Fund ownership and stock price informativeness of Chinese listed firms

We examine the impact of mutual fund ownership on stock price informativeness in China. Existing evidence shows that stock price informativeness is low in China, and attributes this to firms’ lack of disclosure incentives under the weak investor protection institutional environment. Mutual funds are more sophisticated and influential than individual investors to monitor firms, and thus serve as an external governance mechanism to improve corporate transparency. However, the impact of mutual funds in China can also be moderated by state ownership of listed firms, which reduces firms’ dependence on outside investors for capital. Indeed, we find that mutual fund ownership is positively related to share price informativeness, but this effect is less pronounced among state-controlled firms. The main policy implication from our findings is that mutual funds contribute to the corporate information environment of emerging economies but further privatization of listed firms would be needed to realize greater benefit.     

Underpricing,ownership dispersion,and aftermarket liquidity of IPO stocks

Booth and Chua [Booth J., Chua L. Ownership dispersion, costly information, and IPO underpricing. Journal of Financial Economics 1996; 41; 291–310] hypothesize that IPOs are underpriced to promote ownership dispersion, which in turn increases aftermarket liquidity of IPO stocks. We examine a sample of 1179 Nasdaq IPOs and find that underpricing is positively correlated with the number of non-block institutional shareholders after IPO but negatively correlated with the changes in the total number of shareholders. Firms with many non-block institutional shareholders tend to have high liquidity in the secondary market. These results provide support to Booth and Chua's hypothesis. Underpricing also has direct effects on secondary market liquidity after controlling for ownership structure and other factors.     

Voluntary disclosure,ownership structure,and corporate debt maturity: A study of French listed firms

This study examines the effect of voluntary disclosure on corporate debt maturity and the role of ownership structure in this effect. For a sample of 440 French listed firms from 2007 to 2013, the empirical results indicate that firms with greater voluntary disclosure have more long-term debt, suggesting that companies benefit from extensive disclosure through greater access to long-maturity debt. This finding is consistent with the evidence that voluntary disclosure provides an efficient monitoring mechanism in firms where long-term debt could insulate firms from lender scrutiny for long periods. The results also show that the positive association between voluntary disclosure and long-term debt is relevant only when the control rights of the controlling shareholders are significantly in excess of cash-flow rights. This finding supports recent work showing that better disclosure policies are viewed more positively by the market in environments where the risk of wealth expropriation by dominant shareholders is higher.     

State ownership and stock liquidity: Evidence from privatization

We provide unique firm-level evidence of the relation between state ownership and stock liquidity. Using a broad sample of newly privatized firms (NPFs) from 53 countries over the period 1994–2014, our study identifies a non-monotonic association between state ownership and stock liquidity. The inverse U-shaped relation is consistent with trade-offs between costs and benefits of state ownership and suggests an optimal level of government shareholdings that maximizes stock liquidity of NPFs. We further identify that the inflection point from the cost/benefit trade-off is contingent upon characteristics of the nation's institutional environment.     

Underpricing of homecoming A-share IPOs by Chinese firms already listed abroad

Many Chinese firms have pursued overseas listings in Hong Kong or US without being first listed in China’s domestic market, mainly due to the regulatory constraints imposed by the Chinese government. Some of them eventually returned to mainland China through an A-share offering to Chinese investors. This unique feature of cross-listed Chinese stocks offers an experiment field to test some of the conventional theories of initial public offerings (IPOs) underpricing. Homebound IPOs are expected to be less underpriced than domestic only IPOs that are not cross-listed because being already listed in a developed market can mitigate the information asymmetry and issue uncertainty associated with their A-share IPOs. Nevertheless, we find that homecoming A-share IPOs are still substantially underpriced, with an average market adjusted first-day return of 96.53 %. Furthermore, their first-day returns are not significantly different from those of domestic only IPOs once firm- and offer-characteristics are controlled. This is in sharp contrast to the lukewarm aftermarket performance experienced in their overseas debuts. The mean market adjusted first-day return is merely 5.35 % in their US ADR offerings and 11.63 % in their Hong Kong H-share IPOs. Overall, our results suggest the importance of local market structures and norms as influential factors of IPO underpricing.     

Why newly listed firms become acquisition targets

We study the operating, financial, and ownership structure characteristics of newly listed firms which become acquisition targets shortly after their initial public offerings. We examine whether such firms get acquired because of their successful performance or as an alternative to delisting. We find that firms, which do relatively well in terms of operating as well as stock performance and attract institutional investor interest, draw the attention of acquirers. Furthermore, we observe that investments made by newly listed target firms do not destroy shareholder value and have comparable profitability to investments made by newly listed firms which grow by acquisitions. Overall, firms acquired shortly after listing are on a growth trajectory similar to that of surviving firms.     

