MARKET POWER AND PRICE MOVEMENTS OVER THE BUSINESS CYCLE*

This paper develops and tests implications of an oligopoly‐pricing model. The model predicts that during a demand expansion, the short run competitive price is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium but in a recession, firms set prices above the competitive price. Thus, price markups over the competitive price are countercyclical. Prices set during a recession are more variable than prices set in expansions because firms employ mixed strategy pricing in recessions. The empirical analysis utilizes Hamilton's time series switching regime filter to test the predictions of the model. Fourteen out of fifteen industries have fluctuations consistent with this oligopoly‐pricing model.     

Sales Promotion and Cooperative Retail Pricing Strategies

Supermarket retailers make strategic pricing decisions in a high-frequency, repeated game environment both in buying and selling fresh produce. In this context, there is some question as to whether a non-cooperative equilibrium can emerge that produces margins above the competitive level. Supermarket pricing results from tacitly collusive equilibria supported by trigger price strategies played in upstream markets. Upstream activities are, in turn, driven by periodic retail price promotions. This hypothesis is tested using a sample of fresh produce pricing data from 20 US supermarket chains. The results support the existence of tacitly collusive non-cooperative equilibria in upstream and downstream markets.     

论垂直价格挤压下的接入定价规制

在自然垄断产业引入竞争的过程中,独占传输网络的纵向一体化垄断厂商可能对下游市场新进入者实施接入价格挤压。接入价格挤压从属于价格歧视。尽管一定条件下的接入价格挤压具有正向的竞争效应,但垄断厂商将具有同等效率或更高效率的独立厂商驱逐出市场则应该受到规制。接入价格规制包括政府直接规制定价和反垄断法间接规制定价。直接规制定价中整体价格上限较为可取,而反垄断法间接规制需要采用基于福利后果分析的合理推定原则,但从短期来看采用直接规制更有效率。最后提出了完善我国自然垄断产业接入定价规制的相关政策建议。     

主制造商供应商合作协商定价让步博弈研究

本文针对由单一主制造商和单一供应商组成的供应链系统,基于主制造商供应商的战略合作模式和双方的利益追求,制定了主制造商供应商的谈判协商规则,建立了以价格谈判为切入点的战略谈判协商定价模型,并研究了主制造商和供应商分别为第一出标者下的让步均衡,求出了实现双方利益最大化下的最优出标量。最后通过算例分析,验证了本文所构建的主制造商供应商协商谈判模型的可行性,并对比分析了双方合作的纳什博弈结果与让步博弈结果。研究表明主制造商和供应商通过谈判制定让步规则,双方主体分别作为主导者和跟随者,确定各自价格的削减量,相对于低效的纳什均衡时的合作结果,能够实现双方的利益增加。     

油价改革——渐进市场化的蜕变

为了解决国际油价高企情况下我国油价倒挂所产生的炼化环节的亏损和迎接2006年底放开成品油批发市场放开外资进入的挑战，我国开展了成品油定价机制改革。虽然市场化是定价机制改革的总方向，但介于我国市场化条件的不成熟，我国应实行逐步实现市场化的方法，同时要注重配套措施的改革，如对弱势群体的补偿，建立公平有效的成品油市场，建设我国的战略石油储备和石油期货市场，我国只有完善了这些软硬件才能真正的实现油价的市场化。     

Strategic and deterrent pricing responses to antitrust investigations

This paper examines the issue of the effects of antitrust on pricing through two empirical studies. The first analyzes time series of prices in five industries involved in antitrust cases to determine whether the various stages of the antitrust process influenced pricing behavior. Some evidence of a ‘deterrent’ effect is found, with real prices lower than their pre-investigation level following the conclusion of the case; a major part of the pricing reaction occurs prior to the filing of formal charges. The second study provides additional evidence of the existence of such a ‘strategic’ reaction to the onset of investigation through an examination of prices in 23 industries investigated but not charged with price fixing.     

Is Airline Price Dispersion the Result of Careful Planning or Competitive Forces?

We develop a model of price dispersion to distinguish the impact of price discrimination from that of peak load pricing schemes or atypical competition resulting from the financial difficulties of the early 1990s. By utilizing three alternative measures of dispersion and appealing to economic theory for our specification, we find robust results suggesting an estrangement between price dispersion and price discrimination. While some discrimination continues to persist at monopolized endpoints, most dispersion is associated with fare wars and peak load pricing schemes.     

Economies of scale,strategic advertising and fully credible entry deterrence

Recent work on entry deterrence has emphasized the distinction between a monopolist’s reversible and irreversible preentry strategic moves (e.g., limit pricing) will not credible deter a rational potential entrant. Dixit (1980) and other have demonstrated, however, that irreversible preentry capacity investments can result in credible deterrence. In this paper, we examine preentry advertising investments which irreversibly alter postentry demand conditions. Using an infinite horizon model, we show that preentry investments in advertising may result in credible deterrence even for the extreme case where an entrant expects a collusive postentry price, and the monopolist ceases all advertising at the moment of entry.     

