Matching with noise and the acceptance curse

This paper explores matching with both search and information frictions. Specifically, everyone observes only a noisy signal of the true type of any potential mate. In this context, matching decisions must incorporate not only information about a partner's attribute conveyed by the noisy signal, but also—as in the winner's curse in auction theory—information about a partner's type contained in his or her acceptance decision.We show that there exists an equilibrium exhibiting a stochastic positive assorting of types, generalizing [Becker, J. Polit. Economy 81 (1973) 813-846]. In equilibrium, selection is adverse: being accepted reduces an agent's estimate of a potential partner's type, a phenomenon that we call the acceptance curse effect.     

Monetary union: A welfare based approach

This article attempts to shed light on the consequences of the transition to EMU for individual welfare following specific shocks. To this end, we develop a two country intertemporal general equilibrium model that extends the Obstfeld and Rogoff (Journal of Political Economy 103 (3) (1995) 624) specification to nominal rigidities through price adjustment costs and pricing-to-market behavior.We show that, when facing a positive asymmetric permanent shock to either technology or government expenditures occurring in one country, implementing a monetary union is beneficial to the households living in this economy. Conversely, it is detrimental to foreigners. Further, a sensitivity analysis shows that if the gains/losses to implementing monetary union are qualitatively robust when facing changes in the degree of nominal rigidities and the elasticity of substitution between foreign and domestic goods, they are quite sensitive to the degree of pricing-to-market in the economy.     

The impact of public goods and services and public R&D on the non-observed economy size,wages inequality and growth

We develop a general equilibrium endogenous growth model in which final goods can be produced either in the Non-Observed Economy (NOE) or in the Official Economy (OE). In particular, by solving transitional dynamics numerically towards the unique and stable steady state, we show that, by affecting the technological-knowledge bias in favour of the OE, productive public goods and services and public policies promoting R&D explain the simultaneous rise in the OE size, the wage premium in favour of OE workers and the economic growth rate. These results are mainly in line with empirical evidence for developed countries, since the 1990s.     

The “second economy” and resource allocation under central planning

A formal model of intermediate product reallocation through Second Economy markets in a centrally planned economy is discussed. The principal result is that there exists an equilibrium allocation determined in these Second Economy markets in spite of fixed official prices and centrally monitored trading at these prices. It is always a constrained Pareto optimum with respect to the initial plan-generated allocation. Hence, Second Economy markets can effectively and “second best” efficiently ration the intermediate-product “sellers' market” of a centrally planned economy.     

Audited reputation

We study reputations with imperfect audit and a reputation market. The main result shows the existence of a separating equilibrium in the reputation market, which contrasts with Tadelis [Tadelis, S., 2002, The market for reputations as an incentive mechanism, Journal of Political Economy 110(4), 854–882].     

Harassment, corruption and tax policy: A comment on Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee [Eur. J. Political Economy 16 (2000) 75–94]

Our comment on Marjit et al. [Marjit, S., Mukherjee, V., Mukherjee, A., 2000. Harassment, corruption and tax policy. European Journal of Political Economy 16, 75–94.] addresses the equilibrium concept used in the game with imperfect information, Section 4 of the original paper. The solution represented in the original paper does not constitute a perfect Bayesian Nash-equilibrium. We develop an alternative solution of the game given the assumptions made by Marjit et al. [Marjit, S., Mukherjee, V., Mukherjee, A., 2000. Harassment, corruption and tax policy. European Journal of Political Economy 16, 75–94.] and find that the results concerning the optimal amount of over-evaluation of income and the existence of a pooling or separating equilibrium are altered.     

Strategic policies and growth: an applied model of R&D-driven endogenous growth

We introduce and explore a general equilibrium model with R&D-driven endogenous growth, whose antecedents are the models of Romer (1990) [Romer, P.M., 1990. Endogenous technological change. Journal of Political Economy, 98, S71-102] and Grossman and Helpman (1991) [Grossman, G.M., Helpman E., 1991. Innovation and Growth in the Global Economy, The MIT Press, Cambridge]. Utilizing evidence from recent econometric studies on sources of growth, the model also accounts explicitly for cross-border technological spillovers. The model is specified and calibrated to data from Japan, and is solved to obtain both the transitional and the steady-state equilibria. We explore the effects of selective trade and R&D promotion policies on long-run growth and social welfare. The model results suggest that while a strategic trade policy has little effect on re-allocating resources into domestic R&D activities, it can significantly affect the cross-border spillovers of technological knowledge, which, in turn, stimulates growth. We find that trade liberalization may cause the growth rate to fall and lead to a loss of social welfare in the long-run, although it improves welfare in the short-run. R&D promotion policies stimulate growth by inducing private agents to allocate more resources to domestic R&D, as well as to take greater advantage of global R&D spillovers. Here, we find significantly high growth effects together with sizable gains in social welfare at low incidence to tax payers.     

