Economic inequality and paretian welfare economics: Some insinuating questions

Capitalists, managers, unions and government today have espoused employee ownership and participation in order to further their own selfish ends. By so doing, they unwittingly usher in full workers' democracy, and concomittant radical transformations of the socioeconomic system which, ironically, will curtail their power. These transformations would stem from our populist ideological roots and would promote profound changes in the distribution of political power and in the way the society deals with technology.     

From teleology to evolution

This paper focuses on the uneasy alliance of rational choice and evolutionary explanations in modern economics. While direct evolutionary explanations rule out "purposeful" rational choice by assuming "zero-intelligence" and pure rational choice explanations leave no room for "selective" adaptation, the indirect evolutionary approach integrates both perspectives. Subsequently we go stepwise "from teleology to evolution" and thereby study the model spectrum ranging from pure rational choice over indirect to direct evolutionary approaches. We believe that knowledge of this spectrum can help us to choose more adequate models of economic behavior that incorporate both teleological and evolutionary elements.JEL Classification: C72, B52, B59We gratefully acknowledge the very helpful constructive comments, corrections and the encouragement of our referee. Of course, the conventional disclaimer applies.Correspondence to: S. Berninghaus     

Some political determinants of economic growth: Theory and empirical implications

This work studies the effects of the political environs on economic growth. The theoretical result from a mathematical model suggests that regime instability, political polarization, and government repression all have a negative impact on economic growth. A cross-sectional analysis of 88 countries over the period of 1974–1990 provides preliminary confirmation of three implications derived from the theoretical model.     

A Bayesian Approach to Double Bounded Contingent Valuation

In this paper we propose a Bayesian approach to model double bounded contingent valuation data. The double bounded elicitation method is interpreted as a two tier iterated process in which the subject is allowed to have a second thought about his/her valuation for the environmental good. Prior information is modelled from the answers to the first dichotomous choice question. The model is Quasi-Bayesian (Q-B) in that the prior distribution refers to mean willingness to pay while the likelihood function refers to the proportions of a multinomial distribution. This model is applied to empirical data from a contingent valuation survey involving the valuation expressed by European tourists for access to natural areas in the Canary Islands. Results show that point estimate of consumer surplus computed with the Q-B model does not differ substantially from single bounded model estimation. In addition, double bounded seems to be quite robust to the choice of the prior model of willingness to pay responses. Comparison with open ended suggests that the Q-B model might be useful to control for strategic response and starting point biases.     

Exploring the Economic Choice to Participate in Sport: Results from the 2002 General Household Survey

This article explores the decision to participate in sports activities in the United Kingdom using a qualitative choice framework. The consistency of the results with neoclassical theories of leisure, and heterodox economic theory, which embraces a psychological view of decision making and structure of demand, is assessed. Finding more support for the latter perspective, the implications of this for sports policy are discussed.     

Towards an Economic Approach to Imperfect Meritocracy

In this paper imperfect meritocracy is defined as the appointment in the public sector of unsuitable (in the sense of merit) individuals for political reasons. After discussing the possible causes for the emergence of an imperfect meritocracy framework, the paper then sets the basis for an economic analysis of typical politicians' behaviour in such a framework. After deriving the demand for political appointments, the analysis verifies the intuitive insight that the number of political appointments falls when politicians are competent. Another main result is that the more votes an appointment carries through relatives and friends, the greater the demand for political appointments. Finally, it is shown that the demand for political appointments increases when taxation and the price index increase and that it falls when income increases.     

The challenge of akrasia for the theory of rational choice

The phenomenon of akrasia, in which an actor makes a choice she regrets even while choosing it, appears problematic for theories of rational choice, which assume that an agent prefers any chosen course of action. The apparent possibility of akratic action presents a challenge to rational choice theorists, either to demonstrate that it is illusory or to show that akratic action does not violate the axioms of rational choice. The problematic status of akrasia is exhibited most sharply when set against the backdrop of praxeology. Therefore, this paper will explore whether the idea of akratic action can be reconciled with the fundamental principles of praxeology.

Introduction to a General Equilibrium Approach to Economic Growth

Endogenous growth theory has had some success in explaining the observed data related to the process of economic growth. However, the results of the models in this literature are typically very sensitive to their micro-economic structure. It is therefore important to understand how the growth process behaves under more general specifications of such features as the number of commodities, the number and preferences of consumers, the factors of production, and the financial and information structures. In other words, valuable insights can be gained by integrating growth theory into the framework of general equilibrium theory. The summary of the papers in this volume, focuses on seven issues that are crucial to this integration and highlights the contributions of the papers to the resolution of these issues. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C61, D50, D90, F43, O30, O41.     

