Leverage and debt maturity choices by undiversified owner-managers

We examine the financing choices of undiversified owner-managers in a continuous-time model. Managers' financing choices as well as their dynamic equity stakes, which trade off their private benefits and the costs they incur due to their lack of diversification, are simultaneously and endogenously determined. Our analysis leads to the novel, empirically testable implications that leverage increases with the drift or expected growth rate of the firm's earnings. Debt maturity varies non-monotonically in a U-shaped manner with the project's drift and with its volatility. The predicted variations of leverage and debt maturity with the actual drift of earnings (controlling for the risk-neutral drift) are key implications of our theory that arise from the incorporation of agency conflicts between undiversified managers and well-diversified outside investors. They cannot, therefore, be obtained in traditional capital structure models in which all agents are well-diversified. Our predictions for the variation of leverage and debt maturity with project characteristics potentially reconcile empirical findings that are not consistent with previous theories. We also derive additional novel implications that link manager-specific characteristics - the discount rate or “degree of myopia” and the risk aversion - to leverage and debt maturity. These implications provide support for growing empirical evidence of the significant impact of manager characteristics and manager “fixed effects” on corporate financial policies.     

Performance pricing in bank debt contracts

Performance pricing links bank debt interest rate spreads to a borrower's performance via two options. Interest-decreasing performance pricing reduces spreads if credit quality improves. It is more common when prepayment is more likely or costly and when adverse selection costs are higher, and is less common when multiple performance measures better predict credit quality. Interest-increasing performance pricing increases spreads if credit quality deteriorates. It is more common when lenders reduce interest rates to add this provision, when downgrades are more likely, and when moral hazard costs are higher. We find lower spreads for contracts with interest increasing performance pricing.     

Leverage change,debt overhang,and stock prices

We document a significant and negative effect of the change in a firm's leverage ratio on its stock prices. We find that the negative effect is stronger for firms that have higher leverage ratios, higher likelihood of default, and face more severe financial constraints. Moreover, firms with an increase in leverage ratio tend to have less future investment. These findings are consistent with Myers' (1977) debt overhang theory that an increase in leverage may lead to future underinvestment, thus reducing a firm's value.     

Leverage, options liabilities, and corporate bond pricing

The two major problems with typical structural models are the failure to attain a positive credit spread in the very short term, and overestimation of the overall level of the credit spread. We recognize the presence of option liabilities in a firm’s capital structure and the effect they have on the firm’s credit spread. Including option liabilities and employing a regime switching interest rate process to capture the business cycle resolves the above-mentioned drawbacks in explaining credit spreads. We find that the credit spread overestimation problem in one of the structural models, Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (J Finan 56:1929–1957, 2001), can be resolved by combining option liabilities and the regime-switching interest rate process when dealing with an investment grade bond, whereas with junk bonds, only the regime-switching interest rate process is needed. We also examine vulnerable option values, debt values, and zero-coupon bond values with different model settings and leverage ratios.      

Determinants of financial covenants and pricing of debt in private debt contracts: the UK evidence

This paper presents details of financial covenants given by a sample drawn from the largest 200 non-financial quoted firms in the UK in private debt contracts and analyses these data to see whether there are relationships between the nature of the covenants given and firm characteristics. Data were obtained from 72 firms, of which 17 gave no financial covenants. Firm size was found to be the only significant factor influencing whether firms did or did not give covenants as well as the only factor which influenced the margin given on debt. Some types of covenants given were found to be different from those found in previous research. In particular, there is greater use of EBITDA as a base for both interest cover and gearing covenants. This shows the importance of cash flow based lending as opposed to asset based lending for general financing for large firms.     

The importance of IRS monitoring to debt pricing in private firms

We examine the link between Internal Revenue Service (IRS) monitoring and yield spreads on private firms’ 144A bond issues. After controlling for security-specific and other firm-specific determinants, we provide evidence that debt financing is cheaper when the probability of a face-to-face IRS audit is higher. Consistent with another prediction, we find that IRS oversight has a stronger impact on bond pricing for private firms with high ownership concentration, which suffer worse agency problems between controlling shareholders and outside investors. Collectively, our research implies that IRS monitoring plays a valuable corporate governance role by reducing information asymmetry evident in borrowing costs.     

Belief updating, debt pricing and financial decisions under asymmetric information

This paper studies debt holders’ belief updating, valuation of corporate debt, and equity owners’ financing decisions during financial distress under asymmetric information. This is done within a continuous-time framework, where the relevant state variable is assumed to follow an Arithmetic Brownian motion (ABM). ABM can take negative values and has very realistic feature compared with Geometric Brownian motion (GBM). Using Chapter 11 of U.S. Bankruptcy Code as a costly screening device, we can characterize which firm will choose private workouts (in the form of strategic debt service) and which will choose to file for the Chapter 11 Bankruptcy procedure (in the form of debt-equity swap) when the firm is in financial distress. Using arguments similar to equilibrium refinements, we give a clear picture of how debt holders’ beliefs about the firm’s types are updated according to the state variable and the firm’s default behavior, and describe optimal strategies of both parties under those beliefs. We also provide an approximate solution to the debt pricing problem under asymmetric information.     

