Voluntary disclosure and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from management earnings forecasts

This paper examines the directional effects of management earnings forecasts on the cost of equity capital. We find that forecasters of bad news experience a significant increase in the cost of equity capital in the month after their disclosure. Conversely, the cost of equity capital for good news forecasters does not change significantly in the same period. We also indicate that the magnitude of changes in the cost of capital for good news forecasters is significantly lower than that for bad news forecasters and non-forecasters, which suggests that investors may view good news forecasts less credible. Finally, we show that the effect of the subsequent earnings announcement on the cost of equity capital is preempted by the management forecasts for bad news firms, and that the combined effects of the management earnings forecasts and the earnings announcement are not significant for both good news and bad news forecasters. Our paper contributes to the literature by adding evidence on directional effects of voluntary disclosures and on long-term economic consequences of management earnings forecasts.     

Analyst versus model-based earnings forecasts: implied cost of capital applications

We find that a composite implied cost of capital (ICC) estimate – based on the earnings forecasts generated by cross-sectional models – is highly correlated with future realised returns in both portfolio- and regression-based tests. By contrast, we find very little evidence for an association with future realised returns for an ICC estimate based on analyst earnings forecasts. We also document the time-varying nature of expected returns and risk premia, and provide up-to-date estimates of an implied Australian market risk premium.     

Management forecasts and the cost of equity capital: international evidence

We examine international differences in the effect of management forecasts (which we use to proxy for voluntary disclosure) on the cost of equity capital (COC) across 31 countries. We find that the issuance of management forecasts is associated with a lower COC worldwide but that the effect of management forecasts on the COC depends on country-level institutional factors. Specifically, management forecasts have a stronger effect on the COC in countries with stronger investor protection and better information dissemination and a weaker effect in countries with higher mandatory disclosure requirements. Further analyses reveal that these relations are more pronounced when management forecasts are more frequent, more precise, and more disaggregated. Overall, our findings suggest that the ability of management forecasts to reduce firms’ COC derives not only from country-level factors that enhance the credibility of their forecasts but also from factors that reflect the quality of the information environment in terms of the distribution of news and the availability and quality of alternative information. Thus, investor protection, media penetration, and mandatory disclosure requirements have an important effect on the ability of management forecasts to lower the COC.     

Management earnings forecast disclosure policy and the cost of equity capital

We examine the relation between management earnings forecast disclosure policy and the cost of equity capital in a cross-section of 1,355 firms over a 4-year post-Regulation Fair Disclosure period (2001 through 2004). We find evidence of a negative association between the quality of management earnings forecasting policy and cost of equity capital, and we document that the strength of the association is greater for firms with higher disclosure costs and for firms with more relevant quarterly management earnings forecasts. Our results are robust to the use of multiple methods to address both endogeneity and the measurement error in firm-specific estimates of implied cost of equity capital.     

Using private forecasts to estimate the effects of monetary policy

I develop a methodology that uses the forecasts of market participants and of policy makers to estimate the effects of monetary policy on output and inflation. My approach has advantages over the standard practice of fitting a vector autoregression to the data. I apply my methodology to data on output, interest rates and prices. I find that, even using the Federal Reserve Board's Greenbook forecasts to control for the policy maker's information set, prices rise initially in response to a monetary contraction. This finding undermines the standard justification for including an index of commodity prices in VARs.     

Using accounting earnings and aggregate economic indicators to estimate firm-level systematic risk

Review of Accounting Studies - We revisit the literature on using accounting earnings to estimate firm-level systematic risk, using macroeconomic indicators rather than listed-firm indexes to...     

The effect of management earnings forecast characteristics on cost of equity capital

This study uses a framework presented in Hirst, Koonce, and Venkataraman (2008) to assess how differences in management earnings forecast characteristics influence a firm's cost of equity capital. I find that less specific forecasts, pessimistic forecasts, and forecasts that predict a loss for the period are associated with higher cost of equity capital levels and more timely forecasts and forecasts with more information content are associated with lower cost of equity capital levels. Analysis interacting control variables and forecast antecedents with forecast characteristics indicates that the effects forecast characteristics have on cost of equity capital are either enhanced or moderated depending on firm beta, firm size, firm book-to-market ratios, analyst following, prior forecast bias, and earnings quality. The results highlight the importance of interacting key variables when interpreting the market effect of management earnings forecasts.     

