Signaling and initial public offerings: The use and impact of the lockup period

To reduce information asymmetries for potential investors considering investment in an IPO venture, owners can signal the firm's longer-term viability and quality in several ways. The lockup period, is one signal that can be offered. We investigated the lockup period of a sample of 640 ventures going through the IPO and find that a longer lockup period acts as a substitute signal to venture capital (VC) and prestigious underwriter backing. Furthermore, we find that ventures which have a going concern issue can reduce the amount of underpricing at the time of the IPO by accepting a longer lockup period.     

How much prestige is enough? Assessing the value of multiple types of high-status affiliates for young firms

Young, unproven firms can signal their worthiness, or potential, through affiliations with various types of prestigious parties. Drawing from signaling theory, we present a formal consideration of the implications of multiple numbers and types of prestigious affiliates for IPO valuations. We argue that different types of prestigious affiliates – prestigious executives, directors, venture capital firms, and underwriters – convey different signals of IPO worth, depending on the extent to which they provide certification or substantive benefits. Based on a sample of 257 software IPOs, we find considerable support for our expectations. The benefits of prestigious executives and directors accumulate in a linear, more is better fashion; in contrast, the payoffs from VC and underwriter prestige accumulate in a curvilinear fashion. We discuss the theoretical implications of these findings and propose an agenda for future research.     

Ownership structure,insider behavior,and IPO performance of SMEs in China

This paper examines the drivers of IPO performance of 783 SMEs in China between 2009 and 2012 that were listed on the SME and Growth Enterprise Boards. The study finds that firms that had prior venture capital (VC) investment did not perform better than those that did not. Among VC-invested firms, ventures (1) with strong VC control rights relative to those of the largest block shareholder, (2) with former ownership affiliation between the VC and the underwriter, and (3) that paid higher IPO fees had a negative long-term performance. The negative relationship between VC-underwriter ownership affiliation and long-term performance decreases as the reputation of the underwriter increases.     

Venture capitalists' decision criteria in new venture evaluation

What criteria do venture capitalists use to make venture investment decisions? The criteria venture capitalists use to make their venture investment decisions are of interest for several reasons. First, venture capitalists are conspicuously successful in their investment decisions. The success rate of venture capital-backed ventures is significantly higher than the success rate of new ventures generally (Dorsey 1979: Davis and Stetson 1984). A better understanding of the criteria used could lead to a better understanding of the reasons for this success.Second, a better understanding of the criteria for successful new ventures could lead to an improvement in the success rate of new ventures. Although there is no clear agreement on the precise rate, the failure rate among new ventures is generally viewed as significantly higher than the average failure rate (Dun and Bradstreet 1984; Van de Ven 1980; Shapero 1981).Finally, venture capitalists' investment criteria are of enormous import to entrepreneurs seeking venture funding. Such entrepreneurs require a significant infusion of capital in order to grow their businesses, and knowledge of the criteria sought by venture capitalists can aid entrepreneurs in gaining the necessary financing.This study attempts to uncover the criteria used by venture capitalists through semistructured interviews and verbal protocol analysis of venture capitalists' evaluations of actual venture proposals. Sixteen verbal protocols—in which the participants “think aloud” as they review business proposals— were made of venture capitalists' venture evaluation decisions.The findings of this study suggest that venture capitalists screen and assess business proposals very rapidly: the subjects in this study reached a GO/NO-GO decision in an average of less than six minutes on initial screening and less than 21 minutes on proposal assessment. In venture capitalists' initial proposal screening, key criteria identified include fit with the venture firm's lending guidelines and the long-term growth and profitability of the industry in which the proposed business will operate. In the second stage of proposal assessment, the source of the business proposal also played a major role in the venture capitalists' interest in the plan, with proposals previously reviewed by persons known and trusted by the venture capitalist receiving a high level of interest.In addition to the specific criteria identified and how they were used in reaching GO/NO-GO decisions, the findings of this study also were surprising for the lack of importance venture capitalists attached to the entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team and the strategy of the proposed venture during these early stages of the venture evaluation process.     

