RETAIL PRICE REGULATION AND THE OPTION TO DELAY

ABSTRACT ** :  This paper examines a two-period model of an investment decision in a network industry characterized by demand uncertainty, economies of scale and sunk costs. In the absence of regulation we identify the market conditions under which a monopolist decides to invest early as well as the underlying overall welfare output. In a regulated environment, we consider a monopolist who faces no downstream (final good) competition but is subject to retail price regulation. We identify the welfare-maximizing regulated prices when the unregulated market outcome is set as the benchmark. We show that if the regulator can commit to ex post regulation – that is, regulated prices that are contingent to future demand realization – then regulated prices that allow the firm to recover its total costs of production are welfare-maximizing. Thus, under ex post price regulation there is no need to compensate the regulated firm for the option to delay that it foregoes when investing today. We argue, however, that regulators cannot make this type of commitment and, therefore, price regulation is often ex ante – that is, regulated prices are not contingent to future demand. We show that the optimal ex ante regulation, and the extent to which regulated prices need to incorporate an option to delay, depend on the nature of demand uncertainty.     

Pricing access in network competition

We compare various access pricing rules in the two-way access model. We show that the Generalized Efficient Component Pricing Rule (TECPR) leads to a lower equilibrium price than does the Efficient Component Pricing Rule, (ECPR) marginal cost pricing, (MCP) and any non-negative fixed access charges.      

Optimal Pricing and Price-Cap Regulation in the Postal Sector

This paper studies the optimal price structure in the postal sector when worksharing is available (e.g., for collection, sorting and transportation) and when the operator faces a break-even constraint. Users differ in opportunity and cost to engage in worksharing. We determine the optimal worksharing discount and provide sufficient conditions (on demand functions) under which it exceeds the ECPR level. Furthermore, we show that the optimal prices can be implemented through a global price cap imposed on a weighted average of the prices of all products. The appropriate weights are proportional to the market demand (evaluated at optimal prices) of the corresponding products.     

Technology investment and alternative regulatory regimes with demand uncertainty

A vertically integrated incumbent and an OLO (Other Licensed Operator) compete in the market for broadband access. The incumbent has the option to invest in building a Next Generation Network that covers all urban areas with similar demand structures. The investment return in terms of demand increase is uncertain. We compare the impact of different access regulation regimes – full regulation, partial regulation (only the copper network is regulated), risk sharing – on investment incentives and social welfare. We find that, when the alternative for the OLO is using the copper network rather than leaving the market entirely, exclusion of the OLO does not necessarily happen in equilibrium even when the incumbent is better in offering value-added services. Risk sharing emerges as the most preferable regime both from a consumer and a social welfare perspective for a large range of parameters.     

Capacity-based versus time-based access charges in telecommunications

The Spanish telecommunications regulator recently introduced a capacity-based access system. Under this regulation, entrants pay a flat charge for the interconnection circuits leased to the incumbent operator and are able to freely use these circuits to provide telecommunications services. This paper determines the optimal capacity-based access charge in the presence of time varying demand and capacity constraints and compares this regulation with the traditional time of use access system. The analysis shows that either type of regulation allows the incumbent to recover its fixed costs and can promote the same pattern of entry. Finally, the optimal capacity-based access charge when the entrant has market power is derived.      

Price competition in the market for business telecommunications services

We estimate a two-step control-function model that relates incumbent prices for small-business telecommunications services to the number of facilities-based entrants, cost, demand, regulatory conditions, and a correction for endogenous market structure. Results show that the price effects from entry are understated in ordinary least squares regressions. When controlling for endogeneity, prices are negatively related to the number of entrants, indicating that markets without a competitive presence could exhibit market power. These findings should prove helpful to the Federal Communications Commission and other State regulators determining the conditions under which price and other forms of regulation may be relaxed.     