Bankruptcy,absolute priority,and the pricing of risky debt claims

In practice, there are substantial deviations from the doctrine of ‘absolute priority’, which governs the rights of the firm's claimholders in the event of bankruptcy. To determine whether or not the possibility of such deviations is reflected in the prices of the firm's securities, this study examines the risk and return characteristics of financial claims against firms in court-supervised bankruptcy proceedings. Debt claims against bankrupt firms are indeed ‘risky’, exhibiting levels of systematic risk similar to that of common stocks in general. While some of the findings are anomalous, the data are generally consistent with the view that the capital market ‘properly’ prices risky debt claims to reflect both their risk characteristics and the possibility of departures from the doctrine of absolute priority.     

Managerial ability,information quality,and the design and pricing of corporate debt

We examine if managerial ability affects the efficiency of the contracting environment with lenders. We find that higher ability alters the balance of information-sensitive covenants demanded by outside investors, increases the issuance of bonds with longer maturity, and decreases the issuance of senior secured debt. We also document higher ability reduces the risk premium demanded by investors on information-sensitive debt. These results are collectively consistent with the premise that the mitigation of information risk is an important dimension of managerial ability that has a direct bearing on the structure and pricing of corporate debt.     

LBOs,Reversions and Implicit Contracts

The conventional view of going-private transactions is that they are designed to enhance the efficiency of the firm (for example, Jensen (1986) ). A starkly different view is that these and other control transactions are motivated to effect transfers from other stakeholders in the firm to equity holders ( Shleifer and Summers (1988) ). This study exploits data describing pension terminations as a way to test these theories. We conclude that the efficiency theory can plausibly explain a substantial number of LBO-related terminations, but not enough to undermine the transfer theory. More specific predictions from the efflciency theory are needed to structure more exacting tests.     

A jump-diffusion model for pricing corporate debt securities in a complex capital structure

This paper proposes a jump-diffusion model, in closed form, to price corporate debt securities, senior and junior, with the same maturity and violation of the absolute priority rule. We take the structural approach that the firm's asset value follows a jump-diffusion process in a stochastic interest rate economy. Default occurs only if the firm value at the maturity of the corporate debts is less than the sum of the prespecified face values. Unlike previous models in the structural approach, our model is consistent with the current term structures of credit spreads for both senior and junior debts. In particular, it captures realistic short maturity credit spreads observed in the market. The key idea is to allow the jump intensity to be a time-dependent function. As an application, valuation of credit spread options is presented.     

Active Investors, LBOs, and the Privatization of Bankruptcy

In this testimony to the House Ways and Means Committee on February 1, 1989 (when LBOs and other highly leveraged transactions were under fierce attack by politicians and the media), the author identified “LBO associations” such as KKR and Forstmann Little as a valuable innovation in organizational form—a new model of management and governance that was competing directly with the headquarters of large public corporations, especially conglomerates. In the author's words, LBOs “substitute incentives provided by compensation and ownership plans for the direct monitoring and often centralized decision-making in the typical corporate bureaucracy.” In illustrating his point, the author noted that whereas the CEOs of U.S. companies during the '70s and '80s saw their personal wealth go up by only about $3 for every $1,000 increase in firm value, the average CEO in an LBO experienced a change of $64 per $1,000—and for the partners of the LBO firm, the closest equivalent to a conglomerate CEO, the change was about $200 per $1,000. Based on the performance of the first wave of LBOs to return to public ownership, such dramatic concentrations of equity ownership appear to have produced large gains in operating efficiency. (And since the author's testimony, these findings have been confirmed by subsequent studies of later periods and in other countries.) The heavy debt loads in these transactions, besides making possible the concentration of equity ownership, also perform an important control function, intensifying the search for efficiencies and discouraging reinvestment in low-return projects. For those LBOs that have trouble servicing their debt loads, the author argues that the costs of insolvency should turn out to be significantly lower than for traditional public companies because LBOs provide strong incentives to keep the process of reorganizing troubled companies out of the bankruptcy court (a prediction that, although proving wrong in the early‘90s, has turned out to be true of the most recent wave of private equity deals).     

Basic debt literacy and debt behavior

Using unique survey data from 1001 individuals representative of the French population, we document that less than half of the sample (47%) can provide correct answers to two basic questions addressing the functioning of debt interests. This proportion is higher among credit users, but the improvement emerges mainly from mortgagors (55%) and much less from consumer credit users (51%). Furthermore, among consumer credit users, the portion of respondents giving at least one erroneous answer (i.e. neither correct nor “don't know”) is above one third and significantly higher than in the rest of the population (35% vs. 30%). Next, with regressions, controlling for a wide array of socio-demographic variables and potential confounding factors like present-biased preferences or saving-oriented literacy, we show that incorrect answers to debt literacy questions predict a greater propensity to use consumer debt and to use it in a more expensive way (i.e. choosing lower settlements). Lastly, we find that respondents who answer debt literacy questions incorrectly are not more likely to report intention to take financial education training or to seek financial advice from a bank advisor, even when such respondents also present a high propensity to use debt or to use it in an expensive way.     

