评标专家均衡随机抽取模型

在分析原有评标专家抽取模型不足的基础上,本文提出了评标专家均衡随机抽取模型。这种新的抽取模型不仅可以保证抽取过程的随机性,还能改善一段时间内专家被抽取状况的均衡性。本文介绍了新模型的构建思路和算法步骤,并利用实际数据进行仿真实验,验证了新模型的优势。评标专家均衡随机抽取模型的提出对提高招投标工作的公平性和公正性具有重要的现实意义。     

Competitive subsidization in regional development

This paper uses a game-theoretic bidding model to analyze the process in which regional areas attract new companies by offering subsidies. It is shown that this is not a ‘negative-sum game’, and that companies tend to locate in those regions for which they have the greatest value. A constructive methodology for quantifying the value of the firm to a region including both direct and indirect benefits is developed. A non-cooperative equilibrium bidding strategy is developed for competing regions which expands on some of the behavioral conclusions in Hands and Mann (1987). Dependent value estimates by the regions and the region's attitudes toward risk are shown to influence optimal bidding strategies for new companies.     

On the strictly descending multi-unit auction

We analyze the bidding behavior in a strictly descending multi-unit auction where the price decreases continuously without going back to the initial start price once an object is sold. We prove that any equilibrium in the multi-unit descending auction is inefficient. We derive a symmetric equilibrium for general distribution functions as well as an arbitrary number of bidders and objects. Moreover, equilibrium bidding is characterized by a set of initial value problems. Our analysis thus generalizes previous results in the literature.     

Signaling in Takeover Auctions with Flexible Reserve Price

This paper develops a model of takeover auctions with a two‐step information acquisition process. It shows that the threat of extra information acquisition allows the existence of the signaling jump‐bidding equilibrium even when the seller is able to change its reserve price on the basis of the bidding history. The paper shows that although a higher cost of the secondary information leads to a higher expected price, the precision of the preliminary information has an ambiguous effect on the target's expected profit and that such an effect depends on the number of potential acquirers. Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An experimental study of signaling in auctions with a flexible reserve price

This paper presents the results of an experimental study of preemptive jump bidding in English auctions with a flexible reserve price. While one of the possible explanations for jump bidding is based on signaling arguments, the ability of the seller to adjust his decision to accept an offer based on the bidding history makes the existence of a signaling equilibrium questionable. This paper shows that the seller's ability to set the reserve price after observing the opening bid reduces both jump bidding behavior and the use and interpretation of opening bids as a signaling device.     

建筑工程项目无标底招标行为的经济博弈分析

运用博弈方法对建筑工程项目无标底招标行为展开模型化研究,剖析各投标人的出价策略以及招标人的期望收益,演绎其博弈特性和博弈均衡.在实证中提出建筑工程项目无标底招标行为博弈所需满足的条件,设计可操作的建筑工程项目无标底招标博弈机制,规范建筑行业经营及行政管理部门提供决策支持.     

Existence and description of housing market equilibrium

A rental housing market with finite numbers of non-identical consumers and indivisible housing units, each composed of a vector of attributes, is studied. A partial equilibrium, open city analysis is presented in which all other commodities are perfectly divisible and elastically supplied on national markets. Sufficient conditions for the existence of an equilibrium are rigorously established using a fixed point argument that is based on a bidding arrangement between agents. It is then shown that, although the set of equilibria is not a singleton, all equilibria are similar enough to ensure a strong resemblance between open and closed cities.     

Competitive bidding and proprietary information

We consider the sale of an object by sealed-bid auction, when one bidder has private information and the others have access only to public information. The equilibria of the bidding game are determined, and it is shown that at equilibrium the informed bidder's distribution of bids is the same as the distribution of the maximum of the others' bids. The expected profit of the informed bidder is generally positive, while the other bidders have zero expected profits. The equilibrium bid distributions and the bidders' expected profits are shown to vary continuously in the parameters of the bidding game.     

基于演化博弈的工程投标中的围标行为及对策分析

本文分析了工程招投标市场中的围标行为。应用演化博弈方法构建了工程项目投标过程中招投标双方的效用模型,并分析了招投标策略的动态演化过程及影响策略均衡的决定因素,同时,揭示了其演化稳定策略的特征。最后,给出了工程项目招投标规避围标行为的策略选择及改进措施。     

Defensive sniping and efficiency in simultaneous hard-close proxy auctions

A well-known myopic bidding strategy fails to support an equilibrium of simultaneous ascending proxy auctions for heterogeneous items when a hard-close rule is in place. This is because, in common with the single-auction case, last minute bidding (sniping) is a best response to naive behaviour. However, a modification to the myopic strategy in which all bidders submit an additional bid in the closing stages of the auction–a practice I call ‘defensive sniping’–is shown to yield an efficient, belief-free equilibrium of such environments. This equilibrium is essentially unique within the class of belief-free, efficient equilibria.     