An examination of the influence of industry structure on eight alternative measures of new venture performance for high potential independent new ventures

This study examined the influence of the structure of new ventures’ entered industries on eight alternative measures of new venture performance for 199 high potential independent new ventures. Each of the 199 entrepreneurial ventures had undertaken an initial public offering (IPO) within the first 6 years of the venture’s founding date and were free of corporate sponsorship or prior corporate parentage.Specifically, this research examined the influence of: (1) stage of the life cycle; (2) industry concentration; (3) entry barriers; and (4) product differentiation on eight alternative measures of new venture performance. The eight measures of new venture performance examined in this research consisted of: (1) change in sales; (2) sales level; (3) net profit; (4) earnings before interest and taxes; (5) return on sales; (6) return on assets; (7) return on invested capital; and (8) return on equity.Most prior research examining the influence of industry structure on new venture performance has: (1) utilized only one or two measures of new venture performance as indicators of the venture’s overall effectiveness and efficiency; (2) often failed to provide theoretical justification for the measure(s) of new venture performance or industry structure examined; and (3) utilized data derived from questionnaires and/or the PIMS data base of corporate-sponsored new ventures. In addition, prior industry structure studies examining independent new ventures have often utilized relatively small sample sizes.This study sought to advance the progress in the field of entrepreneurship with regard to understanding the influence of the structure of new ventures’ entered industries on new venture performance by: (1) examining eight alternative measures of new venture performance; (2) providing theoretical justification for the measures of new venture performance and industry structure examined; and (3) utilizing the largest nonquestionnaire data base of independent new ventures developed to date.This research found that the stage of the life cycle of the venture’s entered industry was the most important determinant of new venture performance among the four industry structural elements examined. Stage of the life cycle had a statistically significant relationship, at a 0.05 level, with the majority of the new venture performance measures examined in this research. In addition, ventures entering industries in the introductory stage of the life cycle achieved the highest levels of venture performance, particularly when compared with those ventures that entered industries in the mature stage of the life cycle.However, this study did not find a statistically significant relationship between stage of the life cycle and change in sales. This suggests that there is a trade-off between profitability and sales growth, and that new ventures that undertake an IPO have a stronger focus on achieving profitable operations rather than sales growth during the initial years after their IPO. This may be due to pressures placed on the new ventures to achieve profitability by the external credit market.Conversely, this research found that: (1) industry concentration; (2) entry barriers; and (3) product differentiation did not have statistically significant relationships, at a 0.10 level, with any of the eight alternative measures of new venture performance examined in this research. However, this research did find that over 90% of the new ventures entered industries characterized by: (1) a low degree of industry concentration and (2) a high degree of product differentiation.The relative absence of new venture entry into industries characterized by: (1) high degrees of concentration and (2) low degrees of product differentiation provides support for prior theory, which suggests that successful entry into such industry environments may be substantially more difficult.In sum, the results of this research suggest that high potential independent new ventures that undertake an IPO should enter industries in the introductory stage of the life cycle. In addition, the results of this research suggest that industries characterized by: (1) relatively low degrees of industry concentration and (2) highly heterogenous products may be necessary but not sufficient conditions for successful entry by high potential independent new ventures seeking to raise equity capital through an IPO.     

Dynamic capabilities and venture performance: The effects of venture capitalists

After going through the initial public offering (IPO), new ventures face increased competition, greater public examination, and increased government scrutiny. Resource base weaknesses and external forces pose severe threats to the survival and success of new ventures. Building from resource-based theory, we first examine and delineate dynamic capabilities from entrepreneurial capabilities in entrepreneurship. We then develop theory to explain how venture capitalists (VCs) endue their ventures with greater dynamic capabilities in order to address these weaknesses and threats. We test our hypotheses on a match-pair sample of VC-backed and non-VC-backed new ventures and find that VC-backed ventures demonstrate greater dynamic capabilities as they relate to product and management development but do not display any greater dynamic capabilities as they relate to legal and government regulation threats. Further analysis also revealed that VC experience and VC reputation were positively related to 1-year stock price returns.     

The entrepreneur's search for capital

The popular media have been inundated with stories of the spectacular success of start-up companies whose very existence, let alone their meteoric growth, would not have been possible without the infusion of venture capital. By comparison, there is a dearth of scientific research on the topic of venture capital. In this article we take a systematic look at entrepreneurs in search of risk capital. This inquiry is based upon five data bases including surveys of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. We have tracked 193 ventures which were denied venture capital, surveyed 179 new high-technology companies in Northern California, and reviewed the Dun & Bradstreet credit reports of 145 new ventures in California in SIC codes related to the high tech sector with follow-up interviews of 86 of these 145 start-ups.     

