The growth and welfare effects of international mass migration

We analyze the effects of immigration quotas on growth and welfare in a North-South version of the quality ladders growth model. Quotas in the North increase the growth rate. However, they lower the static utility level and the discounted welfare of Northern workers. Also the discounted welfare of asset owners drops. Hence, unlike in the static migration model where the representative agent in the host country benefits from immigration, in our dynamic model, the representative agent loses despite a positive growth effect. Winners from immigration quotas are the immigrants and the remaining workers in the South.     

Tariff Discrimination versus MFN under Incomplete Information

This paper presents a model of legal migration of temporary skilled workers from one source country to two host countries, both of which can control their levels of such immigration. Because of complementarities between capital and labor, the return on capital is positively related to the level of immigration. Consequently, when capital is immobile, host nations' optimal levels of immigration are positively related to their capital endowments. Further, when capital is mobile between the host nations, the common return on capital is a function of the levels of immigration in both countries, meaning that immigration is a public good. As a result, when immigration imposes costs on host countries, the Nash equilibrium results in free riding and less immigration than would occur in the cooperative equilibrium. These results are qualitatively unaltered when capital mobility extends to the source nation.     

Optimal immigration, education and growth in the long run

The paper extends Manning's model on education and balanced growth to include labour immigration. Each immigration unit is assumed to consist of one skilled worker and some unskilled members. The optimal immigration policy which maximizes the per capita steady-state consumption of the host country is derived. We show that optimal immigration policy can reduce the steady-state skilled labour ratio. More interesting still, contrary to the widespread belief that immigration of skilled workers hurts local skilled workers, it is the unskilled local workers whose interests are threatened by optimal immigration policy.     

Unionized labor markets and globalized capital markets

This paper studies the effects of international integration of capital markets in a world where countries differ in their labor market institutions: one country has a perfectly competitive labor market while the other is unionized. We show that workers should favor autarky in the unionized country, but oppose it in the non unionized country and vice versa for owners of capital. Aggregate gains from integration, however, are negative. We also show that, under capital mobility, an increase in relative bargaining power of unions does not always improve workers' welfare.     

Wage Effects of Labour Migration with International Capital Mobility

Wage effects of immigration are investigated in a setting with international capital mobility, which eliminates two‐thirds of the native wage effects of immigration. Without international capital mobility, overall gains from migration in the immigration region are only a small fraction of total losses to native workers, but with perfect international capital adjustment, overall gains are larger than total losses to native workers. Two alternative tax policies to eliminate the negative wage effects of immigration on low‐skilled native workers are evaluated.     

Foreign Direct Investment and Training in the Host Country: The Tariff-Jumping Argument Revisited

We analyze the direct investment versus export decision of a multinational firm in competition with a potential entrant in a host country. We consider a workers' skills asymmetry between the host and the multinational home countries. We also give the multinational the possibility to train all (or a part of) the hired workers when investing. We show that an improvement in the workers' skills in the host country does not systematically increase the multinational incentive to invest. We also demonstrate that the tariff-jumping investment can improve the welfare of the host country even if it excludes the local firm from the market.     

Rethinking the area approach: Immigrants and the labor market in California

A framework that uses a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) production function with skill differentiation and integrated national labor markets has predictions for the employment effect of immigrants at the local level. The employment (rather than wage) response to immigration by skill in a state reveals the production substitutability-complementarity between native and immigrant labor. This, in turn, reveals the degree to which immigrants stimulate or depress the demand for native labor. To estimate this elasticity, I use a novel instrument based on demographic characteristics of total Central American migrants or of the Mexican Population to predict immigration by skill level within California. Looking at immigration to California between 1960 and 2005 these estimates support the assumption of a nationally integrated labor market by skill and they support the hypothesis that natives and immigrants in the same education-experience group are not perfectly substitutable. This explains the counter-intuitive fact that there is a zero correlation between immigration and wage and employment outcomes of natives in the state.     

