Entrepreneurial visions in founding teams: Conceptualization,emergence, and effects on opportunity development

Prior research on entrepreneurial visions has typically taken a leadership perspective and explored how the founders’ future images of their ventures motivate themselves and followers. Drawing on an upper echelon perspective and longitudinal case studies of eight founding teams, this study finds that founders’ entrepreneurial visions do not only capture the future images of their ventures, but also the future images of the founders’ relationship with it. Taking into account this personal aspect of visions, we show that within a founding team, the members’ visions can be incongruent, i.e., they cannot be realized simultaneously within the current venture. While our data reveal that vision incongruence tends to occurs when all team members perceive to have an equal status, vision congruence emerges when the attributed status in the team is heterogeneous. Founding teams with more congruent visions tend to follow a focused opportunity development path, while those with less congruent visions tend to follow a comprehensive opportunity development path. Depending on the teams’ behaviors in the face of challenging situations either path can lead to successful opportunity commercialization or failure. We discuss the implications of these findings for the literatures on entrepreneurial visions, opportunities, and upper echelons.     

Human capital theory and venture capital firms: exploring “home runs” and “strike outs”

Using a human capital perspective, we investigated the relationship between the education and experience of the top management teams of venture capital firms (VCFs) and the firms' performance. We found that although general human capital had a positive association with the proportion of portfolio companies that went public [initial public offering (IPO)], specific human capital did not. However, we did find that specific human capital was negatively associated with the proportion of portfolio companies that went bankrupt. Interestingly, some findings were contrary to expectations from a human capital perspective, specifically the relationship between general human capital and the proportion of portfolio companies that went bankrupt. Future research is suggested.     

The role of top management team human capital in venture capital markets: Evidence from first-time funds

This paper examines whether the human capital of first-time venture capital fund management teams can predict fund performance and finds that it can. I find that fund management teams with more task-specific human capital, as measured by more managers having past experience as venture capitalists and by more managers having past experience as executives at start-up companies, manage funds with greater fractions of portfolio company exits. I also find that fund management teams with more industry-specific human capital in strategy and management consulting and, to a lesser extent, engineering and non-venture finance manage funds with greater fractions of portfolio company exits. Perhaps counter-intuitively, I find that fund management teams that have more general human capital in business administration, as measured by more managers having MBAs, manage funds with lower fractions of portfolio company exits. Overall, measures of task- and industry-specific human capital are stronger predictors of fund performance than are measures of general human capital.     

Does negative feedback impact new ventures' organizational identity? The role of founding teams' human capital and feedback source

Although a strong organizational identity (OI) is important for venture success, the impact of negative feedback on a new venture's OI is poorly understood. Drawing on human capital theory we argue that founding teams with more founding and industry experience can more effectively defend OI after negative feedback. Using literature on intra-group bias we further theorize that these benefits of founding and industry experience are more pronounced when feedback emerges from sources external rather than internal to the venture. A multi-period research design and data on 1528 survey responses from 598 members of 81 ventures support our model.     

