Making sense of future uncertainties using real options and scenario planning

Healthcare across the world is facing many uncertainties. In Dutch healthcare, a recent policy change is forcing health organizations to deal more efficiently with their real estate, and this increases the need for real estate strategies that are more flexible. In order to support managers in incorporating flexibility in their decision-making over the design of new healthcare facilities, we have developed a method that combines scenario planning and real options. Scenario planning enhances sensemaking over the consequences of future uncertainties, and real options should help in addressing flexibility in decision-making through weighing the pros and cons of flexibility measures. We illustrate the sensemaking process by applying the method to a hospital, to a forensic clinic and to a care organization for vulnerable citizens. Data collection took place through interviews and workshops. We found that the identity and characteristics of the workshop participants influenced the sensemaking process. The method proved a useful means of making sense of abstract uncertainties that influence an organization, aspects that are normally outside the scope of real estate managers. The real options approach offered a more structured way of balancing the costs and benefits of strategies in dealing with future uncertainties.     

Making imaginary worlds real: The case of expensing employee stock options

West [West, B. (2003). Professionalism and accounting rules. London: Routledge] and Chambers [Chambers, R. J. (1966). Accounting evaluation and economic behavior. Houston: Scholars Book Company] have provocatively argued that financial reporting has reached a state of near-total incoherence. In this paper, we argue that a source of this incoherence is the transformation of the US accounting academy into a sub-discipline of financial economics, a transformation in which accounting became a servant of the imaginary world of neoclassical economics. After noting the unusually prominent role of rules within the accounting profession, we describe the displacement of accounting’s centuries-old root metaphor of accountability by the metaphor of information usefulness, and situate that displacement within neoliberalism, a broader political movement that arose after World War II. Finally, we use SFAS 123R, the recently issued stock option standard, as a case study of the incoherence that West and Chambers assert. Through various issues – such as reflexivity, theory paradox, and unexplained questions of responsibility – we demonstrate the logical inconsistencies involved in SFAS 123F. The incoherence of stock option reporting rules raises serious questions about the information metaphor as a foundation for either individual rules or the standard setting process. The Financial Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) attempts to make the imaginary world of neoclassical economics real have resulted in rules which are not defensible.     

Sequential real rainbow options

We develop two models to value European sequential rainbow options. The first model is a sequential option on the better of two stochastic assets, where these assets follow correlated geometric Brownian motion processes. The second model is a sequential option on the mean-reverting spread between two assets, which is applicable if the assets are co-integrated. We provide numerical solutions in the form of finite difference frameworks and compare these with Monte Carlo simulations. For the sequential option on a mean-reverting spread, we also provide a closed-form solution. Sensitivity analysis provides the interesting results that in particular circumstances, the sequential rainbow option value is negatively correlated with the volatility of one of the two assets, and that the sequential option on the spread does not necessarily increase in value with a longer time to maturity. With given maturity dates, it is preferable to have less time until expiry of the sequential option if the current spread level is way above the long-run mean.     

How process enterprises really work

Many companies have succeeded in reengineering their core processes, combining related activities from different departments and cutting out ones that don't add value. Few, though, have aligned their organizations with their processes. The result is a form of cognitive dissonance as the new, integrated processes pull people in one direction and the old, fragmented management structures pull them in another. That's not the way it has to be. In recent years, forward-thinking companies like IBM, Texas Instruments, and Duke Power have begun to make the leap from process redesign to process management. They've appointed some of their best managers to be process owners, giving them real authority over work and budgets. They've shifted the focus of their measurement and compensation systems from unit goals to process goals. They've changed the way they assign and train employees, emphasizing whole processes rather than narrow tasks. They've thought carefully about the strategic trade-offs between adopting uniform processes and allowing different units to do things their own way. And they've made subtle but fundamental cultural changes, stressing teamwork and customers over turf and hierarchy. These companies are emerging from all those changes as true process enterprises--businesses whose management structures are in harmony, rather than at war, with their core processes. And their organizations are becoming much more flexible, adaptive, and responsive as a result.     