民间标会持续运行的机制分析

民间标会作为中国非正式金融组织的一种重要形式,长期以来饱受“倒会”事件的困扰。本文在仔细考察民间标会组织运行机制的基础上发现,决定民间标会能否持续运行的,是会头与会脚的博弈过程。在此基础上,本文通过博弈模型的建立与求解,得出倒会均衡点,并在此基础上提出相应政策规制建议。     

Wars of attrition and all-pay auctions with stochastic competition

We extend the war of attrition and all-pay auction analysis of Krishna and Morgan (1997) to a stochastic competition setting. We determine the existence of equilibrium bidding strategies and discuss the potential shape of these strategies. Results for the war of attrition contrast with the characterization of the bidding equilibrium strategies in the first-price all-pay auction as well as the winner-pay auctions. Furthermore we investigate the expected revenue comparisons among the war of attrition, the all-pay auction and the winner-pay auctions and discuss the linkage principle as well. Our findings are applicable to future works on contests and charity auctions.     

The set of equilibria of first-price auctions

I specify the class of functions that are equilibria of symmetric first-price auctions. A formula to recover the distribution of valuations for any equilibrium bidding strategy is given.     

基于交易费用理论的土地整治招投标制度分析

招投标作为土地整治交易的重要制度,将引致交易费用,按照制度经济学理论,可以从信息对称性、委托-代理关系、博弈、外部性四个维度对土地整治招投标进行交易费用分析。在土地整治招投标中,存在围标串标失控、投标人失信、代理机构失德、政府部门失位等问题。基于交易费用理论,应当设计信息显示机制,降低信息不对称对土地整治招投标的影响;建立信用长效约束机制,对土地整治招投标参与者实行优胜劣汰;树立公共利益目标约束,增强集体选择力量;强化政府制度建设职能,促进土地整治招投标的市场化和社会化进程。     

Auctions with asymmetric common-values: The first-price format

We study the performance of the first-price format in auctions with asymmetric common-values. We show that, contrary to the result for second-price auctions, a small advantage for one player translates only to small changes in bidders’ strategies, and the equilibrium remains close to the first-price equilibrium of the original game. We characterize the equilibrium bidding strategies and their behavior as the degree of asymmetry increases. Finally, we compare the revenues at the optimal auction, the first-price auction and the second-price auction.     

On the lowest-winning-bid and the highest-losing-bid auctions

Theoretical models of multi-unit, uniform-price auctions assume that the price is given by the highest losing bid. In practice, however, the price is usually given by the lowest winning bid. We derive the equilibrium bidding function of the lowest-winning-bid auction when there are k objects for sale and n bidders with unit demand, and prove that it converges to the bidding function of the highest-losing-bid auction if and only if the number of losers n−k gets large. When the number of losers grows large, the bidding functions converge at a linear rate and the prices in the two auctions converge in probability to the expected value of an object to the marginal winner.     

Efficiency of markets for heterogeneous,indivisible housing

A rental housing market with a finite number of traders is presented. Tenants trade money to landlords for the use of an indivisible, heterogeneous house. Equilibrium is defined as the outcome of a competitive bidding arrangement among agents, the bid rent approach. Using this bidding arrangement, the two fundamental welfare theorems are shown to apply to this market. The second welfare theorem is verified via an algorithm which constructs equilibrium prices for Pareto-efficient allocations.     

Second-Price Auctions with Asymmetric Payoffs: An Experimental Investigation

A series of two-player, second-price common-value auctions are reported. In symmetric auctions, bidders suffer from a winner's curse. In asymmetric auctions in which one bidder has a private value advantage, the effect on bids and prices is proportional rather than explosive (the prediction of Nash equilibrium bidding theory). Although advantaged bidders are close to making best responses to disadvantaged bidders, the latter bid much more aggressively than in equilibrium, thereby earning negative average profits. Experienced bidders consistently bid closer to the Nash equilibrium than inexperienced bidders, although these adjustments towards equilibrium are small and at times uneven.     

Corruption and auctions

We investigate how corruption affects the outcome of a first-price auction (bidding behavior, efficiency and the seller’s expected revenue). The auctioneer approaches the winner to offer the possibility of a reduction in his bid in exchange for a bribe. The bribe can be a percentage of the difference between the winning and the second-highest bid or a fixed amount. We show that there exists a symmetric bidding strategy equilibrium that is monotone, i.e., higher valuation buyers bid higher. Corruption does not affect efficiency but both the auctioneer’s expected bribe and the seller’s expected revenue depend on the format of the bribe payments. We also find the optimal bribe scheme.     

Asymmetry in first‐price auctions with affiliated private values

Collusion and heterogeneity across firms may introduce asymmetry in bidding games. A major difficulty in asymmetric auctions is that the Bayesian Nash equilibrium strategies are solutions of an intractable system of differential equations. We propose a simple method for estimating asymmetric first‐price auctions with affiliated private values. Considering two types of bidders, we show that these differential equations can be rewritten using the observed bid distribution. We establish the identification of the model, characterize its theoretical restrictions, and propose a two‐step non‐parametric estimation procedure for estimating the private value distributions. An empirical analysis of joint bidding in OCS auctions is provided. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.