Regulation and Access Pricing: Comparison of Regulated Regimes

The statutory duties of regulators of British utilities include both the encouragement of competition and protection of consumers (through price caps). Competition depends on the terms on which new entrants can gain access to the monopolist's network. Where the incumbent in the retail market also owns the network, the regulator may determine prices in the capped and access markets separately or may make the price cap explicitly dependent on entry in the uncapped market. Contrary to the received wisdom that access charges should be separately regulated we show that higher welfare can be obtained in some circumstances by allowing the incumbent to determine access charges. This is achieved by permitting the incumbent to choose from a menu of retail prices which the regulator makes conditional on the extent of entry in the retail market.     

The value of information in monotone decision problems

We study the information preferences and information demand of decision-makers facing uncertainty. We focus on monotone decision problems in which the posterior beliefs induced by the decision-maker’s information can be ordered so that higher actions are chosen in response to higher signal realizations. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for decision makers with different classes of payoff functions to prefer one information structure to another. We also provide conditions under which two decision-makers in a given class can be ranked in terms of their information demand. Applications and examples are given.     

An Efficient Avoided Cost Pricing Rule for Resale of Local Exchange Telephone Services

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 requires incumbent local exchange telephone companies to make their retail telecommunications services available to resellers at a discount that reflects the costs that will be avoided by providing the services at wholesale rather than at retail. In this article, we develop a pricing methodology to apply to such wholesale services. The methodology, which we label the Avoided Cost Pricing Rule, is designed to generate an economically efficient discount that may be applied to the incumbent local exchange carriers' services that are offered to resellers.     

Asymmetric access price regulation in telecommunications markets

In liberalized telecommunications markets, the incumbent typically enjoys several advantages over any entrant. Regulation in such asymmetric markets stimulates competition in the short and the long term if retail prices are low and the entrant's profits are high so that entry is encouraged. I show that asymmetric access price regulation with a cost-based access price for the incumbent and an access markup for the entrant is more successful than cost-based access price regulation applied to incumbent and entrant. This is a robust prediction with respect to the pricing strategies considered. Such asymmetric access price regulation is in accordance with European legislation.     

Optimal access pricing with interconnection obligation

In view of the recent regulatory trend that the incumbent is mandated to provide its own bottleneck facilities to entrants when requested, it is more reasonable to take an entrant than the incumbent as the one who plays a leader role. Given this regulatory framework, the present paper examines under what conditions the ECPR or marginal cost pricing is socially optimal.     

On the look-out for a white knight: options-based calculation of probability and expected value of increased bids in hostile takeover battles

Takeover bids provide an option right to the target's shareholders; they guarantee the offered price but maintain the chance of higher offers. Using Option Pricing Theory (OPT) we estimate the probability and expected value of higher bids from target stock prices.     

Access charges under two-tier pricing

This article analyzes the regulation of access charges in a liberalized postal market where operators use two-tier pricing. It develops a model of vertical product differentiation that allows determination of the demand for First and Second Class mail from an incumbent postal operator and a group of entrants. The optimal access charges for First and Second Class letters are determined as well as the optimal quality for these services.      

质疑食品价格管制 ——兼论政府管制职能定位

由于信息严重不对称,食品安全市场存在不同程度失灵。消费者对食品安全的需求是通过对食品安全的支付意愿向企业传递信号的,并以此激励企业提高食品安全水平。部分食品价格上涨是消费者增加食品安全需求的反应。借助案例研究发现,政府对食品价格管制将增加市场的不确定性,食品价格管制与食品安全管制目标间存在冲突。食品安全危机重重,政府应慎用价格管制。在经济转型过程中政府应明确管制职能定位,放松食品价格管制,切实有效地加强食品安全管制。     

Profit sharing under the threat of nationalization

A multinational corporation engages in foreign direct investment for the extraction of a natural resource in a developing country. The corporation bears the initial investment and earns as a return a share of the profits. The host country provides access and guarantees conditions of operation. Since the investment is totally sunk, the corporation must account in its plan not only for uncertainty in market conditions but also for the threat of nationalization. In a real options framework, where the government holds an American call option on nationalization, we show under which conditions a Nash bargaining leads to a profit distribution maximizing the joint venture surplus. We find that the threat of nationalization does not affect the investment threshold but only the Nash bargaining solution set. Finally, we show that the optimal sharing rule results from the way the two parties may differently trade off rents with option values.     