生态经济区建设原理初探

生态经济区建设原理的探讨是适应当前国内蓬勃发展的生态经济省（市）建设的要求,本文就生态经济区的概念,内容,区域生态位和“发展位”,及以为生态创新的概念和作用进行了探讨。其中特别突出了关于生态经济区建设的重要意义和生态文化建设的看法。     

Political Entrepreneurship and the Democratic Allocation of Economic Resources

Political entrepreneurship occurs when an individual acts on a political profit opportunity. These profit opportunities can be divided into two categories: productive, and predatory. Productive opportunities enable entrepreneurs to profit from enhancing the efficiency of government, while predatory opportunities enable entrepreneurs to profit from forcibly transferring resources from some to others. This analysis shows that political institutions tend to favor predatory over productive political entrepreneurship, and shows that what is sometimes referred to as political exchange does not have the same efficiency characteristics as voluntary exchange in private markets.     

Aids: An Economic Approach to the Choice of Policies*

This paper presents a novel approach to the difficult problem of society choosing the optimal set of policy instruments to control the spread of AIDS. The economic approach emphasizes the determinants of agents' behaviour and the reciprocal nature of the market failure problem. The nature of the social objective function is discussed and an expected-utility-maximizing model of the behaviour of HIV-infectious agents is developed In the light of the agents' responses to government policies, some general principles relating to the ranking of instruments and their targeting of individual groups and of instrument variables are developed     

经济增长与银行的合约选择

由于信息不对称对资本积累过程的影响,为了维持足够的经济增长速度,银行必须考虑签订消除贷款人与借款人之间信息不对称的合约,让更多的可贷资金流向生产性投资,推动经济走向更高的资本积累路径。     

An Economic and Ethical Approach to Charity and to Charity Endowments

We examine how and why donors divide gifts between people in the present (across distance) and between the present and future (across time). US donors tend to give less to charities that benefit the poor and more to charities that benefit the non-poor (such as museums, universities, and arts organizations). Many of these wealthier charities have created endowments that benefit not only present persons, but also future persons. We develop a shorthand framework for linking time to distance in charitable allocations that incorporates a “proximity preference,” i.e., charity that prefers those who are nearer to us whether by reason of physical distance, psychic-identity, or temporal distance. Even though ethical considerations suggest that recipients' level of need should be the dominant factor in allocating gifts, donors also express preferences, ceteris paribus, for benefits arriving sooner rather than later, and for recipients who are ``closer'' rather than farther away.     

A Research on Approach to the Development Strategy of Tourism Economic Growth

As the tourism is improving, the economy growth can be obtained. Therefore, to improve tourism is to improve the economy. In fact, some supplies of tour could not meet the demands, which brings out conflict. It is obvious that solving the problem of supply and demand of tour is the approach to the development strategy of tourism economic growth.     

Rationalizable variable-population choice functions

Summary. We analyze the rationalizability of variable-population social-choice functions in a welfarist framework. It is shown that fixed-population rationalizability and a weakening of congruence together are necessary and sufficient for rational choice, given a plausible dominance property that prevents the choice of alternatives involving low utility levels. In addition, a class of critical-level separable choice functions is characterized. This result, which extends an earlier axiomatization of a related class of bargaining solutions to a variable-population setting, is the first axiomatization of critical-level principles in a general choice-theoretic model. Received: November 30, 1999; revised version: September 11, 2000     

品牌的经济学分析:一个比较静态模型

现有的经济学理论和模型中缺少全面针对品牌的分析,导致品牌理论与实践的双重混乱.在选择爆炸式增长的经济条件下,品牌对消费者的选择行为产生了巨大影响,因此对品牌选择的经济学分析显得更为迫切.品牌的经济学本质是降低消费者的选择成本,进而影响消费者对品牌的选择,而消费者选择又决定了厂商的销售量和利润.我们在经济学的框架下,以品牌为研究对象,建立起一个比较静态模型,对品牌进行经济学分析,得出消费者均衡和厂商均衡的条件.     

比较经济体制研究的新方法：历史的比较制度分析

“历史的比较制度分析”(Historical and Comparative Institution Analysis, HCIA)是20世纪90年代才刚刚在西方兴起的一种崭新的理论和学说。其主要代表人物是美国斯坦福大学的阿夫纳·格雷夫(Avner Greif)教授。虽然它产生的时间不长，但其独特新颖的研究视角、富有创造性的研究方法、别具一格的理论框架、灵活实用的分析工具以及令人瞩目的研究成果，已经引起了国际学术界越来越密切的关注和重视。它的出现和发展为比较经济体制研究提供了一种全新的研究视角和分析方法，也为其开拓了更广阔的研究领域。本文，拟从方法论的角度，探讨历史的比较制度分析的学术特征与成就，并对其进行简要的评析。……     

政府规模优化的经济学分析

政府规模的增长已成为当今界各国行政发展的普遍趋势,如何界定合理的政府规模已成为行政改革的重要内容。从政府和市场两个方面来探讨政府规模扩张的原因,并根据二者之间的关系对政府适度规模进行研究,从量的角度建构我国合理政府规模的尺度,进而可提出我国政府规模优化的对策,并以此作为我国行政机构的改革选择和基本切入点。