Efficiency and Organizational Structure: A Study of Reverse LBOs

This paper is a report on 72 firms which went public since 1983 but previously underwent a full or divisional LBO. Accounting measures of performance reveal significant improvements in profitability which resulted mainly from these firms' ability to reduce costs. Firms experience dramatic increases in leverage at the LBO, but the leverage ratios are gradually reduced. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that the change in the governance structure of these firms towards more concentrated residual claims created a new organizational structure which is more efficient than its predecessor.     

A comparison of Merton's option pricing model of corporate debt valuation to the use of book values

Many studies use the book value of debt as a proxy for its market value because most corporate debt does not trade. I call this practice the book value of debt (BVD) approximation, and it appears to be justified by the observation that the average market value of debt is close to its book value. Many corporate bonds, however, trade at values significantly different from their book values, and consequently the BVD approximation can create important biases. I compare the accuracy of the BVD approximation to Merton's option pricing (OPT) model of corporate debt valuation, and find consistent evidence that the Merton model provides more accurate estimates. I also show that this model is an easily estimated alternative to the BVD approximation. In short, the BVD approximation not only creates significant biases, but it is also an unnecessary simplification.     

Leverage and acquisition performance

From an agency perspective, leverage may have a positive effect on firm performance by limiting managers’ ability to allocate resources to unproductive uses, as well as increasing pressure on them to perform well. Consequently, we might expect leverage to have a positive impact on acquisition performance. However, the increased risks associated with higher leverage, combined with the other risks inherent in an acquisition, could also cause managers to take actions to reduce risk even if doing so is contrary to value maximization. High debt levels might also limit managerial discretion over how resources are allocated during the acquisition process, which can have a negative impact on performance. We investigate the effect of leverage on post-acquisition stock performance and find that post-acquisition performance is decreasing in leverage brought by the target firm and in additional leverage taken on to execute the acquisition. This negative performance is clustered among acquirers who are already financially constrained. Our results are robust to various returns measurement methodologies and to the inclusion of several controls known to predict future returns. Our results also represent viable investment strategies, and suggest that the market underestimates difficulties that arise from acquisition-related increases in leverage.     

Trader Leverage and Liquidity

Does trader leverage drive equity market liquidity? We use the unique features of the margin trading system in India to identify a causal relationship between traders’ ability to borrow and a stock's market liquidity. To quantify the impact of trader leverage, we employ a regression discontinuity design that exploits threshold rules that determine a stock's margin trading eligibility. We find that liquidity is higher when stocks become eligible for margin trading and that this liquidity enhancement is driven by margin traders’ contrarian strategies. Consistent with downward liquidity spirals due to deleveraging, we also find that this effect reverses during crises.     

Leverage and Mortgage Foreclosures

In this paper, we deduce the default and prepayment characteristics of mortgages by examining the actual behaviors of a large set of conforming fixed rate mortgages tracked over time. Employing reduced form pricing techniques, we are then able to fully value such mortgages, and so determine the cost as well as the probability of default for any particular mortgage. The analysis reveals the levels of foreclosures that can be expected when loans are leveraged at the high loan–to–value ratios characteristic of recent years.     

杠杆化与系统性风险的监管反思

企业、居民、金融机构和中央银行的经济行为改变着自身的资产负债情况,主动或被动地影响着彼此的杠杆程度。金融体系过度杠杆具有增加脆弱性、放大复杂性、顺周期等特点,直接引致系统性风险增加。与此同时,由于企业、居民、金融机构和中央银行的资产负债表相互关联,金融体系杠杆程度加深,意味着与之相联的经济部门关联度扩大,内在依赖性增强,从而进一步放大系统性风险。危机爆发后,为帮助降低金融机构杠杆程度,美联储运用多种创新工具,快速膨胀了自身资产负债规模,前所未有地增加了自身杠杆程度,形成新的系统性风险隐患。有鉴于此,我们应协调宏观经济政策和宏观审慎监管政策,引导虚拟经济与实体经济相互平衡,确保各经济部门负债和杠杆水平维持在健康、合理的区间。     

Leverage and investment in diversified firms

Within diversified firms, the negative impact of leverage on investment is significantly greater for high q than for low q segments and significantly greater for non-core than for core segments. This differs substantially from focused firms and is consistent with the view that diversified firms allocate a disproportionate share of their debt service burden to their higher q and non-core segments. We also find that, among low-growth firms, the positive relation between leverage and firm value is significantly weaker in diversified firms than in focused firms. We conclude that the disciplinary benefits of debt are partially offset by the additional managerial discretion in allocating debt service that is provided by the diversified organizational structure.