Are you a good boss--or a great one?

Private moments of doubt and fear come even to managers who have spent years on the job. Any number of events can trigger them: an initiative going poorly, a lukewarm performance review, a daunting new assignment. HBS professor Hill and executive Lineback have long studied the question of how manager grow and advance. Their experience brings them to a simple but troubling observation: Most bosses reach a certain level of proficiency and stay there--short of what they could and should be. Why? Because they stop working on themselves. The authors offer what they call the three imperatives for managers who seek to avoid this stagnation. First, manage yourself--who you are as a person, the beliefs and values that drive your actions, and especially how you connect with others all matter to the people you must influence. Second, manage your network. Effective managers know that they cannot avoid conflict and competition among organizational groups; they build and nurture ongoing relationships. Third, manage your team. Team members need to know what's required of them collectively and individually and what the team's values, norms, and standards are. The authors include a useful assessment tool to help readers get started.     

The seasoned executive's decision-making style

Leaders make decisions every day of their lives, but how they do it changes dramatically over the course of their careers. At lower levels, the job is to get widgets out the door; action is at a premium. At higher levels, the job involves decisions about which widgets to offer and how to develop them. To climb the corporate ladder and be effective in new roles, managers need to change the way they use information and evaluate options. Based on a study of the decision-making profiles of more than 120,000 executives, the authors found that people make decisions very differently in public than they do in private and that the decision styles of successful managers evolve in highly predictable patterns. The most successful managers and executives become increasingly open and interactive in their leadership (or public) styles, and more analytic in their thinking (or private) styles, as they progress in their careers. The research shows that decision-making profiles do a complete flip over the course of a career; that is, the decision profile of a successful CEO is the opposite of a successful first-line supervisor's. When does the major change in focus occur? Somewhere between the manager level and the director level, executives find that formerly effective decision styles no longer work so well. At this point, decision styles fall into a "convergence zone", where managers use all styles more or less equally. From then on, the executives continue to evolve their styles. The most successful managers come to the convergence zone quickly and continue to adjust their styles as their careers progress. Low performers seem to stagnate once they hit the convergence zone; their styles do not evolve in new directions. Clearly, relying on past successes and habits is no guarantee of success-indeed, it may be the road to failure.     

On the decision to go public with dual class stock

Why do firms deviate from a one share-one vote regime when going public? This question raises considerations that are at the core of many corporate governance issues. We consider three arguments for this choice. Examining data on IPOs from 1980 through 2008, we do not find that firms go public with dual class stock so managers have more incentive to invest in hard to monitor projects nor to gain more when selling control of the firm. Rather, managers appear to take their firms public with dual class stock in order to retain control of their firms while reducing their lack of diversification costs.     

Cutting costs without drawing blood

When looking for ways to cut costs, most managers reach for the head-count hatchet, and the markets usually roar with approval. But a company can almost always create far more sustainable value by rigorously evaluating the small-ticket capital items that often get rubber-stamped. Drawing on his experience as a consultant and providing numerous anecdotes, the author contends that those "little" requests often prove to be gold plated or unnecessary. A disciplined evaluation involves asking only eight questions and conducting postmortems--regular audits of units' capital spending. But the payoff is enormous. Because cutting the capital budget increases cash flow, the author argues that a permanent cut of just 15% in the planned level of capital spending could boost some companies' market capitalization by as much as 30%. The first three questions--Is this your investment to make? Does it really have to be new? How are our competitors meeting compliance needs?--are asked of operating managers as they assemble capital project requests. The next three are asked by senior managers of themselves and their colleagues as they examine proposals: Is the left hand duplicating investments made by the right? Are trade-offs between profit and capital spending well understood? Are there signs of budget massage? At the end of the review process, senior managers ask: Are we fully using shared assets? How fine-grained are our capacity measures? The author's suggestions for the postmortem include searching for systematic problems with whole classes of expenditures and making sure audit teams come up with specific recommendations for change.     

