Hedging,speculation, and shareholder value

We document that gold mining firms have consistently realized economically significant cash flow gains from their derivatives transactions. We conclude that these cash flows have increased shareholder value since there is no evidence of an offsetting adjustment in firms’ systematic risk. This finding contradicts a central assumption in the risk management literature that derivatives transactions have zero net present value, and highlights an important motive for firms to use derivatives that the literature has hitherto ignored. Although we find considerable evidence of selective hedging in our sample, the cash flow gains from selective hedging appear to be small at best.     

Foreign equity investment restrictions, capital flight, and shareholder wealth maximization: theory and evidence

This article provides a theory of foreign equity investmentrestrictions. We consider a model where the demand functionfor domestic shares differs between domestic and foreign investorsbecause of deadweight costs in holding domestic and foreignsecurities that depend on the country of residence of investors.We show that domestic entrepreneurs maximize firm value by discriminatingbetween domestic and foreign investors. The model implies thatcountries benefiting from capital flight have binding ownershiprestrictions such that foreign investors pay a higher pricefor shares than domestic investors. The empirical implicationsof this theory are supported by evidence from Switzerland.     

An analysis of working capital efficiency and shareholder return

Since 1997, CFO Magazine has published a ranking of 1000 companies in its “Working Capital Scorecard.” Our research explores the question as to whether working capital management practices based on the accounting metrics used by CFO Magazine serve as a basis for investor-based strategies for superior return generation. We examine the stock performance of top ranked companies from 1997 to 2012 against benchmark portfolios. Controlling for market, market capitalization, book to market, momentum factors, liquidity factors, and corporate governance; the higher ranked firms produce statistically higher excess returns than bottom ranked firms. In bull market periods, firms with superior working capital management outperformed their counterparts on a raw and risk-adjusted basis. These top ranked firms also provide statistically significant active returns regardless of market cycle. In sum, our results indicate that shareholders reward firms with superior working capital management strategies with higher raw and risk-adjusted performance over longer holding periods across the economic cycle especially in bear markets cycles.     

Controlling shareholder share pledging and the cost of equity capital: Evidence from China

We propose and test the incentive view—that the margin call pressure and ownership-control discrepancy associated with insider share pledging increase investors’ perceived risk, and thus also the cost of equity capital, in an emerging market. Using a controlling shareholder share pledging sample for Chinese listed firms, we find that firms with share pledging have a cost of equity capital that is 23.7 basis points higher than firms without share pledging. Further, share pledging increases the cost of equity capital through the information risks and agency conflicts channels. Cross-sectional analyses show that share pledging has a stronger effect on the cost of equity capital in non-state-owned enterprises, firms without monitoring of multiple large shareholders, firms with controlling shareholders assuming the position of chairperson, and firms with a weak institutional environment. In addition, using the global financial crisis and the outbreak of the coronavirus (COVID-19) as quasi-natural experiments, we disentangle the potential confounding effect of firm fundamentals and show that share pledging is positively associated with the cost of equity capital. Overall, the results are consistent with our incentive view that share pledging increases the cost of equity capital in an emerging market.     

Payout policy, capital structure, and compensation contracts when managers value control

The optimal contract between managers and investors is endogenouslyderived when managers have preferences for both monetary compensationand corporate resources under their control. When the optimalpayout is privately known to managers, they can be induced tomake payouts by linking their compensation to the payout. Publicequity is a claim on this discretionary payout. If investorscan obtain new information about the firm's optimal payout level,it can be utilized by transferring the control from managementto investors. The new information allows the firm to achievea more efficient allocation through recontracting. We show thatthe new information will be obtained if and only if the payoutfalls below a promised level     

Pursuing shareholder value: The rhetoric of James Hardie

In this paper we analyse the media release by James Hardie Industries Limited (JHIL) announcing the establishment of a separate entity to fund current and future asbestos litigation claims using the interpretive tool of rhetorical criticism. At the centre of the corporate reorganisation which alienated asbestos-related liabilities from the corporate group was the concept of shareholder value. This concept was presented as an unequivocal rationale to persuade the public that the reorganisation would resolve the asbestos liability issue and benefit both shareholders and legitimate asbestos claimants alike. Accounting is implicated by the use of accounting concepts such as assets and liabilities to persuade stakeholders of the financial viability of the new entity. These concepts were presented as objective and unproblematic without consideration of the nuances of accounting measurement, recognition and disclosure criteria.