Sources of earnings variability and their effect on earnings forecasts

Previous research shows that analysts’ forecasts of earnings do not fully incorporate information contained in reported earnings variability. This study investigates whether the inefficient forecast is because of a failure to incorporate observable information on two components of earnings variability: variability in operating performance and income smoothing. Our results show that analysts’ forecasts fully incorporate information contained in earnings variability for firms with high income smoothing and for firms with low operating variability. A smaller serial correlation of forecast errors is observed for firms with low operating variability, which suggests that analysts recognize the permanence in earnings for such firms.     

Natural disasters and analysts' earnings forecasts

The effects of natural disasters on capital markets have been investigated by limited evidence even though these calamities bring considerable damages or loss of life. To fill this gap, we investigate the impacts of natural disasters, particularly earthquakes, on security analysts' earnings forecasts for affected firms in China. We obtain three key findings. First, analysts' optimism significantly decreases for firms located in neighborhood areas. Second, earthquakes do not significantly affect firm earnings and stock returns, thereby indicating that post-earthquake analyst pessimism is not based on rational judgment. Third, media attention promotes irrational pessimism among analysts, and post-earthquake pessimism is a result of heuristics bias attributable to psychological shocks. However, analysts correct the bias after initial irrational forecasts. Taken together, our findings contribute to the broader psychology and economics literature on the effects of natural disasters on analyst forecasts.     

Analyst reputation and management earnings forecasts

Prior studies show that analysts with high reputation are influential in the market. This paper examines whether managers consider analyst reputation in shaping their voluntary disclosure strategy. Using Institutional Investor magazine’s All-American (AA) rankings as a proxy for analyst reputation, we find that the coverage of AA analysts is positively associated with the likelihood of quarterly management earnings forecasts (MEFs). We also find that AA analysts’ forecast optimism is more positively associated with the likelihood of MEFs than non-AA analysts’ forecast optimism when the firm is covered by AA analysts. Analyses based on AA analyst coverage changes and AA status changes confirm the relation between analyst reputation and MEFs. We further find that analyst reputation influences other MEF properties, such as forecast news, bias, and revisions, and that our results are robust to alternative measures of analyst reputation. Further analyses show that market reactions at quarterly earnings announcements are more positive (negative) when firms meet/beat (miss) AA analysts’ forecasts than when firms meet/beat (miss) non-AA analysts’ forecasts. Collectively, our findings suggest that managers strategically provide voluntary forecasts by taking into account the reputation of individual analysts following their firms.     

The supply of analysts and earnings forecasts

Using a unique set of hand-collected data, this study examines whether a larger supply of prospective analysts leads to existing financial analysts' higher earnings forecast accuracy. We analyze the effect of the analyst supply proxied by the number of universities and the number of finance and economics universities located in the same city as the headquarters of brokerage firms. Our findings suggest that brokerage firms located closer to a larger supply of potential analyst candidates are associated with higher analyst forecast accuracy, as observed by a lower forecast error. We further find that the degree of employed analysts' effort acts as a mediator between the supply of prospective analysts and the accuracy of their earnings forecasts.     

Consistency in meeting or beating earnings expectations and management earnings forecasts

This paper provides evidence that firms that have consistently met or beaten analysts’ earnings expectations (MBE) provide more frequent “bad news” management forecasts than firms with no established string of MBE, particularly when existing analyst forecasts are optimistic. This suggests that firms with a consistent MBE record are more likely to guide analysts’ expectations downward to avoid breaking the consistency. Subsequent analyst forecast revisions following bad news management forecasts issued by these firms are dampened, implying that analysts suspect that these forecasts may be opportunistic. The relation between management forecasts and MBE consistency is stronger after Regulation FD.     

Management earnings forecasts and other forward-looking statements

We identify forward-looking statements (FLS) in firms’ disclosures to distinguish between “forecast-like” (quantitative statements about earnings) and “other”, or non-forecast-like, FLS.  We show that, like earnings forecasts, other FLS generate significant investor and analyst responses. Unlike earnings forecasts, other FLS are issued more frequently when uncertainty is higher. We then show that earnings-related FLS are more sensitive to uncertainty than quantitative statements, suggesting that managers are more likely to alter the content than the form of FLS when uncertainty is higher.  Our study indicates that incorporating other FLS into empirical measures provides a more comprehensive proxy for firms’ voluntary disclosures.     

Management earnings forecasts and bank loan contracting

We find that firms tend to issue management earnings forecasts and convey good news before bank loan initiation. Issuing firms enjoy more favorable contracting terms and attract more lenders. Management forecasts issuance within a nine‐month period prior to the loan activating quarter can lower the subsequent loan spread by 14.06 basis points. Moreover, firms with larger management forecast errors are charged harsher contracting terms and attract fewer lenders. Our study suggests that firms strategically issue management earnings forecasts before entering into debt contracts and lenders incorporate the information contained in management earnings forecasts into bank loan contracting.     

