On the Characterization of Efficient Production Vectors

In this paper we study the efficient points of a closed production set with free disposal. We first provide a condition on the boundary of the production set, which is equivalent to the fact that all boundary points are efficient. When the production set is convex, we also give an alternative characterization of efficiency around a given production vector in terms of the profit maximization rule. In the non-convex case, this condition expressed with the marginal pricing rule is sufficient for efficiency. Then we study the Luenberger’s shortage function. We first provide basic properties on it. Then, we prove that the above necessary condition at a production vector implies that the shortage function is locally Lipschitz continuous and the efficient points in a neighborhood are the zeros of it and conversely.     

On the complexity of repeated principal agent games?

Summary. We examine an infinitely repeated principal agent game without discounting (Radner [1985] ), in which the agent may engage in multiple projects. We focus on “linear” strategies that summarize each history into a linear function of public outcomes, and select an action according to a single threshold rule. We claim that linear strategies significantly simplify the computation needed to make strategic decisions following each history. Despite the simplicity of linear strategies, we can virtually recover the folk theorem. For any individually rational payoff vector in the interior of the set of feasible expected payoff vectors, there exists a pair of linear strategies that form a Nash equilibrium supporting the target payoff. The equilibrium strategies and the equilibrium payoff vectors form a globally stable solution (Smale [1980] ).     

Government size and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with rent‐seeking

We explore the relationship between government size and economic growth in an endogenous growth model with human capital and an unproductive capital which facilitates rent‐seeking. With exogenous as well as endogenous time discounting, we find a non‐monotonic relationship between the size of government and economic growth. We find that with very high (low) discounting, there is a unique low (high) growth equilibrium, regardless of the size of government. For the intermediate range of discounting, there are multiple equilibria and the growth outcome depends on the size of government. With endogenous time discounting, the growth outcome is path dependent and depends on the level of inherited human capital. However, there is only one stable growth regime and the economy endogenously switches to it. When the institutional constraints on rent‐seeking are not extremely high, the stable regime is the one in which there is a high‐growth equilibrium for a smaller size of the government and for larger size, both the high‐growth and the low‐growth equilibrium coexist. When the institutional constraints on rent‐seeking are extremely high, there exists only a unique high‐growth equilibrium irrespective of the size of government. Furthermore, economies with bigger size of the government and/or with poor quality institutions will take longer to endogenously switch to this stable growth regime.     

企业集群边界均衡影响因素分析——基于空间区位架构

文章以企业集群为研究对象,从空间区位的角度研究集群边界均衡问题。通过salop圆形选址模型的集群区位架构,应用C-D形效用函数的扩展微观方程组,经过推演得到的渐进解析解显示,区位市场容量和谈判成本对集群边界有最直接的制约作用。如果谈判成本不存在,集群边界可以无限大;如果谈判成本存在,在市场价格稳定不变、投入成本系数固定的情况下,谈判成本系数与集群边界负相关,区位市场容量与集群边界正相关。在分别满足这两种情况的数值条件下,集群边界达到均衡。而区位企业密度结构对集群边界扩张速度具有调节作用,帮助集群以最优效率发展。从均衡结论入手,文章指出如果一种类型的产品是盈利的,那么应该重点关注于找出最合理的集群空间密度结构,调控边界增速,同时尽可能降低谈判成本,作为治理集群边界的核心渠道。文章对认识集群边界扩张的演化发展有一定的理论创新性,从空间区位架构的视角来研究集群扩张边界问题,扩展了现有的文献研究。     

Environmental Abatement and the Macroeconomy in the Presence of Ecological Thresholds

We study the environmental and economic effects of public abatement in the presence of multiple stable steady-state ecological equilibria featuring reversible hysteresis. The isocline for the stock of pollution possesses two stable branches. Assuming that the ecology is initially located on the upper (high pollution) branch of the isocline, a simple time-invariant temporary abatement policy can be used to steer the environment from the high- to the low-pollution equilibrium. In all models considered in this paper, a “cold turkey” abatement policy is optimal within the class of stepwise policies, i.e. the largest feasible shock should be administered for the shortest possible amount of time. The cold-turkey result is robust to alternative models for the economic system, although there is a capital feedback effect that either helps or hinders the speed of transition to the low-pollution equilibrium.     

