The future of fiscal federalism

For at least three decades after World War II, there was little interest in fiscal decentralization. Because of the large growth in public spending that took place during that period, a growth that was mainly focused at the central government level, this was a period characterized by fiscal centralization in most countries. Starting in the late 1970s, a reaction against large governments started. This reaction followed two distinct tracks: privatization and fiscal decentralization. The paper argues that these two tracks were almost two sides of the same coin and were largely mutually exclusive. They reflected similar concerns and objectives. In more recent decades, globalization has been creating global public goods or public “bads” and international activities that would require public attention or the action of a “world government”. Because no such government exists, its role is progressively being delegated to proxies, in the form of international organizations, agreements, treaties, accords and other forms of international understandings. The paper concludes that this development is likely to weaken over time the role of central governments. It also speculates that it may strengthen the importance of municipalities.     

A voting paradox of fiscal federalism

This paper draws attention to certain tensions within fiscal federalism. We compare median- voter decisions on the socialization of goods and services at different levels of government. They show typical differences which are primarily due not to changes in the economic or political situation but to changes in the level of decision making.     

School finance reform: Assessing general equilibrium effects

In 1994 the state of Michigan implemented one of the most comprehensive school finance reforms undertaken to date in any of the states. Understanding the effects of the reform is thus of value in informing other potential reform initiatives. In addition, the reform and associated changes in the economic environment provide an opportunity to assess whether a simple general equilibrium model can be of value in framing the study of such reform initiatives. In this paper, we present and use such a model to derive predictions about the effects of the reform on housing prices and neighborhood demographic compositions. Broadly, our analysis implies that the effects of the reform and changes in the economic environment are likely to have been reflected primarily in housing prices and only modestly on neighborhood demographics. We find that evidence for the Detroit metropolitan area from the decade encompassing the reform is largely consistent with the predictions of the model.     

The suboptimality of local taxation under two-tier fiscal federalism

Increased taxation in a single, local jurisdiction changes the tax base of the national as well as the local government. Changes in national-government tax revenue then affect citizens in other jurisdictions. Local fiscal decisions, which neglect such national spillovers, are suboptimal. If factor supply decreases with the local tax rate, a reduction in tax-financed spending on local-government goods increases welfare. A reduction in tax-financed local-government redistributions increases welfare generally.     

Tax incentives in fiscal federalism: an integrated perspective

Abstract Models of fiscal federalism rarely account for the efficiency implications of intergovernmental fiscal ties for federal tax policy. This paper shows that fiscal institutions such that federal tax deductibility, vertical revenue‐sharing, and fiscal equalization (being common features of existing federations) encourage local taxation, but may discourage federal taxation. Furthermore, the structure of public spending is skewed towards local spending. We also show that, when considering Leviathan governments, fiscal institutions reduce confiscatory taxation by the federal government. The result is contrary to the Cartelization Hypothesis ( Brennan and Buchanan 1980 ). Finally, we characterize the efficient design of intergovernmental fiscal ties.     

A dynamic game for fiscal federalism with non-local externalities

We address the questions of the patterns and the efficiency of public intervention in a dynamic game model between public agencies in charge of a non-local externality. We give two examples: pollution spreading between water basins (negative externality), and non-uniform contributions from the elite and from the mass to a cultural background (positive externality). We define two extreme cases, depending on whether or not the receiving end of the externality balances the transmitting end. When both balance, the reactivity of the agency structure is strong and the need for redistribution between them is weak. When they do not balance, the externality is more markedly non-local and redistribution is required to balance the fiscal burden (or product) from pigouvian instruments among all beneficiaries. We show that, with a static rule of redistribution that allows them to compute transfers between them as a function of their own strategies, the decentralized agencies' reactivity is somewhat slowed, but they still react faster and more efficiently than a static central agency.     

The impressive contribution of Canadian economists to fiscal federalism theory and policy

The study of fiscal federalism has been central to the research of Canadian economists since the Rowell–Sirois Report. To mark the 50th anniversary of the founding of the Canadian Economics Association, it is fitting to take stock of their contributions. We focus on the period since 1982 and emphasize the main scholarly publications of an inclusive array of Canadian economists and economists in Canadian universities. Our attention is devoted to applications in the context of federal and provincial governments, setting aside related issues in municipal government finance. We briefly discuss instances where the fiscal federalism literature has informed policy debates including through policy research institutes, government commissions and international organizations.     

The trade-off between risk and incentives in fiscal federalism: Evidence from China

A central argument of the second-generation fiscal federalism literature is that allocating a considerable share of tax revenue to local governments can provide fiscal incentives for local officials to promote economic growth. However, increasing incentives will increase the costs of uncertainty if local government officials are risk averse. Building on the insights of the classic principal-agent models, we predict that the optimal share of tax revenues retained by local government will decrease as the uncertainty of total tax revenues increases. Using Chinese provincial data, we find a robust negative relationship between volatility and the tax-sharing ratio at the sub-provincial level. Our results indicate that optimal decentralization in developing countries balances the trade-off between risk and incentives.     

