The projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic

We investigate a variety of connections between the projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic. At interior population states, the standard microfoundations for the replicator dynamic can be converted into foundations for the projection dynamic by replacing imitation of opponents with “revision driven by insecurity” and direct choice of alternative strategies. Both dynamics satisfy a condition called inflow–outflow symmetry, which causes them to select against strictly dominated strategies at interior states; still, because it is discontinuous at the boundary of the state space, the projection dynamic allows strictly dominated strategies to survive in perpetuity. The two dynamics exhibit qualitatively similar behavior in strictly stable and null stable games. Finally, the projection and replicator dynamics both can be viewed as gradient systems in potential games, the latter after an appropriate transformation of the state space.     

The projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic

We investigate a variety of connections between the projection dynamic and the replicator dynamic. At interior population states, the standard microfoundations for the replicator dynamic can be converted into foundations for the projection dynamic by replacing imitation of opponents with “revision driven by insecurity” and direct choice of alternative strategies. Both dynamics satisfy a condition called inflow–outflow symmetry, which causes them to select against strictly dominated strategies at interior states; still, because it is discontinuous at the boundary of the state space, the projection dynamic allows strictly dominated strategies to survive in perpetuity. The two dynamics exhibit qualitatively similar behavior in strictly stable and null stable games. Finally, the projection and replicator dynamics both can be viewed as gradient systems in potential games, the latter after an appropriate transformation of the state space.     

Global stability of dynamic models

A necessary and sufficient condition for global stability of dynamic models is summability to one of the long-run elasticities and cointegration. The short-run coefficients automatically satisfy the homogeneity condition. A relevant restriction has to be imposed in the parameter estimation process; otherwise, the ratios of variables appearing in the model will tend to either infinity or zero, which is economic nonsense in most cases. This conclusion is particularly important for the ECM or VEC (SVEC) models that decompose behavior into long and short-run parts.     

A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies

We uncover a new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies by mechanisms that satisfy the “best element property” where for each agent, there exists a strategy profile that gives him the highest payoff in the mechanism. This class includes finite and regular mechanisms. We conclude that either the quasilinearity-like assumptions of available sufficiency results cannot be completely dispensed with or some mechanisms that do not satisfy the best element property must be employed. We term the condition “restricted deception-proofness.” It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation by mechanisms satisfying the best element property are more restrictive than previously thought.     

Mechanism design with multidimensional, continuous types and interdependent valuations

We consider the mechanism design problem when agents’ types are multidimensional and continuous, and their valuations are interdependent. If there are at least three agents whose types satisfy a weak correlation condition, then for any decision rule and any ?>0 there exist balanced transfers that render truthful revelation a Bayesian ?-equilibrium. A slightly stronger correlation condition ensures that there exist balanced transfers that induce a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which agents’ strategies are nearly truthful.     

SOCIAL INTERACTIONS IN LARGE NETWORKS: A GAME THEORETIC APPROACH

This article studies estimation of social interactions in a large network game, where all observations come from one single equilibrium of a network game with asymmetric information. Simple assumptions about the structure are made to establish the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium. I show that the equilibrium strategies satisfy a network decaying dependence condition requiring that dependence between two players' decisions decay with their network distance, which serves as the basis for my statistical inference. Moreover, I establish identification and propose a computationally feasible and efficient estimation method, which is illustrated by an empirical application of college attendance.     

Gross substitutes and immiserizing growth

In a pure exchange economy immiserizing growth occurs when an increase in the endowment of one trader results in a new equilibrium where that trader has lower utility. This paper demonstrates that such perverse behavior is ruled out when excess demands satisfy a particular gross substitute condition.     

Strategy-Specific Barriers to Learning and Nonmonotonic Selection Dynamics

The replicator dynamics are generalized to allow for strategy-specific barriers to learning. The resulting dynamics satisfy neither payoff monotonicity nor payoff positivity, but do satisfy weak payoff positivity. It is shown that initial states from which trajectories converge to a rest point under the replicator dynamics may yield trajectories which approach a stable limit cycle under the generalized replicator dynamics. Furthermore, strategies which are strictly dominated by other pure strategies may survive indefinitely along such nonconvergent paths.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: C73.     

AN EXPERIMENTAL INVESTIGATION OF COOPERATION IN THE DYNAMIC COMMON POOL GAME

This article studies experimentally to what extent subjects can cooperate in a dynamic common pool game, where the stage game changes endogenously. Although efficiency can be supported with strategies that condition on history, the main finding is that it is difficult to cooperate. Even if the incentives to cooperate are large, modal behavior can be rationalized with equilibrium Markov strategies that do not condition on history. The popularity of Markov strategies, however, is decreasing in the incentives to cooperate. The evidence also suggests that strategic uncertainty added by facing stage games that change in time may move play away from efficiency.     