Passion for entrepreneurship or passion for the product? A conjoint analysis of angel and VC decision-making

Passion is important to venture investors, but what specifically do they want entrepreneurs to be passionate about? This study theorizes that angel investors and venture capitalists consider both entrepreneurs' passion for activities related to the product or service the venture provides (i.e., product passion) and passion for founding and developing new ventures (i.e., entrepreneurial passion). We demonstrate that both types of passion become more appealing when the investor perceives that the entrepreneur is highly open and receptive to feedback, suggesting that openness to feedback mitigates potential concerns associated with passion in its extremes. We further find that venture investors differ in their consideration of passion; angel investors and venture capitalists with more investing experience place greater emphasis on the combination of product passion and openness to feedback, whereas those with more entrepreneurial experience emphasize the combination of entrepreneurial passion and openness to feedback.     

The Effect of Venture Capital Investment—Evidence from China's Small and Medium‐Sized Enterprises Board

In this paper, we use a matched sample to empirically test the effect of venture capital investment on the companies listed on the Small and Medium‐Sized Enterprises Board in China. We find that Chinese venture capitalists neither add value to their invested firms in the initial public offering (IPO) process nor improve operating performance. Rather, compared with their non‐venture‐backed counterparts, venture‐backed firms are associated with a greater level of IPO underpricing and inferior operating performance both before and after IPO. Our findings in China support neither the certification/monitoring hypothesis nor the grandstanding hypothesis, but partly support the adverse selection hypothesis.     

Why do venture capital firms exist? theory and canadian evidence

This paper investigates the role of venture capitalists. We view their “raison d’être” as their ability to reduce the cost of informational asymmetries. Our theoretical framework focuses on two major forms of asymmetric information: “hidden information” (leading to adverse selection) and “hidden action” (leading to moral hazard). Our theoretical analysis suggests four empirical predictions.1. Venture capitalists operate in environments where their relative efficiency in selecting and monitoring investments gives them a comparative advantage over other investors. This suggests strong industry effects in venture capital investments. Venture capitalists should be prominent in industries where informational concerns are important, such as biotechnology, computer software, etc., rather than in “routine” start-ups such as restaurants, retail outlets, etc. The latter are risky, in that returns show high variance, but they are relatively easy to monitor by conventional financial intermediaries.2. Within the class of projects where venture capitalists have an advantage, they will still prefer projects where monitoring and selection costs are relatively low or where the costs of informational asymmetry are less severe. Thus, within a given industry where venture capitalists would be expected to focus, we would also expect venture capitalists to favor firms with some track records over pure start-ups. To clarify the distinction between point 1 and point 2, note that point 1 states that if we look across investors, we will see that venture capitalists will be more concentrated in areas characterized by significant informational asymmetry. Point 2 says that if we look across investment opportunities, venture capitalists will still favor those situations which provide better information (as will all other investors). Thus venture capitalists perceive informational asymmetries as costly, but they perceive them as less costly than do other investors.3. If informational asymmetries are important, then the ability of the venture capitalist to “exit” may be significantly affected. Ideally, venture capitalists will sell off their share in the venture after it “goes public” on a stock exchange. If, however, venture investments are made in situations where informational asymmetries are important, it may be difficult to sell shares in a public market where most investors are relatively uninformed. This concern invokes two natural reactions. One is that many “exits” would take place through sales to informed investors, such as to other firms in the same industry or to the venture’s own management or owners. A second reaction is that venture capitalists might try to acquire reputations for presenting good quality ventures in public offerings. Therefore, we might expect that the exits that occur in initial public offerings would be drawn from the better-performing ventures.4. Finally, informational asymmetries suggest that owner-managers will perform best when they have a large stake in the venture. Therefore, we can expect entrepreneurial firms in which venture capitalists own a large share to perform less well than other ventures. This is moral hazard problem, as higher values of a venture capitalist’s share reduce the incentives of the entrepreneur to provide effort. Nevertheless, it might still be best in a given situation for the venture capitalist to take on a high ownership share, since this might be the only way of getting sufficient financial capital into the firm. However, we would still expect a negative correlation between the venture capital ownership share and firm performance.Our empirical examination of Canadian venture capital shows that these predictions are consistent with the data. In particular, there are significant industry effects in the data, with venture capitalists having disproportionate representation in industries that are thought to have high levels of informational asymmetry. Secondly, venture capitalists favor later stage investment to start-up investment. Third, most exit is through “insider” sales, particularly management buyouts, acquisitions by third parties, rather than IPOs. However, IPOs have higher returns than other forms of exit. In addition, the data exhibit the negative relationship between the extent of venture capital ownership and firm performance predicted by our analysis.     