The agency and wholesale models in electronic content markets

I analyze a model of dynamic competition between retail platforms in the presence of consumer lock-in. Two different revenue models are considered, one in which platforms set final retail prices and one in which the suppliers set final retail prices. Platforms have long-term (or strategic) pricing incentives but suppliers do not, which implies that the inter-temporal price path faced by consumers depends on the revenue model in place. When suppliers set prices instead of platforms, prices may be higher in early periods but lower in later periods, suggesting that appropriate antitrust enforcement ought to consider more than initial price changes when an industry shifts to the agency model. Indeed, consumers may (but need not) prefer the agency model even when prices increase in initial periods. A potential downside of the agency model is that it may align the incentives of suppliers and platforms and thereby encourage platforms to lower the competitiveness of the supplier market, harming consumers; no such incentives exist under the wholesale model. I relate my results to events in the market for electronic books.     

Best Practices for New Product Pricing: Impact on Market Performance and Price Level under Different Conditions

To date, research on new product pricing has predominantly been approached as a choice between market skimming and penetration pricing. Despite calls for research that addresses other complexities in new product pricing, empirical research responding to these calls remains scarce. This paper examines three managerial price‐setting practices for new products, i.e., value‐informed, competition‐informed, and cost‐informed pricing. By engaging in these practices, managers can develop and compare quantifications in order to attain an introduction price for the product. The authors draw on consumer price perception literature, Monroe's pricing discretion model, and numerical cognition literature to develop hypotheses about the impact of price‐setting practices on new product market performance and price level. By studying the effects on market performance and price level, the paper provides insights that may help explain the growth of new products and address the problems of underpricing. The hypotheses are tested in a management survey of 144 production and service companies. The results indicate which pricing practices are superior for the achievement of either higher market performance or higher prices in specific product and market conditions. Whereas value‐informed pricing has an unambiguous positive impact on relative price level and market performance, the results also suggest that in many cases engaging in value‐informed pricing is not enough. The effects of cost‐informed and competition‐informed pricing may differ depending upon the objective (market performance or higher prices), product conditions (product advantage and relative product costs), and market condition (competitive intensity). Engaging in inappropriate pricing practices leads to a decline in new product performance. Moreover, bad pricing practices make the positive effect of product advantage on the outcome variables disappear. The latter finding suggests that companies can jeopardize their efforts and investments in the new product development process if they engage in the wrong price‐setting practices. The findings imply that managers should consider different factors in new product pricing. First, when launching a new product, they should determine their explicit pricing objective, either stressing market performance or a higher price level. To determine the most appropriate pricing practices, however, they should next assess their situation in terms of product advantage, relative product costs, and competitive intensity. Together with the pricing objective, these conditions determine the best pricing practice. On a higher level, the findings imply that companies should invest in knowledge development in order to engage in the appropriate pricing practices for each product launch.     

Pricing strategy, quality signaling, and entry deterrence

I investigate a pricing strategy that is aimed at deterring entry by applying a two-period model of a durable-goods monopolist. There exists an incumbent that is of two types, that is, high and low quality types. They differ in terms of their R&D capabilities, and the incumbent's type is assumed to be unknown to an entrant. If the entrant decided to enter the market, Nash–Bertrand price competition ensues between the incumbent and the entrant. I show that not only limit pricing but also prestige pricing signals the incumbent's quality type, which serves to discourage entry. In the prestige pricing, the high-quality type sells the products at an intentionally higher price. I also show that although limit pricing is more desirable than prestige pricing from a social welfare viewpoint, the incumbent can still choose prestige pricing.     

规制定价机制的激励强度权衡与模型设计--以我国电信产业的规制定价总体模型设计为例

自然垄断产业中，由于规制机构与被规制企业之间存在着信息不对称。价格规制政策的实施效果受到制约，而制度背景和经济发展程度是设计一个适合国情的规制定价机制必须考虑的前提因素。本文分析了我国目前的制度特征如何影响我国自然垄断产业规制定价机制激励强度的权衡。在此基础上，尝试提出适合我国目前制度特征的电信产业规制定价总体模型——基于收益率规制并加入动态激励因素的规制定价模型．最后对未来的规制定价机制做出展望．     

Price reaction functions and conjectural variations

Price conjectural variations are estimated to measure the degree of price competition in a product differentiated oligopoly. The empirical model is a simultaneous equation system of product demand and price reaction functions. Own and cross price demand elasticities are estimated in conjunction with the price conjectural variations and price reaction function elasticities. The conjectural variations are estimated for pairs of ready-to-eat breakfast cereal products using brand price and quantity data. The empirical results reject competitive brand pricing behavior in favor of independent or collusive pricing. Further, the hypothesis of a unique consistent conjecture is rejected.     

Sustaining Collusion Via a Fuzzy Trigger

Probability theory is the standard economic representation of uncertainty, although it is not always an accurate one. Fuzzy logic is an alternative representation that does not require individual beliefs regarding the explicit functional form of uncertainty. This paper applies fuzzy logic to an oligopoly trigger pricing game. The fuzzy trigger pricing game reverses the standard cyclical price war prediction; collusion-sustaining price wars are most likely to occur during times of high demand. The fuzzy model also predicts that markets with relatively volatile prices are more likely to undergo collusion-sustaining price wars. The predictions are consistent with available empirical evidence.     