Equilibrium Selection and Stability for the Groves Ledyard Mechanism

In their seminal paper Groves and Ledyard (1976) construct a balanced incentive compatible mechanism that solves the free rider problem. In subsequent research, Bergstrom, Simon, and Titus (1983) prove that there exist numerous asymmetric equilibria in addition to the symmetric equilibrium. In the present paper, we explicitly solve for the additional equilibria and use computational experiments to examine the structure and stability of the set of equilibria of the Groves Ledyard Mechanism. We find that all of the equilibria found by Berstrom, Simon, and Titus are unstable and that for a high level of the punishment parameter these equilibria do not exist. Further, we find that there exists an additional boundary equilibrium for each of the equilibria found by Bergstrom, Simon, and Titus. The boundary equilibria are all stable.     

On the complexity of repeated principal agent games

Summary We examine an infinitely repeated principal agent game without discounting (Radner [1985]), in which the agent may engage in multiple projects. We focus on linear strategies that summarize each history into a linear function of public outcomes, and select an action according to a single threshold rule. We claim that linear strategies significantly simplify the computation needed to make strategic decisions following each history. Despite the simplicity of linear strategies, we can virtually recover the folk theorem. For any individually rational payoff vector in the interior of the set of feasible expected payoff vectors, there exists a pair of linear strategies that form a Nash equilibrium supporting the target payoff. The equilibrium strategies and the equilibrium payoff vectors form a globally stable solution (Smale [1980]).I would like to thank Andrew Atkeson and the anonymous referee for helpful comments. John Curran and Hao Li provided excellent research assistance. Financial support from the National Science Foundation, the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation and the Division of Social Sciences at the University of Chicago is gratefully acknowledged.     

Nature of Competition and New Technology Adoption

The incentives to adopt cost‐reducing technology by firms in a horizontally‐differentiated duopoly are analysed in the present paper. Cost reduction depends on the ‘quality’ of the ‘new technology’. A firm has to procure such technology in a ‘scoring auction’. When the quality offered by the suppliers of this technology lies in the interior of the feasible range, both firms adopt the new technology regardless of the nature of competition (Cournot or Bertrand). However, when there is a corner solution, there are equilibria where only one firm (or no firm) adopts the new technology. With a corner solution the nature of competition affects the equilibrium outcomes.     

Strategic Cost Reduction and Cost Revelation

Strategic cost reduction requires cost transparency. When unilateral cost revelation is feasible, strategic cost reduction indeed arises as equilibrium. If it is not feasible, however, credible revelation has to be organized, possibly by a trade association. Then, firms face a prisoners' dilemma: in Cournot duopoly, cost revelation arises as an equilibrium, but hurts firms; in Bertrand duopoly, cost concealing is the equilibrium, while firms would be better off with cost revelation. Since cost revelation is socially desirable (undesirable) in Cournot (Bertrand) competition, it should be encouraged (discouraged).     

Social equilibrium and cycles on compact sets

One proof of existence of general equilibrium assumes convexity and continuity of a preference correspondence on a compact convex feasible set W. Here the existence of a local equilibrium for a preference field which satisfies, not convexity, but the weaker local acyclicity is shown. The theorem is then applied to a voting game, σ, without veto players. It is shown that if the dimension of the policy space is no greater than ν(σ) ? 2, where ν(σ) is the Nakamura number of the game, then no local cycles may occur and a local equilibrium must exist. With convex preferences, then, there will exist a choice of the game from W.     

区域创新系统中的"区域边界"问题研究

在探讨区域创新系统(RIS)时,不得不首先面对一个现实而又极其重要的问题--RIS中的区域边界问题.正确认识和理解其边界以及与行政边界这二者之间的关系,对于我们针对具体行政区域及其中心城市建立可行的RIS十分重要.因此,从分析RIS的由来及内涵出发,从RIS的系统运行机制、运行目的以及运行过程来看,发现RIS的区域边界应该与行政边界等同.通过进一步的分析,得出了RIS是一个开放系统,区域边界不应成为限制各要素流动的障碍.最后提出构建RIS时要强调地方政府的职责,但同时也要强调区域间的分工与合作.     

Unequal Contributions from Symmetric Agents in a Local Interaction Model

The main findings of the theory on the private provision of public goods under the assumptions of symmetric agents and normality are that (1) there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in which everybody contributes the same; and (2) this pattern is stable. We show that these findings no longer hold in a context characterized by local interaction. In this context, it is always possible to find preferences satisfying the assumption of normality such that the symmetric Nash equilibrium is unstable, and there exist asymmetric Nash equilibria which are locally stable.     

The scope of the hypothesis of Bayesian equilibrium

What behavior can be explained as the Bayes equilibrium of some game? The main finding is—almost anything. Given any Bayesian (coordination) game with positive priors, and given any vector of nondominated strategies, there is an increasing transformation of each utility function such that the given vector of strategies is a Bayes (Nash) equilibrium of the transformed game. Any nondominated behavior can be rationalized as Bayes equilibrium behavior. Some comments on the implications of these results for game theory are included.     

