing trade. However, if we consider the way new FTA s change the relative position of a country, we can see that if new FTA s make the country more central or less constrained in the network, these new agreements have a strongly positive and significant pro‐trade effect.     

Multilateral stability and efficiency of trade agreements: A network formation approach

We study the endogenous network formation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements by means of hypergraphs and introduce the equilibrium concept of multilateral stability. We consider multicountry settings with a firm in each country that produces a homogeneous good and competes as a Cournot oligopolist in each market. Under endogenous tariffs, we find that a multilateral trade agreement governing the rules and norms of tariff setting, that is the WTO/GATT regime itself, together with a bilateral preferential trade agreement (PTA) is multilaterally stable. We also find that the existence of the WTO is necessary for the stability of the trading system. We further analyse the impact of PTAs on multilateral tariffs within the WTO. We find that the formation of PTAs increases countries' incentives for multilateral tariff reduction.     

On the conservation of distance in international trade

Using disaggregated bilateral trade data, we find that the elasticity of trade to distance increased (in absolute value) by about 10% since 1985. To explore the reasons for this shift, we decompose the change in the distance elasticity of trade into the part due to a shift in the composition of trade among industries and the part due to a change in the distance sensitivity within industries. We find that adjustment in the composition of trade had little effect, but for 40% of industries distance became more important, with nearly all of the remaining industries showing no significant change. We explore alternative hypotheses as to why the elasticity of trade to distance increased in some industries. We find that homogeneous goods, bulky goods, and high tariff goods became significantly more distance sensitive. In contrast, the evidence implies that changes in tariffs and freight costs have reduced the importance of distance on trade. We conclude that the increase in the importance of distance over time is related to the substitutability of goods and the level of trade costs, but not to changes in tariffs or freight costs.     

Trade liberalization,free trade agreements,and the value of firms: Stock market evidence from Singapore

We examine the effects of the United States–Singapore Free Trade Agreement (FTA) on the value of firms listed in the Singapore Exchange using event study analysis. Despite the predictability of the FTA negotiations, we find that one event – the removal of the last obstacle to the free trade deal in January 2003 – increases the value of firms in some industries by 1–11% on average. These results indicate that trade liberalization and FTAs do increase the value of firms.     

Recurrent trade agreements and the value of external enforcement

This paper presents a theory of dynamic trade agreements in which external institutions, such as the WTO, play a central role in supporting credible enforcement. In our model, countries engage in ongoing negotiations, and, as a consequence, cooperative agreements become unsustainable in the absence of external enforcement institutions. By using mechanisms such as delays in dispute resolution and direct penalties, enforcement institutions can restore incentives for cooperation, despite the lack of coercive power. The occurrence of costly trade disputes, and the feasibility of mechanisms such as escape clauses, depend on the degree to which enforcement institutions can verify, and condition on, events that may lead to trade disputes.     

Assessing the impact of communication costs on international trade

Communication costs are frequently cited as an important determinant of trade costs. We test this relationship by incorporating alternative measures of communication costs in a model of bilateral trade. We find that international variations in communication costs indeed have a significant influence on trade patterns. Furthermore, estimates using disaggregated data reveal that communication costs are more important for trade in differentiated products than for trade in homogenous products.     

Economic geography and international inequality

This paper estimates a structural model of economic geography using cross-country data on per capita income, bilateral trade, and the relative price of manufacturing goods. We provide evidence that the geography of access to markets and sources of supply is statistically significant and quantitatively important in explaining cross-country variation in per capita income. This finding is robust to controlling for a wide range of considerations, including other economic, geographical, social, and institutional characteristics. Geography is found to matter through the mechanisms emphasized by the theory, and the estimated coefficients are consistent with plausible values for the model's structural parameters.     

Investment liberalization and international trade

This paper estimates the cross-price elasticity of exports with respect to investment costs for bilateral relations between 36 countries. We show that the effect of reducing foreign direct investment costs on exports depends on country characteristics and trade costs as predicted by the [Markusen, 1997] and [Markusen, 2002] model. When countries differ in relative factor endowments and trade costs are low, investment liberalization stimulates exports, whereas when countries are similar in terms of relative factor endowments and size, and trade costs are moderate to high, investment liberalization reduces exports.     

Endogenous political organization and the value of trade agreements

In a bargaining model of endogenous protection, I introduce fixed costs of political-organization that need to be incurred by capitalists prior to actual lobbying. Unlike Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [J. Pol. Econ. 106(3) (1998) 575] intersectoral capital mobility is disallowed. Nevertheless, I am still able to obtain their main result that a government with low bargaining power vis-à-vis the import-competing lobby precommits to a free-trade agreement. Further, with high fixed organizational costs, the government prefers to stay out of such agreements. Its maximum bargaining power consistent with signing a trade agreement has an inverse-V-shaped relationship with respect to the size of fixed costs.     

Anonymous market and group ties in international trade

History provides many examples of cohesive groups dispersed over several countries who exploit the ties between their members to gain entry into foreign markets. The phenomenon is well-established empirically and noteworthy because it suggests the importance of informational barriers in international transactions. We present a simple model where output is produced through a joint venture, and agents have complete information domestically but are unable to judge the quality of their match abroad. A minority of individuals, otherwise identical to all others, can exploit complete information in international matches between group members, if they so choose. Group ties increase aggregate trade and income, but hurt the anonymous market because they deprive it disproportionately of the group’s more productive members.     

