Sovereign debt crises and credit to the private sector

We use micro-level data to analyze emerging markets' private sector access to international debt markets during sovereign debt crises. We find that these crises are systematically accompanied by a decline in foreign credit to domestic private firms, both during debt renegotiations and for over two years after restructuring agreements are reached. This decline is large, statistically significant, and robust. We find that this effect is concentrated in the non-financial sector and is different for firms in the exporting and in the non-exporting sectors. We also find that the magnitude of the effect depends on the type of debt restructuring agreement.     

Behavior of output during currency crises

This paper documents the behavior of output and its association with other macroeconomic variables in 195 episodes of currency crises in developing countries during 1970-2000. We find that about 60% of the crises are contractionary, while the rest are expansionary. Crises are one and a half times more likely to be contractionary in emerging markets than in other developing economies. The number of contractionary crises or their severity does not increase in the 1990s. Economies which experience capital inflows in the years prior to the crisis or an increase in external debt burden during the crisis are more likely to slow down during crises, while those with restrictions on capital flows prior to the crisis or are more open to international trade are less likely to do so. The results are robust to different ways of measuring changes in output during crises.     

Balance sheet effects and the choice of exchange rate regime in developing countries

We investigate the choice of regime amongst hard pegs, soft pegs, managed floats and independent floats for a panel of developing countries. There is evidence of a matched ordering of regimes and country characteristics. We find some evidence for the ‘balance sheet' hypothesis that foreign liabilities in the banking system and foreign debt are associated with less exchange rate flexibility, particularly when a ‘de facto’ regime classification is used. Easily the best predictor of a country's current regime is its regime in the previous year.     

The external wealth of nations mark II: Revised and extended estimates of foreign assets and liabilities, 1970-2004

We construct estimates of external assets and liabilities for 145 countries for 1970-2004. We describe our estimation methods and key features of the data at the country and global level. We focus on trends in net and gross external positions, and the composition of international portfolios. We document the increasing importance of equity financing and the improvement in the external position for emerging markets, and the differing pace of financial integration between advanced and developing economies. We also show the existence of a global discrepancy between estimated foreign assets and liabilities, and identify the asset categories accounting for this discrepancy.     

Getting beyond carry trade: What makes a safe haven currency?

The main objective of this paper is to investigate the fundamentals of safe haven currencies, which are those currencies that provide an hedge for a reference portfolio of risky assets, conditional on shocks to global risk aversion. We analyse a large panel of 52 currencies in advanced and emerging countries over almost 25 years of data. We find that only a few factors are robustly associated to a safe haven status, most notably the net foreign asset position, an indicator of external vulnerability, and whether currencies have been a good hedge in the past. In addition, the currencies of large, less financially open economies are a good hedge against global risk aversion shocks. By contrast, the level of the interest rate spread vs. the US is significant only during the latest crisis. Finally, we find some evidence of non-linearity as the importance of the fundamentals is stronger during crisis times.     

Foreign currency exposure and balance sheet effects: A firm-level analysis for Korea

If firms match the currency composition of their liabilities with that of their assets or income, a currency depreciation will have an ambiguous effect on investment of firms holding foreign debt. Using Korean firm-level data, we first find evidence of currency matching. We then show that foreign debt has a significant negative balance sheet effect on firm investment following a depreciation, once foreign assets and exports are controlled for. The balance sheet effect is particularly severe for firms subject to financial constraints. The inclusion of foreign assets is important for identifying the balance sheet effect separately from the competitiveness effect.     

Is foreign direct investment a safer form of financing?

It has been common to attribute financial crises to short-term capital inflows, while foreign direct investment (FDI) is seen as a safer form of finance. The relationship between crises and the composition of capital flows is particularly relevant at present because the flow of capital to Latin America is becoming increasingly dominated by FDI. This paper asks whether the composition of capital inflows and of the stock of foreign liabilities is relevant for financial crises, be it their frequency, depth, or length. It explores the possible role of FDI as a benign form of external liability relative to other classes of liabilities, reviewing both analytical and empirical arguments.     