Limited attention and the role of the venture capitalist

This research analyzes the venture capitalist's incentives to maximize the profits of the entrepreneurs of ventures and the limited partners of a venture fund. Venture capital is a professionally managed pool of capital invested in equity-linked private ventures. Entrepreneurs turn to venture capitalists for financing because high-technology startup firms have low or negative cash flows, which prevent them from borrowing or issuing equity. In addition, venture capitalists are actively involved in management of the venture to assure its success. This solves the problem of startup firms that do not have the cash flows to hire management consultants.Venture capital contracts have three main characteristics: (1) staging the commitment of capital and preserving the option to abandon, (2) using compensation systems directly linked to value creation, and (3) preserving ways to force management to distribute investment proceeds. These characteristics address three fundamental problems: (1) sorting the venture capital among the entrepreneurial ventures, (2) providing incentives to motivate venture capitalists to maximize the value of the funded ventures, and (3) providing incentives to motivate entrepreneurs to maximize the value of the ventures. Venture capitalists fund only about a dozen projects a year out of a thousand evaluated. Each project may receive several rounds of financing. Payoffs to VCs can be very high or be a complete loss.The typical venture capital (VC) firm is organized as a limited partnership, with the venture capitalists serving as general partners and the investors as limited partners. General partner VCs act as agents for the limited partners in investing their funds. VCs invest their human capital by placing their reputation on the line. The goal is to begin to convert the investment into cash or marketable securities, which are distributed to the partners. VC management companies receive a management fee equal to a percentage (usually 2.5%) of the capital of each fund. They also receive a percentage (15–30%) of the profits of each fund, called carried interest. Periodic reports are made by the VC firm to the limited partners. Usually these are only costs of managing the fund, and so revenues are negative. Most contracts specify the percentage of time that the VC will devote to managing the fund.The analysis of this research deals with the incentives of the VC who has limited attention to be allocated between improving current ventures and evaluating new ventures for possible funding. The analysis shows that the VC, as agent for both the entrepreneur and the general partners, does not have the incentives required to maximize their profits. The VC allocates attention among ventures and venture funds less frequently than required to maximize the entrepreneurs' and limited partners' profits. However, the VC does maximize the total profits of all ventures. Because the VC considers the opportunity cost of attention, the VC's allocation of attention is efficient. The implication of this result is that, although the entrepreneurs and limited partners could be made better off with a different allocation of the VC's time, this would be an inefficient use of the VC's time.     

Venture capitalists and serial entrepreneurs

Habitual entrepreneurship is receiving growing attention, much of which has focused on entrepreneurs who have started more than one venture. This paper examines the importance of habitual entrepreneurs to the venture capital industry, with particular emphasis on those who have exited from an initial investment in the venture capitalist's portfolio, termed serial entrepreneurs. As venture capital markets mature, increasing numbers of entrepreneurs are likely to exit from their initial enterprises, creating a pool of entrepreneurs with the potential for embarking on subsequent ventures. Venture capitalists making investments may invest both in entrepreneurs starting new ventures and those who purchase a venture through a management buy-out or buy-in. On this wider basis, the paper develops a classification of types of serial venture. A number of issues are raised for venture capitalists, notably the relative attractiveness of reinvesting in exited entrepreneurs and the policy they adopt in tracking and assessing such individuals.The paper addresses venture capitalists' perspectives on investing in serial entrepreneurs based on a representative sample of 55 UK venture capitalists (a response rate of 48.7%, and a follow-up survey of those who had more extensive experience of serial entrepreneurs (23 respondents). The results of the survey show that despite a strong preference for using an entrepreneur who had played a major role in a previous venture, the extent to which exiting entrepreneurs are funded from their own portfolio again is limited, though there is more extensive use of such individuals in a consultancy capacity. In screening entrepreneurs exiting from previous ventures for subsequent investments, venture capitalists scored attributes relating to commercial awareness, experience in a particular sector, and personal ambition of the entrepreneur most highly.Venture capitalists do make extensive use of serial entrepreneurs who have exited from other venture capitalists' portfolios, primarily to lead management buy-ins. Indications from the survey are that venture capitalists rarely assess entrepreneurs formally at the time of exit and that it is unusual to maintain formal links with entrepreneurs after they have exited. These apparent shortcomings suggest that perhaps investment opportunities are being missed. Those venture capitalists preferring serial entrepreneurs generally had a larger volume of funds under investment and were rather older than those venture capitalists who do not prefer to use serial entrepreneurs, reflecting the possibility that longer established venture capitalists have had more opportunity and experience in relation to second-time entrepreneurs.Investment appraisal factors were subject to a principal components analysis to identify underlying dimensions/relationships between them. With respect to the general investment appraisal factors, five factors were identified. Two factors were related to track record; one of these reflected ownership experience, while the other represented management experience. The third factor was related to personal attributes such as age, knowledge, and family background. The fourth factor represented links to the funding institution, and the final factor (a single variable factor) concerned financial commitment. The principal components analysis for screening factors on management buy-ins produced a single factor comprising all variables. These factors were then subject to a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), with preference for use of a serial entrepreneur as the independent variable. The results suggest that there are significant differences between venture capitalists who prefer serial entrepreneurs and those who do not in respect to their business ownership experience, the length of their entrepreneurial careers, and the number of their previous ventures.The results of the study have implications for practitioners. First, the findings emphasize the importance of not considering previous venture experience in isolation but in the context of other key investment criteria. Second, the lack of strongly greater performance from serial, versus novice, entrepreneurs further emphasizes the care to be taken in assessing experienced entrepreneurs. Third, the relatively low degree of formal and rigorous post-exit assessment and monitoring by venture capitalists suggests that important opportunities to invest in experienced entrepreneurs may be missed.     