Credit constraints, equity market liberalizations and international trade

This paper provides evidence that credit constraints are an important determinant of international trade flows. I exploit shocks to the availability of external finance and examine the impact of equity market liberalizations on the export behavior of 91 countries in the 1980-1997 period. I show that liberalizations increase exports disproportionately more in financially vulnerable sectors that require more outside finance or employ fewer collateralizable assets. This result is not driven by cross-country differences in factor endowments and is independent of simultaneous trade policy reforms. Moreover, it obtains with equal strength in the full panel of countries as well as in both panel and event-study analyses of countries which removed capital controls during the sample period. Finally, the effects of liberalizations are more pronounced in economies with initially less active stock markets, indicating that foreign equity flows may substitute for an underdeveloped domestic financial system. Similarly, opening equity markets has a greater impact in the presence of higher trade costs caused by restrictive trade policies.     

论高职高专层次国际贸易课的"具体化"教学

高职高专层次的学生学习基础普遍较差,学习能力不足,而国际贸易是一门技术性、实践性很强的应用学科,因此学生普遍感到国际贸易课比较难,"听不懂".究竟怎样才能让学生更好地理解国际贸易相关课程呢?笔者在教学实践中发现,"具体化"教学是一个非常好的选择.本文详细阐述了国际贸易课采用"具体化"教学法的依据及开展"具体化"教学的主要方法.     

Free trade networks

The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a network formation game. We consider an n-country model in which (possibly asymmetric) countries trade differentiated industrial commodities. We show that if all countries are symmetric, the complete FTA network is pairwise stable and it is the unique stable network if industrial commodities are not highly substitutable. We also compare FTAs and customs unions (CUs) as to which of these two regimes facilitates global trade liberalization, noticing that unlike CUs, each signatory of an FTA can have another FTA without consent of other member countries.     

Increasing returns, multinationals and geography of preferential trade agreements

This paper uses a model of horizontal multinational enterprises to explore the relationship between transportation costs and trade policy cooperation. Tariffs have the effect of attracting foreign direct investment to the benefit of consumers in the host country. As transport costs fall, the incentive to impose tariffs falls and the benefits to cooperation rise. Thus, in a repeated game in which cooperation is limited by a self-enforcement constraint, a reduction in transport costs facilitates free trade. This logic is applied to a three-country model to examine preferential trade agreements. It is found that if any country is too distant from the others, then global free trade is not attainable. Rather, if two of the countries are within a critical distance of each other and distant from the third country, then the unique outcome is an exclusive free trade agreement between the two adjacent countries. Thus, the model predicts a strong regional bias in preferential trade agreements.     

Technical regulations and specialization in international trade

It is widely acknowledged that while technical regulations can improve welfare and facilitate markets, they can also impede trade. The trade impeding effects of technical regulations are especially worrisome for developing countries: they frequently lack the human and capital resources necessary to satisfy technical measures, and thus are more likely to be excluded from markets by technical measures. This paper uses highly disaggregated US data on agricultural, mining and manufacturing imports to examine the impact of technical regulations on trade patterns. Using instrumental variables estimation to correct for the potential endogeneity of technical regulations, the analysis suggests that technical regulations substantially impinge on poor countries' exports: their weaker capacities to satisfy technical regulations lead them to specialize away from industries with heavier regulatory burdens.     

The de minimis threshold in international trade: The costs of being too low

With tariffs largely negotiated away, trade facilitation issues such as custom delays and border costs are one of the next key barriers for trade policymakers to address. One important trade facilitation issue is the de minimis threshold (DMT )—a valuation ceiling for imports below which no duty or tax is charged and the clearance procedures are minimal. Customs assessments are costly and low thresholds can hinder trade flows. We offer a detailed analytical approach to assess the direct economic effects of raising the DMT . We focus on Canada, which has one of the lowest DMT s among developed countries. We utilise a unique data set and find that raising Canada's DMT would have positive effects for consumers and businesses, particularly small businesses because the cost saving for smaller entities is disproportionately large. For the government, foregone duty and tax revenues are outweighed by the cost saving, resulting in a fiscally neutral or even positive effect for government revenues.     

Paying a visit: The Dalai Lama effect on international trade

Is political compliance a precondition for healthy trade relations with China? The Chinese government frequently threatens that meetings between its trading partners' officials and the Dalai Lama will be met with animosity and ultimately harm trade ties. We run a gravity model of exports to China from 159 partner countries between 1991 and 2008 to test the extent to which bilateral tensions affect trade with autocratic China. In particular, we empirically investigate whether countries that receive the Dalai Lama despite China's opposition experience a significant reduction in their exports to China. In order to account for the potential endogeneity of meetings with the Dalai Lama, the number of Tibet Support Groups and the travel pattern of the Tibetan leader are used as instruments. Our empirical results support the idea that countries officially receiving the Dalai Lama at the highest political level are punished through a reduction of their exports to China. However, this ‘Dalai Lama Effect’ is only observed for the Hu Jintao era and not for earlier periods. Furthermore, we find that this effect is mainly driven by reduced exports of machinery and transport equipment and that it disappears in the second year after a meeting took place.