The CEO,venture capitalists,and the board

An element in the never-ending debate about the process of funding highpotential businesses is the extent to which venture capitalists add value besides money to their portfolio companies. At one end of the spectrum, venture capitalists incubate start-ups and nurture hatchlings, while at the other extreme, so-called “vulture” capitalists feed on fledgling companies. A very important way in which venture capitalists add value other than money to their portfolio companies is by serving on boards of directors. Hence, by studying the role of outside directors, especially those representing venture capital firms, we were able to shed light on the issue of value-added.In the first phase of the research, we studied 162 venture-capital-backed high-tech firms located in California, Massachusetts, and Texas. In the second phase (with data from 98 of the 162 firms), the lead venture capitalists on the boards were classified according to whether or not they were a “top-20” firm.Board Size The average board size was 5.6 members, which was somewhat less than half the size of the board of a typical large company. Board size increased from 3 to 4.8 members with the first investment of venture capital.Board Composition and Control The typical board comprised 1.7 inside members, 2.3 venture capital principals, .3 venture capital staff, and 1.3 other outsiders. Insiders constituted 40% or less of the members of 82% of the boards, while venture capitalists made up over 40% of members of 55% of the boards. When a top-20 venture capital firm was the lead investor, then 55% of the board members were venture capitalists; in contrast, when the lead was not a top-20 firm, only 23% of board were venture capitalists.Value-Added Overall, our sample of CEOs did not rate the value of the advice of venture capitalists any higher than that of other board members. However, those CEOs with a top20 venture capital firm as the lead investor, on average, did rate the value of the advice from their venture capital board members significantly higher—but not outstandingly higher—than the advice from other outside board members. On the other hand, CEOs with no top-20 as the lead investor found no significant difference between the value of the advice from venture capitalists and other outside board members. Hence, in our sample, we could not say that there was a noticeable difference in the value of valueadded by top-20 boards and non-top-20 boards.The areas where CEOs rated outside board members (both venture capitalists and others) most helpful were as a sounding board, interfacing with the investor group, monitoring operating performance, monitoring financial performance, recruiting/replacing the CEO, and assistance with short term crisis. That help was rated higher for early-stage than later-stage companies.Our findings have the following implications for venture capitalists, entrepreneurs, and researchers.Venture Capitalist The main product of a venture capital firm is money, which is a commodity. It's impossible to differentiate a commodity in a martetplace where the customers have perfect information. As venture capitalists learned since the mid-1980s, their customers (entrepreneurs) now have an abundance of information that, while it may not be perfect, is certainly good enough to make a well-informed decision when selecting a venture capital firm. Hence, value-added may be the most important distinctive competence with which a venture capital firm—especially one specializing in early-stage investments—can differentiate itself from its competitors. If that is the case, then venture capital firms need to pay more attention to their value-added, because CEOs, overall, do not perceive that it has a great deal of value to their companies. The top-20 appear to be doing a somewhat better job in that area than other venture capital firms.Entrepreneurs If an entrepreneur wants outside board members who bring valueadded other than money, it appears that they can do as well with non-venture capitalists as with venture capitalists. The entrepreneurs we talked to in our survey gave the impression that board members with significant operating experience are more valued than “pure” financial types with no operating experience. If venture capital is an entrepreneur's only source offunding, then the entrepreneur should seek out firms that put venture capitalists with operating experience on boards. It also appears that an entrepreneur, will, on average, get more value-added when the lead investor is a top-20 firm, but there is a drawback: when a top-20 is the lead investor, it is more likely that venture capitalists will control the board. No entrepreneur should seek venture capital solely to get value-added from a venture capitalist on the board, because outside board members who are not venture capitalists give advice that is every bit as good as that given by venture capitalists.Researchers Value-added is a fruitful avenue of research. From a practical perspective, if valueadded exists it should be measurable. So far the jury has not decided that issue. Some finance studies of the performance of venture-capital-backed initial public offerings (IPOs) claim to have found valueadded, some claim to have found none, and at least one study claims to have found negative value- added. From a theoretical perspective, value-added is relevant to agency theory, transaction cost economics, and the capital asset pricing model. It also is relevant to strategic analysis from the viewpoint of distinctive competencies.     

Emerging strategies in the venture capital industry

This article reports a study of the future direction of the venture capital industry by examining the basic strategies and strategic assumptions of a broad sample of venture capital firms. There are three main sets of results:First, the once homogeneous venture capital industry is rapidly dividing into several different “strategic groups.” Members of these “groups” are increasingly distinguishing themselves from other groups on four basic dimensions followed by member firms: 1. Financial Resources—Equity capital comes from a greater variety of sources (five major sources) resulting in fundamentally different demands on the mission of the receiving venture capital firm. 2. Staff Resources—The way venture capital firms use staff resources, particularly regarding investee management assistance, is becoming increasingly varied across different groups. Some firms provide fewer than 2-days per year, while others provide up to 450 man-days per year per client. 3. Venture Stages—While the overall industry retains a primary interest in stage 1,2, and 3 investment, specific firms vary considerably in the distribution of investment emphasis across these three stages. 4. Use of Financial Resources-Firms in the industry are becoming increasingly differentiated in the size of minimum investments they make ($100 M to $1000 M) and in their role as a direct investor versus a “broker” for institutional funds. Practicing venture capitalists should make use of this first set of findings in two ways. First, they may find it useful to compare their firm's orientation along these four strategic dimensions with those of the firm's that comprised this study. Second, they may seek to use these four strategic dimensions as a basis on which they might examine, clarify, and/or redefine the marketing strategy pursued by their firm.A second set of results identified three goals and priorities of venture capital firms that have neither changed over time nor across increasingly different strategic groups. Annualized, after-tax return on investments of between 25% and 40% remain the most common objective across all firms. A 5-to-6 year investment time horizon and a major emphasis on the quality of the management team in evaluating new deals were universal priorities across diverse venture capital firms.A third finding in this study was that venture capital firms profess greater “certainty” about the future direction of the venture capital industry than the direction of their firm. The most notable example of this is a strong sense that industry-wide rates of return are headed downward yet few senior partners expect their firm to experience this decline.Practicing venture capitalists may be interested to peruse these results to see what trends are predicted within the venture capital industry by this subsample of that industry. Second, they should consider the finding that industry-wide rates of return are headed downward in light of the first two sets of findings to develop their own opinion about the future performance of different strategic groups within the industry.It is important to note that the sample of venture capital firms on which this study was based did not include most of the larger, older funds. Some of these funds would be characterized as “industry leaders, pace-setters, and innovators.” The sample provides a solid representation of the “broad middle” of the venture capital industry and newer entrants into the industry. While larger, older funds are under represented, their impact on future trends and strategies in the industry is captured to some extent in the set of questions about “future direction of the venture capital industry.“Finally, the emerging strategic groups in the venture capital industry that were identified by this study may be useful information for investors as well as users of venture capital. For investors, the opportunity to participate in venture capital activity should become more clearly understood and varied. Basically, this study should help investors differentiate the strategic posture of different venture capital firms and funds on four factors rather than simply industry/geographic considerations.For users of venture capital, the results of this study suggest a possibility for multiple options that are both more accessible and more catered to specific needs. Users of venture capital should find a clearer basis on which to differentiate venture capital firms in terms of venture stage priorities, staff utilization orientations, sources and uses of financial resources. This should make for more informed “shopping” among different venture capital sources and provide a basis on which to “shop” for the most compatible firm.     