Foreign institutional ownership and stock market liquidity: Evidence from Indonesia

From January 2002 to August 2007, foreign institutions held almost 70% of the free-float value of the Indonesian equity market, or 41% of the total market capitalization. Over the same period, liquidity on the Jakarta Stock Exchange improved substantially with the average bid–ask spread more than halved and the average depth more than doubled. In this study we examine the Granger causality between foreign institutional ownership and liquidity, while controlling for persistence in foreign ownership and liquidity measures. We find that foreign holdings have a negative impact on future liquidity: a 10% increase in foreign institutional ownership in the current month is associated with approximately 2% increase in the bid–ask spread, 3% decrease in depth, and 4% rise in price sensitivity in the next month, challenging the view that foreign institutions enhance liquidity in small emerging markets. Our findings are consistent with the negative liquidity impact of institutional investor ownership in developed markets.     

The effects of ownership and stock liquidity on the timing of repurchase transactions

We analyze detailed monthly data on U.S. open market stock repurchases (OMRs) that recently became available following stricter disclosure requirements. We find evidence that OMRs are timed to benefit non-selling shareholders. We present evidence that the profits to companies from timing repurchases are significantly related to ownership structure. Institutional ownership reduces companies' opportunities to repurchase stock at bargain prices. At low levels, insider ownership increases timing profits and at high levels it reduces them. Stock liquidity increases profits from timing OMRs.     

Impact of managerial ownership on investment and liquidity constraints: Evidence from Chinese listed companies

We examine the impact of managerial ownership on investment and financial constraints in the context of China. Using the system generalized method of moments estimation of an investment Euler equation, we find that investment decisions are related to managerial ownership in two ways. First, managerial ownership exerts a positive direct effect on corporate investment decisions by aligning management’s incentives with the interests of shareholders. Second, managerial ownership helps to reduce the degree of financial constraints faced by firms, suggesting that managerial ownership acts as a form of credible guarantee to lenders, signaling the quality of investment projects to the capital markets. Our findings suggest that recent policies enacted by the Chinese government, aimed at reforming ownership structure and encouraging managerial ownership in listed firms, help reduce agency costs and asymmetric information; thereby facilitating firms’ investment efficiency. Our findings will be of interest to scholars, practitioners, and policy makers interested in the financial impacts of management-compensation contracts.     

Ownership level,ownership concentration and liquidity

We examine the link between the liquidity of a firm's stock and its ownership structure, specifically, how much of the firm's stock is owned by insiders and institutions, and how concentrated is their ownership. We find that the liquidity-ownership relation is mostly driven by institutional ownership rather than insider ownership. Importantly, liquidity is positively related to total institutional holdings but negatively related to institutional blockholdings. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that while the level of institutional ownership proxies for trading activity, the concentration of such ownership proxies for adverse selection.     

The value of ongoing venture capital investment to newly listed firms

We examine whether the market values continuing venture capital (VC) investor involvement in firms post-IPO. Compared to the US, Australian VC investors exit their investments post-IPO by on-market sales rather than distribution of holdings to their investors. Lockup periods tend to be longer and ownership thresholds for reporting trades lower. We find that the market responds positively to buy transactions, negatively to sell transactions of VC investors and negatively to the resignation of VC directors. These results are consistent with VC investors in the firm having a positive influence and creating value from which the VCs and other shareholders benefit.     

Bank power,block ownership,boards and financial distress likelihood: An investigation of Spanish listed firms

We investigate the effects of bank power, block ownership and board independence on the likelihood of financial distress. Using a matched sample design, we find that firms in which banks have power are more likely than their counterparts to enter financial distress. However, the bank power effects are moderated by block ownership and board independence. Specifically, on the one hand, financial distress due to bank power is lower for firms with greater ownership by pressure resistant blockholders and such blockholders appear to be the largest blockholder in the firm. The bank power effects are also lower in firms with greater outside directors and this appears to be primarily driven by proprietary directors than independent directors. On the other, we document evidence suggesting that the bank power effects are magnified for firms in which the board chair is a proprietary director aligned to non-financial blockholders or CEO/Chair, suggesting that banks might partly influence decisions via board chairs. Overall, the findings are consistent with bank power actions being detrimental to the firm, but the extent to which such actions harm the firm depends on the monitoring intentions of blockholders and/or board of directors. These findings have important implications for policymakers.     