Committing and reneging: A dynamic model of policy regimes

Actual policy decisions are made in real time and are not irrevocable, but most policy modeling has largely neglected these mundane factors. In an environment of uncertainty, the ability to switch policies adds an option value to the choice problem. This “option to wait” makes the incumbent regime relatively more attractive (compared to the traditional once-and-for-all analysis), as does increased uncertainty, which increases the value of the option. Furthermore, because the commitment decision takes place in real time, policy choice displays hysteresis.     

Internal rationality, imperfect market knowledge and asset prices

We present a decision theoretic framework in which agents are learning about market behavior and that provides microfoundations for models of adaptive learning. Agents are ‘internally rational’, i.e., maximize discounted expected utility under uncertainty given dynamically consistent subjective beliefs about the future, but agents may not be ‘externally rational’, i.e., may not know the true stochastic process for payoff relevant variables beyond their control. This includes future market outcomes and fundamentals. We apply this approach to a simple asset pricing model and show that the equilibrium stock price is then determined by investors? expectations of the price and dividend in the next period, rather than by expectations of the discounted sum of dividends. As a result, learning about price behavior affects market outcomes, while learning about the discounted sum of dividends is irrelevant for equilibrium prices. Stock prices equal the discounted sum of dividends only after making very strong assumptions about agents? market knowledge.     

Response of industrial customers to hourly pricing in Ontario’s deregulated electricity market

This paper uses hourly data from Ontario (Canada) between 2005 and 2008 to estimate the effects of real time wholesale electricity prices on demand by industrial customers. Nonlinear SUR estimates from Generalized Leontief (GL) specifications reveal elasticities of substitution from 0.02 to 0.07, confirming that industrial customers (connected to the transmission grid) shift consumption across peak and off-peak periods in order to reap benefits of lower prices. Estimates from FGLS and IV models suggest that this reduction in demand by industrial customers results in lower wholesale prices, which benefits all consumers. The policy lesson is that market based schemes that encourage Real Time Pricing (RTP) pricing should result in positive spillovers to all consumers.     

Competition with asymmetric regulation of mobile termination charges

The aim of this paper is to explore the effectiveness of asymmetric regulation, which allows a new mobile network operator to set higher termination rates than the incumbent operator. We assume that there are two market segments: one in which operators compete on equal terms, with a new technology, and the other in which the entrant is at a disadvantage since the technology it offers is inferior to the incumbent??s. Results show that asymmetric regulation can create favorable conditions that allow the entrant to strengthen its market positioning, and enhance consumer net utilities and social welfare. This highlights the importance of the degree of network asymmetry and the ways in which consumers are split between the two market segments. Lastly, we show that asymmetric regulation can create greater investment incentives for the entrant which could effectively enhance social welfare. These findings can provide useful insights for regulatory policy.     

Feedback effects between credit ratings and financial markets

Credit rating agencies often make sharp adjustments in their pronouncements during times of stress in financial markets. These adjustments typically happen with a delay relative to shocks in market prices. Since prices convey information about what market participants are doing and thinking, it is likely that rating agencies take into account market prices when issuing their pronouncements.In order to understand the relationship between credit ratings and financial prices, we develop a model of debt roll-over in which rating agencies incorporate information publicly available in financial markets. We find that (1) rating agencies respond to market prices, i.e. nonfundamental price volatility can shift financing conditions from a low risk spread and high credit rating equilibrium to an equilibrium with high spread and low rating, and (2) rating agencies can anchor expectations about the equilibrium in financial markets, thus serving as an antidote to nonfundamental price volatility.