上市公司财务信息自愿披露指数实证研究

研究表明，上市公司财务信息自愿披露程度随时间有明显的增加，样本公司的平均披露分数随时间而增加，而且对同质和非同质样本统计上都是显的，中后期比早期披露程度更高。     

Dissemination of Price-sensitive Information and Management of Voluntary Corporate Disclosure

This paper aims to describe how 27 large UK case companies sought to adapt their City and stock market disclosure policies to cope with the changes brought about by the publication in March 1994 of the Stock Exchange's Guidance on the Dissemination of Price-sensitive Information. Legislators and regulators have long sought to define and regulate the corporate decision problem in the price-sensitive information area. This paper employs corporate case interview data to describe models of corporate behaviour and to investigate how the case companies have dealt with this problem area. The paper concludes by (a), considering the effectiveness of regulation in providing a clear boundary for corporate behaviour, and (b), by discussing the relationship between this research and another major field study of corporate disclosure management (Gibbins, Richardson and Waterhouse, 1990), developing the disclosure model that they present.     

The Impact of Antitakeover Devices on the Valuation Consequences of Voluntary Corporate Selloffs

This study reveals that there are valuation differences in the announcement effects among firms engaged in interfirm asset sales. Even though, in the aggregate, these selloffs result in significant increases in share prices, there is a group of firms that experience no significant increases in shareholder wealth. These are firms that have adopted antitake-over devices prior to announcing corporate selloffs. For these firms, public perception about management's intention has been altered to the extent that the selloffs are interpreted as a way to consolidate the antitakeover position of the management.     

Voluntary Disclosure,Manipulation, and Real Effects

We study a model in which managers’ disclosure and investment decisions are both endogenous and managers can manipulate their voluntary reports through (suboptimal) investment, financing, or operating decisions. Managers are privately informed about the value of their firm and have incentives to voluntarily disclose information and manipulate their reports in order to obtain more favorable terms when issuing equity to finance a new profitable investment opportunity. The model shows that treating managers’ disclosure and investment decisions both as endogenous and allowing managers to manipulate their voluntary reports yields qualitatively different predictions from when the disclosure and investment decisions are considered separately and managers cannot engage in manipulation. The model predicts that managers’ disclosure strategy is sometimes characterized by two distinct nondisclosure intervals (contrary to traditional threshold equilibria of voluntary disclosure models) and that managers with intermediate news sometimes forego the new profitable investment opportunity. As such, the paper highlights the importance of considering the interdependencies between firms’ disclosure and investment decisions and provides new empirical predictions.     

The Impact of Statutory Sanctions on the Level and Information Content of Voluntary Corporate Disclosure

This article examines the effect of statutory civil and criminal sanctions on voluntary corporate disclosures by firms listed on the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). Apart from direct investigation of the quantity of voluntary disclosure, we also investigate several possible consequences of altered corporate disclosure policies, namely properties of analysts' forecasts, the degree to which share prices anticipate the information content of periodic earnings reports, and the relationship between volatility and corporate disclosures. Results suggest that, post-sanctions, any increase in voluntary disclosure is confined to smaller firms and those which performed relatively poorly. Moreover, analysts' earnings forecasts did not become more accurate or less diverse following the introduction of statutory sanctions, and there was no statistically significant increase in the weight placed on each disclosure's ability to explain return volatility. There is some evidence that share prices have anticipated earlier the value relevant components of annual periodic accounting data, although this result is again confined to smaller firms. Although the tests used are not independent and have a limited time period post-sanctions, the results cast doubt on the extent to which the imposition of substantive civil or criminal sanctions affects corporate disclosure policy.     

Corporate Governance: Factors Influencing Voluntary Disclosure by Publicly Traded Canadian Firms*

We report on the comprehensiveness of voluntary corporate governance disclosures in the annual reports and management information circulars of Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) firms. We focus on disclosure of the corporate governance practices implemented by our sample of TSE 300 firms vis‐à‐vis the 14 guidelines set out in the TSE's report on corporate governance Where Were the Directors? Our analysis indicates that only a very few firms disclose that they have fully implemented the TSE guidelines, and that the extent of disclosure of corporate governance practices implemented varies widely among the firms. We then test factors associated with the comprehensiveness of such disclosures and the choice of disclosure medium using simultaneous equations multivariate analysis. We also assess the influence of publicized corporate governance failures on disclosure. Overall, our results suggest that the choices of disclosure medium and the extent of disclosure are made concurrently, and are influenced by the strategic considerations of management.     

