The propensity of managers to create budgetary slack: A cross-national re-examination using random sampling

Following a review of the slack literature, Merchant (1985a) proposed that the propensity of subordinate managers to create slack is positively related to the importance placed on meeting budget targets, negatively related to the extent of participation allowed in budgeting processes, negatively related to the degree of predictability in the production processes, and negatively related to their superiors' abilities to detect slack. The results of his empirical tests provided little overall support for these hypotheses. The mixed nature of his results is of some concern since the literature provides considerable support for the theoretical framework underlying his propositions. He concluded that his use of non-random sampling may have influenced the results of his study. The objectives of this paper are first to extend Merchant's (1985a) study using the same measures but employing random sampling in a cross-national setting to enhance result generalizability. Second to assess whether the ability of superiors to detect slack interacts with budgetary participation to affect a subordinate manager's propensity to create slack. The results provide support for the cross-national generalizability of all five hypotheses.     

Flattening the organization: the effect of organizational reporting structure on budgeting effectiveness

This study investigates whether increasing a superior’s span of control improves the effectiveness of the budgeting process. We characterize the superior’s utility function as consisting of utilities for norm enforcement and wealth, leading the superior to reject profitable projects believed to contain excessive slack. We develop theory to predict that superiors become more willing to reject projects as their span of control increases. Further, subordinates anticipate superiors’ behavior and reduce slack as span of control increases. Experimental results are consistent with these predictions. As span of control increases, superiors show a greater willingness to reject projects that they believe contain excessive slack, and subordinates submit budgets with less slack. The net result is that superiors earn more profit per subordinate under an expanded span of control. Our study suggests that increasing span of control can improve the effectiveness of the budgeting process, an important component of most firms’ control environments.     

国有企业集团预算管理的特殊问题及对策研究

国有企业集团有不同于一般企业的产权特征、政治特征和作为一种复杂层级组织产生的组织结构特征,由此导致预算管理中存在比一般企业更严重的预算松弛、责权利关系不明确问题,也产生了预算目标的制定受到行政约束、母公司对子公司的预算缺乏实质性的控制等特殊问题.因此,有必要建立和完善预算管理的动力机制,组建集团内部经理人市场,制定既能体现国家政治要求又能对集团战略提供支持的预算目标,实现对子公司预算管理的实质性控制.     

Managing budget emphasis through the explicit design of conditional budgetary slack

Budgetary slack plays an important role in the functioning of budgets in organizations. While theory has found negative as well as positive elements associated with its presence, the empirical literature has interpreted it as being dysfunctional to organizations. In this paper, we present empirical evidence on how a company purposefully budgeted additional financial resources with a motivation intention (Lukka. Budgetary biasing in organizations: Theoretical framework and empirical evidence. Accounting, Organizations and Society 13 (1998) 281–302) to facilitate the managers’ task in achieving the goals of the company. Using quantitative and qualitative data from four logistic sites of a disk drive manufacturer for 24 months, we examine how the company accepted more slack as the demand on business processes increased and goals other than budget targets––in particular, service quality––became harder to achieve. By allowing this practice, headquarters made it clear to local managers that product quality and service were at least as important as meeting budget objectives. We also find that not only was budgetary slack purposefully built during the budgeting process but also in the budgeting system itself through the underlying cost accounting assumptions. The results of this paper provide empirical evidence on the positive aspects of budgetary slack and on the role of cost accounting models used in the budgeting system to facilitate managerial work.     

An investigation of ethical position and budgeting systems: Egyptian managers in US and Egyptian firms

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the possible impact of ethical position and national culture on budgetary systems. In particular, the present study examines the budgeting behaviors of Egyptian managers who work for Egyptian firms and Egyptian managers who work for US firms in Egypt. Based on a survey that was administered to 395 participants, our results suggest higher (lower) levels of budgetary participation for Egyptian managers working in US (Egyptian) firms, higher (lower) levels of incentive for Egyptian managers to create slack in US (Egyptian) firms, and more (less) frequent slack-creation behavior among Egyptian managers employed by US (Egyptian) firms. Significant differences were found in the ethical orientations of Egyptian individuals employed by US firms compared with those employed by Egyptian companies. Our results also suggest that ethical orientation helps mitigate slack-creation behavior.     