Using an organisational discourse analysis framework, the media release is ‘dismantled’ to expose the rhetorical strategies used to create particular understandings and to privilege certain interests. The analysis demonstrates the power of a single textual artefact to harness and influence strategic possibilities and serve an organisational strategy.     

Dynamic capital structure and political patronage: The case of Malaysia

This paper investigates the effect of political patronage on firms' capital structure. The evidence is from Malaysia, a country characterised by relationship-capitalism, and covers 1988 to 2009. Using a system GMM estimator we find firms set leverage targets and adjust towards them following deviations at the rate of 28% per annum. Next, we construct a natural experiment and use a difference-in-differences model to investigate if the strategic financing decisions of politically patronised firms differ from non-connected firms after an exogenous shock caused by the 1997 Asian crisis. Our results unambiguously demonstrate a significant difference in the capital structure of patronised firms relative to non-connected firms following the exogenous shock but only for the crisis period 1998–2001. After 2002 the capital structures of patronised and non-connected firms are statistically equivalent.     

Board structure,mergers, and shareholder wealth: A study of the mutual fund industry

We study mutual fund mergers between 1999 and 2001 to understand the role and effectiveness of fund boards. Some fund mergers—typically across-family mergers—benefit target shareholders but are costly to target fund directors. Such mergers are more likely when funds underperform and their boards have a larger percentage of independent trustees, suggesting that more-independent boards tolerate less underperformance before initiating across-family mergers. This effect is most pronounced when all of the fund's directors are independent, not the 75% level of independence required by the SEC. Higher-paid target fund boards are less likely to approve across-family mergers that cause substantial reductions in their compensation.     

Taxation of shareholder capital gains and the choice of payment method in takeovers

From December 1999, shareholders who disposed of shares in Australian takeovers in exchange for scrip could elect to defer capital gains taxation until the disposal of the shares received. We investigate payment method choice by acquiring firms before and after this regulatory change to assess whether target shareholder capital gains tax liabilities became an important factor considered in choosing the form of payment. The results show that, subsequent to the regulatory change, there is a significantly higher probability that equity will be offered as consideration where target shareholder capital gains are greater. This finding confirms the importance of shareholder level taxation in explaining corporate acquisition structure and adds to previous European and US evidence on factors associated with payment method choice in takeovers.     

Human capital,capital structure,and employee pay: An empirical analysis

We test the predictions of Titman (1984) and Berk, Stanton, and Zechner (2010) by examining the effect of leverage on labor costs. Leverage has a significantly positive impact on cash, equity-based, and total compensation of chief executive officers (CEOs). Compensation of new CEOs hired from outside the firm is positively related to prior-year firm leverage. In addition, leverage has a positive and significant impact on average employee pay. The incremental total labor expenses associated with an increase in leverage are large enough to offset the incremental tax benefits of debt. The empirical evidence supports the theoretical prediction that labor costs limit the use of debt.     

Corporate diversification and shareholder value: a survey of recent literature

We survey the recent developments in the literature on corporate diversification. This literature is voluminous, diverse, and quite old. To make the task more manageable, we focus our attention on recent contributions to that subset of the diversification literature that is in our judgment most influential in setting the agenda for financial research. The study of diversification at the corporate level can be grouped into one of two bodies of literature: cross-sectional studies of the link between corporate diversification and firm value (i.e., the diversification discount) and longitudinal studies of patterns in corporate diversification through time. The prevailing wisdom among financial economists throughout much of the last decade has been that diversified firms sell at a discount and that the level of corporate diversification has been trending downward. However, recent research questions both these tenets and a number of studies now suggest that the diversification discount is either not due to diversification at all, or may be a result of improper measurement techniques. Furthermore, some researchers are now beginning to argue that previous attempts to assess changes in the levels of corporate diversification through time is also flawed as a result of biases built into the compustat database in combination with the use of noisy proxies for corporate diversification.     

Optimal capital structure,bargaining, and the supplier market structure

This paper studies the relationship between firm leverage and supplier market structure. We find that firm leverage decreases with the degree of competition between suppliers. Specifically, leverage decreases with the elasticity of substitution between suppliers. Leverage also decreases with the number of suppliers when the elasticity of substitution is high, and increases with the number of suppliers when the elasticity is low. We also provide empirical evidence that is consistent with the model predictions.     

