大股东对上市公司的资金占用情况对R&D投入的影响

本文以2010年-2014年披露的R&D投入的上市公司作为研究的样本,分析研究大股东对上市公司的资金占用情况与R&D投入的关系。研究结果表明:大股东对上市公司的资金占用情况与研发密度呈显著的倒U型关系。一定范围内的资金占用,会迫使大股东以个人利益为目的注重企业的长远发展,R&D投入加强;而当大股东的资金占用超过一定值,会严重影响企业的现金流,使得R&D投入减少。     

信息技术行业上市公司股权结构与经营绩效的关系研究

本文以信息技术行业82家上市公司2007-2011年的财务数据进行实证分析,将净资产收益率作为被解释变量构建面板数据固定效应回归模型.研究发现,第一大股东持股比例与公司绩效显著正相关;前五大股东持股比例与公司绩效呈U型关系;股权制衡Z指数与公司经营绩效呈负相关关系;法人股比例与公司经营绩效显著正相关,国有股比例与公司经营绩效显著负相关,但流通股比例对公司经营绩效不具有显著影响.     

民营上市公司管理层特征与R & D投入的实证研究

本文以2007－2009年披露R&D数据的我国民营上市公司为研究对象,选取高管层平均年龄、性别比例、董事长与总经理是否兼任以及管理层持股比例为解释变量,以R&D支出/主营业务收入衡量企业R&D投入强度,构建管理层特征与R&D投入绩效的模型。研究发现,高管年龄越大,企业R&D强度越小;管理层的性别多样化能促进企业R&D投入;董事长和总经理兼任有利于企业R&D投入决策;高管持股比例则与R&D强度显著正相关。     

我国上市公司股权结构对现金股利的影响分析

通过实证研究,认为我国上市公司选择现金股利的占大多数,第一大股东有一半以上是国有股东。第一大股东持股比例、股权集中度、国有股持股比例与每股现金股利都呈正相关关系,法人股持股比例与每股现金股利呈负相关关系,而流通股持股比例与每股现金股利的影响不显著。     

股权结构与企业股利政策选择关系:理论与实证分析

本文从公司治理视角出发,以中国上市公司为样本,对股权结构与企业股利政策关系进行了理论与实证分析。结果表明,管理者持股比例、股权集中度(包括第一大股东持股比例)与现金股利支付率显著正相关;国有股比例与现金股利支付率正相关;法人股比例和流通A股比例对现金股利支付率的影响可能是负向的,且极不显著。     

企业研发投入内部影响因素研究

本文从企业内部分析研发投入的影响因素,研究发现企业的规模、公司治理、等因素影响企业的R&D投入。具体而言:企业研发投入更多的是与企业规模呈正相关关系,私有产权控股的R&D投入的激励效应更大。第一大股东的持股比例对增加企业价值的R&D投入有正向的影响。董事长与总经理两职合一,投入更多的研发费用。     

混合所有制改革背景下股权结构与经营绩效的关系研究——基于我国上市银行的实证分析

本文分别建立了线性模型和非线性模型,深入分析了我国上市银行股权结构与公司经营绩效的关系。实证研究结果表明:国有股、境内法人股与经营绩效呈显著倒"U"型关系,境外法人股与经营绩效呈显著"U"型关系,股权集中度与经营绩效呈显著负相关关系,而股权制衡度与经营绩效呈显著正相关关系。     

股权分置改革背景下股权结构对我国沪深两市上市公司股利政策的影响

本文对我国沪深两市上市公司的面板数据进行实证研究,结果显示,股权结构对我国上市公司的股利支付水平影响显著,国有股比例与股利支付水平负相关,法人股比例、流通A股比例、第一大股东持股比例与股利支付水平正相关.股改后,股权结构得到优化,尤其是对国有股的优化效果明显,股利政策趋于稳定.     

上市公司股权结构与业绩相关性实证分析

本文选取沪深两市2004年度的359家A股公司作为研究对象,分别对股权构成和股权集中度对公司业绩的影响进行实证分析,结果表明,国有股比例与公司绩效不存在相关性;法人股比例对公司绩效产生显著的正面影响;社会公众股对公司绩效具有显著的负相关关系;第一大股东持股比例与公司绩效存在负相关关系;前五大股东持股比例和赫芬德尔指数与公司绩效存在显著的正相关关系.     