Taking the stress out of stressful conversations.

Stressful conversations are unavoidable in life. In business, they can run the gamut from firing a subordinate to, curiously enough, receiving praise. But whatever the context, stressful conversations carry a heavy emotional load. Indeed, stressful conversations cause such anxiety that most people simply avoid them. Yet it can be extremely costly to dodge issues, appease difficult people, and smooth over antagonisms; avoidance usually only worsens a problem or a relationship. Using vivid examples of the three basic stressful conversations that people bump up against most often in the workplace, the author explains how managers can improve those interactions unilaterally. To begin with, they should approach the situations with greater self-awareness. Awareness building is not about endless self-analysis; much of it simply involves making tacit knowledge about oneself more explicit. It is important for those who are vulnerable to hostility, for example, to know how they react to it. Do they clam up or do they retaliate? Knowing how you react in a stressful situation will teach you a lot about your trouble areas and can help you master stressful situations. The author also recommends rehearsing difficult conversations in advance to fine-tune your phrasing and tone. And the best way to keep from being thrown off balance by difficult conversations that crop up unexpectedly is to develop a few hip-pocket phrases that you can pull out on the spot. We all know from past experience what kinds of conversations and people we handle badly. The trick is to have prepared conversational tactics to address those situations.     

The perfect message at the perfect moment

Marketers planning promotional campaigns ask questions to boost the odds that the messages will be accepted: Who should receive each message? What should be its content? How should we deliver it? The one question they rarely ask is, when should we deliver it? That's too bad, because in marketing, timing is arguably the most important variable of all. Indeed, there are moments in a customer's relationship with a business when she wants to communicate with that business because something has changed. If the company contacts her with the right message in the right format at the right time, there's a good chance of a warm reception. The question of "when" can be answered by a new computer-based model called "dialogue marketing," which is, to date, the highest rung on an evolutionary ladder that ascends from database marketing to relationship marketing to one-to-one marketing. Its principle advantages over older approaches are that it is completely interactive, exploits many communication channels, and is "relationship aware": that is, it continuously tracks every nuance of the customer's interaction with the business. Thus, dialogue marketing responds to each transition in that relationship at the moment the customer requires attention. Turning a traditional marketing strategy into a dialogue-marketing program is a straightforward matter. Begin by identifying the batch communications you make with customers, then ask yourself what events could trigger those communications to make them more timely. Add a question or call to action to each message and prepare a different treatment or response for each possible answer. Finally, create a series of increasingly urgent calls to action that kick in if the question or call to action goes unanswered by the customer. As dialogue marketing proliferates, it may provide the solid new footing that Madison Avenue seeks.     

Everything I know about business I learned from monopoly

How do game designers approach their work? Perhaps in the same way that managers should. Here, the author, an expert in board-game design and the world's foremost authority on Monopoly, translates six tenets of game design into management principles. Three tenets focus on giving players the right level of structure. First, design simple and unambiguous rules: That also holds true in business; people engage most when responsibilities, objectives, and evaluation criteria are clear. Second, avoid frustrating the casual player. Just as not every game player aspires to be a grand master, not every employee wants to think like an executive. Third, establish a rhythm so that players know intuitively whether they are at the beginning, middle, or end of the game. Managers can also engineer such shifts of momentum and motivation for workers. Three more principles focus on providing entertainment. The most important is to tune into what's happening off the board. For many people, the real joy of a great game--or a great job--comes from the larger social experience surrounding it. Another key is to offer chances to come from behind. Even struggling employees want to believe, "The odds may be stacked against me, but just one great stroke and I'm right back in it." Finally, managers, like game designers, should provide outlets for latent talents. Games themselves can be useful in the workplace. For instance, an afternoon of game playing builds relationships and increases an organization's social capital. And simulation games can sharpen employees' business judgment. Managers may come to appreciate that games succeed depending on how well designed they are--and that many design challenges have their equivalents in the art of management.     