Emigration and wages: The EU enlargement experiment

The enlargement of the European Union provides a unique opportunity to study the impact of the lifting of migration restrictions on the migrant sending countries. With EU enlargement in 2004, 1.2 million workers from Eastern Europe emigrated to the UK and Ireland. I use this emigration wave to show that emigration significantly changed the wage distribution in the sending country, in particular between young and old workers. Using a novel dataset from Lithuania, the UK and Ireland for the calibration of a structural model of labor demand, I find that over the period of five years emigration increased the wages of young workers by 6%, while it had no effect on the wages of old workers. Contrary to the immigration literature, there is no significant effect of emigration on the wage distribution between high-skilled and low-skilled workers.     

Guest worker programs: A theoretical analysis of welfare of the host and source countries*

This article examines the interaction between migration policies of the host and source countries in the context of a model of guest-worker migration. For the host, the objective is to provide low-cost labor for its employers while avoiding illegal immigration. It optimizes over these objectives by setting the time limit of a guest-worker permit. The source country seeks remittance flows and return migration by offering fiscal benefits to returnees. Within this framework, we solve for the Nash equilibrium values of the migration policy instruments and compare them, to the extent possible, with the ones that emerge in a cooperative setting.     

The U.S. immigration debate: what’s all the shouting for?

Potential GDP growth has slowed by 1.3% a year. The main culprit is labor force decline. It follows logically that a more welcoming immigration policy would be responsive to our demographic challenges and thereby complementary to macroeconomic growth. Ironically, anger at immigration has grown in inverse proportion to actual immigration flows. There is little evidence that immigrants have negative impacts on the wages of native-born workers, and increased immigration would likely have a net positive fiscal impact. Based on these economic considerations, the U.S. immigration debate seems driven by much more heat than light.     

Subsidies for FDI: Implications from a model with heterogeneous firms

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of subsidies to attract multinational corporations when firms are heterogeneous in their productivity levels. I show that the use of a small subsidy raises welfare in the FDI host country, with the consumption gains from attracting more multinationals exceeding the direct cost of funding the subsidy program through a tax on labor income. This welfare gain stems from a selection effect, whereby the subsidy induces only the most productive exporters to switch to servicing the host's market via FDI. I further show that for the same total subsidy bill, a subsidy to variable costs delivers a larger welfare gain than a subsidy to the fixed cost of conducting FDI, since a variable cost subsidy also raises the inefficiently low output levels stemming from each firm's markup pricing power.     

Differentiation,labor market and globalization

We consider two countries with initially one firm in each country and the possibility for each firm to invest in the other country or commercialize its products, and for workers to immigrate (Common Labor Market; CLM). Interestingly, when firms compete on the product market with no competition on the labor market (Goods’ Mobility; GM), they do not differentiate their qualities. However, when competition is introduced in both markets (Foreign Investment; FI) firms differentiate their products. We compare the globalization scenarii and prove that they improve the global social welfare relative to autarky and that a cooperative choice by countries of a globalization scenario would lead to GM.     

Terms of trade risk with partial labor mobility

We examine the welfare consequences of terms-of-trade risk in a small open economy in which it is costly for workers to move between sectors. Relocation costs lead to partial labor mobility, sectoral wage gaps and income risk exceeding that of an economy in which relocation is costless. Using observed wage differentials and standard values for volatility and preferences, we find that the welfare cost of partial labor mobility alone is unlikely to be very large, even in the absence of self-insurance arrangements. In addition, modest consumption substitution elasticities significantly reduce these welfare costs.     

The impact of international trade on emigration in developing countries

This paper studies how international trade affects emigration in developing countries. This is a new aspect as previous studies investigated the impact of immigration on trade from host countries perspective. However, there are also reasons to believe that trade may affect the propensity to emigrate in the home countries, leading to potential brain drain in developing countries, especially given the theoretical hypothesis in Stolper–Samuelson (S–S) theorem within Heckscher–Ohlin (H–O) factor-proportion model that more educated workers are more likely to emigrate due to an increase in international trade. When low-skill abundant developing countries liberalize trade, the reward of the scarce factor (skilled labor) is reduced in these countries, but it increases in the high-skill abundant developed countries. Therefore, skilled workers in the developing countries see a strong incentive to migrate to developed countries. To test this hypothesis, this paper utilizes a panel of 133 developing countries for the period of 1980–2010 and finds that high-skilled workers are more likely to emigrate with trade while there appears to be no effect of trade on low-skilled workers.     