THE EFFECT OF EMPHASIS ON TIGHT BUDGET TARGETS AND COST CONTROL ON PRODUCTION AND MARKETING MANAGERS'' PROPENSITY TO CREATE SLACK

Extant literature suggests that target setting must be complemented by cost control. There are, however, strong theoretical reasons to suggest that cost control, whilst meaningful for the manufacturing function, may be less effective for the marketing function. Difficulties in setting standards and tracing marketing results (sales) to marketing effort and the discretionary nature of many marketing costs are likely to reduce the effectiveness of cost control in marketing departments. This study examines firstly, whether cost control moderates the relationships between emphasis on tight budget targets and subordinates' propensity to create slack; and secondly, whether these relationships are found in both the manufacturing and the marketing functions. The results support a significant two-way interaction between emphasis on tight budget targets and cost control affecting propensity to create slack for the manufacturing function, but not for the marketing function. Marketing managers' propensity to create slack was found to be associated only with emphasis on tight budget targets. These results are consistent with the theory that differences in manufacturing and marketing can influence the effectiveness of accounting control systems.     

How Top‐down and Bottom‐up Budgeting Affect Budget Slack and Performance through Social and Economic Exchange

This paper investigates the effects of a top‐down (TD) versus bottom‐up (BU) orientation in different stages of the budgetary target‐setting process on slack and managerial performance. We use social exchange theory to explain the outcomes of these alternative budgetary arrangements, and complement the traditional focus on budgetary participation in target setting with a process‐oriented perspective. We develop hypotheses predicting that TD and BU orientations in the subsequent stages of the budgeting process have different effects on managers’ exchange relationships with the firm, and their behavioural responses. Using survey evidence from German managers across 127 firms we find that a TD orientation in the issuance of guidelines enhances economic exchange and that a BU orientation in the development of the initial budget proposal enhances social exchange, which in turn are associated with reduced slack and higher performance, respectively.     

Slack in participative budgeting: The joint effect of a truth-inducing pay scheme and risk preferences

An incentive problem in participative budgeting occurs when a worker has private information about factors that influence his or her performance and the pay scheme is budget- or standard-based. This information, if communicated accurately by the worker, may be valuable to a manager for planning and control purposes. However, the worker has an incentive to bias its communication such that a relatively easy standard is set, thereby creating slack. To alleviate this problem, analytical research has proposed truth-inducing pay schemes that provide incentives for accurately communicating private information and maximizing performance. A conventional assumption underlying these schemes is worker risk neutrality, despite the wide-spread belief that risk aversion is more typical in organizational settings. This paper reports an experiment demonstrating that, when a (conventional) truth-inducing scheme is introduced, slack decreases for risk-neutral subjects but not for risk-averse subjects.     

Antecedents of participative budgeting

This paper has four purposes. First, it analyzes 47 published studies on participative budgeting. Almost all of these studies focus on the effects of participative budgeting and not on its causal antecedents. Second, to provide insight into these antecedents, we report the results of a survey which identifies reasons why managers participate in setting their budgets. Third, we report how these reasons are associated with four theoretical antecedents—environmental and task uncertainty, task interdependence and superior-subordinate information asymmetry. The results indicate that participative budgeting is most important for planning and control, specifically vertical information sharing and co-ordinating interdependence, and that specific reasons for participative budgeting are correlated with three of the antecedents. Finally, directions for future research on participative budgeting are presented.     

关于绩效预算与零基预算相结合的预算方法体系的思考

零基预算作为一种有效的财政预算编制模式,在许多西方发达国家得到广泛应用.近几年我国也开始试行零基预算,取得了一定成效,但也存在很多不足.本文首先论述了零基预算编制模式以及它在我国实践当中所面临的问题;接着阐述了绩效预算的涵义及其优势;最后指出建立以零基预算与绩效预算相结合的预算方法体系,对零基预算在我国的运行以及发挥财政预算的控制、评估、监督作用具有重要意义.     

Cooperation in the Budgeting Process

In this article I analyze the role of cooperation between firm divisions in the budgeting process. I study a setting in which cooperation is a necessary condition for information sharing among division managers, which in turn benefits the principal. The results in this article can help reconcile the differing views between practitioners and academic researchers on the desirability of cooperation in the budgeting process. The results also have implications for some common budgeting processes observed in practice, including bundling budgeting and bottom‐up budgeting.     

Do organizations adopt sophisticated capital budgeting practices to deal with uncertainty in the investment decision?: A research note

This study examines the impact of uncertainty on the sophistication of capital budgeting practices. While the theoretical applications of sophisticated capital budgeting practices (defined as the use of real option reasoning and/or game theory decision rules) have been well documented, empirical evidence on the factors that affect the importance and use of these sophisticated capital budgeting practices is scarce. I investigate the relation between specific uncertainties and sophisticated capital budgeting practices in 189 Dutch organizations. The empirical results show that sophisticated capital budgeting involves the use of multiple tools and procedures (such as Monte Carlo simulations, certainty equivalents, Game Theory decision rules and Real Option Reasoning). An increase in financial uncertainty is associated with the use and importance of sophisticated capital budgeting practices. Finally, size and industry are also related to the use and importance of sophisticated capital budgeting practices.     

