不完全契约理论:一个综述

标准的契约理论或委托-代理理论假定契约是完全的,然而现实中的契约是不完全的。契约的不完全会导致事前的最优契约失效,当事人在面临被“敲竹杠”的风险时会做出无效率的专用性投资。经济学家们在研究如何最大程度地减少由于契约不完全所导致的效率损失时,发展了一个新兴的不完全契约理论。本文以一个基本模型为基点,围绕专用性投资效率问题,从司法干预、赔偿、治理结构、产权以及履约等多个视角,全面地介绍了不完全契约理论的产生、发展、应用以及面临的挑战和未来的前景。     

“不对称信息下风险投资合约理论”的讨论研究

JeffretJ.Trester关于风险投资的“不对称信息下合约理论”提出,不对称信息环境引发的监控困难是最佳契约选择的驱动力。通过对HD公司成功运用国外风险基金的案例,对该理论的“不对称信息定义”和“合约形式选择”进行了讨论。     

"不对称信息下风险投资合约理论"的讨论研究

Jeffret J.Trester关于风险投资的“不对称信息下合约理论”提出，不对称信息环境引发的监控困难是最佳契约选择的驱动力。通过对HD公司成功运用国外风险基金的案例，对该理论的“不对称信息定义”和“合约形式选择”进行了讨论。     

公司治理中的准租金和不完全契约分析

通过对国内外有关“公司治理”文献内容的分析，运用委托—代理理论、不完全契约理论、寻租经济学的相关知识．力求从准租金和不完全契约的角度出发，探求企业存在准租金的情况下，公司治理的定义、特点和本质特征。     

信托义务是投资基金立法的核心

投资基金在美国被称为“共同基金”(MutualFund),英国称为“单位信托基金”(Unit Trust),日本和台湾地区称为“证券投资信托基金”。 基金各方当事人——持有人、管理人、托管人,一向被称为“投资基金三角”,他们之间靠基金契约以及托管协议来调整各自的权利义务关系。在所有权、经营权和保管监督权三权分立的结构关系中,信托义务是最为关键的制度。信托义务(Fiduciary Duty)来     

培育开放式基金职业经理人

开放式基金的本质是一种委托一代理关系，契约是不完全的，存在剩余索取权问题、隐藏行为道德风险和隐藏知识道德风险，使基金经理人的行为偏离投资的利益。运用信息经济学的声誉理论和层次分析方法，通过建立开放式基金职业经理人市场、开放式基金经理人的激励约束机制和开放式基金经理人业绩评价体系来培育我国第三代市场化的基金经理人，以保护投资的利益。     

基于随机政策的人力资本道德风险防范

科斯(Coase)的“企业契约理论”中的一个基本命题是,企业是一系列契约的组合,是个人之间交易产权的一种方式。相对于市场而言,企业是一种不完备的契约。^[1]正是由于企业中普遍存在的契约不完备性和信息非对称性,诱发了人力资本的机会主义行为。在随机因素不可确知的情况下,人力资本可能隐藏自己的行为,由于劳动契约签订之后,组织(雇主)无法完全监视员工的工作努力程度,受雇者的怠惰行为可能不被察觉,产生所谓“道德风险”问题。     

企业契约问题探析

契约理论为人们认识市场体制,特别是企业组织制度提供了一个全新的视角。由科斯开创的“企业契约理论。已成为用以研究现代企业理论最核心的方法。本文力求从完全契约和不完全契约、默认契约、激励契约等方面全面把握契约理论的内涵,在此基础上,深入认识企业契约的本质特征,进而作出了企业契约不完全性的理论解释。     

契约不完全的必然性分析

不完全契约理论的主要缺陷之一是对契约的不完全性成因没有权威、一致的解释。近年来,学者们对契约的不完全性成因主要从有限理性、交易成本、环境不确定性等因素来分析。但要得出契约不完全的必然性必须从内因、外因两个层面,多角度地对不完全契约进行分析,才能得出现实经济中契约不完全的必然性。     

不完全契约下企业劳动力成本最优

整个市场就是一系列的契约,企业本身是一个契约,并且是一个不完全契约。劳动力进入企业后就会与企业形成一种不完全契约。企业如何在这种不完全契约下使劳动力成本最小,是所有企业要解决的问题,也是企业竞争优势的一个重要来源。本文主要是分析讨论企业如何在不完全契约下实现劳动力成本最小。     

FUND SUBSTITUTION AND THE INCENTIVE EFFECT OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT SUBSIDIES

This paper analyses the observed phenomenon of public for private fund substitution in industrial assistance, by examining the public and private sector funding of investment under different assumptions about the nature of the private capital market. This bears on the effectiveness of industrial subsidies, and has implications for welfare and the design of optimal assistance contracts. It is shown that fund substitution depends crucially on the elasticity of investment with respect to the user cost of capital in the without-subsidy position, and on the nature of any amount and rate constraints on the assistance contract.     