Strategic alliances by venture capital backed firms: an empirical examination

A growing body of literature examines the formation of strategic alliances as an important value-added role provided by venture capital firms. This paper contributes to this literature by examining two related questions: whether venture capital firms use strategic alliances as a substitute or compliment to capital infusion, and how venture capital firms use alliances to mitigate different types of risk. Results from 2505 venture-backed startups reveal that venture capital firms treat alliance formation as a substitute for capital infusion and that the breadth of the network of syndication partners investing in the startup increases the number of its strategic alliances. We also find intentionality in alliance formation. Specifically, firms operating in industry environments characterized by technical risk are more likely to form alliances with partners capable of mitigating technical risks, and firms operating in environments characterized by market risk are more likely to form alliances with partners capable of mitigating market risk. Our findings lend additional support to the perspective that alliances represent an important mechanism through which venture capital firms add value to their portfolio companies.     

The association between venture capitalists’ selection and value adding behavior: evidence from early stage high tech venture capitalists

Building upon self-efficacy and collective effort theories, we study the association between the selection behavior of venture capitalists and their involvement in value adding activities. We argue that investors, who prioritize different characteristics of a business proposal during selection, will be more or less confident of their own abilities and the abilities of entrepreneurial teams to effectively add value to portfolio companies and hence will be more or less involved in providing value adding activities. In order to test this claim, we use a stratified sample comprising 68 European early stage high tech venture capitalists. Results show that venture capitalists, who focus on entrepreneurial team characteristics or financial criteria during selection, are less involved in value adding activities compared to their peers, who focus on technological criteria. We discuss these findings from a theoretical and practical perspective.     

Technology commercialization, incubator and venture capital, and new venture performance

This study examines the effects of technology commercialization, incubator and venture capital supports on new venture performance from the resource-based view. This study uses regression analysis to test the hypotheses in a sample of 122 new ventures. The findings highlight the role of technology commercialization as a mediator between organizational resources, innovative capabilities, and new venture performance. Also, the empirical evidence indicates that incubator and venture capital supports moderate the effects of technology commercialization on the performance of new ventures. Finally, this study discusses managerial implications and highlights future research directions.     

资源稀缺、技术冲击与风险投资退出时机

通过建立风险投资退出时机选择模型,运用2004~2011年中国风险投资退出的季度数据考察了技术冲击和市场利率等因素变化对风险投资退出时机的影响。研究发现：（1）资源稀缺的程度与风险投资退出时机的选择有着非常紧密的联系;（2）市场利率的变化对风险投资的退出行为的影响具有不对称性：市场利率下降可能会导致风险投资加速退出质量较差的风险企业,同时却更长时间地持有质量较好的风险企业;（3）技术进步会增加风险企业的数量,提高风险投资市场上风险企业的平均质量,加速风险投资退出。     

Venture Creation Speed and Subsequent Growth: Evidence from South America

Though time is an important dimension of the venture creation process, our understanding of why some entrepreneurs are able to act more quickly than others is limited. Equally, not much is known about the relationship between venture creation speed and the subsequent venture growth. In this paper, we use a resource‐based perspective to provide insights into the factors that quicken or retard venture creation and to explore how speed impacts on subsequent growth. This is important because the topic remains generally underresearched and because even less is understood about venture creation speed in the context of South American economies. Data were collected from face‐to‐face interviews with 647 entrepreneurs in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and Peru. Using a multivariate regression framework, we find that entrepreneurs make use of their human and social capital resources to shape the speed by which their venture is created. Moreover, their perceptions of unfavorable environmental conditions seem to retard venture creation. Findings also suggest that entrepreneurs who take more time to create a more solid resource base tend to receive better growth outcomes. Implications from the findings are discussed.     