Equilibrium and options on real assets

In aggregate, options on real and financial assets can havevery different properties. Typically, the good or service producedby a real asset has a finite elasticity of demand, and developershave finite capacities. Also, the supply of options can be limited,and developers can be less than perfectly competitive. In asubgame, perfect Nash equilibrium with these properties, theoptimal exercise policy, and resulting values of developed andundeveloped assets are calculated explicitly. The novel comparativestatics are discussed in detail.     

Organigraphs: drawing how companies really work

Walk into any organization and you will get a snapshot of the company in action--people and products moving every which way. But ask for a picture of the company and you will be given the org chart, with its orderly little boxes showing just the names and titles of managers. Now there's a more revealing way to depict the people and operations within an organization--an approach called the organigraph. The organigraph is not a chart. It's a map that offers an overview of the company's functions and the ways that people organize themselves at work. Perhaps most important, an organigraph can help managers see untapped competitive opportunities. Drawing on the organigraphs they created for about a dozen companies, authors Mintzberg and Van der Heyden illustrate just how valuable a tool the organigraph is. For instance, one they created for Electrocomponents, a British distributor of electrical and mechanical items, led managers to a better understanding of the company's real expertise--business-to-business relationships. As a result of that insight, the company wisely decided to expand in Asia and to increase its Internet business. As one manager says, "It allowed the company to see all sorts of new possibilities." With traditional hierarchies vanishing and newfangled--and often quite complex--organizational forms taking their place, people are struggling to understand how their companies work. What parts connect to one another? How should processes and people come together? Whose ideas have to flow where? With their flexibility and realism, organigraphs give managers a new way to answer those questions.     

A real-world way to manage real options

Each corporate growth project is an option, in the sense that managers face choices--push ahead or pull back--along the way. Yet many companies hesitate to apply options theory to initiatives such as R&D and geographic expansion, partly because these "real" options are highly complex. In this article, the authors make the case that the complexity of real options can be eased through the use of a binomial valuation model. Many of the problems with real-options analysis stem from the use of the Black-Scholes-Merton model, which isn't suited to real options. Binomial models, by contrast, are simpler mathematically, and you can tinker with a binomial model until it closely reflects the project you wish to value. Suppose your company is considering investing in a new plant. To use the binomial model, you must create an "event tree" to figure out the full range of possible values for the plant during the project's lifetime--next year, at the end of the design phase, upon completion. Then you work backward from the value at completion, factoring in the various investments, to determine the value of the project today. These calculations provide you with numbers for all the possible future values of the option at the various points where a decision needs to be made on whether to continue with the project. The authors also address another criticism of real options: that gaps often arise between theoretical and realized values of options of all types. Such gaps may be largely the result of managers exercising options at the wrong time. To improve the way it manages its real options, a company can look out for the decision trigger points that correspond to the nodes on a binomial decision tree. The trigger points should not only tell managers when they need to decide on exercise but also specify rules governing the exercise decisions.     

Strategy as a portfolio of real options

In financial terms, a business strategy is much more like a series of options than like a single projected cash flow. Executing a strategy almost always involves making a sequence of major decisions. Some actions are taken immediately while others are deliberately deferred so that managers can optimize their choices as circumstances evolve. While executives readily grasp the analogy between strategy and real options, until recently the mechanics of option pricing was so complex that few companies found it practical to use when formulating strategy. But advances in both computing power and our understanding of option pricing over the last 20 years now make it feasible to apply real-options thinking to strategic decision making. To analyze a strategy as a portfolio of related real options, this article exploits a framework presented by the author in "Investment Opportunities as Real Options: Getting Started on the Numbers" (HBR July-August 1998). That article explained how to get from discounted-cash-flow value to option value for a typical project; in other words, it was about reaching a number. This article extends that framework, exploring how, once you've worked out the numbers, you can use option pricing to improve decision making about the sequence and timing of a portfolio of strategic investments. Timothy Luehrman shows executives how to plot their strategies in two-dimensional "option space," giving them a way to "draw" a strategy in terms that are neither wholly strategic nor wholly financial, but some of both. Such pictures inject financial discipline and new insight into how a company's future opportunities can be actively cultivated and harvested.     