Accrual usage to manage earnings toward financial analysts' forecasts

This study examines whether management uses discretionary accounting accruals to move earnings upward toward analysts' earnings forecasts when it appears that earnings before discretionary accruals will fall short of the forecast. An earnings shortfall relative to analysts' forecasts could lead management to fear lower compensation and an increase in the likelihood of job termination. The article finds that firms whose earnings before discretionary accruals are below analysts' forecasts use income-increasing discretionary accruals and do so to a greater extent than do firms whose earnings before discretionary accruals are above analysts' forecasts.     

The disparity between long-term and short-term forecasted earnings growth

We find the disparity between long-term and short-term analyst forecasted earnings growth is a robust predictor of future returns and long-term analyst forecast errors. After adjusting for industry characteristics, stocks whose long-term earnings growth forecasts are far above or far below their implied short-term forecasts for earnings growth have negative and positive subsequent risk-adjusted returns along with downward and upward revisions in long-term forecasted earnings growth, respectively. Additional results indicate that investor inattention toward firm-level changes in long-term earnings growth is responsible for these risk-adjusted returns.     

Reputation management and the disclosure of earnings forecasts

In this paper, managers differ from each other in terms of the probability that they are ??forthcoming?? (and disclose all the earnings forecasts they receive) or ??strategic?? (and disclose the earnings forecasts they receive only when it is in their self-interest to do so). Strategic managers choose whether to disclose their forecasts based on both the disclosure??s effects on their firms?? stock price and on their reputation among investors for being forthcoming. Our findings include: strategic managers can build a reputation for being forthcoming by disclosing unfavorable forecasts; managers?? incentive to build a reputation for being forthcoming may be so strong that they disclose even the most negative forecasts; as managers become more concerned about their reputation: (a) the current price of the firm in the event the manager makes no forecast increases; (b) managers who have a high probability of behaving strategically (as forthcoming) in the future issue forecasts more (less) often in the present.     

Investors’ reactions to retractions and corrections of management earnings forecasts

Timely voluntary disclosure of information by companies sometimes results in erroneous disclosure that must be later retracted (i.e., withdrawn) and/or corrected (i.e., replaced with a corrected disclosure). Although such retractions and corrections appear to be relatively easy and costless ways to fix the erroneous disclosure, our results generally show that both actions have unexpected effects on investor judgment. The results of four experiments, which are consistent with affect theory from psychology, indicate when a company provides a retraction of a previous erroneous voluntary disclosure, investors’ judgments continue to reflect the implications of the initial erroneous information. That is, investors under-adjust. In contrast, when a company provides a correction (alone or with a prior retraction) with an opposite earnings implication, investors tend to over-adjust. Our results also show that if investors do not form a strong initial affective reaction to the initial erroneous forecast, they are less prone to over-adjustment when the correction is later received. Implications for regulators and standard setters are provided.     

Risk-based forecasting and planning and management earnings forecasts

This study examines the association between a firm’s internal information environment and the accuracy of its externally disclosed management earnings forecasts. Internally, firms use forecasts to plan for uncertain futures. The risk management literature argues that integrating risk-related information into forecasts and plans can improve a firm’s ability to forecast financial outcomes. We investigate whether this internal information manifests itself in the accuracy of external earnings guidance. Using detailed survey data and publicly disclosed management earnings forecasts from a sample of publicly traded U.S. companies, we find that more sophisticated risk-based forecasting and planning processes are associated with smaller earnings forecast errors and narrower forecast widths. These associations hold across a variety of different planning horizons (ranging from annual budgeting to long-term strategic planning), providing empirical support for the theoretical link between internal information quality and the quality of external disclosures.     

Predicting long-term earnings growth from multiple information sources

While expected long-term earnings growth plays a pivotal role in valuation and investment applications, its common proxy, analysts' long-term growth forecasts (LTG), is well known for being over-optimistic. Guided by a stylized growth model, this paper uses three information sources to improve growth prediction—analysts' forecasts, stock prices, and financial statements. We find that the growth model using LTG, past earnings growth, the forward earnings-to-price ratio and past returns as predictors is unbiased and most accurate among the models considered in this paper. We further show that this growth prediction results in higher trading profits, more accurate equity predictions, and more reliable estimates of cost of equity. The findings suggest that this improvement in growth prediction leads to economically significant consequences in valuation and investment applications.