Coordination need not be a problem

In a game of common interest there is one action vector that all players prefer to every other. Yet there may be multiple Pareto-ranked Nash equilibria in the game and the “coordination problem” refers to the fact that rational equilibrium play cannot rule out Pareto-dominated equilibria. In this paper, I prove that two elements — asynchronicity and a finite horizon — are sufficient to uniquely select the Pareto-dominant action vector (in subgame perfect equilibrium play). Asynchronicity may be exogenously specified by the rules of the game. Alternatively, in a game where players choose when to move, asynchronicity may emerge as an equilibrium move outcome.     

A Search Model of Money and Circulating Private Debt With Applications To Monetary Policy

A search-theoretic model is used to examine the coexistence of money and circulating private debt. Money is still valued even though there coexists credit which circulates among agents and dominates in the rate of return. When there coexist multiple equilibria, the equilibrium with credit Pareto dominates the one without credit if money supply is not extremely plentiful. This article also provides some predictions about the effects of monetary policies. A policy of open market operations whereby government discounts less for second-hand debt decreases the value of money, credit, and interest rate prevailing in the market. This policy can also improve welfare by making credit trade feasible when the only equilibrium entails no credit without intervention.     

产业依赖、就业与经济增长——基于1980～2009年数据检验

经济增长中，三次产业之间存在相互依赖的关系。随着第一产业回报率的降低，投资和劳动力逐渐转向第二、第三产业直至达到均衡。资本和劳动力不断在三次产业中转移，产业之间相互依赖使得总资本和总劳动力存在适当的分配比例。当符合这个比例的时候，所有的资源得到充分利用，经济就能够健康稳定增长。当这个比例被打破的时候，会有部分资源无法达到最大产出而处于闲置状态，导致经济增长的失衡。对经济数据进行分析表明，目前我国第一产业劳动力已经过剩，需要向第二、第三产业转移。     

企业技术创新的影响因素、市场结构及动态博弈分析

在对企业技术创新的影响因素和市场结构进行分析的基础上,阐释了企业技术创新的动态博弈过程,认为寡头垄断的市场结构最有利于企业技术创新。在成本和技术存在显著差异的条件下,技术领先企业从事创新,技术跟随企业从事模仿是一个Nash均衡解;在成本和技术相似条件下,两个企业同时选择技术创新策略是一个最优博弈策略。该动态过程可能使技术跟随企业成为技术领先企业,同时,对如何提高我国企业的技术自主创新能力,缩短与技术强国的差距提出了相应的对策。     

Financing Public Goods by Means of Lotteries

When viewed as taxes, lotteries are routinely criticized as being both inequitable and inefficient. But is this an entirely fair comparison? Frequently lotteries are used in lieu of voluntary contributions by private charities and governments when taxes are not feasible. When heterogeneous individuals with quasi-linear preferences participate in lotteries whose proceeds will be used to fund a public good, we find that, relative to voluntary contributions, wagers in the unique lottery equilibrium (a) increase the provision of the public good, (b) are welfare improving, and (c) provide levels of the public good close to first-best as the lottery prize increases.     

一般均衡理论的价值基础

现代西方主流经济学中的一般均衡理论缺乏应有的价值基础。近年来试图建立马克思主义的一般均衡理论的努力也一直未能成功。然而,根据马克思的劳动价值论可以证明,在假定社会总产品的价格总量等于价值总量、平均利润总量等于剩余价值总量的条件下,必然有且仅有一个恰好等于相应价值向量的一般均衡价格向量。这意味着,一般均衡理论完全可以建立在劳动价值论的基础之上。本文首先根据马克思关于两大部类社会总产品构成的理论,建立包括技术关系在内的价值体系和相应的价格体系,其次说明在价格体系中存在有无穷多的一般均衡价格向量,最后从无穷多的一般均衡价格向量中确定一个"标准"的价格向量,并证明这个标准价格向量必然等于相应的价值向量。     

Welfare Comparisons of Customs Unions and Other Free Trade Associations

The main purpose of this note is to establish a precise version of the proposition that, in the context of a worldwide constituency, a customs union is more beneficial or less harmful than a comparable but distinct free trade association. It is shown that, corresponding to each feasible tariff-ridden world trading equilibrium, there is a Pareto-preferred and feasible free trade association; and, corresponding to each free trade association, there is a Pareto-preferred and feasible Kemp–Wan customs union.