On the dynamics of inequality in the transition

Inequality has increased in many of the transition economies. At the same time, spending on education has declined. In this paper we survey the factors driving these changes. We then set up a small general equilibrium model to simulate the effect of different policy choices on the path of inequality over the transition. We show that the policies selected in Central Europe engender a relatively rapid spike in inequality but with a Kuznets curve. In the simulations that broadly capture features of the policy regime dominating in Russia and the FSU, we find no Kuznets curve. We then turn to the longer run and look at the way in which both trade liberalization and technological and organizational change are likely to affect the relative demand for types of labour. We show how substantial technological and organizational change - obvious features of transition - can result in raising inequality. Persistence in inequality can be expected to depend critically on the pace at which the acquisition of skills takes place in the economy - and, hence, on the evolution of the educational system. As such, policies aimed at raising adaptability - such as quality educational systems - can be expected to dampen the increase in wage inequality.     

行政区经济--长株潭经济一体化的瓶颈

“行政区经济”是我国在计划经济向市场经济转轨过程中出现的一种特殊的、过渡性质的区域经济。在经济体制转轨时期,它将对我国区域经济产生不可忽视的影响。长株潭经济一体化提出已将近半个世纪,然而进展依然缓慢,其中一个重要的原因就是受到行政区经济的强烈影响。抑制“行政区经济”、加速长株潭经济一体化是长株潭三市以及湖南全省面临的一个重要课题。     

Search, money, and inflation under private information

I study monetary exchange and inflation when buyers have private information about their willingness to pay for certain goods. Introducing imperfect information in the Lagos-Wright [A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis, J. Polit. Economy 113(3) (2005) 463-484] economy shows that the existence of monetary equilibrium is a more robust feature of the environment. In general, my model has a monetary steady state in which only a proportion of the agents hold money. Agents who do not hold money cannot participate in trade in the decentralized market. The proportion of agents holding money is endogenous and depends (negatively) on the level of expected inflation. As in Lagos and Wright's model, in equilibrium there is a positive welfare cost of expected inflation, but the origins of this cost are very different.     

Sequential voting with abstention

Dekel and Piccione [2000. Sequential voting procedures in symmetric binary elections. J. Polit. Economy 108, 34–55] have proven that information cascades do not necessarily affect the properties of information aggregation in sequential elections: under standard conditions, any symmetric equilibrium of a simultaneous voting mechanism is also an equilibrium of the correspondent sequential mechanism. We show that when voters can abstain, these results are sensitive to the introduction of an arbitrarily small cost of voting: the set of equilibria in the two mechanisms are generally disjoint; and the informative properties of the equilibrium sets can be ranked. If an appropriate q-rule is chosen, when the cost of voting is small the unique symmetric equilibrium of the simultaneous voting mechanism dominates all equilibria of the sequential mechanism.     

The Democratic Efficiency Debate and Definitions of Political Equilibrium

An ongoing debate has been occurring within public choice for over a decade concerning the efficiency of democracy. Virginia Political Economy holds that political markets perform very differently from traditional markets. Chicago Political Economy, exemplified by the work of Becker and Wittman, maintains that political equilibrium, properly defined, is relatively efficient. I argue that the debate can be understood at least partially in methodological terms: Chicago views politics exclusively within the equilibrium framework of traditional economics, while Virginia draws at least implicitly on Austrian economics' view of the economy as a disequilibrium process. I contend that the factors which public choice scholarship has identified as distinguishing politics from markets—rational ignorance, majority rule, collective outcomes—affect the performance of politics as a process even if political equilibrium is relatively efficient.     

中国企业信誉缺失的理论分析

针对当前中国缺乏高信誉度品牌这一现象,本文构造了一个重复博弈理论模型,试图找出其背后更深层的经济和制度原因。现有文献主要研究均衡所能实现的最高效率支付(最好均衡)。我们认为,分析中国信誉缺失问题,合理的视角应该是考查最差均衡,并据此来分析摆脱低信誉陷阱的因素。在本文的模型里,在均衡中企业信誉有一个动态演变的过程。在一定的条件下,即使在最差均衡中,经过足够长的时间后,均衡会实现从低效率状态到高效率状态的转变,而社会总体效率取决于这种转变的快慢。我们刻画了这种转变所需要的时间,以及影响转变速度的经济制度因素。我们发现,中国社会普遍的低信任度、市场机制的不完善(尤其是市场中介机构和监督机构的不足)、市场竞争的不充分和技术水平的落后,是阻碍和延长中国经济从低效率到高效率状态转变的重要因素。     

General equilibrium impact of an energy-saving policy in the public sector

We analyse a disregarded environmental policy instrument: a switch in government expenditure away from energy (or other natural resources) and toward a composite good which includes energy-saving expenditure. We first develop two variants of an analytical general equilibrium model. A composite good is produced with constant returns to scale, and energy is imported or produced domestically with diminishing returns, yielding a differential rent to its owners. The government purchases energy and composite goods from private firms. Such a policy unambiguously increases employment. It also raises private consumption and welfare under two conditions: (i) it is not too costly and (ii) the initial share of the resource is smaller in public spending than in private consumption, or the difference is small enough. We then run numerically a model featuring both importation and domestic production of energy (oil, gas and electricity), for the OECD as a whole. Simulations show that employment, welfare and private consumption rise. We provide magnitudes for different parameter values. Earlier versions of this paper have benefited from conference participants at the European Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy, International Society for Ecological Economics World Congress, CIRED seminar and EUREQua environmental economics seminar. We especially thank Michèle Sadoun and two anonymous referees. The usual disclaimer applies.     