The alternative workplace: changing where and how people work

Today many organizations, including AT&T and IBM, are pioneering the alternative workplace--the combination of nontraditional work practices, settings, and locations that is beginning to supplement traditional offices. This is not a fad. Although estimates vary widely, it is safe to say that some 30 million to 40 million people in the United States are now either telecommuters or home-based workers. What motivates managers to examine how people spend their time at the office and where else they might do their work? Among the potential benefits for companies are reduced costs, increased productivity, and an edge in vying for and keeping talented employees. They can also capture government incentives and avoid costly sanctions. But at the same time, alternative workplace programs are not for everyone. Indeed, such programs can be difficult to adopt, even for those organizations that seem to be most suited to them. Ingrained behaviors and practical hurdles are hard to overcome. And the challenges of managing both the cultural changes and systems improvements required by an alternative workplace initiative are substantial. How should senior managers think about alternative workplace programs? What are the criteria for determining whether the alternative workplace is right for a given organization? What are the most common pitfalls in implementing alternative workplace programs? The author provides the answers to these questions in his examination of this new frontier of where and how people work.     

Convertible calls and security returns

The study examines the impact of convertible security calls on securityholder's wealth. On average common stock values fall by approximately two percent at the announcements of convertible debt calls, but common stockholder's wealth is unaffected by convertible preferred stock calls. These findings are consistent with a corporate tax effect. A small average decrease in firm value is also found at the announcements of convertible debt calls. The study raises, but leaves unanswered, the interesting question of what motivates managers to make capital structure decisions that reduce stockholder wealth and firm value.     

A brief history of decision making

Sometime around the middle of the past century, telephone executive Chester Barnard imported the term decision making from public administration into the business world. There it began to replace narrower terms, like "resource allocation" and "policy making," shifting the way managers thought about their role from continuous, Hamlet-like deliberation toward a crisp series of conclusions reached and actions taken. Yet, decision making is, of course, a broad and ancient human pursuit, flowing back to a time when people sought guidance from the stars. From those earliest days, we have strived to invent better tools for the purpose, from the Hindu-Arabic systems for numbering and algebra, to Aristotle's systematic empiricism, to friar Occam's advances in logic, to Francis Bacon's inductive reasoning, to Descartes's application of the scientific method. A growing sophistication with managing risk, along with a nuanced understanding of human behavior and advances in technology that support and mimic cognitive processes, has improved decision making in many situations. Even so, the history of decision-making strategies--captured in this time line and examined in the four accompanying essays on risk, group dynamics, technology, and instinct--has not marched steadily toward perfect rationalism. Twentieth-century theorists showed that the costs of acquiring information lead executives to make do with only good-enough decisions. Worse, people decide against their own economic interests even when they know better. And in the absence of emotion, it's impossible to make any decisions at all. Erroneous framing, bounded awareness, excessive optimism: The debunking of Descartes's rational man threatens to swamp our confidence in our choices. Is it really surprising, then, that even as technology dramatically increases our access to information, Malcolm Gladwell extols the virtues of gut decisions made, literally, in the blink of an eye?     

CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, ETHICS, AND ORGANIZATIONAL ARCHITECTURE

Effective corporate leadership involves more than developing a good strategic plan and setting high ethical standards. It also means coming up with an organizational design that encourages the company's managers and employees to carry out its business plan and maintain its ethical standards.
In this article, the authors use the term organizational architecture to refer to three key elements of a company's design:

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  the assignment of decision-making authority–who gets to make what decisions;

       
  
  

Stock repurchasing and corporate social responsibility

Stock repurchases are controversial. Researchers often view the positive association between free cash flow and the volume of the stock repurchases to be in the shareholders’ interest and the positive association between executive options and stock repurchases to be in the managers’ interest. Using firms’ corporate social responsibility (CSR) ratings as a measure of ethical culture—one that increases the cost of self-serving behavior for managers— we examine whether a firm’s CSR rating is related to its stock repurchase decisions. Although the baseline regression shows a positive association between CSR and repurchases, we find that CSR amplifies the positive association between free cash flow and stock repurchases and lessens the positive association between executive options and stock repurchases. These results indicate that ethical culture might play a role in repurchase decisions: it may encourage repurchases aligned with shareholders’ interests and discourage those primarily in managers’ interest. Furthermore, we also find that high CSR firms are associated with a greater completion rate of announced repurchase programs and receive more favorable stock market reaction to their repurchase announcements.     

