风险投资政府"补位"

从1985年3月以来,风险投资逐渐受到政府的高度重视,也越来越得到全社会的关注,但是它的发展却不尽如人意。在我国的风险投资发展中,政府虽然也作了一些政策引导,但更主要的作用体现对风险投资的直接参与上。在风险投资发展早期,我国资金短缺,风险投资还不为社会所熟悉,投资者对其认识不足的情况下,政府提供绝大部分资金,承担了风险,对其他资金的进入有引导作用,有利于风险投资的进一步发展。但从另一方面来看,政府作为投资主体,其负面作用也极其严     

风险投资发展中政府角色定位问题探讨

本文首先简要阐述了风险投资的概念以及发达国家政府在本国风险投资中的做法,据此对政府在风险投资中应承担的角色进行分析.然后结合当前我国风险投资的现状及存在的问题,研究我国政府在风险投资中的角色并提出相应的政策建议.     

风险投资离不开政府的扶持

要推动中国经济赶上世界知识经济的浪潮,我们一方面要重视高新技术的研究与开发,另一方面更要重视通过风险投资.尽快把高科技转化为生产力.风险投资在中国还是一件新生事物,离不开政府的扶持.政府如何规范和引导风险投资,对于我国风险投资的健康发展具有极为重要的作用.     

风险投资 政府如何定位

我国是一个从计划经济体制向市场经济体制转型的发展中大国,政府在风险投资中的角色定位与行为选择是否妥当,对我国风险投资的发展关系极大。风险投资离不开政府的支持,在发展初期尤其应该强化政府的作用。但在市场经济条件下,政府对风险投资只能引导,不能作为主要投资主体,政府主办风险投资不符合市场经济以及风险投资的发展规律。现阶段我国政府主要应当加大对风险投资的扶持力度,全面加强促进风险投资业发展的制度供给,为风险投资创造一个适宜的环境。     

高新技术企业与风险投资链接的缺环

风险投资运作框架的健全完善为风险投资进入高新技术企业提供有效制度保障。作者试剖析目前中国风险投资与高新技术企业链接中的严重缺环现象 ,并提出应对措施。     

我国现行风险投资机制存在的问题研究

自1985年“中国新技术创业投资公司”成立以来,我国的风险投资业开始正式运作。尽管风险投资在高新技术产业发展中起了重要作用,我们必须看到我国的风险投资业与西方发达国家存在很大差距,原因在于我国缺乏一套有效的风险投资机制。本文详细地分析了我国风险投资机制存在的诸多问题。     

浅谈政府投资项目的投资控制

针对政府投资项目在投资控制方面存在的一些问题,站在项目工程管理专业的角度,从政府投资项目决策、可行性研究、项目初步设计、投资概算、招投标和施工阶段及监管、审计等方面,论述了政府投资项目投资控制的必要性,提出了投资控制的要点和控制方法,并向投资项目的决策层和承建者提出了一些建设性意见.     

浅谈政府投资项目的投资控制

针对政府投资项目在投资控制方面存在的一些问题,站在项目工程管理专业的角度,从政府投资项目决策、可行性研究、项目初步设计、投资概算、招投标和施工阶段及监管、审计等方面,论述了政府投资项目投资控制的必要性,提出了投资控制的要点和控制方法,并向投资项目的决策层和承建者提出了一些建设性意见.     

引导和推动企业境外投资的政府职能

实施"走出去"战略,提高企业境外投资规模和质量,需要正确处理好政府与市场关系,发挥好政府的职能作用。从目前我国政府实际履行的职能来看,还存在着比较明显的"越位"、"缺位"和"错位"现象。为了加快"走出去"战略的顺利实施,不断提高企业境外投资规模和质量,需要通过"退位"、"补位"和"正位"来矫正政府职能缺陷,让政府履行好该履行的职能,退出不该履行的职能。     

Venture planning and analysis: An integrated approach to investment evaluation and product pricing

The venture planning and analysis (VPA) system is a quantitative analysis useful for developing pricing policy, projecting financial results, and comparing various investment opportunities. It is an integrated approach to product (investment) evaluation utilizing both marketing and cost information to determine an optimum pricing strategy.A venture plan is developed which covers several years of the anticipated life of the product (venture). The pricing strategy is determined by identifying the relationship between price, volume, and variable cost which yields the greatest positive cash flow. Revenue, variable expense, fixed expense, and engineering expense are input by fiscal year.The VPA system computes interest expense/income and cash flows. Ratios of the venture's quality-marginal investment quality factor and investment quality factor-are displayed, as are matrices which indicate the sensitivity of the venture to changes in the input data. Computer generated plots also help illustrate the cash flow and optimum level of production for each fiscal year of the analysis.     

