Optimal Climate Change Policies When Governments Cannot Commit

We analyse the optimal design of climate change policies when a government wants to encourage the private sector to undertake significant immediate investment in developing cleaner technologies, but the relevant carbon taxes (or other environmental policies) that would incentivise such investment by firms will be set in the future. We assume that the current government cannot commit to long-term carbon taxes, and so both it and the private sector face the possibility that the government in power in the future may give different (relative) weight to environmental damage costs. We show that this lack of commitment has a significant asymmetric effect: it increases the social benefits of the current government to have the investment undertaken, but reduces the private benefit to the private sector to invest. Consequently the current government may need to use additional policy instruments—such as R&D subsidies—to stimulate the required investment.     

Using the allocation of emission permits for strategic trade purposes

We show that the presence of transaction costs in emission permit markets challenges the common presumption that grandfathering permits corresponds to lump-sum transfers with no strategic effects on output. Fixed transaction-costs influence firms’ decision to participate in the permits market, while variable transaction-costs affect firms’ output choice by creating a wedge between buyers’ and sellers’ opportunity cost of using permits. Thus, permit grandfathering can be used as a strategic trade instrument even when firms are price takers in the permit markets. Grandfathered permits differ from subsidies in that the stimulus they provide is bounded exogenously and rather limited.     

CROSS SUBSIDIZATION AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR WAGES

ABSTRACT 1 : This study has examined wage determination in the presence of cross‐subsidization of firms in the telecommunications industry. How variations in cross subsidies received, via the separations mechanism used in the industry, influence some firms to pay a greater level of wages is assessed. The firms studied have been almost the entire population of local exchange carriers in the US telecommunications industry between 1995 and 2000. The analysis has established that firms which are able to obtain greater cross‐subsidies, on average, in fact pay higher wages and the elasticity of the relationship is quite high. The study is the first of its kind assessing the relationship between an important regulatory variable that measures a ubiquitous process, such as cross subsidization, and the impact on employee wages.     

Additionality of public R&D grants in a transition economy

This paper examines the input and output additionality of public R&D subsidies in Western and Eastern Germany. We estimate the impact of public R&D grants on firms’ R&D and innovation input. Based on the results of this first step we compare the impact of publicly funded private R&D on innovation output with the output effect of R&D funded out of firms’ own pockets. We employ microeconometric evaluation methods using firm‐level data derived from the Mannheim Innovation Panel. Our results point towards a large degree of additionality in public R&D grants with regard to innovation input measured as R&D expenditures and innovation expenditures, as well as with regard to innovation output measured by patent applications. Input additionality has been more pronounced in Eastern Germany during the transition period than in Western Germany. However, R&D productivity is still larger for the established Western German innovation system than for Eastern Germany. Hence, a regional redistribution of public R&D subsidies might improve the overall innovation output of the German economy.     

Can Production Subsidies Explain China's Export Performance? Evidence from Firm‐level Data*

This paper analyses the relationship between production subsidies and firms’ export performance using a very comprehensive and recent firm‐level database and controlling for the endogeneity of subsidies. It documents robust evidence that production subsidies stimulate export activity at the intensive margin, although this effect is conditional on firm characteristics. In particular, the positive relationship between subsidies and the intensive margin of exports is strongest among profit‐making firms, firms in capital‐intensive industries, and those located in non‐coastal regions. Compared to firm characteristics, the extent of heterogeneity across ownership structure (SOEs, collectives, and privately owned firms) proves to be relatively less important.     

Spillovers,product innovation and R&D cooperation: a theoretical model

ABSTRACT

We analyze the impact of post-innovation knowledge spillovers on firms’ decisions to invest and cooperate in R&D, forming a research joint venture (RJV). We study the case of two potential investors involved in a non-tournament stochastic competition for developing a new but imitable product. We propose a theoretical model where cooperation may emerge as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of a three-stage game. In the first stage, firms decide whether to cooperate; in the second, they decide whether to invest; and in the third, they compete. We show that firms cooperate in R&D when the spillovers are high enough and the fixed costs associated with R&D activities are low enough; however, our analysis suggests that forming an RJV may not always be socially optimal, and subsidizing R&D cooperation may not be efficient. We propose an optimal scheme of subsidies, which should be designed according to the intensity of the spillovers, the level of the R&D costs, and the probability of innovation success. Finally, we show that in the case of mergers the private incentive to invest is maximized, and firms may not need public subsidies to cooperate. When subsidies are costly, not hindering mergers may be the second-best solution.     

