基于模糊决策的多属性在线拍卖决策算法

通过对现有应用模糊数学的方法来解决多属性在线拍卖中决定胜出者的方法进行分析后,发现其存在两个问题,一是原计算方法存在简化空间,二是方法本身涉及到模糊指标值和模糊权重的直接加权,导致了模糊元素的非线性化和计算的复杂化。本文针对第一个问题提出计算步骤简化意见,进而又针对第二个问题提出一种新的模糊决策算法。新算法避免了直接对模糊指标值进行加权,从而保持了模糊元素的线性性质,简化了模糊决策计算过程,优化了现有多属性拍卖中用到的模糊决策算法,丰富和完善了拍卖问题涉及模糊环境时采用模糊数学求解的算法。     

一种多属性的多物品拍卖方法研究

通常意义的多物品拍卖中,卖方只对买方的竞标价格和数量感兴趣,而不考虑竞标的其他属性。而在实际交易时,卖方往往需要考虑买方竞标更多的属性,如买方的企业信誉、付款方式、合作关系等,卖方对不同属性的买方竞标评价值不同。为此采用一种多属性的多物品拍卖模型,并用基于效用理论的多属性决策方法PROMETHEE-Ⅱ且属性的优先值与属性值成非线性关系正弦准则的优先函数进行实证分析。     

多属性网上采购理论与方法研究

随着互联网的迅猛发展,电子商务成为了一种新型的商务模式,并在企业的生产和经营中发挥着越来越多的作用。如今,在少数提供网上采购功能的电子商务网站中,只能对价格这一种属性进行谈判。而大多数企业在采购过程当中,经常要根据不同的合同条款,例如价格、交货期、数量、质量、交货方式等进行谈判。因此多属性网上拍卖理论也越发显得重要。本文主要讨论多属性网上拍卖相关理论问题,最后提出了一种新的决定胜出者的线性规划算法。     

多属性逆向拍卖采购机制设计

全球市场环境不断向买方市场的转变,为企业利用逆向拍卖机制进行采购创造了条件。多属性逆向拍卖机制是采购拍卖中具有广泛应用价值的机制之一,在供应商成本和采购商效用具有可加属性特征的条件下,设计了一个基于模糊评价的多属性逆向拍卖机制,将各属性等级权重值设为供应行业提供此属性等级的平均边际成本,发现该机制是激励相容的较好机制。     

国有企业的出售机制:拍卖

目前国有企业的出售机制大多采用管理层收购,并且在具体实施中大多采用政府与企业的在任管理层双方非公开议价的方式进行。收购过程不透明,且收购价格过低,这是人们对管理层收购的两大质疑之处。允许管理层参加拍卖是解决这两方面问题的有效途径。因此,拍卖是国有企业的最优出售机制。考察了四种标准拍卖方式在各种环境下的效率,以及不同拍卖方式对政府出售企业收入的影响,并确定最优拍卖。     

依法规范完善涉诉国有资产拍卖交易

本文从涉诉国有资产管理的本质要求入手．介绍了广东省法院涉诉国有资产拍卖交易的现状及存在的问题。实证研究发现，依法规范广东省涉诉国有资产拍卖交易工作．推进省级涉诉国有资产拍卖交易网络平台建设，建立统一的公共资源拍卖平台，可有效化解当前涉诉国有资产拍卖交易中存在的问题，促进拍卖标的信息更加公开，交易价格最大化。同时，为了进一步推进公共资源拍卖平台建设．本文还提出了创新监管体制，建立“多位一体”的公共资源拍卖的监管体系等建议。     

网络拍卖策划新思维

网络拍卖,又称网上拍卖、在线拍卖,是一种与传统拍卖迥异的新拍卖模式。它通过互联网开展价格谈判,并采取竞价方式进行标的交易,因其应用于互联网环境,存在便捷、快速、影响力大等特点。     

如何完善企业国有产权拍卖机制

随着我国市场经济体制改革的深入,企业国有产权协议转让中存在违规操作等诸多问题,造成了国有资产流失。而拍卖方式是减少寻租行为和国有资产流失的有利手段,从而成为企业国有产权转让市场定价的有效方式。本文探讨了拍卖机制在企业国有产权转让中的重要意义和完善对策。     

博弈论在土地拍卖中的应用

本文把基于博弈论的线性出价规则应用在土地交易市场密封第一价格拍卖中,从数学上分析了密封第一价格拍卖的形成机理,论证了此拍卖方式的可行性,得出的结论可供交易时参考。     

国有废旧物资的拍卖处置

国有资产废旧物资是国有资产。根据2005年1月1日起实施的商务部发布的《拍卖管理办法》,拍卖是处置国有资产．防止国有资产流失的重要手段。对国有资产中的废旧物资拍卖更能有效防止国有资产流失,使买卖双方获得利益最大化。要做好国有废旧物资拍卖．需要从废旧物资管理、委托拍卖、拍卖、转移处置等多方面下功夫     

在线拍卖诚信行为的博弈分析

在线拍卖交易中双方的不诚信行为已经成为制约在线拍卖交易发展的一个重要因素,为此,有必要应用博弈论的有关方法对在线拍卖交易双方的诚信行为进行分析研究,构建在线拍卖信用评价机制,这样在一定程度上保证了在线交易的安全,为政府监督在线拍卖交易提供有力的支持。     

拍卖交易模式在农产品流通中的应用

大力发展农产品批发市场的拍卖交易,逐步缩减散、小、乱的传统对手交易市场,是今后我国农产品交易的发展方向和目标.在农产品流通体系上,要在政府的引导和规范下构建农产品批发市场多层次交易体系,既有农村基层市场的小额批发和城市社区市场的末梢批发,又有区域流通性质的大型集散型批发;在拍卖主体建设上,在大型农产品集散基地推行拍卖交易,特别是在大规模区域种植的产地批发市场加大投入,完善批发市场配套设施与服务功能;在农产品拍卖上下游建设上,一方面要培育、扶持现有农产品运销大户和农业经营企业,促进批发商、代理商和经纪人的组织化发展,另一方面要促进农民合作组织的发展,从资金、政策上给予必要的扶持,鼓励农民加入各类专业合作组织,提高农民进入市场的组织化程度.     