Venture capital in transition: A Monte-Carlo simulation of changes in investment patterns

This article examines the nature of the investment process which has historically generated high returns for venture capital funds, and the impact on fund returns of perceived changes in management practice and the structure of the industry. The article outlines some policy implications for fund managers, investors, and the general management of corporations.The authors have investigated the investment process and the changes in the nature of the process through the use of a Monte-Carlo simulation model. Information gathered from interviews with fund managers and the available published data on venture fund performance (including proprietary surveys) was used to develop and calibrate the model. The model replicates the relatively high average fund returns and distribution of returns for funds through the early 1980s. The model simulates a multistaged investment process which draws on a pool of investment opportunities which have a log normal distribution of returns and a low (zero) average return. The model readily permits the exploration of the impact of management and industry practices on fund returns.The conditions identified by the authors, which led to high rates of return on the part of venture capital funds, include:

• 1.1) multistaged investment or commitment of funds on an incremental basis with evaluation of venture performance before commitment of additional fund;
• 2.2) objective evaluation of venture performance with the clear distinguishing of winners from losers;
• 3.3) parlaying funds or having the confidence to commit further funds to ventures identified as winners;
• 4.4) persistence of returns from one round to the next, which implies that valuable information is gained from previous rounds of investment in the same venture;
• 5.5) long-term holding of investment portfolios for a period sufficient for geometric averaging of compound returns to cause the winners to “take over” or raise portfolio returns.

Taken together, these conditions have permitted venture capital funds to historically realize strong average returns with a few of them realizing extraordinary returns.The article also explores the consequences of what some believe is happening in the industry: a trend toward holding investments for shorter periods, increased competition both for investments and later in the product-market arena, and a growing lack of loyalty between investors and investees. All of these conditions and their indirect consequences were shown by the model to negatively impact the limited partners in the venture capital funds while general partners, given the structure of fees and the distribution of investment returns, generally realized a reasonable to extraordinary return. The article outlines a number of management and investment policy implications for investors and fund managers.     

Analysis of government policies,institutions, and inward foreign direct investment: Evidence from sub‐Saharan Africa

This article examines the effects of government policies and institutions on foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows in sub‐Saharan African context using both quantitative and qualitative approaches. On the quantitative approach, we analyzed the effects of institutions on FDI using two statistical techniques—canonical cointegration regression (CCR) and fully modified ordinary least square (FMOLS)—over the period of 1984–2012. We find that political instability, democratic accountability, and investment risk have significant impact on inward FDI in Nigeria. Using a trend analysis, our results provide evidence to suggest that liberal government investment policies have positive influence on FDI inflows. Our qualitative analysis over the 1962–2012 period supports the results of the quantitative analysis.     

Untangling government,market, and investment failure during the Nigerian oil boom: the Cement Armada scandal 1974–1980

Abstract

The ‘Cement Armada’ was a major Nigerian government scandal which culminated in hundreds of cement-laden ships arriving en masse at Lagos, creating severe multi-year-long port congestion during the height of the 1970s oil boom. In spite of the scale of the scandal, its causes and consequences have received little attention from scholars. This article presents new research which suggests the Armada was one of several contributing factors to the extraordinary inflation in the price of construction during period. It places the scandal in the context of debates about corruption, organisational failure and a ‘resource curse’ in Nigeria.     

Gender,Risk, and Venture Creation Intentions

This paper is concerned with whether women are less likely to express business start‐up intentions because of a less favorable attitude to risk. Previous research suggests that attitude to risk differs significantly between genders, but has not addressed the question of whether this contributes to lower levels of female interest in venture creation. This paper describes a conceptual basis for this question, and investigates it using a survey of business start‐up intention from across a sample of European universities. A large proportion of the difference in average levels of intention between genders appears to be associated with attitude to risk.