Firm location decisions,regional grants and agglomeration externalities

We examine whether discretionary government grants influence where domestic and multinational firms locate new plants, and how the presence of agglomeration externalities interacts with these policy instruments. We find that a region's existing industrial structure has an effect on the location of new entrants. Grants do have a small effect in attracting plants to specific geographic areas, but importantly, we find that firms are less responsive to government subsidies in areas where there are fewer existing plants in their industry. This suggests that these subsidies are less effective in influencing firms' location decisions in the face of countervailing co-location benefits.     

A model of principal-agency control of wastes under technological progress

We analyze performance and outcome of principal-agency relationships in an environment with pollution externalities and technological progress. We assume that firms may not purposely violate the pollution control regulations but nonetheless generate some pollution due to negligence. The models allow firms two possible actions: either to increase the level of treated waste legally or pay an expected penalty if illegal pollution is detected. We show that in a world with pollution externalities, technological progress does not guarantee increases in the welfare level. Most important for policy purposes, the analysis shows the trade-offs between the policy instruments: penalties, taxes/subsidies and treatment costs in a world where technological progress occurs and firms may violate the law.     

Strategic spin-offs of input divisions

When a downstream producer enters backward into the input market, a “helping the rivals effect” exists: Such entry hurts the firm's downstream business as it increases upstream competition and thus benefits its rival downstream firms. This negative externality prevents the newly-created upstream unit from expanding. A spin-off enables the firm to credibly expand in the input market, thereby forcing its upstream competitors to behave less aggressively. Spin-offs occur in equilibrium if and only if the number of downstream firms exceeds a threshold level. When there is more than one integrated firm, a spin-off by a firm can trigger spin-offs by others that would not occur otherwise.     

Do subsidies have positive impacts on R&D and innovation activities at the firm level?

In this paper we analyze whether and how “research” and “development” subsidies influence private R&D activity. Our empirical results show that “research” subsidies stimulate R&D spending within firms while “development” subsidies substitute such spending. At the theoretical level we find empirical support for the market failure argument that private R&D expenditure is best stimulated in areas where the gap between the social and the private rate of return to R&D is high. A policy implication is that technology programs should support research projects in the private sector in order to stimulate to more R&D.     

Firm's objective function and product and process R&D

Firms undertake different kinds of R&D activities. They do product R&D (R&D aimed at improving the quality of existing products, and creating new products). They also do process R&D (R&D aimed at lowering the cost of making existing and new products). Moreover, firms often do both product and process R&D simultaneously. As far as the objective of firms is concerned, this need not be limited to profit-maximization only. Rather, firms may have a broader objective, where they care about profits as well as consumer surplus. This paper studies effects of a firm having a general objective function (that takes into consideration both profits and consumer surplus) on its product and process R&D choices, and corresponding implications.I consider product and process R&D choices of firms in an infinite horizon set-up with discrete time. Firms in my framework can simultaneously do both product and process R&D in every period, face a discrete-choice model of consumer demand with vertical product differentiation, and maximize a discounted, weighted sum of their profits and consumer surplus over the infinite time horizon.I show how process and product R&D differ from each other in my framework, and the role of a firm's objective function in this regard. I compare process and product R&D choices across firms that differ in their objective function, and illustrate effects of providing general R&D subsidies (subsidies given for any R&D, regardless of whether it is product or process R&D) to firms. I also characterize how in my framework, the choice of process R&D in total R&D — R&D composition — by an individual firm varies over time, and how process and product R&D choices, process and product R&D productivity, and the choice of R&D composition vary across firms that differ in size but are otherwise similar.     