上市公司自愿信息披露与高管薪酬绩效敏感度

本文考察了自愿信息披露程度对高管薪酬绩效敏感度的影响。我们发现,自愿信息披露本身对高管薪酬无显著影响,但对高管薪酬绩效敏感度的影响显著为正。此外,在董事会有女性董事或者不存在两权分离的情况下,自愿信息披露对高管薪酬绩效敏感度的影响显著为正。这说明公司治理较好的董事会可以更好的利用自愿披露的信息对高管进行评价,从而改善对高管的激励。     

Roundtable on Corporate Disclosure

In an article published in this journal two years ago titled "Just Say No to Wall Street," Harvard's Michael Jensen and The Monitor Group's CEO Joseph Fuller urged companies to put an end to what they called the "earnings guidance game." Instead of earnings forecasts, Jensen and Fuller recommended that companies provide investors with information about their strategic goals and value drivers, and about the risks associated with carrying out those goals and management's plans to manage those risks.
In this roundtable, a group of corporate executives, equity analysts, and academics explore the possibility that companies can increase their values by resisting the temptation to "manage" earnings, committing to expanded disclosure, and engaging investors in a more strategic dialogue. By establishing such a dialogue, companies may be able to break out of the current "bad equilibrium" in which markets distrust managers and managers distrust markets.     

Voluntary Disclosures,Corporate Control,and Investment

We examine the valuation and capital allocation roles of voluntary disclosure when managers have private information regarding the firm’s investment opportunities, but an efficient market for corporate control influences their investment decisions. For managers with long‐term stakes in the firm, the equilibrium disclosure region is two‐tailed: only extreme good news and extreme bad news is disclosed in equilibrium. Moreover, the market’s stock price and investment responses to bad news disclosures are stronger than the responses to good news disclosures, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. We also find that myopic managers are more likely to withhold bad news in good economic times when markets can independently assess expected investment returns.     

Voluntary Disclosure, Earnings Quality, and Cost of Capital

We investigate the relations among voluntary disclosure, earnings quality, and cost of capital. We find that firms with good earnings quality have more expansive voluntary disclosures (as proxied by a self‐constructed index of coded items found in 677 firms' annual reports and 10‐K filings in fiscal 2001) than firms with poor earnings quality. In unconditional tests, we find that more voluntary disclosure is associated with a lower cost of capital. However, consistent with the complementary association between disclosure and earnings quality, we find that the disclosure effect on cost of capital is substantially reduced or disappears completely (depending on the cost of capital proxy) once we condition on earnings quality. Extensions probing alternative proxies show that our findings are robust to measures of earnings quality and cost of capital, but not to other measures of voluntary disclosure. In particular, we find opposite relations for voluntary disclosure measures based on management forecasts and conference calls, and we find no relations for a press release based measure.     

环境信息披露制度、公司治理和环境信息披露

企业环境信息披露体现了上市公司对环境信息披露制度的遵守和执行,同时增加了公众对上市公司行为的了解;反过来,这将促使上市公司改变他们的一些行为。本文在给出企业环境信息披露制度定义的基础上,采用我国重污染行业上市公司2006—2010年年报和独立报告中披露的环境信息进行实证研究,研究证明制度对企业环境信息披露有显著的正向关系,即环境信息披露法律法规的颁布及实施提高了企业环境信息披露水平;同时研究验证了公司治理具有增强制度对企业环境信息披露的促进作用。研究结果为《上市公司环境信息披露指南》的出台提供了证据支持、为完善企业环境信息披露制度的设计提供了经验证据。     

Determinants of Corporate Social Disclosure in Developing Countries: The Case of Qatar

In this study, an attempt is made to test the validity of theories employed in the literature to explain variation in the extent of corporate voluntary disclosure within the corporate social disclosure context. The annual reports of 21 out of the 22 companies listed on the Doha Stock Exchange in Qatar were used as a basis for the study. Variations in corporate social disclosure by the sampled Qatari companies are found to be associated with firm size measured by the firm's market capitalisation, business risk measured by leverage and corporate growth. The outcome of the study lends partial support to agency theory, political economy theory, legitimacy theory, stakeholder theory as well as the accountability approach.     

