Earned Income Tax Credits: Do They Have Any Role to Play in Australia?

Earned income tax credits (EITCs) have been used mainly in the United States. The Australian tax–transfer system is already very complicated and the aims of the EITC—notably reductions in effective tax rates for low income earners—might be achievable through reforms to existing components of the system. Such tax rates can be lowered either through reductions in social security tapers, or reductions in income tax payable. Action to reduce tapers affecting families is already proceeding through the social security component of the Government's tax reform package. To go further, by reducing tapers on the main allowances, like Newstart Allowance and Parenting Payment, would accelerate developments for such allowances to become forms of wage supplementation for the low paid. If it were not desired to go further down this path (and it does have problems), then relief of income tax burdens could be implemented through changes to the rate structure. While the EITC may make sense in the US context, a country with a well-developed welfare system like that of Australia has other options. In particular any EITC in this country is likely to be a supplement, not an alternative, to existing cash support for low income families.     

A positive model of overlapping income taxation in a federation of states

This paper develops a positive theory of overlapping income taxation in a federation of states. The analysis provides a complete characterization of the equilibrium federal and states tax rates as functions of the level of total productivity dispersion between the states. The federal rate is increasing in the level of total productivity dispersion between the states, even if the income of the decisive voter at the federal level is above the mean income. Given that the individuals' income is endogenously determined there exists a negative trade-off between the implemented federal tax rate and the resulting states' tax rates, regardless of the pre-tax income of the decisive voter at the state level. Thus, high levels of productivity dispersion between the states cause a higher than optimal federal tax rate together with low states' tax rates. It is also shown that a system of overlapping income taxation is not efficient. The resulting inefficiency might be exacerbated by the implementation of a federal matching grants program, contradicting previous results in the related normative literature.     

A cost‐benefit analysis of R&D tax incentives

Abstract.  Although technical knowledge generates spillover benefits, production of technical knowledge creates congestion externalities; thus, private R&D investment could be inefficient. A computable general equilibrium model is used to rank tax incentives by their effects on research effort and measure welfare effects. Five results stand out: R&D tax credits produce relatively large increases in research effort and welfare. Lower corporate income tax rates and ITCs for downstream users of high‐tech production inputs rank second. Revenue losses from lower personal income tax rates can produce welfare losses. Ironically, ITCs for upstream producers of innovative inputs are ineffective. Incremental R&D credits dominate comprehensive credits. JEL Classification: E62, H21, O38     

Flat income taxation,redistribution and labour market performance

A flat tax rate on labour income has gained popularity in European countries. This article assesses the attractiveness of such a flat tax in achieving redistributive objectives with the smallest distortions to employment. We do so by using a detailed applied general equilibrium model for the Netherlands. The model is empirically grounded in the data and encompasses decisions on hours worked, labour force participation, skill formation, wage bargaining between unions and firms and a wide variety of institutional details. The simulations suggest that the replacement of the current tax system in the Netherlands by a flat rate will harm labour market performance if aggregate income inequality is contained. Only flat tax reforms that reduce redistribution will raise employment. This finding bolsters the notions from optimal tax literature regarding the equity-efficiency trade off and the superiority of nonlinear taxes to obtain redistributive goals in an efficient way.     

Donations in a recursive dynamic model

Abstract.  This paper studies how donations respond to unexpected permanent changes in income and tax rates in a recursive dynamic model. The dynamic approach yields several interesting insights. If marginal tax rates are progressive, a permanent jump in a household's income increases its consumption and donations in the short run, but has no effect in the long run. The permanent income elasticity of current donations is likely to exceed one. If the marginal tax rate is flat, the jump in income raises consumption and donations in both the short and the long run. A permanent marginal tax rate cut raises consumption and donations in the long run if marginal tax rates are progressive, while it reduces donations in the short run if it has little direct impact on tax payments. If the marginal tax rate is flat, a tax cut has a positive effect on consumption in both the short and the long run, but has an ambiguous effect on donations.     

Don't shoot yourself in the foot! A (real-effort task) experiment on income redistribution and voting

This paper reports results from a laboratory experiment that investigates the Meltzer–Richard model of equilibrium tax rates in which individuals are either low or high skilled workers and face a real-effort task that includes leisure at the work place. We find that a large proportion of low-skilled workers vote for the lowest tax rate (the one that gives them the lowest payoff), especially when the alternative tax rate is very high. However, this proportion is significantly reduced in treatments in which the subjects are given extra information about how the tax operates in redistributing income. This result suggests that the lack of information about the role of taxes in income redistribution may be an important factor in explaining the counter-intuitive voting behavior of low-income voters over income redistribution. We also find some support that the prospect of upward mobility and the belief in the negative effect of taxes on productivity make low-income voters support low tax rates, especially when the alternative tax rate is very high.     