List pricing and discounting in a Bertrand–Edgeworth duopoly

List, or retail, pricing is a widely used trading institution where firms announce a price that may be discounted at a later stage. Competition authorities view list pricing and discounting as a procompetitive practice. We modify the standard Bertrand–Edgeworth duopoly model to include list pricing and a subsequent discounting stage. Both firms first simultaneously choose a maximum list price and then decide whether to discount, or not, in a subsequent stage. We show that list pricing works as a credible commitment device that induces a pure strategy outcome. This is true for a general class of rationing rules. Further unlike the dominant firm interpretation of a price leader, the low capacity firm may have incentives to commit to a low price and in this sense assume the role of a leader.     

On the strategic value of risk management

This article examines how firms facing volatile input prices and holding some degree of market power in their product market link their risk management and their production or pricing strategies. This issue is relevant in many industries ranging from manufacturing to energy retailing, where firms that are rendered “risk averse” by financial frictions decide on and commit to their hedging strategies before their product market strategies. We find that commitment to hedging modifies the pricing and production strategies of firms. This strategic effect is channeled through the risk-adjusted expected cost, i.e., the expected marginal cost under the probability measure induced by shareholders' “risk aversion”. It has opposite effects depending on the nature of product market competition: commitment to hedging toughens quantity competition while it softens price competition. Finally, not committing to the hedging position can never be an equilibrium outcome: committing is always a best response to non-committing. In the Hotelling model, committing is a dominant strategy for all firms.     

The effect of competition on pricing and product positioning: Evidence from wholesale club entry

This paper empirically examines incumbents’ reactions to market entry along price and non-price dimensions in the example of wholesale warehouse entry into grocery retail markets. Leveraging a detailed retail panel spanning 2001–2011 and a novel dataset documenting opening and closing dates and locations of all Costco warehouse clubs, we classify incumbent retailers’ strategic responses (e.g., pricing, assortment) by the storability of product categories, controlling for persistent systematic differences across retailer–product combinations. We find that retailers are substantially affected by increased competition from wholesale club warehouse openings and in response increase the variability of their prices, consistent with adoption of the Hi–Lo pricing strategy. In addition, incumbent retailers’ strategic responses differ significantly across storability levels: They are more likely to increase prices and reduce assortments for highly storable products and decrease prices and increase assortments for less storable products. We extend our analysis by exploiting the spatial variations in our data and analyzing divergent market effects across geographical areas. We find significant geospatial differences in these strategic responses.     

Identifying customer behavioral factors and price premiums of green building purchasing

In recent years, global urbanization and overdevelopment have resulted in environmental degradation and an energy crisis. Promoting green buildings is among the most effective methods for achieving environmental sustainability. Although the initial costs of green buildings are higher than those of ordinary buildings, people perceive that the environmental benefits of green buildings justify their higher price premiums. From a developer's perspective, devising optimal pricing strategies according to customer-perceived prices and developers' expected profit is complex and difficult. Hence, in this study, we developed a framework based on the Howard–Sheth model of consumer behavior to identify behavioral factors that may affect consumer purchases of green buildings. An artificial neural network (ANN) was then used to develop a pricing model for predicting the price premiums of green buildings. The results revealed that the ANN model's overall prediction capability was 94%; the model's robustness was demonstrated by comparing the results produced using the model with those produced using a multiple regression analysis. In addition, the characteristics of consumers who were willing to accept higher price premiums for green buildings were identified and discussed. The proposed model can be applied as an effective decision-support tool for green building pricing and formulating marketing strategies.     

对我国建立天然气衍生品市场的思考

我国目前的天然气流通机制和价格管理方式落后于天然气工业及市场的发展,建立天然气衍生品市场是我国未来天然气流通机制和价格体系的改革之路.目前东北亚地区没有一个能够反映天然气供需、形成机制公开透明的指标性的市场化价格.为控制价格风险和保障供应,建立健全我国天然气衍生品市场具有战略意义.按照目前我国天然气管线和液化天然气接收站的建设规划,广东省更有可能成为我国重要的天然气定价基点之一.我国液化天然气(槽车运输)市场开放度较高,且已经存在一定规模的现货交易,建议近期上市液化天然气衍生品品种,为以后上市管道天然气现货及衍生品品种做好试点.     

Collusive Communication and Pricing Coordination in a Retail Gasoline Market

This paper studies how communication is used by a retail gasoline cartel in Australia to coordinate price increases, a role of communication in collusion not highlighted by Genesove and Mullin (Am Econ Rev 91(3): 379–398, 2001). A unique data set from the trial record allows for quantifying not only the pricing dynamics, but also the communication patterns. Both empirical and narrative evidence suggests the collusive communication and pricing behavior is well captured by the price cycle equilibrium of the Maskin and Tirole (Econometrica 56(3): 571–599, 1988) model.