Fiscal federalism in monetary unions: hypothetical fiscal transfers within the Euro-zone

Net fiscal transfers are commonly seen as a possible means to ensure the well-functioning of a currency area. We show that US net fiscal transfers, measured as the difference between gross federal revenues and federal expenditures per state, are enormous. Moreover, we run panel regressions that suggest their dependence on relative GDP and relative GDP growth during crisis periods, evidence of net fiscal transfers from relatively rich to relatively poor states (redistributive effect) and to states with an underperforming economic development (stabilization effect). The Euro-zone (EZ) lacks a system of fiscal federalism, which raises the question of whether it should be established in the medium- and long-run. If so, which should be the magnitude of net fiscal transfers? We calculate these transfers hypothetically for 1999–2010, using a relative volume comparable to the one in the USA.     

The effect of fiscal system reform on fiscal policy outcomes

We investigate how reform in governmental accounting affects fiscal policy outcomes including debt, balance, and fiscal transparency. Since a change from cash to accrual accounting can be regarded as a natural experiment among governments, a fixed-effects model is exploited. We discover that the change diminishes debt in developed countries, but expands it in less-developed ones, with strong effects in highly indebted countries. The change improves balance in developed countries and worsens it in less-developed countries, which is significant for developed countries with large deficits. Transparency is improved only in less transparent developed countries.     

Green fiscal reform and employment: A survey

In the European debate an increase in employment is generally regarded as an important extra-dividend-in addition to improved environmental quality-from environmental taxes. The scope of this paper is to evaluate, going through the existing empirical literature, if-and to what degree-this result could be achieved through a green fiscal reform. A further goal of this paper is to assess which taxes are more efficient in terms of employment-creation when they are utilized for recycling back to the economy the revenue flowing from environmental taxes. This kind of exercise is largely different from the theoretical analysis of the double dividend issue. A large quantity of literature has grown during the recent years according to this approach, but this version of the double dividend theory will be disregarded in this paper.     

Fiscal crisis and fiscal reform in developing countries

In recent years, policy-makers in developing countries haveresponded to crisis of macroeconomic instability with two setsof measures: conventional stabilisation policies and policiesof economic liberalisation. The fiscal implications of thisdouble agenda are set out, following three lines of enquiry.First, how can policies be kept consistent, when some liberalisationmeasures have large adverse fiscal consequences? Second, cana fiscal deficit be reduced without damaging the provision ofpublic services vital for growth and poverty alleviation? Finally,since lack of tax revenue is usually the binding constrainton government intervention, how can this most easily be relaxed?     

Exchange market reform,inflation, and fiscal deficits

This paper examines the effects of exchange market reform on inflation and quasifiscal deficits in developing countries. The first part presents the conceptual framework, which identifies a variety of implicit taxes and subsidies that must be taken into account (in addition to implicit taxes on exports, as emphasized by Pinto (1991)) in assessing the fiscal and inflationary effects of exchange market reform. A formula that attempts to capture explicitly these taxes and subsidies is derived. The second part applies the formula to six countries (Guyana, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka). The results suggest that exchange market reform may lead to a significant reduction in reliance on the inflation tax.     

Sharing budgetary austerity under free mobility and asymmetric information: An optimal regulation approach to fiscal federalism

In the present article, Tiebout meets Laffont and Tirole in the land of fiscal federalism. A non-trivial Principal–Multi-Agent model is used to characterize the optimal intergovernmental grant schedule, when the cost of local public goods depends on hidden characteristics and actions of local governments, and under citizen free mobility. We show how informational rents, landlords' interests, and citizen mobility interact to produce distortions at both ends of the type space: in particular the most efficient jurisdictions should overproduce and overtax in second-best optimum. Informational asymmetries decrease the average production of public goods and increase the inter-jurisdictional variance of taxes and public-good production.     

How to reform China’s fiscal system?

ABSTRACT

As the population aging, China’s government expenditures, including general fiscal expenditure, healthcare and social security expenditure, will grow more rapidly than government revenues, tending to elevate government debt. Local governments undertake overwhelming 85% of total general fiscal revenue and are responsible for healthcare and social security, and their debt has been growing. Fiscal reforms are imperative, including tax reforms, the structure of government spending reforms, social security reforms, healthcare reforms, local public finance reforms, and central and local government’s fiscal relationship reforms. This paper will explore the fiscal challenges China faces and discuss how to reform the fiscal system to cope with these challenges.     

财政学教学改革探讨

财政学作为一门专业基础课,其基本理论和分析方法对我国建立和完善社会主义市场经济体制具有重要的意义,一直以来都是教育部确定的高等学校经济类专业的核心课程。因此,精通教学内容、完善教学方法、运用教学技巧,教授学生掌握财政学的理论体系和精髓是财政学教师义不容辞的责任。文章分析了该课程的特色及在目前教学中普遍存在的一些问题,并提出了财政学教学改革的若干建议。