The optimal linear income tax with tax credits contingent on fertility

The literature on the optimal linear income tax is extended by incorporating tax credits contingent on the number of dependents the taxpayer is responsible for. The choice over how many dependents to be responsible for is made endogenous by allowing taxpayers a choice over their own fertility. Formulae are derived governing the government's optimal choice of the labor income tax rate and the tax credit contingent on fertility. It is also shown that if the government chooses its policy based on the belief that fertility behavior is exogenous when it is actually endogenous, then a suboptimal policy will be chosen. If certain conditions are fulfilled the government will choose a labor income tax rate lower than that which is actually optimal.     

Differential income taxation and household asset allocation

This article empirically investigates the effects of differential income taxation on households’ portfolio choice and asset allocation, applying a two-stage budgeting model of asset demand to German survey data. The model is structured into the discrete and the continuous asset choice. Cross-sectional variation in marginal tax rates, appropriately instrumented, as well as over-time variation from a major tax reform are used to identify the tax effects. Households with higher tax rates are found to have relatively greater demand for tax-privileged assets, such as nonowner-occupied housing, mortgage repayments, building society deposits, stocks, insurances and consumer credits, than households with lower tax rates. Demand at higher tax rates is lower for owner-occupied housing, bank deposits and bonds.     

Optimal Nonlinear Income Taxation with Habit Formation

It has recently been shown that incorporating “keeping up with the Joneses” preferences into a prototypical two‐ability‐type optimal nonlinear income tax model leads to higher marginal tax rates for both types of agents. In particular, the high‐skill type faces a positive marginal tax rate, rather than zero as in the conventional case. In this paper, agents’ utility functions are postulated to exhibit “habit formation in consumption” such that the prototypical two‐ability‐type optimal nonlinear income tax model becomes a dynamic analytical framework. We show that if the government can commit to its future fiscal policy, the presence of consumption habits does not affect the standard results on optimal marginal tax rates. By contrast, if the government cannot precommit, the high‐skill type will face a negative marginal tax rate, while the low‐skill type’s marginal tax rate remains positive.     

THE IMPACT OF GOVERNMENT DEFICITS ON PERSONAL AND NATIONAL SAVING RATES

This study provides fresh evidence on the responsiveness of private consumption and, by implication, saving to government deficits. It focuses on consumption and saving from 1981 to 1989, a period during which the personal saving rate was characterized as surprisingly unresponsive to high federal budget deficits. The authors attempt to determine whether this experience is consistent with previous behavior. They also test whether this experience refutes the Ricardian Equivalence Proposition (REP), under which consumers incorporate the government's intertemporal budget constraint into their own.
The analysis involves estimating two consumer expenditure functions based on two measures of current income capable not only of explaining expenditure behavior during the postwar period but also of successfully forecasting out of sample into the 1981–1989 period. Only one model is consistent with the REP, but neither model indicates that high government deficits caused the drop in the national saving rate experienced during the 1980s. Both models predict similar short-run responses to shifts in the government deficit. The responses depend crucially on the mix of tax and expenditure changes used to achieve the deficit shift. Both consumption and saving are more responsive to changes in government expenditures on goods and services than they are to changes in taxes.     

Neutral taxation under uncertainty

The analogs under uncertainty of two well-known certainty results are derived: first, if there are timing differences between tax payments and accruals, neutrality is preserved if the resulting tax credits or liabilities are carried forward at the risk-free interest rate, provided that tax credits and liabilities are sure to be redeemed eventually. Second, the invariance of asset valuations with respect to the rate of income tax, at a given pre-tax interest rate, proved by Johansson and Samuelson under certainty, can be extended to cover the case of uncertainty, given analogous ceteris paribus conditions.     

Income Shifting within a Dual Income Tax System: Evidence from the Finnish Tax Reform of 1993*

Dual income tax systems can suffer from income that shifts from progressively taxed labour income to capital income, which is taxed at a lower, flat rate. This paper empirically examines the 1993 Finnish dual income tax reform, which radically reduced the marginal tax rates on capital income for some, but not all, taxpayers. We measure how overall taxable income and the relative shares of capital income and labour income reacted to the reform. We find that the reform led to a small positive impact on overall taxable income, but part of the positive response was probably offset by income shifting among the self‐employed.     

The Oecd Model Tax Treaty: Tax Competition And Two‐Way Capital Flows*

Model tax treaties do not require tax rate coordination, but do require that either credits or exemptions be applied to repatriated earnings. This contradicts recent models with a single capital exporter where deductions are most efficient. I incorporate the fact that capital flows are typically bilateral. With symmetric countries, credits by both is the unique and efficient treaty equilibrium. This equilibrium weakly dominates the nontreaty equilibrium. With asymmetric countries, the treaty need not offer improvements without tax harmonization. With harmonization, it is always possible to reach efficient capital allocations while increasing both countries' welfares only if neither uses deductions.     