Real options give insights into real value

Developments in real options theory are resulting in valuation tools more suited to our increasingly dynamic economy. These tools can help where conventional business valuation techniques fail to capture the full opportunity value of new business strategies. Steve Leppard and Peter Morawitz report.     

Resources,real options,and corporate strategy

The types of investments a firm undertakes will depend in part on what it expects the outcome of those investments to reveal about its skills, capabilities, and assets (i.e., its resources). We predict that a firm will specialize when young, then experiment in a new line of business for some time, and then either expand into a large, multisegment business or focus and scale up its specialized business. We derive several empirical implications for firm valuations and the reaction of stock prices to news about firm prospects. We also offer a novel explanation for the well-documented “diversification” discount.     

Deferring real options with solar renewable energy certificates

This study evaluates investment in a utility-scale solar power plant using a real-options approach (ROA). Although ROAs have been widely applied in the literature, the deferring option for a utility-scale power plant has not been fully examined, especially within the context of the unique subsidy program of solar renewable energy certificates (SRECs) in the USA. Using data from one of the most developed solar electricity markets in New Jersey, we incorporate the time-varying volatility of electricity prices and bounded SREC prices in real-options valuation. Our results show that deferring real options generates significant value for the project that the traditional discount cash flow approach ignores. It is thus optimal to postpone the investment in more than 70% of cases. In addition, we demonstrate that debt financing is crucial for renewable energy investments.     

Buying real options - Valuing uncertainty in infrastructure planning

For the last two decades real options thinking has been heralded as a new approach for handling uncertainty in investment decisions. However, application of the approach in infrastructure investment decision-making is negligible thus far. In this contribution we address the question: what are the barriers for the implementation of the real option approach (ROA) in practice? We focus on the experiences in several infrastructure-bound sectors: spatial planning and transport, ports, and energy.We conclude that the ROA maturity levels of these different sectors are quite different, and we ascribe these differences to the political setting, the institutional setting and the organisational flexibility of the sectors and their stakeholders. We suggest that the same issues apply to other advanced, quantitative methods.     

Re-examining the investment-uncertainty relationship in a real options model

The main purpose of this paper is to re-examine the investment-uncertainty relationship in a real options model, and demonstrates that the Sarkar (J Econ Dyn Control 24:219–225, 2000) model is a special case of our model. This paper uses a general dynamic process, which incorporates mean reversion and jumps in a firm’s project earnings. We further derive a quasi-analytical form solution for the critical investment value and investment probability of a firm’s projects. From the simulation results, we find that an increase in uncertainty can always lead to an increase in the probability of investment, and thus has a positive impact on investment. These results, which differ from the findings of Sarkar (J Econ Dyn Control 24:219–225, 2000), could be explained by the mean-reversion and jump effects on a firm’s earnings.     

Making competition in health care work

Health care reform in the United States is on a collision course with economic reality. Most proposals focus on measures that will produce one-time cost savings by eliminating waste and inefficiency. But the right question to ask is how to achieve dramatic and sustained cost reductions over time. What will it take to foster entirely new approaches to disease prevention and treatment, whole new ways to deliver services, and more cost-effective facilities? The answer lies in the powerful lessons business has learned over the past two decades about the imperatives of competition. In industry after industry, the underlying dynamic is the same: competition compels companies to deliver constantly increasing value to customers. The fundamental driver of this continuous quality improvement and cost reduction is innovation. Without incentives to sustain innovation in health care, short-term cost savings will soon be overwhelmed by the desire to widen access, the growing health needs of an aging population, and the unwillingness of Americans to settle for anything less than the best treatments available. The misguided assumption underlying much of the debate about health care is that technology is the enemy. By assuming that technology drives up costs, reformers neglect the central importance of innovation or, worse yet, attempt to slow its pace. In fact, innovation, driven by rigorous competition, is the key to successful reform.     