Birds of a feather get lost together: new venture team composition and performance

This study explores the relationship between new venture team composition and new venture persistence and performance over time. We examine the team characteristics of a 5-year panel study of 202 new venture teams and new venture performance. Our study makes two contributions. First, we extend earlier research concerning homophily theories of the prevalence of homogeneous teams. Using structural event analysis we demonstrate that team members?? start-up experience is important in this context. Second, we attempt to reconcile conflicting evidence concerning the influence of team homogeneity on performance by considering the element of time. We hypothesize that higher team homogeneity is positively related to short term outcomes, but is less effective in the longer term. Our results confirm a difference over time. We find that more homogeneous teams are less likely to be higher performing in the long term. However, we find no relationship between team homogeneity and short-term performance outcomes.     

Formal institutions, culture, and venture capital activity: A cross-country analysis

Why does the level of venture capital activity vary across countries? This study suggests that the variation can be attributed to the different levels of formal institutional development. Further, this study proposes that venture capitalists respond differently to the incentives provided by formal institutions depending on different cultural settings. Analysis of VC activity for 68 countries during the 1996-2006 period shows that formal institutions have a positive effect on the level of venture capital activity, but this effect is weaker in more uncertainty-avoiding societies and in more collectivist societies. This study has useful theory and policy implications for venture capital and entrepreneurship development.     

Social capital of venture capitalists and start-up funding

How does the social capital of venture capitalists (VCs) affect the funding of start-ups? By building on the rich social capital literature, we hypothesize a positive effect of VCs?? social capital, derived from past syndication, on the amount of money that start-ups receive. Specifically, we argue that both structural and relational aspects of VCs?? social networks provide VCs with superior access to information about current investment objects and opportunities to leverage them in the future, increasing their willingness to invest in these firms. Our empirical results, derived from a novel dataset containing more than 1,500 first funding rounds in the Internet and IT sector, strongly confirm our hypotheses. We discuss the implications of our findings for theories of venture capital and entrepreneurship, showing that the role and effect of VCs?? social capital on start-up firms may be more complex than previously argued in the literature.     

Syndicated investments by venture capital firms: A networking perspective

The networking of 464 venture capital firms is analyzed by examining their joint investments in a sample of 1501 portfolio companies for the period 1966–1982. Some of the factors that influence the amount of networking are the innovativeness, technology, stage, and industry of the portfolio company. Using the resource exchange model, we reason that the relative amount of networking is explained primarily by the degree of uncertainty associated with an investment rather than by the sum of money invested.Among the findings of our study about venture capitalists are the following:The top 61 venture capital firms that managed 57% of the pool of venture capital in 1982 had an extensive network. Three out of four portfolio companies had at least one of the top 61 venture capital firms as an investor. Those top 61 firms network among themselves and with other venture capital firms. Hence they have considerable influence.Sharing of information seems to be more important than spreading of financial risk as a reason for networking. There is no difference in the degree of co-investing of large venture capital firms—those with the deep pockets—and small firms. Furthermore, where there is more uncertainty, there is more co-investing, even though the average amount invested per portfolio company is less. That, we argue, is evidence that the primary reason for co-investing is sharing of knowledge rather than spreading of financial risk. Venture capital firms gain access to the network by having knowledge that other firms need.It is likely that there will be increasing specialization by venture capital firms. Knowledge is an important distinctive competence of venture capital firms. That knowledge includes information such as innovations, technology, and people in specific industry segments. Among the portfolios of the top 61 venture capital firms are ones with a concentration of low innovative companies, others with a concentration of high innovative technology companies, and others with a no particular concentration. As technology changes rapidly and grows more and more complex, we expect that venture capitalists will increasingly specialize according to type of companies in which they invest. Only the largest firms with many venture capitalists will be like “department stores,” which invest in all types of companies. The smaller firms with only a few venture capitalists will tend to be more like “boutiques” which invest in specific types of companies, or in specific geographical regions around the world.We think that the networking of venture capital firms has the following implications for entrepreneurs:Entrepreneurs should seek funds from venture firms that are known to invest in their type of product. It speeds the screening process. If the venture capital firm decides to invest, it can syndicate the investment through its network of similar firms. And after the investment has been made, the venture capital firms can bring substantial expertise to the entrepreneur's company.Entrepreneurs should not hawk their business plans indiscriminately. Through their networks, venture firms become aware of plans that have been rejected by other firms. A plan that gets turned down several times is unlikely to be funded. Thus it is better to approach venture capital firms selectively.The extensive network of the leading venture capital firms probably facilitates the setting of a “market rate” for the funds they invest. The going rate for venture capital is not posted daily. Nevertheless, details of the most recent deals are rapidly disseminated through venture capitalists' networks. Hence, that helps to set an industry-wide rate for the funds being sought by entrepreneurs.Lastly, we give the following advice to strategic planners:Venture capital firms share strategic information that is valuable to others outside their network. Since they often invest in companies with emerging products and services, venture capitalists gather valuable strategic information about future innovations and technological trends. Thus, strategic planners should tap into venture capitalists' networks, and thereby gain access to that information. It is sometimes information of the sort that can revolutionize an industry.     