考虑革新程度认知差异的新产品技术授权研究

建立博弈模型，探讨技术革新认知差异情形下，外部技术创新者向寡占竞争格局的生产企业授权生产新产品专利的最优决策问题。研究发现，创新授权者关于新产品市场的认知劣势使固定收费契约不具备完全优于特许权收费契约的绝对优势；在双重收费契约下，专利人授权对象选择因认知差异影响，由排他性授权向非排他性授权决策转变；认知差异性削弱了创新企业市场势力，从而提高特许权收费契约优势，而拍卖、股权投资等有助于创新企业克服认知劣势。据此，建议创新企业明晰创新专利长期回报，综合搭配应用多种授权契约；以非排他性授权策略配合特许权收费、双重收费和股权投资等契约模式，实现技术交易产业链激励共容下的利润最大化，促进技术创新传播应用，提高社会福利水平。     

Financial Development, Financing Choice and Economic Growth

In an overlapping generations economy, households (lenders) fund risky investment projects of firms (borrowers) by drawing up loan contracts on the basis of asymmetric information. An optimal contract entails either the issue of only debt or the issue of both debt and equity according to whether a household faces a single or double enforcement problem as a result of its own decision about whether or not to undertake costly information acquisition. The equilibrium choice of contract depends on the state of the economy which, in turn, depends on the contracting regime. Based on this analysis, the paper provides a theory of the joint determination of real and financial development, with the ability to explain both the endogenous emergence of stock markets and the complementarity between debt finance and equity finance.     

The Law and Economics of Costly Contracting

In most of the contract theory literature, contracting costsare assumed either to be high enough to preclude certain formsof contracting or low enough to permit any contract to be written.Similarly researchers usually treat renegotiation as eithercostless or prohibitively costly. This article addresses themiddle ground between these extremes, in which the costs ofcontracting and renegotiation can take intermediate values andthe contracting parties can themselves influence these costs.The context for our analysis is the canonical problem of inducingefficient relation-specific investment and efficient ex posttrade. Among our principle results are: (i) The efficiency andcomplexity of the initial contract are decreasing in the costto create a contract. Hence the best mechanism design contractscan be too costly to write. (ii) When parties use the simplercontract forms, they require renegotiation to capture ex postsurplus and to create efficient investment incentives. In somecases, parties want low renegotiation costs. More interestingis that, in other cases, parties have a strict preference formoderate renegotiation costs. (iii) The effect of contract lawon contract form is significant but has been overlooked. Inparticular, the law's interpretive rules raise the cost of enforcingcomplex contracts, and thus induce parties to use simple contracts.Worse, the law also lowers renegotiation costs, which furtherundermines complex contracts and is also inappropriate for someof the simpler contracts.     

Asymmetric contracts,cash flows and risk taking of mutual funds

Fund managers in delegated portfolio management face asymmetries in their compensation contracts and in the fund flows contingent on their funds' performance relative to a benchmark. In this study we investigate the impacts of contract asymmetry and fund flow asymmetry on the risk-taking behavior of open-end funds whose delegation contracts are performance based, and show that their impacts are opposite. When the two asymmetries apply simultaneously, the impact of one on the fund's risk-taking alleviates the impact of the other. Raising the return-sharing ratio cannot make the manager take more risk, but increasing the cash flow volume can. We also show that the tracking-error variance can measure the degree of risk that the fund takes.     

渤海产业基金的运行机制分析

渤海产业基金是我国第一支中资产业投资基金和第一支大型产业投资基金,其设立与运行将推动我国产业投资基金管理办法的尽快出台和不断完善,并将对中国产业投资基金的未来走向产生重要影响。文章从组织形式、融资机制、投资机制、退出机制四个方面对该基金的运行机制进行分析。     

Operating efficiency and output insensitive employment contracts for capital management

Summary This paper considers a problem in which an agent is hired to manage a capital investment and subsequently receives private information regarding the productivity of the capital investment. The capital manager must decide whether to invest capital supplied by the firm (the principal), or to divert these investment funds to perquisite consumption. If the manager decides to invest, the manager must then select the level of operating efficiency (productivity) of the capital investment, this latter choice being unobservable and constrained by the (maximal) productivity of the investment. In this setting we demonstrate that the optimal employment contract, from the perspective of the firm hiring the manager, is the contract whichminimizes the dependence of the manager's compensation on firm output. This contract pays the manager a fixed wage whenever output from the investment exceeds the wage and provides the manager with all of the projects rents whenever output falls below this level. Thus, we provide a setting in which fixed wage contracts are the optimal incentive contract even when agents are risk neutral and contracts can be costlessly written on future output.We would like to thank the participants in the Princeton Economics and Finance Workshop and the Ohio State University Finance Workshop for their comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The second author gratefully acknowledges the research support of the Georgia State College of Business Administration Research Council.     

PERFORMANCE‐BASED FEE CONTRACT AND RISK‐TAKING STRATEGY IN ASSET MANAGEMENT TOURNAMENT

This paper investigates how performance‐based fee (PBF) contracts affect strategic risk‐taking behaviours of fund managers in an asset management tournament. In the perfect equilibrium, managers with better mid‐year performance will hold the risky asset with a higher probability in the remaining of the year, compared to managers with poorer mid‐year performance. If the volume of the cash flow into the winner fund is contingent on its level of success, the winning fund will take a more aggressive approach. When the PBF contract pays more heed to relative performance against the benchmark, managers are more likely to adopt aggressive strategies.     

从契约设计角度看中国私募证券基金企业创新发展的路径选择——通过比较分析公司制与有限合伙制私募企业的激励机制

按特定组织形式组建的私募企业具有特定的内部收益分配制度,而受益分配制度的设置实际上是一种契约设计,反映了基金投资人对基金管理人的激励特征。结合目前中国私募证券基金在组织形式上的创新需求,可以利用契约理论,对可供参考的两类私募企业组织形式:公司制与有限合伙制企业的收益分配制度所对应的契约激励机制进行比较分析,为中国私募证券基金在组织形式上的创新路径选择提供参考。