企业国际化程度对公司治理结构的影响研究——基于不同所有权性质与行业的分析

本文以2009—2014年有海外收入的非金融类上市公司为样本,检验国际化程度对公司治理结构的影响,并进一步检验不同所有权性质和不同行业企业国际化程度对公司治理结构影响的差异。结果表明:不区分所有权性质和行业时,国际化程度与董事长总经理两职合一、高管股权激励显著正相关;区分所有权性质后,国际化程度对非国有性质企业董事长总经理两职合一、高管股权激励影响显著;对国有性质企业董事长总经理两职设置不产生显著影响,但对其高管薪酬激励影响显著;分行业来看,国际化程度能促进技术密集型企业董事长总经理两职合一,并强化了资本密集型和技术密集型企业的高管股权激励和薪酬激励,但与劳动密集型企业高管薪酬激励显著负相关。     

Political Connection,Ownership Structure,and Corporate Philanthropy in China: A Strategic-Political Perspective

This paper investigates whether philanthropic giving decisions and amount of charitable giving are related to firms’ political connections and ownership type. To this end, Chinese firms listed on either the Shenzhen or Shanghai stock exchange between 2004 and 2011 are examined, where government interference in the business sector is prevalent, state ownership structure is dominant, and corporate political connections prevail. Our analyses show (1) a significant and positive relationship between political connections and the likelihood and extent of firm contributions; (2) a significant and negative relationship between state ownership and extent of firm contributions; and (3) a stronger relationship between political connections and corporate philanthropy in non-state-owned firms. These findings with regard to the relationship between corporate giving, political connections, and ownership type have important implications for understanding corporate giving behavior in China and in emerging markets in general.     

Formal and informal influences of the state on OFDI of hybrid state-owned enterprises in China

This study investigates how the state influences the outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) of hybrid state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China. Previous studies have provided conflicting arguments and empirical findings on the internationalization of SOEs, with some studies proposing a positive relationship between state ownership and OFDI, while others propose a negative relationship. In this paper, we argue that the mixed effects are due to different influences of different levels of state ownership and different types of political connections. We investigate our proposed hypotheses based on a sample of publicly listed hybrid Chinese SOEs between 2009 and 2016. We find an S-shaped relationship between state ownership and OFDI such that at low levels of state ownership, OFDI increases as state ownership increases; at medium levels of state ownership, OFDI decreases as state ownership increases; at high levels of state ownership, OFDI increases again as state ownership increases. We further find that executive-branch political connections between boards and top management teams of firms and the government have a negative effect on OFDI, while legislative-branch political connections have no significant effect on OFDI.     

The political determinants of executive compensation: Evidence from an emerging economy

In regulated economies, corporate governance mechanisms such as executive compensation are less driven by market-based forces but more subject to political influence. We study the political determinants of executive compensation for all listed Chinese firms in the context of an exogenous shock that removed market frictions in share-tradability. Under strong political constraints, state ownership reduced the managerial pay levels and increased pay-for-performance sensitivity (to asset-based benchmarks). Board independence and compensation committees do not curb managerial pay, and market-based factors do not have a significant influence. However, these effects reversed following the governance shock (removal of market frictions in share tradability).     

Managerial Stock Ownership and Debt Diversification

In this study, we examine the impact of managerial behavior on the debt diversification decisions of firms using the agency cost of debt framework. We hypothesize that managers with higher equity ownership should favor debt diversification to avoid efficient monitoring by debt holders and thus, be able to engage in risk‐shifting behavior. Our empirical results provide strong evidence for a positive association between managerial ownership and debt diversification. This relationship is observed to be stronger for smaller firms, which are traditionally more susceptible to the moral hazard problem. Our results remain robust for an alternate measure of debt diversification.     

Does financial resource slack drive sustainability expenditure in developing economy small and medium-sized enterprises?

While firms continue to commit slack financial resources to sustainability causes, knowledge is lacking on how financial resource slack drives sustainability expenditure under varying conditions of market pressure and political connectedness in a developing-economy market. Using primary data from exporting small and medium sized enterprises in Nigeria, this study shows that increases in financial resource slack are associated with decreases in sustainability expenditure. Additionally, results indicate that the negative effect of financial resource slack on sustainability expenditure becomes positive when levels of market pressure are higher. However, the negative effect relationship is strengthened (i.e. becomes more negative) when levels of political connectedness are greater. We discuss theoretical and managerial implications of these findings.     