Valuation effects with transitory and trend productivity shocks

Changes in asset prices of a country's foreign assets and liabilities (“valuation effects”) are commonly thought of as stabilizing: they counteract current account movements and mitigate the impact of the current account on the country's net foreign asset (NFA) position. This paper shows that whether valuation effects are stabilizing or not depends critically on the nature of the underlying productivity shocks. In response to transitory shocks, valuation effects are stabilizing; but in response to trend shocks, such effects amplify the impact of the current account on NFA position. These contrasting effects arise because optimally smoothing consumers respond differently to a transitory shock than to a trend shock to income. This theoretical result finds empirical support with G7 countries' data, and is illustrated by the pattern of external imbalances between the U.S. and other G7 countries since the 1990s.     

Borrowing Without Debt? Understanding the U.S. International Investment Position

Sustained large U.S. current account deficits have led some economists and policymakers to worry that future current account adjustment could occur through a sudden and disruptive depreciation of the dollar and a sharp drop in U.S. consumption. Two factors that, to date, have cast doubt on such concerns are the stability of U.S. net external liabilities and the minimal net income payments made by the United States on these liabilities. We show that the stability of the external position reflects sizable capital gains stemming from strong foreign equity markets and a weaker dollar—conditions that could be reversed in the future. We also show that while minimal U.S. net income payments reflect a much higher measured rate of return on U.S. foreign direct investment (FDI) assets than on U.S. FDI liabilities, JEL Classification F21     

金融危机理论演进与发展研究

随着我国金融开放的深度和广度的不断提高,旧有风险进一步暴露,新的风险进一步产生。我国经济受全球经济波动的影响越来越大,发生金融危机的可能性也在增大。由于金融危机的最大特征就是货币的急剧贬值,关于货币危机的研究也最为成熟,目前已形成四代理论模型。而银行业危机理论和外债危机理论的研究比较分散,还没有形成像货币危机理论那样完善的体系。     

What drives financial crises in emerging markets?

The study examines the causes of financial crises in 31 emerging market countries during 1980–2001. It estimates a probit model using 23 macroeconomic and financial sector variables. Traditional variables such as unemployment and inflation, as well as several indicators of indebtedness such as private sector liabilities and the foreign liabilities of banks explain currency crises rather well, and it appears currency crises occur in tandem with banking crises. Indeed, in emerging market countries the vulnerability to crisis is exacerbated by situations involving large liabilities that permit sudden capital outflows. Increases in indebtedness followed the liberalization of capital flows and domestic financial sectors.     

Sovereign defaults and liquidity crises

Sovereign debt crises in emerging markets are usually associated with liquidity and banking crises. The conventional view is that the domestic turmoil is the consequence of foreign retaliation, although there is no clear empirical evidence on “classic” default penalties. This paper emphasizes, instead, a direct link between sovereign defaults and liquidity crises building on two natural assumptions: (i) government bonds represent a source of liquidity for the domestic private sector and (ii) the government cannot discriminate between domestic and foreign creditors in the event of default. In this context, external debt emerges even in the absence of classic penalties, and government default is countercyclical, triggers a liquidity crunch, and amplifies output volatility. In addition, a reform that involves a substitution of government bonds with privately-sourced liquidity instruments could backfire by restricting governments' access to foreign credit.     

Novelties of financial crises in the 1990s and the search for new indicators

This paper argues that, first, despite some similarities, financial crises in the 1990s have featured substantial differences between them: the ERM crisis of 1992–1993 was mainly due to stringent monetary policies; the Mexican crisis of 1994–1995 was associated to private overconsumption; and the East Asian crisis of 1997–1999 were basically the result of private overinvestment. Therefore, as crises do not seem to present strong regularities over time, the task of trying to predict them on the basis of past developments is surely doomed to fail. As crises might be simply unpredictable, specialists should refrain from creating and developing predictors and focus instead on simpler early-warning indicators. Second, the paper reviews the main body of literature on leading indicators of crises and it suggests that the bulk of these conventional indicators do not seem to be appropriate to the East Asian episodes. In order to create a new set of early-warning indicators, economists should focus on non-conventional deficiencies, such as those related to financial fragility associated with financial deregulation and with capital inflows, to a declining efficiency of investment, and to a high short-term external debt (especially as a proportion of foreign exchange reserves).     

Risk,external adjustment and capital flows

This paper studies the process of external adjustment. I develop an open economy model with endowment and preference shocks that can account for the empirical behavior of real exchange rates, interest rates and consumption in the U.S. and Europe. The model includes cross border holdings of bonds and equity, and financial frictions that impede international risk-sharing. I find that external adjustment following endowment shocks predominantly takes place via trade flows, consistent with the intertemporal approach to the current account. In contrast, preference shocks that change investors' risk aversion induce adjustment via the trade and valuation channels; where the latter includes the effects of unexpected capital gains and loss on existing cross border holdings and changes in the expected future return differentials between foreign assets and liabilities. The model estimates imply that the valuation channel of external adjustment is more important for the U.S. than the trade channel. Consistent with this implication, I show that forecasts of future return differentials contributed most to the volatility of the U.S. net foreign asset position in the post Bretton-Woods era.     