上市公司社会责任信息披露影响因素研究

本文以在深圳证券交易所上市的公司为样本，对上市公司社会责任信息披露程度及其影响因素进行了实证研究。研究发现，我国上市公司社会责任信息披露的总体状况较差，公司绩效、行业属性及规模是影响我国上市公司社会责任信息披露的重要因素，而独立董事比例及董事长与总经理是否二职合一两个公司治理结构变量均末表现出对社会责任信息披露的显著影响．     

Corporate Disclosure,Market Valuation,and Firm Performance

In this paper, I study the relationship between the Association for Investment Management and Research disclosure rankings and several corporate performance measures. I find a positive relationship between these rankings and stock returns. Furthermore, disclosure rankings are highly correlated with firm value. Specifically, Qs of firms ranked at the top of disclosure rankings are 35% higher than those of firms ranked at the bottom. I also find positive associations between disclosure rankings and future net profit margins, sales growth, and research and development intensity. Finally, I document a positive correlation between changes in disclosure rankings and future earnings surprises.     

Disclosure Regulation and Corporate Acquisitions

This paper examines the effect of disclosure regulation on the takeover market. We study the implementation of a recent European regulation that imposes tighter disclosure requirements regarding the financial and ownership information on public firms. We find a substantial drop in the number of control acquisitions after the implementation of the regulation, a decrease that is concentrated in countries with more dynamic takeover markets. Consistent with the idea that the disclosure requirements increased acquisition costs, we also observe that, under the new disclosure regime, target (acquirer) stock returns around the acquisition announcement are higher (lower), and toeholds are substantially smaller. Overall, our evidence suggests that tighter disclosure requirements can impose significant acquisition costs on bidders and thus slow down takeover activity.     

它山之石:QFII与上市公司信息披露

合格境外机构投资者(QFII)为上市公司提供了一个来自境外的特殊且专业的监督力量。本文利用2006-2015年中国A股上市公司数据,并采用Kim and Verrecchia(2001)的方法测度信息披露质量,发现QFII持股与公司信息披露质量显著正相关。在使用PSM-DID、安慰剂检验、工具变量法和反向因果识别来缓解内生性后,本文证明了QFII持股与公司信息披露之间存在因果关系,说明QFII已经成为一种重要的外部治理力量。分样本研究发现,QFII持股对信息披露质量的改善作用对内部治理较好和被“四大”审计的公司更加明显。最后,机制检验发现QFII可以通过增加持股公司的分析师跟踪人数和高管薪酬业绩敏感性来改善信息披露质量。因此,增加QFII的数量和逐渐放松资本项目管制有助于改善信息环境和保护中小股东权益,进而促进我国资本市场的健康发展。     

Corporate Innovation and Disclosure Strategy

This study investigates the impact of firm innovation on MD&A disclosure. Firms need to reduce information asymmetry to assist investors on the one hand and to prevent rivals from benefitting from disclosures on the other. Innovative firms can use an optimistic tone to convey good news but increase content similarity to reduce proprietary costs. Management chooses a certain content similarity and tone strategy for an innovation and as the number of innovations increases, the ratio of similar innovation disclosure and positive tone increases in the overall MD&A, resulting in greater content similarity and more news conveyed with a positive tone. We find that the firm's level of innovation is positively related to content similarity and tone optimism. We also find that this positive relation is more pronounced when product market competition is stronger and when regional intellectual property rights protection is weaker. Our further analyses on market responses provide evidence suggesting that management's disclosure strategy functions as intended.     

Investor Sentiment and Corporate Disclosure

This paper investigates how firms react strategically to investor sentiment via their disclosure policies in an attempt to influence the sentiment‐induced biases in expectations. Proxying for sentiment using the Michigan Consumer Confidence Index, we show that during low‐sentiment periods, managers increase forecasts to “walk up” current estimates of future earnings over long horizons. In contrast, during periods of high sentiment, managers reduce their long‐horizon forecasting activity. Further, while there is an association between sentiment and the biases in analysts' estimates of future earnings, management disclosures vary with sentiment even after controlling for analyst pessimism, indicating that managers attempt to communicate with investors at large, and not just analysts. Our study provides evidence that firms' long‐horizon disclosure choices reflect managers' desire to maintain optimistic earnings valuations.