财务冗余、股权集中度与企业产品创新——基于高科技上市公司的实证数据

以2007-2014年我国高科技上市公司为研究样本,基于资源基础论和委托代理理论,实证检验不同类型财务冗余对企业产品创新的作用,并引入股权集中度,研究其如何调节不同类型财务冗余对产品创新的作用。研究发现：可利用财务冗余有利于企业产品创新的推进;而潜在财务冗余却对企业产品创新产生负向影响,即负债率越高,潜在财务冗余越低,企业越倾向于实施产品创新;且股权集中度增强了可利用财务冗余对企业产品创新的促进作用,但也放大了潜在财务冗余产生的负向影响。     

Shared interest and honesty in budget reporting

This study uses two experiments to investigate the honesty of managers’ budget reports when the financial benefit resulting from budgetary slack is shared by the manager and other non-reporting employees. Drawing on moral disengagement theory, we predict that the shared interest in slack creation makes misreporting more self-justifiable to the manager and, therefore, leads to lower honesty. Consistent with our prediction, the results of our first experiment show that managers report less honestly when the benefit of slack is shared than when it is not shared, regardless of whether others are aware of the misreporting. Our second experiment investigates whether the preferences of the beneficiaries of the slack affect managers’ honesty. We predict that managers’ honesty will be improved when the beneficiaries of the slack have a known, higher-order preference for truthful reporting. Consistent with our prediction, the results show that managers report more honestly when other employees have a known preference for honesty than otherwise. The implications of our findings for management accounting research and practice are discussed.     

How and when do firms translate slack into better performance?

Many studies have tested the impact of organizational slack on performance, and yet little is known about how managers make use of slack, and in what circumstances it is most beneficial. We show that the managers of firms with higher levels of slack tend to overinvest, which will have a negative impact on performance, but at the same time they may innovate, which will subsequently have a positive impact. Our results also indicates slack is more beneficial when the firm has many profitable investment opportunities. We show that different types of slack influence performance differently, the total effect of available slack on performance being positive, whereas that of recoverable slack on performance being negative.     

The role of budgeting in eliminating tacit collusion

While accounting textbooks emphasize the roles of budgeting in controlling and coordinating agents' activities, the principal-agent literature has focused primarily on the control aspect. Recent papers have studied the coordination aspect of budgeting in settings in which the agents are technologically dependent (sequential or joint production is considered). In this article, we develop a role for budgeting in coordination, despite the agents being technologically independent (individual production is considered). In our model, the principal uses relative performance evaluation to extract information rents from the agents. However, the use of relative performance evaluation results in a multiple equilibria (tacit collusion) problem. The value of budgeting procedures is derived from their ability to coordinate the agents to arrive at the right equilibrium.     

中国公共预算改革的目标选择:近期目标与远期目标

本文运用凯顿的预算模式理论研究了中国公共预算改革的目标选择主要结论是,中国现阶段仍然应该以建立一种"控制取向"的现代公共预算体制为目标,中国预算改革的当务之急是将政治控制与行政控制纳入预算过程.最后,虽然新绩效预算是一种非常理想的预算模式,但是,中国目前并不具备实行的条件.即使对于实行新绩效预算来说,先实行一种"控制取向"的预算体制也是有帮助的.     

Beyond budgeting or budgeting reconsidered? A survey of North-American budgeting practice

Budgets have historically played a key role in management control; however, recently they have become the subject of considerable criticism and debate. Some argue that the problems with budgeting stem from the way budgets are used (Horngren et al., 2004) while others argue that budgeting processes are fundamentally flawed (Hope and Fraser, 2003a). Hansen et al. (2003), among others, have called for a systematic examination of these issues against empirical evidence. In this paper, we present the results of two surveys of mid- to large-sized North-American organizations to 1) update the literature on North-American budgeting practices, 2) collect empirical evidence to assess the criticisms, and 3) begin to identify strong tendencies or patterns in budgeting practice to inform future academic research. Overall, we find for the majority of firms that budgets continue to be used for control purposes and are perceived to be value-added. While problems exist with budgets, organizations are adapting their use to account for these problems rather than abandoning budgets altogether.     

Influences on departmental budgeting: an empirical examination of a contingency model

This paper reports the results of a study designed to test whether or not differences in approaches to budgeting at the departmental level are systematically related to differences in production technologies, market factors and organizational characteristics. The results suggest that budgeting is related to departmental size, functional differentiation and degree of automation of production processes, but not the products' stage in the product life cycle or the company's strength of market position.     

Action and reaction: Decisive factors in developing accounting practice

The article describes the development and introduction of a system for budgeting in a middle-sized Swedish city. The budgeting system is described and the interaction between policy-making and budgeting is discussed. Based on observations of the design process and the subsequent use of the budgeting system, conclusions are presented. Particular attention is paid to the method used in the design process — action and reaction.