从非经常性损益项目看亏损上市公司的盈余管理

盈余管理是现代会计理论研究中的一个重要领域。以仅仅亏损一年的上市公司（除ST、PT公司之外）1999年度盈余管理的数据为研究基础,对其盈余管理行为进行实证研究。结果发现,为了在来年顺利实现盈利,亏损公司存在明显地利用非经常性损益调高收益避免亏损的现象,亏损年度的非经常性损益显著表现为负。1999年度的数据支持公司通过调控非经常性损益获取配股资格的结论。     

On the Welfare Significance of National Product for Economic Growth and Sustainable Development

This paper formulates an investment value transversality condition in a continuous-time growth model, which characterizes competitive paths along which current net national product measures the welfare achieved along the path. This transversality condition requires that the present value of net investment goes to zero asymptotically. An example provided shows that, in general, competitive paths do not necessarily satisfy this condition. It is also shown that, in a standard growth model including an exhaustible resource as an essential factor of production, competitive paths always satisfy this condition. Implications regarding national income accounting procedures and sustainable development policies are discussed.
JEL Classification Numbers: D90; O11; O41; Q32.     

Optimal and competitive programs in reachable multi sector models

Summary. We show that in multi-sector optimal growth models, where the technology satisfies a simple reachability condition, infinite horizon programs which satisfy the competitive conditions are optimal. We provide examples of a variety of production models where the reachability condition is satisfied. An example is also provided where the reachability condition is not satisfied and there are competitive programs which are not optimal. The results of the paper are of interest from the standpoint of decentralization in intertemporal economies. Received: March 24, 1994; revised version: October 10, 1998     

A Property of Nash Equilibria in Repeated Games with Incomplete Information

We consider two-person non-zero-sum infinitely repeated games with lack of information on one side. The characterization of Nash equilibrium payoffs obtained by Hart allows for complex strategies, which are actually required by some equilibrium payoffs in some games. We show that appropriate one-shot public communication mechanisms make Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable by means of simple strategies. Furthermore, these mechanisms satisfy a notion of self-fulfillment.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D82, C72.     

Bargaining one-dimensional social choices

We analyze bargaining over the one-dimension characteristic of a public good among n impatient players when decisions require q favorable votes, q?2. Stationary subgame perfect equilibrium strategies are characterized for all games with deterministic protocol. We provide a monotonicity condition (satisfied by all single-peak, strictly quasi-concave and concave utilities) that assures uniqueness for every q whenever player's utilities are symmetric around the peak. Without symmetry, the monotonicity condition assures uniqueness for qualified majorities, q>n/2, provided that agents are sufficiently patient and utilities satisfy an additional regularity condition. Asymptotic uniqueness is assured for qualified majorities by imposing only the monotonicity condition.     

ON EQUILIBRIUM FOR OVERLAPPING GENERATIONS ORGANIZATIONS*

Necessary conditions for equilibrium are that beliefs about the behavior of other agents are rational and individuals maximize. We argue that in stationary OLG environments this implies that any future generation in the same situation as the initial generation must do as well as the initial generation did in that situation. We conclude that the existing equilibrium concepts in the literature do not satisfy this condition. We then propose an alternative equilibrium concept, organizational equilibrium that satisfies this condition. We show that equilibrium exists, it is unique, and it improves over autarky without achieving optimality. Moreover, the equilibrium can be readily found by solving a maximization program.     

Intertemporal Equity and Efficient Allocation of Resources

Competitive paths which are efficient are shown to satisfy a terminal cost minimization condition, thereby providing a continuous-time counterpart to the discrete-time result due to Malinvaud. Using this result, competitive paths which are equitable and efficient are shown to satisfy Hartwick's investment rule, which states that the value of net investment is zero at each date. Our result indicates that Hartwick's rule can help to signal inefficiency of competitive equitable paths. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C61, D90, O41.     

Tit for tat: Foundations of preferences for reciprocity in strategic settings

This paper assumes that in addition to conventional preferences over outcomes, players in a strategic environment have preferences over strategies. It provides conditions under which a player's preferences over strategies can be represented as a weighted average of the utility from outcomes of the individual and his opponents. The weight one player places on an opponent's utility from outcomes depends on the players’ joint behavior. In this way, the framework is rich enough to describe the behavior of individuals who repay kindness with kindness and meanness with meanness. The paper identifies restrictions that the theory places on rational behavior.     

A test for rational bubbles in stock prices

This paper presents two necessary conditions for the absence of rational bubbles on the assumption that the discount rate is stationary. One condition is that real stock prices and real dividends are cointegrated with the time-varying cointegrating vector. The other is that the order of integration of real stock prices is equal to that of real dividends. The first condition is different from that proposed on the assumption of a constant discount rate. In contrast, the second condition is the same as that presented on this assumption. Examining the second condition using Japanese data, we find that Japanese stock prices and dividends satisfy the necessary condition. First version received: May 2000/Final version accepted: April 2001     

On the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice

This paper attemts to make precise the frontier between possibility and impossibility theorems in social choice. It is shown that some criterion of rejection of some alternative is the critical factor. In the absence of such a condition, it is possible to construct a fairly wide class of “democratic” decision rules which satisfies a class of consistency conditions. Any one of these, together with the criterion of rejection, generates a power structure similar to the ones discovered by Arrow, Gibbard, and others when the decision rule is required to satisfy the weak Pareto principle and the independence condition.     

大掺量粉煤灰海工混凝土的应用及经济成本分析

针对某跨海大桥所处环境的特点,通过大掺量粉煤灰配制海工混凝土。试验结果表明,大掺量粉煤灰海工混凝土的工作性、力学性能良好,所确定的配合比使混凝土能满足耐久性要求,又能满足低成本的要求,并在大桥钻孔灌注桩中得到比较成功的应用。