Structuring deals and governance after the IPO: Entrepreneurs and venture capitalists in high tech start-ups

In an effort to better understand the effects of venture capital investment on selected firm governance and financing structures, we examined the post-IPO experiences of 190 biotechnology and healthcare firms (see appendix). Our study revealed that in virtually all cases, the involvement of venture capitalists reduced the role of the founder-entrepreneur in strategic decision making. This was illustrated by the larger proportion of outside directors when venture capitalists invested and the smaller proportion of entrepreneurs who remained officers or in board positions after the IPO. We also found that venture capitalists rarely invested alone, and preferred to structure deals in which venture capital partners share both risks and rewards.     

Is venture capital worth it? Effects on firm performance and founder returns

This paper extends research on venture capital (VC) finance by studying its effects on a venture's performance and on its founders' returns beyond an initial public offering (IPO). A “founder performance” construct, defined as a founder's financial and nonfinancial returns, is proposed and used to measure and compare returns to founders with returns to investors and firm performance. In general, venture characteristics pre-IPO and venture performance post-IPO were not significantly different when comparing ventures with and without VC backing. Only when VC backing is very high, do pre-IPO resources and funding improve significantly. However, higher levels of resource endowments did not seem to affect post-IPO performance for the venture or its investors. On the other hand, founders resorting to VC funding before taking their company public generated significantly less wealth for themselves and were less likely to remain as CEOs of their ventures after the IPO. Results suggest that founders motivated primarily by wealth creation and those motivated by remaining in control of their ventures should, in both instances, minimize VC backing when taking their ventures public. The finding that founder performance differs from venture and investor performance calls for future research to explore potential conflicts of interest that may arise from the double role of founders as principals and agents.     

Specialization versus diversification as a venture capital investment strategy

Much important work has informed us of rates of return earned by venture capitalists, the importance of venture capitalists to the “going public” process, and the criteria venture capitalists use to evaluate deals. This paper seeks to add to the literature by testing hypotheses, based upon both the finance and strategic management literature, regarding certain venture capitalist investment practices.Venture capitalists seek to control or manage risk (Driscoll 1974; MacMillan, Siegel, and SubbaNarasimha 1985). Financing structure and investment strategy provide several means for venture capitalists to do this. Tools available to the venture capitalist include portfolio diversification to spread risk across different industries, firms, or hot/cold IPO markets to minimize unsystematic or investment-specific risk. Information sharing, networking, and specialization can also be used to control unsystematic risk.Several hypotheses are developed from these conflicting perspectives. Data used to test the hypotheses are derived from responses to a survey of venture capitalists. Three hundred surveys were mailed to venture capitalists; 98, or 32.7%,returned usable responses.Portfolio diversification is a well-known means to control risk exposure by reducing unsystematic or specific risks. However, Bygrave (1987, 1988), as well as financial intermediation theorists, argues that maintaining a high degree of specialization is useful for controlling risk as well as for gaining access to networks, information, and deal flow from other venture investors. The analyses of this paper build upon Bygrave's work. We construct more rigorous tests to resolve the conflict between the diversification and information-sharing hypotheses. Our hypothesis tests were usually resolved in favor of the information-sharing view. For example, venture capitalists in the sample that were heavily involved in seed round financing were diversified across fewer numbers of firms and industries.Further evidence in favor of information sharing is seen in investment patterns across different financing stages. Diversification would imply maintaining a portfolio of investments across the different investment stages. The information sharing/specialization view would argue that it is best to stay focused on a single stage or several “connected” stages. The empirical evidence from the sample once again favors the specialization perspective.This research provides information of use to venture capitalists, as they seek information on how best to control risk; to entrepreneurs, as they learn of the factors venture capitalists consider in determining their investment strategy; and to academicians, as such studies provide insight to general industry practice and thus help to form the basis of classroom discussion and future research endeavors.     