Dividend taxation and the ownership structure of private firms

This paper examines the effect of dividend taxation on the ownership structure of private firms. I exploit a German dividend tax increase that only affects corporate shareholders owning a minority stake. Using data on private German firms and their shareholders, I find that corporate shareholders reduce their minority stakes in firms after the dividend tax reform. This result is in line with the notion that, because minority shareholders do not have sufficient decision-making power to influence the payout policy, they can only react to a dividend tax increase by selling their shares. This effect is larger when the affected minority shareholders face high dividend tax costs. However, I find a smaller effect when the benefits of the minority stakes are highly relevant for the firm and the affected shareholders, suggesting that non-tax factors mute the response to dividend taxes. In addition, I find that the largest shareholder of the firm buys the minority stake, resulting in greater ownership concentration. These findings extend the prior literature that finds no effect of dividend taxes on the ownership structure of private firms.     

Insider trading and future stock returns in firms with concentrated ownership levels

We investigate the relationship between insider trading and stock returns in firms with concentrated ownership. To this end, we employ data from East Asian countries which span the period January 2003 to May 2012. Consistent with the previous literature, we find a significantly negative relation between the selling activity of insiders and stock returns. However, contrary to studies which focus on highly developed markets, we find that the buying activity of insiders is also inversely related to future stock returns. Our analysis shows that top directors with higher ownership levels drive this result, suggesting that the trading activity of insiders is not always associated with profit-making motives and can be explained by their level of ownership. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a trading strategy which focuses solely on purchases made by top directors with high ownership levels yields negative returns. The paper has important implications for outside investors who mimic the trading activity of insiders with the aim to realise profits.     

The performance of newly privatized firms in selected MENA countries: The role of ownership structure, governance and liberalization policies

The paper analyzes 95 newly privatized firms (NPFs) in four Middle Eastern and North African countries (Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey). We find that these firms experienced significant increases in profitability and operating efficiency, and significant declines in employment and leverage. We also document strong performance improvements for firms that did remain state-owned, that were not sold to foreigners, and that came from Egypt. Job losses are higher in Egypt and in firms where the state is no longer in control. Also, the results indicate that revenue firms and NPFs in Morocco display significantly less leverage than control firms and those from other countries. We find that profitability changes are negatively related to state control and positively related to foreign ownership. Trade openness, change in real GDP over the privatization window, index of investor protection, and foreign ownership are important determinants of the changes in sales efficiency and output. These findings suggest that NPFs become more productive in environments where property rights are better protected and enforced and that foreign investors influence firms' productivity through their monitoring role.     

The effects of newly listed derivatives in a thin stock market

This study examines the informational feedback effects associated to the listing and trading of derivatives in Switzerland. The observed changes in the price and higher moments of stock returns are representative of a thin stock market. The listing of stock options and index futures generated positive abnormal returns for large stocks and for the index while small stocks essentially benefited from the launching of index options. While reducing the variance of blue chips and of the index, their variance's stochasticity increased (decreased) at index options' (futures) listings. Finally, we detect significant stock and index derivatives' price leads which do not however generate arbitrage opportunities.     

Characteristics and behavior of newly listed firms: Evidence from the Asia-Pacific region

We examine the size, profitability and delisting experience during 1980–1999 of new lists in the Pacific Basin countries. We also examine the impact of the legal environment on post-listing behavior. We find that new lists are more numerous in common law countries. They are smaller than seasoned firms, regardless of legal regime. New lists are more profitable in civil law countries, but this is due to the high profitability of Japanese new lists. Asian new lists have lower rates of delisting compared to U.S. firms. The delisting frequency of seasoned firms exceeds that of new lists for our sample countries.     

Lead-lag relationships in an embryonic stock market: Exploring the role of institutional ownership and liquidity

This paper investigates the influence of institutional ownership and liquidity on stock return relationships for an embryonic and relatively illiquid stock market. Using daily, individual stock data for Trinidad and Tobago from 2001 to 2015 and a VAR modelling approach, we find for firms of all sizes and levels of analyst coverage that the returns of more institutionally favoured stocks lead those with less institutional ownership. Distinctively, greater institutional coverage is shown not to be associated with greater liquidity, though liquidity levels do condition the influence of institutional ownership. This indicates that institutional owners have information advantages relative to other stock owners.     

Institutional ownership and commonality in liquidity

We investigate the relation between institutional ownership and commonality in liquidity and whether this relation differs across country-level institutional and information environments. Using a comprehensive dataset for firms across 40 countries for the period between 2000 and 2016, we find that institutional ownership is negatively associated with stock liquidity commonality. In addition, a firm’s information environment plays the moderating role in the relation between institutional ownership and commonality in stock liquidity. Importantly, we document that the negative association between institutional ownership and liquidity commonality is stronger for firms in countries with weak institutional characteristics or less transparent information environments. Our findings provide additional insights into the role of institutional investors as a demand-side factor of liquidity commonality in international financial markets.