The Effects of CEO Founder Status and Stock Ownership on Entrepreneurial Orientation in Small Firms

This paper studies how governance drives entrepreneurial orientation (EO) in small firms. We argue that founder status and ownership create powerful personal incentives for small firm CEOs to engage in behaviors that influence EO. Integrating stewardship theory and the principal‐principal branch of agency theory, we test our hypotheses on a sample of 339 Swedish firms, and find that CEO founder status is significantly and positively associated with EO, while CEO stock ownership significantly but negatively predicts EO. We additionally test two boundary conditions that show that the founder‐CEO's prior managerial experience in start‐up firms positively moderates the founder‐EO relationship, while contrary to expectations, CEO ownership diversification has no effect on the negative association between ownership and EO. Thus, our study adopts a corporate governance perspective to explain how variations in EO across small firms are driven by the goals and motivations of its leader. Our research also shows that in small, private firms the balance of power is tipped in favor of the CEO rather than the board of directors. Finally, we underline the importance of adopting alternative theoretical lens like stewardship and principal‐principal agency, given that traditional principal‐agent problems are largely mitigated in the small firm context.     

Managerial Ownership and Agency Cost: Evidence from Bangladesh

This study examines the influence of managerial ownership on firm agency costs among listed firms in Bangladesh. This is an institutional setting that features a mixture of agency costs. This institutional setting has a concentration of ownership by managers, but the firms are not solely owned by managers. The extant literature suggests that the sacrifice of wealth by the principal and potential costs associated with monitoring the agents is known as the agency cost. This study uses three measures of agency cost: the ‘expense ratio’, the ‘Q-free cash flow interaction’, and the ‘asset utilisation ratio’. The finding of the study is that managerial ownership reduces the firm agency cost only under the ‘asset utilisation ratio’ measure of agency cost; this is robust with regard to a number of robustness tests. Furthermore, the non-linearity tests suggest that the convergence of interest is evident with very high and low levels of managerial ownership. The entrenchment effect by the owners is evident at moderate levels of managerial ownership. Although there has been great scepticism among management researchers on the validity of agency theory, overall, the findings of this study do not reject the validity of agency theory. Given that the entrenchment by managers is evident at certain levels of ownership and that the agency problem may still exist between insiders and outsiders, legislative guidelines for controlling share ownership may be required.     

Corporate Social Responsibility,Ownership Structure,and Political Interference: Evidence from China

Prior research suggests that ownership structure is associated to corporate social responsibility (CSR) in developed countries. This article examines whether and how ownership structure affects CSR in emerging markets using Chinese firms’ social responsibility ranking. Our empirical evidences show that for non-state-owned firms, corporate ownership dispersion is positively associated to CSR. However, for state-owned firms, whose controlling shareholder is the state, this relation is reversed. We attribute the reversed relationship to political interferences and further test this hypothesis by demonstrating that regional economic development is negatively related to CSR for state-owned firms due to decreased political interference in more developed areas. This study is the first to directly examine the relationship between the dispersion of corporate ownership and CSR in emerging markets, and our results depict that it is important to consider ownership type in assessing CSR in emerging market where state ownership is still prevalent such as China. The results also reveal that firm size, profitability, employee power, leverage, and growth opportunity affect CSR in China.     

Enhancing or inhibiting: The impact of investment in political ties on the link between firm innovation and productivity

Whether investment in political ties enhances or inhibits firm innovation has not been well understood in the literature. Theoretically, proactive use of political ties could help firms gain favourable political resources, thereby enhancing the effectiveness and efficiency of firm innovation activities. However, investment in political ties might conflict with innovation in internal resource orchestration processes. Based on a sample of 9693 firms across 27 transition economies, I find that the effect of investment in political ties on the link between innovation and productivity is based on type of innovation and type of political investments. Although bribery does not show any significant influence on the link between either product or organizational innovation and firm productivity, managerial time invested in political ties weakens the positive relationship between organizational innovation and productivity.     

Political embeddedness,media positioning and corporate social responsibility: Evidence from China

We examine the effect of political embeddedness and media positioning on corporate social responsibility (CSR). Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2009–2017, we provide evidence that firms with political embeddedness from the perspectives of both government ownership and managerial political connection (PC) perform more CSR than other firms, but their motivations for doing so are different. Employing media positioning, we find that firms controlled by the government conduct less CSR when they receive more positive media reporting, indicating that this is a firm's passive choice due to political pressure; and firms with PC are incentivized by negative media reporting to conduct more CSR, indicating an active choice to maintain political legitimacy. This association is robust to different media positioning measurements and endogeneity checks. Additional analyses show that this relationship is more pronounced in central government-controlled firms and regionally politically connected firms; in firms that disclose CSR reports voluntarily; and in the environment where CSR are more valued (following the 2012 national Anti-corruption Campaign and in provinces with higher levels of marketization). Overall, our study suggests that media positioning can help to identify the motivation for conducting CSR.