Changing underwriting practices on underpricing of U.S. global initial public offerings

We examine the underpricing of U.S. firms that went public globally (Global IPOs) between 1986 and 2003. Our results suggest that, when compared to their peers that went public at home, U.S. issuers did not enjoy an advantage in issue costs from their global offerings. Their offers experienced substantial increases in underpricing, which exceeded that of their peers since the late nineties. We observe that the increased underpricing was accompanied by an overwhelming proportion of Global IPOs being underwritten by prestigious underwriters and backed by venture capitalists. In addition, Global IPOs accounted for an increasing percentage of total issues of U.S. firms in the late nineties. Further findings suggest that Global IPOs may be motivated by expanding investor demand under favorable overseas market conditions and increasing visibility through global placement.     

Effects of differential information on the after-market valuation of initial public offerings

This paper examines the after-market for initial public offerings (IPOs), particularly the security valuation effects of structural differences in available information. There is a diversity of information among issuing firms at the time of their offering and particularly under certain market conditions. Because this diversity decreases with time and after-market trading, the IPO market provides an ideal setting for testing errors due to differential information levels in early after-market valuation of IPO firms. We find evidence that during “hot” market conditions and for firms characterized by low levels of available information, the market values of issuing firms are more likely to be overestimated in the immediate after-market. We also find positive overestimation of market values to be more likely for larger IPOs and for those marketed by the less prestigious underwriters.     

Does Venture Capital Syndication Spur Employment Growth and Shareholder Value? Evidence from German IPO Data

This study empirically examines the syndication of equity by multiple venture capitalists in Germany. Following the literature, there are mainly two competing views as to why venture capitalists syndicate investments. First, syndication can be viewed as a means of risk-sharing. Second, venture capitalists may provide important productive resources to firms: capital and information. I test hypotheses based on these two aspects. The results show that the syndication of equity and the number of venture capitalists involved cannot be fully explained by firm characteristics like size, age, or industry affiliation. Although syndicated investments do not differ significantly in stock-market performance, they do show significantly higher growth rates.     

How useful is venture capital prestige? Evidence from IPO survivability

This study examines the effect of venture capitalist (VC) prestige on the post-issue survivability of IPOs and how VC characteristics influence the effect. We find that IPOs backed by prestigious VCs are less likely to delist for performance failure and have longer listing duration relative to those without VC backing; however, IPOs backed by ordinary VCs are as likely to delist as IPOs without VC backing. The finding is robust for Internet and high-tech firms. We further examine heterogeneous VC characteristics and find that the ability of prestigious VCs to improve IPO survival is a function of their investment experience and managerial ability. VC prestige characterized by industry specialization and syndication networks is not related to IPO survival. Overall, the results suggest that the VC characteristics that produce prestige, rather than the prestige itself, drive the long-term survival of IPOs.     

Cash crisis in newly public Internet-based firms: an empirical analysis

This study examines why, even when financial resource constraints are significantly relaxed, some new ventures struggle to survive while others prosper. Using the data of approximately 200 new Internet ventures that went public during the years 1997 through 1999, we propose that the performance of new ventures is a function of pre-initial public offering (IPO) characteristics. We determined that firm-level characteristics, including top management team (TMT), financial position, networks, and location, are related to the performance of struggling new ventures. We found strong evidence of agency relationships, so that a substantial reduction in equity holdings by the entrepreneurial team is a strong signal of impending crisis. Interestingly, similar reductions by venture capital (VC) backers did not serve as a signal of crisis.