我国以FDI形式承接国际服务产业转移的福利效应测度研究

外商直接投资已逐渐成为服务业国际转移的主要方式。本文在Feenstra and Hanson(1997)的外购理论基础上,借鉴R.Posner(1961)以及Fisher and Samuelson(1980)的模型框架,修正了一个服务业转移模型分析其福利效应,并基于我国1989-2005年间的服务业外商直接投资对劳动生产率影响的测度说明:在服务业承接FDI国际转移的初期,东道国的福利效应集中体现为吸收大量非技术性劳动就业,但对人均劳动生产率的影响并不显著;随着FDI的大量涌入,带动国内对于服务业技术性劳动需求及其工资水平增加,激励了非技术性劳动向技术性劳动转变,最终实现了服务业整体人均劳动生产率的显著提高,由此促进了产业结构优化升级,提高了一国整体的福利水平。最后,提出了为更好地实现服务产业的国际接轨,必须逐步放开资本流动管制、营造技术密集型服务业承接软环境等政策建议。     

Tariffs,capital mobility,and foreign ownership

This paper is concerned with the welfare effects of a small capital movement from one country to another followed by the repatriation of that capital's marginal product. Although this issue has been addressed previously, especially from the point of view of the host country, there seems to exist no formal analysis which treats simultaneously the interdependent welfare effects on the investing and host countries and thus on world real income. The purpose of this paper is to develop such an analysis in order to determine the conditions under which a capital flow will help or harm a country.     

The welfare effects of illegal immigration

"This paper extends the work of Ethier on illegal immigration by examining the optimal level of enforcement for the labor-importing country in a two-country model and by considering the effects of allowing capital mobility. We derive a formula for the optimal level of enforcement against firms that hire illegal workers, and show that the presence of enforcement costs makes the policy less efficient than a wage tax. With capital mobility, foreign workers gain from an increase in enforcement in the home country because capital is driven out of the home country."     

Unemployment,environmental policy,and international migration

In this paper, we investigate the effects of an increase in emission tax, a decrease in fixed manufacturing wage rate, and an increased inflow of foreign workers on competitive wages, the environmental stock, the economic welfare of the representative consumer, and employment in the presence of a pollution abatement equipment sector and unemployment. Our main findings are that an increase in emission tax and a decrease in the urban minimum wage rate decrease unemployment, and international immigration may increase the competitive wage rate, employment rate, stock of environmental capital, and economic welfare of the representative worker.     

Outsourcing, unemployment and welfare policy

The paper investigates the consequences of outsourcing of labor intensive activities to low-wage economies. This trend challenges the two basic functions of the welfare state, redistribution and social insurance when private unemployment insurance markets are missing. The main results are: (i) outsourcing raises unemployment and labor income risk of unskilled workers; (ii) it increases inequality between high- and low-income groups; and (iii) the gains from outsourcing can be made Pareto improving by using a redistributive linear income tax if redistribution is initially not too large. We finally derive the welfare optimal redistribution and unemployment insurance policies.     

对民工荒积极效应的认识和思考

学界普遍认为民工荒具有一定的积极效应。通过实证分析,论证了民工荒积极效应的现实表现,揭示了民工荒积极效应难以有效发挥的深层次原因。现阶段我国民工荒的实质是局部荒、结构荒和待遇荒,民工荒积极效应的释放是一个长期的、缓慢的过程,制度性障碍在客观上阻碍了积极效应的发挥。民工荒尚难以从根本上改善农民工工资和福利待遇,难以有效刺激产业升级。要进一步激发民工荒的积极效应,必须依赖政府构建正确的引导和调控机制。