Impact of Reputation and Promotion on Internet Auction Outcomes: Finnish Evidence

The purpose of this article is to explore the impact of seller’s reputation and promotional methods on auction outcomes in the Finnish online auction website, Huuto.net. Multiple linear and logistic regression analyses are used to test a set of hypotheses. The dataset consists of 227 auctions of iPhone 4S 16 GB mobile phones posted for auction by 138 individual sellers. The main finding is that sellers who have acquired a free identification from Huuto.net achieve a hefty increase in the final sales price. Sellers who have not established an online reputation achieve considerably lower closing prices at auction. An increase in negative feedback points reduces the final sales price. Purchasing display-enhancing promotional options does not increase the price but may improve probability of sale. Establishing reputation, avoiding negative feedback, and acquiring identification pay off. The promotional options associated with fonts and colors are not worth the cost.     

A comparison of different pay-per-bid auction formats

Pay-per-bid auctions are a popular new type of Internet auction that is unique because a fee is charged for each bid that is placed. This paper uses a theoretical model and three large empirical data sets with 44,614 ascending and 1,460 descending pay-per-bid auctions to compare the economic effects of different pay-per-bid auction formats, such as different price increments and ascending versus descending auctions. The theoretical model suggests revenue equivalence between different price increments and descending and ascending auctions. The empirical results, however, refute the theoretical predictions: ascending auctions with smaller price increments yield, on average, higher revenues per auction than ascending auctions with higher price increments, but their revenues vary much more strongly. On average, ascending auctions yield higher revenues per auction than descending auctions, but results differ strongly across product categories. Additionally, revenues per ascending auction also vary much more strongly.     

Error Reduction in Distributed DSS Through Coordination of Modeling Activities: Simulation Study

It is well known that the “lemon” problem can cause market failure. Because difficulties in quality discovery of nonstandardized and complex products will increase transaction costs, it was predicted that the “electronic market” would prevail only with less complex and more standardized goods. However, it has been observed that there are many successful electronic (auction) markets for seemingly typical “lemon” goods such as used cars, raw minerals, and agricultural products. It is argued that in such markets, the equilibrium price of electronic trading appeared higher than in the nonelectronic market. Many speculative explanations have been offered for this, but to the best of our knowledge, no analytical studies have been presented. This study is an attempt to fill this gap. In this paper, we look at the problem of quality discovery in the electronic trading of physical goods especially when the goods are not standardized. The information asymmetry between buyer and seller creates the possibility of a “lemon” in the nonstandardized market. To mitigate this problem, several auction markets have devised third party quality grading systems and limited auctions to only relatively higher quality products. Through analytical modeling, we rationalize these mechanisms; that is, the intervention of an impartial third party for quality inspection, market segmentation by quality measure, and the sellers' willingness to pay the cost of quality inspection.     

The effect of buyer feedback scores on internet auction prices

One of the major roles of Internet intermediaries is to help build trust between buyers and sellers for efficient and safe transactions. The buyer feedback system started in online auctions as one of the trust‐building mechanisms on the Internet. As the buyer feedback system is becoming a standard trust‐building mechanism in other e‐commerce sites as well as in online auction, there is an increasing interest about the impact of the buyer feedback system. On the top of recent studies investigating the effects of buyer feedback scores on auction prices, we provide empirical validations using more sophisticated methods. In this study, we tested the relationship between buyer feedback scores and bidding prices using an empirical data set from a leading consumer‐to‐consumer (C2C) Internet auction site. Data analysis results show a strong empirical validation of previous studies. Negative feedback is a significant price discount factor in the final auction price on the C2C Internet auction market. The results also show that potential buyers are more sensitive to negative feedback when they are considering buying inherently risky products such as used or refurbished products.     

电子采购中组合多属性招投标的优化研究

由于物品之间存在互补效应,往往投标者会将几个标的物作为一个组合标进行投标。这一方式在传统的多物品电子采购中仅仅从价格或成本的考虑来确定竞胜标,因而无法同时解决采购中的多属性问题。在网络技术的支持下,这种组合招投标的采购模式已经成为可能。通过以最大化采购方的效用为目标建立数学模型,并运用禁忌搜索算法进行求解,可满足多属性决策的招投标方法要求,解决电子采购中对于具有互补效应的多物品多属性的竞胜标确定问题。但由于问题自身的复杂性,对此类问题的研究处于起步阶段,对于多属性间的关系研究,多属性评价方法的改进,以及求解方法的研究与计算效率的提高等问题还有待于进一步解决。     

Callable bull/bear contracts,call auction sessions,and price manipulations: Evidence from Hong Kong

Call auction sessions are widely adopted to improve the price discovery process. The suspension of the closing call auction session (CAS) of the Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) in 2009 and the reintroduction of an enhanced CAS in 2016 provide us a unique experimental environment to assess the effectiveness of the two different CAS models in reducing market manipulation. In examining the probability of mandatory call events (MCEs) of callable bull/bear contracts (CBBCs), we find the enhanced CAS model being more effective in price manipulation reduction. We also find the enhanced CAS reducing price manipulation in the preopening auction session.