1996年国际200家最大工程设计公司及市场前景

１９９６年国际２００家最大工程设计公司及市场前景金锐（外经贸部国际贸易经济合作研究院）１９９６年，国际工程设计市场呈现出少有的持续繁荣景象，市场需求日益旺盛，市场规模不断扩大，市场前景十分诱人。与此同时，国际工程设计市场也对设计公司的服务方式、服务内...     

国际工程设计市场趋势展望

国际工程设计市场在过去8年中历经了种种冲击,东南亚金融危机、西方股市泡沫破裂、“9·11”恐怖袭击事件、伊拉克战争、非典、地区性经济衰退等事件相继爆发,国际建筑市场持续出现波动。但总体来看,国际工程设计市场仍呈持续增长态势,特别是对高端业务的需求旺盛。市场规模:持续增长多年来,我国商界和学术界估算国际工程设计市场规模的主要数量指标,是根据美国《工程新闻记录》(ENR)杂志对上年度全球最大200家国际工程设计公司海外营业额的统计。《工程新闻记录》历年的统计显示,自20世纪80年代中期至今,全球最大200家国际工程设计公司当…     

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国际工程设计市场特点和全球２００家最大设计公司许丹松（外经贸部国际经济合作研究所国际工程设计市场的特点在全球工程承包市场竞争日趋激烈，市场进一步向综合化方向发展的形势下，国际工程设计市场和国际工程设计公司也相应发生了一些较大的变化，主要表现在以下几个...     

国际2OO家工程设计公司再创佳绩

<正> 据《国际工程新闻记录》(ENR)报道,1991年国际最大的200家工程设计公司获得的与工程设计有关的服务合同额达101亿美元,比1990年的88亿美元增长15%,创历史最高水平。一、合同额的地区分布纵观1991年国际工程设计市场的发展,世界200家最大设计公司几乎在所有地区市场都取得了两位数的增长。按增长速度,非洲市场居首位,比1990年增长了19%,拉美15%,美国13%,中东8%,唯有加拿大市场的发包额继1990年下跌了33.3%之后再次出现7%的负增长。按市场规模,欧洲地位首次超过亚     

2002年全球最大200家国际工程设计公司业绩评述

2003年7月出版的《工程新闻记录》公布了2002年全球最大200家国际工程设计公司的经营情况。2002年,全球最大200家国际工程设计公司营业额总计为509亿美元,比2001年增长6.5%。其中,国际市场营业额达189亿美元,比2001年增长7.4%;国内市场营业额为320亿美元,比2001年增长0.3%。200     

石化项目激增市场持续向好——2006年全球最大200家国际工程设计公司业绩述评

2006年,尽管房地产大幅降温使得美国经济明显减速,国际油价高位震荡,但世界经济依然以较快速度稳定增长.稳定的经济增长环境为国际工程设计市场提供了发展机遇.     

2001年世界最大200家国际工程设计公司评述

亚洲及拉美经济危机过后的这几年，国际工程设计市场发展较为缓慢，世界最大200家国际工程设计公司的营业收入受国际经济环境的影响，从1997年到2000年，发展也一直很慢，2000年甚至出现了下降，但是在2001年，出现了较大的反弹。最大200家公司国际市场营业额在2001年达到了176.5亿美元，比2000年的161亿美元增长9.3%；国内市场营业额为300.7亿美元，比2000年增长了6.2%。这200家工程设计公司的营业额在世界不同地区均有不同程度的增长，某些地区的增长甚至达到了两位数，像中东地区增长了16.8%，美国增长了15.4%，加拿大增长了14.1%。亚洲…     

1999年世界最大200家国际工程设计公司述评

总述１９９９年 ,世界最大２００家国际工程设计咨询公司国际市场营业额为１７２亿美元 ,比１９９８年的１７０亿美元增长１．３%;这２００家设计公司同期在国内市场的营业额为２６７亿美元 ,增长８．５%。亚太地区仍然是国际工程设计师最为活跃的地区 ,营业额为５２．９７亿美元 ,占总额的３０．８%;欧洲地区营业额为４４．１４亿美元 ,北美地区营业额为３１．２９亿美元 ,拉美地区营业额为１５．６亿美元 ,中东地区营业额为１４．７１亿美元 ,非洲地区营业额为１３．０３亿美元。１９９９年 ,最大２００家国际工程设计咨询公司在工业项目…     

中国对外工程设计咨询蓬勃发展──中国国际工程咨询协会第一届理事会第二次会议在京召开

中国对外工程设计咨询蓬勃发展──中国国际工程咨询协会第一届理事会第二次会议在京召开本刊讯（记者齐国强）中国国际工程设计咨询在激烈的竞争中，在国际市场上初露锋芒。目前，已经有１１０家设计咨询企业获得了对外经营权。有１０多家企业在创业之初就有建树，在１９...     

在风险和挑战中抓住机遇在激烈竞争中稳步增长--2003年全球最大200家国际工程设计公司业绩评述

2003年,国际工程设计市场呈良性发展态势。全球经济复苏,各国经济环境都有所改善,国际工程设计公司的经营状况也有明显好转。美国《工程新闻记录》最新公布的数据显示,2003年全球最大200家国际工程设计公司营业额总计为533亿美元,比2002年增长4.7%。其中,国际市场营业额210亿美     

Contest design and heterogeneity

I show that the effect of heterogeneity on contest investments depends on the structure of the competition, which implies that heterogeneity matters for optimal contest design. This insight helps to explain empirical evidence on the comparison of different contest structures.     