On the existence of involuntary unemployment equilibria

Conclusion We have proved the existence of equilibria implying involuntary unemployment of labour in non-competitive economies with fixed wage rate. We notice that model (II) and its extensions have not been presented as aninterpretation of Keynes' theory. We may define them as Keynesian models only in the sense that they admit involuntary unemployment equilibrium, which concept is basic to Keynes' theory. In any case, we think that these models are a first step in the development of more realistic microeconomic foundations for short-run macroeconomic theory.A first draft of this paper was presented in December 1972 at the Institute of Political Economy, Faculty of Economics and Banking, Siena University.     

Variety of products,public capital,and endogenous growth

This paper develops an extension of the endogenous growth model with variety expansion presented in Romer [Romer, P.M., 1990. Endogenous technical change, Journal of Political Economy 98, part 2, S71–S102] by considering public capital accumulation. Characterizing the transitional dynamics, the growth rate of consumption traces (and available number of intermediate goods also might trace) an S-shaped converging path to the equilibrium growth rate, similar to a logistic growth curve, if the intensity of public capital is sufficiently high. We also show that public investment enhances economic growth because it stimulates demand for intermediate goods and raises the market interest rate.     

Endogenous buyer-seller choice and divisible money in search equilibrium

In the Lagos-Wright model [R. Lagos, R. Wright, A unified framework for monetary theory and policy analysis, J. Polit. Economy 113 (2005) 463-484], the quasi-linear preferences assumption is not necessary to generate simple distributions of money holdings if individuals choose endogenously to go to the search market as buyers or as sellers. The non-convex buyer-seller choice provides an incentive for gambling in lotteries, and, as a result, the value function has a linear interval. As long as this interval is the relevant one for evaluating their future utilities, individuals behave as if their preferences were quasi-linear. In the stationary equilibrium, individuals remain inside this linear interval if the money supply does not decline.     

The hump-shaped behavior of inflation and a dynamic externality

We propose a general equilibrium model that explains the empirical evidence of the hump-shaped response of inflation to a monetary policy shock. The model replaces backward-looking indexation à la Christiano et al. [2005. Nominal rigidities and the dynamic effect of a shock to monetary policy. Journal of Political Economy 113(1), 1-45] with a dynamic externality into the production function of firms. The model, armed with sticky wages and variable capital utilization, has two offsetting effects on real marginal cost over the business cycle. First, increasing factor prices raise real marginal cost in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock in the intermediate run. Second, a dynamic externality reduces real marginal cost in the short run because it raises productivity in response to an increase in output following the shock. Overall, the resulting short-run decrease and intermediate-run increase in marginal cost replicate the hump-shaped behavior of inflation under purely forward-looking price and wage Phillips curves.     

Under pressure: Evolution of the social economy institutional recognition in the EU

Social Economy encompasses a wide array of private organizations that can be situated along a continuum that ranges from civil society to the business sector, e.g., associations, foundations, cooperatives, social enterprises, social business initiatives. The social sphere populated by SE/TS organizations operates in complex and multi‐layer environments and is particularly sensitive to institutional configuration. This paper deals with the institutional policy and attitude of the EU Commission towards SE/TS organizations in the field of welfare policy. We start with an illustration of the key features of the Social Investment policy framework, that stresses the adoption of an ‘active policy’ orientation and the overriding of more traditional ‘compensatory policies’. Secondly, we analyze the regulatory eco‐system of the EU towards Social Economy in the last three decades. Thirdly, we present the main results of an European research project aimed at analyzing the ‘level of recognition’ and ‘institutionalization’ of the SE sector in ten European Countries. Then, we provide some data about the consistency of the Social Economy in EU, based on several research reports promoted  by European Institutions (EESC). Finally, the main results of the analysis are summarized in order to assess the current conjuncture of the Social Economy sector in Europe.     

Lombard Enlightenment and Classical Political Economy

Abstract

This paper discusses the formative steps of ‘Classical’ Political Economy under the joint influence of the Italian and Scottish Enlightenment. Pietro Verri is a leading figure of the Italian Enlightenment and he belongs to the Lombard branch of the Italian School of Political Economy (sometimes named ‘School of Milan’) during the latter half of the eighteenth century. Schumpeter's treatment of the ‘School of Milan’ describes Pietro Verri as ‘the most important pre-Smithian authority on Cheapness-and-Plenty’. A careful canvass of the texts substantiates Schumpeter's suggestion. Verri stands out as a key figure in the transition from Physiocracy to the Smithian system.