Promote Internally or Hire Externally? The Role of Gift Exchange and Performance Measurement Precision

Managers often face the choice between promoting an internal employee and hiring an external candidate. Using an interactive experiment, we examine the drivers of managers’ promote/hire decisions and internal employees’ behavior before and after those decisions. Consistent with gift exchange theory, we find that employees exert costly effort to increase the chance of being promoted, and they raise their effort level as the promote/hire decision becomes imminent. Managers respond by promoting those who exert high effort, despite employees’ inferior ability compared to external candidates. Results suggest that managers view employees’ past effort as both a gift to reciprocate and a signal of their future effort. Moreover, we find that managers are more likely to promote internally rather than hire externally under a less precise performance measurement system, and this result is driven by managers who observe low employee output. Finally, we find that total effort is significantly higher when managers promote internally versus hire externally.     

Six IT decisions your IT people shouldn't make

Senior managers often feel frustration--even exasperation--toward information technology and their IT departments. The managers complain that they don't see much business value from the high-priced systems they install, but they don't understand the technology well enough to manage it in detail. So they often leave IT people to make, by default, choices that affect the company's business strategy. The frequent result? Too many projects, a demoralized IT unit, and disappointing returns on IT investments. What distinguishes companies that generate substantial value from their IT investments from those that don't? The leadership of senior managers in making six key IT decisions. The first three relate to strategy: How much should we spend on IT? Which business processes should receive our IT dollars? Which IT capabilities need to be companywide? The second three relate to execution: How good do our IT services really need to be? Which security and privacy risks will we accept? Whom do we blame if an IT initiative fails? When senior managers aren't involved in these decisions, the results can be profound. For example, if they don't take the lead in deciding which IT initiatives to fund, they end up overloading the IT department with projects that may not further the company's strategy. And if they aren't assessing security and privacy risks, they are ignoring crucial business trade-offs. Smart companies are establishing IT governance structures that identify who should be responsible for critical IT decisions and ensure that such decisions further IT's strategic role in the organization.     

How well-run boards make decisions

In the aftermath of seismic debacles like those that toppled Enron and WorldCom, corporate boards have been shaken up and made over. More directors are independent these days, for instance, and corporations now disclose directors' salaries and committee members' names. Research shows that most of the changes are having a positive effect on companies' performance. They are primarily structural, though, and don't go to the heart of a board's work: making the choices that shape a firm's future. Which decisions boards own and how those calls are made are largely hidden from the public. As a result, boards are often unable to learn from the best governance practices of their counterparts at other companies. This article pulls back the curtain and provides an inside look. Drawing on interviews with board members and executives at 31 companies, along with a close examination of three boardroom decisions, the author identifies several formal processes that can help companies improve their decision making: creating calendars that specify when the board and the standing committees will consider key items; drafting charters that define the decisions committees are responsible for; and developing decision protocols that divvy up responsibilities between directors and executives. The author also identifies a number of informal decision-making principles: Items that are strategically significant and touch on the firm's core values should go to the board. Large decisions should be divided into small pieces, so the board can devote sufficient attention to each one. Directors must remain vigilant to ensure that their decisions are effectively implemented. The CEO and either the nonexecutive chair or the lead director should engage in ongoing dialogue regarding which decisions to take to the full board and when. And directors should challenge assumptions before making yes-or-no decisions on management proposals.     