Balance sheet effects of foreign currency debt and real exchange rate on corporate investment: evidence from Turkey

I analyze the balance sheet channels of depreciation of the Turkish non-financial corporations for 2003–2015. Having constructed a novel, hand-collected firm-level dataset on the composition and term structure of foreign currency assets and liabilities, I show that foreign currency debt and mismatch has a significant negative balance sheet effect on capital investment following a depreciation. The results remain same even after controlling for foreign currency assets and exports. This implies that the contractionary net worth effect of depreciation dominates its expansionary competitiveness effect. The result is more pronounced for the firms with short-term foreign currency exposures.     

“Rules of thumb” for sovereign debt crises

This paper investigates the economic and political conditions that are associated to the occurrence of a sovereign debt crisis. We use a new statistical approach (Classification and Regression Tree) that allows us to derive a collection of “rules of thumb” that help identify the typical characteristics of defaulters. We find that not all crises are equal: they differ depending on whether the government faces insolvency, illiquidity, or various macroeconomic risks. We also characterize the set of fundamentals that can be associated with a relatively “risk-free” zone. This classification is important for discussing appropriate policy options to prevent crises and improve response time and prediction.     

Die Schuldenbremse der Bundesländer: eine Fehlkonstruktion?

The debt brake for the German Länder, which forbids them from taking on new net debt beginning in 2020, has two major shortcomings. First, the Länder do not have tax autonomy. In fiscal crises, they can only adjust on the expenditure side, not on the revenue side. Given the fact that most expenditure is predetermined by law, in such a crisis, a balanced budget without new debt would hardly be feasible. Second, it is not taken into account that, in particular in small regional units, large investments can hardly be financed by current expenditure. Thus, there is a very high probability that at least some Länder will still take on new net debt after 2020 and, therefore, violate the rules of the debt brake.     

The Greek Debt Crisis: Likely Causes,Mechanics and Outcomes

We use insights from the literature on currency crises to offer an analytical treatment of the crisis in the market for Greek government bonds. We argue that the crisis itself and its escalating nature are very likely to be the result of: (i) steady deterioration of Greek macroeconomic fundamentals over 2001–09 to levels inconsistent with long‐term EMU participation; and (ii) a double shift in markets’ expectations, from a regime of credible commitment to future EMU participation under an implicit EMU/German guarantee of Greek fiscal liabilities, to a regime of non‐credible EMU commitment without fiscal guarantees, respectively occurring in November 2009 and February/March 2010. We argue that the risk of contagion to other periphery EMU countries is significant; and that without extensive structural reforms, the sustainability of the EMU is in question.     

International currency exposures,valuation effects and the global financial crisis

We examine the evolution of international currency exposures, with a particular focus on the 2002–12 period. During the run up to the global financial crisis, there was a widespread shift towards positive net foreign currency positions, such that relatively few countries exhibited the archetypal emerging-market “short foreign currency” position on the eve of the global financial crisis. During the crisis, the upheaval in currency markets generated substantial currency-generated valuation effects — much of which were not reversed. There is some evidence that the distribution of valuation effects was stabilizing in the sense of showing a negative covariation pattern with pre-crisis net foreign asset positions.     

The Credit Crunch of 2007–08: Lessons Private and Public

The current financial crisis has much in common with past crises. Poor investment strategies with respect to risk as well as poor evaluation have contributed to the current crisis. This paper presents the lessons to be learned by the private and public sectors. Why do crises keep happening? Mismatch of assets—long-term liabilities offset by short-term assets—can be profitable but is risky, and robust strategies must be able to cope with the risk. A number of measures can and should be taken by private financial entities for their own sake as well as that of the entire financial system. With respect to the public sector, one should be wary of expanding the role of regulation. What should be done, however, is to make sure that public policies are pursued through on-budget spending and taxation rather than through off-budget initiatives, such as encouraging government-sponsored enterprises to accumulate subprime debt in order to further public policy objectives. It would also be useful to reduce overall levels of private debt by reducing tax incentives to borrow.