Subsidiary debt,capital structure and internal capital markets

I study external debt issued by operating subsidiaries of diversified firms. Consistent with Kahn and Winton's [2004. Moral hazard and optimal subsidiary structure for financial institutions. Journal of Finance 59, 2537–2575] model, where subsidiary debt mitigates asset substitution, I find firms are more likely to use subsidiary debt when their divisions vary more in risk. Consistent with subsidiary debt mitigating the free cash flow problem, I find that subsidiaries are more likely to have their own external debt when they have fewer growth options and higher cash flow than the rest of the firm. Finally, I find that subsidiary debt mitigates the “corporate socialism” and “poaching” problems modeled in theories of internal capital markets.     

Decoupled earnings: An institutional perspective of the consequences of maximizing shareholder value

Recent accounting scandals have brought focus on the role of management in financial statement manipulation. This focus on micro-behavior does not capture the complexities of earnings management. Taking an institutional rather than agency theory approach, earnings management is posited as a decoupled behavior. A behavior that results from not only agency-based motivations of self-interests, but also regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive legitimacy pressures. Conformity to the central logic of “maximizing shareholder value” found in the “US financial market” institutional field provides the context in which to explore earnings management as a decoupled behavior. Insights for earnings management include the blending of agency and institutional theory perspectives to gain a more complete understanding of the behavior and the positing of a continuum of earnings management conducive to this merger. Institutional theory benefits from exploring the nesting in multiple institutional fields.     

Intangible capital,volatility shock,and the value premium

This paper extends the canonical, neoclassical investment‐based asset‐pricing model through the incorporation of intangible capital and the formulation of a joint productivity distribution with economic uncertainty shocks at the firm level. The distinctive evolutionary dynamics of intangible capital as opposed to that of physical capital mitigate the negative impact of temporary uncertainty shock on production and serve well to explain the value premium with modest assumptions. The value premium is unconditionally positive, but the realized value spread plummets to negative after major transient second‐moment shocks, for example, the Loma Prieta Earthquake and the 9/11 terrorist attack.     

Rethinking bank shareholder equity: The case of Deutsche Bank

We introduce and apply an innovative accounting approach to analyse the equity position of a European systemically important financial institution, Deutsche Bank, between 2001 and 2015. According to our findings, the actual contribution by shareholders to bank equity capital was limited, while shareholder payout policies, including share buybacks and trading on its own shares, were both material. These findings raise concerns on the actual capacity by shareholder equity to assure protection against (residual) risk and loss absorption. Customer and investor protections appear to lay with bank entity equity dynamics. These findings have implications for bank financial sustainability and resilience, company capital maintenance, and regulatory capital requirements. Further developments based upon this innovative methodology may improve on existing prudential and accounting regulations.     

Manufacturing shareholder value: The role of accounting in organizational transformation

This paper explores the role of accounting calculations in constructing shareholder value within the context of organizational transformation in work organization. Using an intensive longitudinal case study (Conglom, a pseudonym), the paper relates innovation and experimentation in new forms of work organization to a drive for shareholder value creation. The priority given to shareholder value creation was articulated through a proliferation of accounting metrics and calculations that intermediated between the strategic preoccupation with securing financial profitability, as demonstrated by the share price, and the operational challenge of squeezing costs and improving margins to boost short-term performance through outsourcing, programme management and divestment. We interpret the discourse of shareholder value creation and the development of related accounting metrics as a hegemonic move which is central to the reassertion of capital – a development that, we contend, is symptomatic of a shift towards a more ‘despotic’ mode of capitalist reproduction [Burawoy, M., (1985). The politics of production. London: Verso], where the whip of the market, allied to notions of possessive individualism, free choice and self-determination, progressively replaces the velvet glove of the corporatist state.     

Dynamic capital structure and the contingent capital option

The financial crisis has emphasized the difficulties for financial companies to raise funds through conventional liabilities. In this environment, hybrid securities are becoming popular. In this paper we study the optimal capital structure of a company issuing a particular type of hybrid security: perpetual contingent capital, i.e., debt that converts into equity under some conditions. A two-period model with endogenous bankruptcy for a company with equity, straight debt and contingent capital is analyzed. We investigate the instrument under different conversion rules: automatic or optimally chosen by equity holders. We show that contingent capital reduces the coupon of straight debt and expected bankruptcy costs but can require a high spread. A trigger imposed by the regulatory authority in terms of par value of debt may induce a little use of contingent capital with an increase of bankruptcy costs.