Effects of relational capital and commitment on venture capitalists' perception of portfolio company performance

In this study, we examine how relational capital and commitment affect a venture capital firm's (i.e., VCFs) perception of the performance of its portfolio companies (i.e., PFCs). That is, we examine how perceived performance is affected by the social nature of the relationship between the VCF and PFC. The study's hypotheses are tested by applying quantitative analyses to survey data collected from 298 U.S.-based venture capital firms. The data from the survey are complemented with additional information drawn from secondary data sources and interviews with several venture capitalists. We found that the amount of relational capital embedded in the VCF–PFC dyad and the extent to which the VCF is committed to the PFC are strongly related to perceived performance. We speculate that relational capital and commitment enhance learning, an effect that increases VCFs' perceptions of performance. Further, these perceptions of performance will also be amplified by the positive affect generated by relational capital and commitment. We discuss the limitations and contributions of our findings and provide directions for future research.     

风险投资软环境中的风险投资家——性质、作用机理和筛选机制

在支撑风险投资制度成功移植的软环境因素研究问题上,从风险投资家生成和筛选机制这一研究视角出发,研究风险投资家人力资本的异质性质及其作为风险资本市场中心签约人的作用机理,认为优秀的风险投资家的生成和筛选机制是外生模仿型风险资本市场生成的关键的软环境。因此,我国需要建设系统的包括宏观和微观层面的生成和筛选机制。     

The role of domestic and cross-border venture capital investors in the growth of portfolio companies

This paper studies how the presence of cross-border as opposed to domestic venture capital investors is associated with the growth of portfolio companies. For this purpose, we use a longitudinal research design and track sales, total assets and payroll expenses in 761 European technology companies from the year of initial venture capital investment up to seven years thereafter. Findings demonstrate how companies initially backed by domestic venture capital investors exhibit higher growth in the short term compared to companies backed by cross-border investors. In the medium term, companies initially backed by cross-border venture capital investors exhibit higher growth compared to companies backed by domestic investors. Finally, companies that are initially funded by a syndicate comprising both domestic and cross-border venture capital investors exhibit the highest growth. Overall, this study provides a more fine-grained understanding of the role that domestic and cross-border venture capital investors can play as their portfolio companies grow and thereby require different resources or capabilities over time.     

风险投资、管理层过度自信与企业并购溢价

现有研究多关注管理层过度自信所带来的一系列“后果”，对影响管理层过度自信的“前因”研究较为鲜见，这种“头重脚轻”式的不对称式研究对深入理解管理层过度自信造成了障碍。文章以2012-2017年我国创业板上市企业完成的并购事件为研究样本，从并购视角出发，研究了风险投资对管理层过度自信的影响及其带来的并购后果。结果发现，风险投资能够显著抑制并购活动中管理层的过度自信行为，而抑制管理层过度自信在风险投资降低并购溢价过程中发挥了重要的中介效应，上述作用在民营企业或风险投资派驻了董事的企业中更为显著。进一步分析显示，在考虑了风险投资与管理层过度自信之间的反向因果关系、风险投资这一“外部”监督角色和企业董事会治理这一“内部”监督角色的交互影响对结论可能产生的影响后，上述结论仍显著成立。     

Founder/Chief Executive Officer Exit: A Social Capital Perspective of New Ventures

The founder/chief executive officer (CEO) exit is a significant event for all business organizations. However, a social capital perspective suggests that the exit of the founder/CEO may be more disruptive for new start-ups due to the critical role the founder/CEO plays in the new organization and the heightened potential chance for failure of a new venture. A social capital perspective suggests that the ability of the entrepreneurial firm to perform better is affiliated with the social capital within the organization. This study supports a social capital perspective of CEO exit and social capital's impact on performance. It helps establish a foundation of study of CEO exit and new ventures from this perspective.