Unlocking value: Equity carve outs as strategic real options

Equity carve outs, the partial listing of a corporate subsidiary, appear to be transitory arrangements, usually dissolved within a few years by either a complete sale or a buy back. Why do firms perform expensive listings just to reverse them thereafter? We interpret carve outs of a production unit as strategic options to attract information from the market over its value as an independent entity. This improves the decision to exercise the option to sell out or to regain control. A listing is costly, as it reduces coordination of production, but generates valuable information from the market over the optimal allocation of ownership. We compute the optimal timing for the final sale or buy back decisions, the value of the strategic options embedded in the carve out and the optimal shares retained. The model explains the temporary nature of carve outs, and suggests an explanation for many empirical findings. In particular, it explains why carve outs are more common in highly uncertain sectors and in more informative markets.     

A real options perspective on the future of the Euro

A break-up of the Eurozone is no longer regarded as implausible. This will be a costly and irreversible decision in conditions of continuing uncertainty; therefore it is amenable to analysis in the real options framework. We do so by solving as an n-dimensional optimal stopping problem with country-specific shocks and “convergence” of member economies. We compare a complete break-up with individual country departures. In calibrated solutions for a symmetric case we find a non-negligible but small option value. Furthermore, we find a new theoretical result on the non-monotonicity of abandonment threshold with respect to volatility.     

Strategic entry and market leadership in a two-player real options game

We analyse the entry decisions of competing firms in a two-player stochastic real option game, when rivals earn different but correlated uncertain profitabilities from operating. In the presence of entry costs, decision thresholds exhibit hysteresis, the range of which is decreasing in the correlation between competing firms. A measure of the expected time of each firm being active in the market and the probability of both rivals entering within a finite time are explicitly calculated. The former (latter) is found to decrease (increase) with the volatility of relative firm profitabilities implying that market leadership is shorter-lived the more uncertain the industry environment. In an application of the model to the aircraft industry, we find that Boeing’s optimal response to Airbus’ launch of the A380 super carrier is to accommodate entry and supplement its current product line, as opposed to the riskier alternative of committing to the development of a corresponding super jumbo.     

Public private partnerships: Incentives, risk transfer and real options

Private financing of large-scale infrastructure projects through public private partnerships (PPPs) has grown in recent decades. Together with changes in conventional construction procedures, there have been changes in the project financing model. The use of PPPs raises questions as to the role of the private sector in infrastructure provision and the conditions governing the long-term contractual relationships between the private and public sectors. In some early examples of PPPs, the government guaranteed a minimum profitability over the cash flows using a set of contractual terms which transferred some of the risk of the project from the private provider back to the government. Using a large toll road project, the Melbourne CityLink Project, as a case study we show how the imposed conditions can be treated as real options, how these options affect the incentive to invest and how the public sector may be transferring considerable value to the private sector through government guarantees.     

Real options at the interface of finance and operations: exploiting embedded supply-chain real options to gain competitiveness

Exploiting embedded supply-chain real options creates powerful opportunities for competitive manufacturing in high-cost environments. Rather than seeking competitiveness through standardization as is common to lean production, real-options reasoning explores opportunities to use supply-chain variability as a strategic weapon. We present an illustrative case study of a Swiss manufacturer of cable extrusion equipment supported by a formal real-options model that aids in valuing the embedded options that make up supply-chain flexibility: postponement, contraction, expansion, switching, and abandonment. Real-options reasoning provides a plausible retrospective rationale for the case firm's use of supply-chain flexibility that provided protection against competition from low cost, but less responsive competitors. Their intuitive real-options reasoning facilitated incorporating fuller information concerning volatility, flexibility, and control into choosing what products to make, in what quantity, and with work allocated to which supplier. The case study also highlights how competing through exploiting embedded real options requires a different managerial skill set than does competing through cost reduction. Skills such as customer communication, supplier management, and ability to ensure a smooth flow of production join the ability to reduce and control lead times as key sources of competitive advantage.