Professor Friedman,meet Lady Rhys-Williams: NIT vs. CIT

In the conventional view, income testing is required to make a tax-transfer program ‘efficient.’ This view can be seen to hinge on the ‘target efficiency’ concept. The economic efficiency of income testing is analyzed here-including distortions of household behavior and the total administrative costs of the tax-transfer system. The income-tested program is a negative income tax system (NIT), which has divergent marginal tax rates for beneficiaries and net taxpayers; the nontested scheme is a credit income tax (CIT), which makes universal payments and imposes a uniform marginal tax rate. Theoretical analysis shows the conditions under which the CIT is more efficient than a comparable NIT. Some suggestive empirical evidence and policy considerations in the choice between NIT and CIT are presented.     

Growth and inequality in an endogenous fiscal policy model with taxes on labor and capital

I study an economy where individuals have different initial endowments and fiscal policy is decided by majority voting. Public investment is financed by two flat rate taxes, one on labor income and the other one on capital income. The model shows a positive (negative) correlation between growth and the tax rate on labor (capital) income and a negative (positive) correlation between the tax rate on labor (capital) income and inequality. The results reconcile the theory with empirical evidence.     

Negative income taxes,inequality and poverty

We use a neoclassical growth model with heterogeneous agents to analyze the redistributive effects of a negative income tax system, which combines a flat rate tax with a fully refundable credit (“demogrant”). We show that changing the demogrant‐to‐output ratio causes significant changes in the distribution of income. Specifically, we find that increasing the demogrant‐to‐output ratio sharply reduces the level of inequality as well as both relative and absolute poverty (all measured in terms of post‐tax total income). However, these reductions in inequality and poverty come at the expense of a significant reduction in output.     

Elasticity of Taxable Income: Evidence from Changes in Municipal Income Tax Rates in Finland

The elasticity of taxable income (ETI) is a key parameter in income tax analysis, in terms of both efficiency and tax revenue. In this paper, I use Finnish data to analyze the ETI. I use changes in flat municipal income tax rates as an instrument for overall changes in marginal tax rates. This instrument is not a function of individual income, and thus the ETI estimates are less susceptible to bias caused by differential trends across the income distribution. In general, instruments used in previous studies do not have this feature. My preferred estimate for the average ETI is 0.21.     

Optimal age‐dependent income taxation in a dynamic extensive model: The case for negative participation tax on young people

We consider optimal age‐dependent income taxation in a dynamic model where the labor‐leisure choice is the extensive margin, each household faces idiosyncratic shocks to labor productivity and a pecuniary cost to work, and there is no insurance market against the shocks. We show that the well‐known property of the optimal participation tax rate in the static model continues to hold in our dynamic economy, that is, the participation tax rates for some income groups with low consumption are likely negative. In dynamic models, the optimal participation tax rate depends on age and on labor income. Our numerical simulations suggest that a negative participation tax should be restricted to young households.     

Evaluation of Policy Options to Encourage Welfare to Work

This article compares five alternative policy options with the January 2006 tax and social security system. Each option is designed to cost a similar amount of approximately $5 billion per year to the government at the observed level of labour supply. The five options include reducing the lowest income tax rate, increasing the tax‐free threshold, increasing the low income tax offset, decreasing all taper rates on own and partner's incomes for a number of allowances, and introducing an earned income tax credit. The criteria for comparison are the labour supply responses, the expected budgetary cost to the government after taking into account labour supply responses, the number of winners and losers from the policy change, the effects on the distribution of effective marginal tax rates, and the effects on the number of jobless households. From the results, it is clear that the option to reduce taper rates is dominated by the other options on all criteria. The other four options each have their advantages and disadvantages; no option scores best on all criteria.     

THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1986: CONCENTRATED COSTS, DIFFUSE BENEFITS—AN INVERSION OF PUBLIC CHOICE

The public choice paradigm asserts the superior force of concentrated benefits over diffuse costs in the political marketplace. Vote-seeking politicians exchange favors for support to members of special interest groups, whereas the public at large places fewer demands on and have less clout with politicians. The historical evolution of the federal income tax fits the public choice paradigm. Each provision in the tax code benefits primarily a narrow interest. Little incentive exists for anyone to represent such general interests as a broad-based, low-rate, simple tax system.
The Tax Reform Act of 1986 inverted the public choice paradigm. The general interest, in the form of lower tax rates, prevailed over legions of special interests—which lost their prized deductions. The reason for this inversion lay in the power of an idea—the political and economic appeal of a low top rate. Deductions were simply worth less at lower deductible rates, and the benefits of higher after-tax income were readily apparent. A coalition of liberals seeking the abolition of special breaks for the rich and conservatives favoring the enhanced incentives in sharply lower tax rates together defeated the community of special interest groups.