Network design and defence

Infrastructure networks are a key feature of an economy. Their functionality depends on the connectivity and sizes of different components and they face a variety of threats, from natural disasters to intelligent attacks. How should networks be defended and designed to ensure the best functionality?We develop a model to study this question. There are two players, the Designer and the Adversary. The Designer forms costly links among n given nodes and chooses to protect some of them at a cost. The Adversary then allocates resources to attack nodes. Successful attack on a node leads to its elimination. We study sub-game perfect equilibria of this game.Our main finding is that if defence is affordable and reliable, then the network is sparse and heterogeneous, and either centrally or fully protected. On the other hand, if defence is relatively costly compared to linking, then dense and homogeneous networks arise in equilibrium.     

Entrepreneurship and organization design

We model entrepreneurship and the emergence of firms as an outcome of simultaneous bidding for labor services among heterogeneous agents. What distinguishes our approach from prior work is that occupational choice and job matching are determined simultaneously, so that the opportunity costs of entrepreneurs are accounted for. Those who are relatively unmanageable, while possibly excellent managers themselves, become entrepreneurs. Entrepreneurs compete and create value by building efficient organizations and offering potentially well-paid jobs to others. While the entry of an additional entrepreneur typically reduces some individual wages, we show that it always raises the average wage and depresses the average income of incumbent entrepreneurs. This result may help explain the empirically low returns to entrepreneurship.     

Model design and simulation

The purpose of this paper is to illustrate some of the uses of simulation in building econometric models. By its means we can solve complicated non-linear systems and discover how sensitive the solutions are to changes in the parameter values and in the form of particular relationships. These uses are exemplified in a simple model of cyclical growth, whose stability depends on the speed with which the wage rate is kept adjusted to the marginal product of labour.     

Mediated contracts and mechanism design

The framework of incentive compatible finite direct coordination mechanisms in the sense of Myerson (1982) [5] is isomorphic to a framework of incentive compatible stochastic mediated contracts in the sense of Rahman and Obara (2010) [11] and Rahman (2009) [10]. The equivalence follows because the framework of Myerson (1982) [5] allows for a correlation between recommendations and transfers. The literature has hitherto not recognized the importance of this correlation for the structure of optimal contracts and for extending the revelation principle to address agency (moral hazard) problems.     

Structural stability and model design

The paper introduces the concept of structural stability and proposes that it should be considered a necessary property of scientifically valid models. Formalization of the concept is considered in both linear and non-linear models. A strong preference in favour of the wider use of non-linear models is supported by consideration of the dangers of linearization in dynamic models. The importance of structural stability is demonstrated with reference to dynamic rational expectations models which exhibit the saddle-point property. In such cases convergence to equilibrium is shown to be a structurally unstable property which can be forced by restrictive auxillary assumptions, which are highlighted.     

Reciprocal relationships and mechanism design

We study an incomplete information game in which players can coordinate their actions by contracting among themselves. We model this relationship as a reciprocal contracting procedure where each player has the ability to make commitments contingent on the other players' commitments. We differ from the rest of the literature on reciprocal contracting by assuming that punishments cannot be enforced in the event that cooperation breaks down. We fully characterize the outcomes that can be supported as perfect Bayesian equilibrium outcomes in such an environment. We use our characterization to show that the set of supportable outcomes with reciprocal contracting is larger than the set of outcomes available in a centralized mechanism design environment in which the mechanism designer is constrained by his inability to enforce punishments against non‐participants. The difference stems from the players' ability in our contracting game to convey partial information about their types at the time they offer contracts. We discuss the implications of our analysis for modelling collusion between multiple agents interacting with the same principal.     

Hard evidence and mechanism design

This paper addresses how hard evidence can be incorporated into mechanism-design analysis. Two classes of models are compared: (a) ones in which evidentiary decisions are accounted for explicitly, and (b) ones in which the players make abstract declarations of their types. Conditions are provided under which versions of these models are equivalent. The paper also addresses whether dynamic mechanisms are required for Nash implementation in settings with hard evidence. The paper shows that static mechanisms suffice in the setting of “evidentiary normality” and that, in a more general environment, one can restrict attention to a class of three-stage dynamic mechanisms.     

Constitutional design and economic performance

This paper is motivated by the belief that some cultural traits favor economic performance more than others. One trait examined is the ease with which individuals in a community drift away from the spirit of the law for their own benefit; this, it is argued, generates verbose legislation and high-transaction-cost institutions with deleterious effects on economic performance. An empirical comparison between the number of articles in a country's constitution, as a proxy for length and lack of simplicity, and economic performance as measured by GDP per capita finds that no country with a high GDP per capita has a long constitution or, restated, that long constitutions are invariably associated with low levels of GDP per capita.     

Informational control and organizational design

This paper focuses on issues of allocating authority between an uninformed principal and an informed expert. We analyze the benefits of informational control—restricting the precision of the expert's information (without learning its content). In this case, the result of Dessein (2002) [8] that delegating decisions to a perfectly informed expert is better than communication when preferences between the expert and the principal are not too far apart is reversed. We demonstrate that these organizational forms—informational control and delegation—can be either complements or substitutes, depending on the principal's ability to affect the expert's discretion about the set of allowed policies.