The Role of Visual Attention in the Managerial Judgment of Balanced‐Scorecard Performance Evaluation: Insights from Using an Eye‐Tracking Device

This paper investigates the role of visual attention in managerial judgments during balanced‐scorecard performance evaluations. Using the Locarna eye tracker to establish the amount of time managers spent focused on visual cues, we found that managers who look more at strategically linked performance measures are more likely to make decisions consistent with the achievement of their subordinates’ strategic objectives. When aware of strategy, managers focused more on strategically linked performance measures than on nonlinked measures. The presentation format of the strategy information did not significantly affect this focus. Our findings indicate that awareness of strategically linked performance measures, but not their presentation, appears to be important in helping managers to make better decisions. This study contributes to the management accounting literature by generating useful insights into the impact of visual attention on judgments and decision‐making processes.     

Bridging Sustainability and Finance: The Value Driver Adjustment Approach

Even though most large corporations view sustainability considerations and concerns as having the potential to affect their revenue and profits, and studies have shown that sustainability can affect stock returns, investors and corporate managers continue to struggle to incorporate such concerns into their financial decision‐making. As a consequence, the valuation effects of sustainability issues are not fully reflected in either the valuation of companies by investors or in capital investment decisions by corporate managers. The author argues that sustainability can be integrated into both of these kinds of financial decision‐making by linking it to business models, competitive positions, and value drivers using what the author calls a “value‐driver adjustment” (VDA) approach. The basic idea is simple: material sustainability issues affect business models and competitive positions, which in turn affect the company's value drivers—notably, sales, margins, and capital. The VDA approach explicitly considers these linkages by taking three steps: (1) identifying a company's material sustainability issues; (2) analyzing how these issues are expected to affect the company's business model and competitive position; and (3) quantifying the effects of such changes in business model and competitive position on the company's value drivers, including its cost of capital. In the first part of the article, the author provides an investor perspective that shows how sustainability can be integrated into investment decisions by asset managers. There he explains how and why ESG integration has so far failed to become mainstream, and what needs to be done to make it successful. The second part of this article takes the corporate perspective and shows how sustainability can be linked to value drivers using much the same ingredients as in asset management, but slightly different tools that can help corporate managers incorporate sustainability concerns into strategy and operations, including the finance function. And in closing, the author brings together corporate and investor perspectives while showing how sustainability programs can be used to make the relationship between companies and their shareholders both stronger and longer‐lasting.     

Big hat, no cattle: managing human resources

When faced with business problems, managers naturally make identifying the trouble their priority. Once that is done, at least half the job is over; finding solutions is just a matter of time. This hasn't been so, however, with the human resources problem: how to motivate employees. Sixty years ago, the Hawthorne experiments revealed the issue, and ever since, managers, researchers, and consultants have been searching for the answer to the human resources problem. Why aren't employees as productive, loyal, and dedicated to their companies as their managers know they can be? The author of this article proposes four reasons why actuality has fallen so far below expectation in personnel management, namely, that managers' expectations have been too high in the first place, that the concepts staff professionals offer managers are frequently contradictory, that the corporate role of personnel has always been problematic, and finally, that managers hold assumptions concerning their employees that undermine efforts to motivate them.     

The limits of accountability

Calls for greater accountability from managers and corporations are regularly voiced these days, both in the academic literature and in public discussions more generally. Specifically, it is often suggested that extant financial and management accounting practices embody a rather restricted form of accountability that falls short of our mutual responsibilities as more than economic subjects. Against this backdrop, this paper raises the question of whether more accountability is always and unambiguously desirable from an ethical point of view. It does so by inquiring into the limits that the accountable self faces when giving an account. Building upon the recent work of Judith Butler, the paper describes the accountable self as an opaque, exposed, and mediated self that is inherently limited in its ability to give an account of itself. Because of these limits, we cannot expect demands for accountability always to be fully met. The paper points to the ethical importance of recognizing this limited nature of accountability and outlines possible ramifications of this fact for practice.