Time-consistent subsidies to unlucky firms

This paper examines government subsidies that prevent unlucky firms from going out of business. Subsidies can save jobs and prevent an increase in unemployment insurance expenditures, but they modify the incentives of the firms to exert adequate effort. If firms expect to obtain help, they may not undertake enough effort to decrease the probability of needing help. The cost-minimizing government must therefore trade off the savings in unemployment insurance expenditures against the increased bill in subsidies to the firms. The analysis shows that this trade-off is significantly affected by the level of commitment of the government; if the government cannot commit to a future subsidy policy, the level of subsidies will be unambiguously higher, the level of effort by the firms lower, and the number of firms making losses higher than if the government could so commit.     

A matching analysis of why some firms in peripheral regions undertake R&D whereas others do not

Many studies have established the importance of investment in R&D to facilitate innovation and consequently improve firm productivity. Firms decide whether or not to undertake R&D depending on a range of factors such as market orientation, business objectives, competitive advantages and absorptive capacity. This paper studies the factors that influence this decision in peripheral locations; and for firms that do not undertake R&D, we analyse the reasons for not doing so. The research is based on data from a survey of some 250 matched firms operating in Northern Ireland, about half undertaking R&D and half not. Northern Ireland is an interesting case study because it exhibits a low level of investment in R&D despite the public subsidies and policy initiatives that have existed over the last 30 years. For firms that undertake R&D, our results mostly confirm the findings of others while for firms that do not undertake R&D the results point to a capabilities-gap rather than a resource-gap as the fundamental problem. Policy conclusions are drawn as to what might be done to boost both the amount of R&D undertaken and the number of firms engaged in R&D in peripheral regions.     

补贴对中国企业出口行为的影响——基于配对倍差法的经验分析

文章利用配对倍差法控制内生性后,基于新新贸易理论,利用1999-2007年中国工业企业微观数据,经验分析了补贴对企业是否出口及出口规模的影响。分析结论是,补贴显著提升了企业的出口可能性和出口规模;相对于未补贴企业,补贴企业出口概率增长率高出30%-110%,出口规模增长率高出30%-50%;对外资企业的影响大于本土企业,对私营企业的影响大于国有企业;但补贴对出口规模的影响在入世后特别是近年来才显现。这意味着补贴对出口的影响可能存在门槛效应。从政策层面看,尽管政府可以通过补贴等政策手段帮助企业走出国门,但要在国际市场实现持续增长仍要靠企业自身的核心竞争力。     

Regulations and Technology Diffusion: Cross Subsidies and Digital Infrastructure Creation

Using contemporary historical data, the analysis has examined the impact of cross‐subsidization on technology diffusion within telecommunications networks for local exchange sector telecommunications firms in the United States for the years 1995 to 2000. Firms obtaining greater cross‐subsidies engage in greater technology diffusion via network modernization using digital technologies. Contingent on the institutional setting, cross subsidies have risen. These amounts have been put to relevant use in the diffusion of technology via deployment of digital infrastructure. The principles of subsidization are considered negatively as they have presumed anti‐competitive consequences. In technology diffusion they have played a positive role, as the evidence shows. From a radical subjectivist perspective, cross subsidies generate financial capital for firms, which permits them to deploy high quality technology investments such as broadband and these investments can be used for entrepreneurial experiments in providing several customer services.     

Heterogeneous firms,corporate taxes and export behavior: A firm-level investigation for Italy

This paper analyses the effect of home corporate taxes on a firm’s decision to expand the scale of its activity through exports using a rich dataset on Italian firms. Starting out from the observation that firms’ export activity vary greatly among them and tend to be systematically related to firm’s characteristics, we relate differences in firms’ export choices to firm level incidence of corporate taxes. Our results suggest that (i) corporate taxes matter at both the extensive and the intensive margin and (ii) higher corporate taxes may increase the probability of new firms’ entry in the foreign market while they decrease the export intensity of incumbent exporters.     

Does Firm Size make a Difference? Analysing the Effectiveness of R&D Subsidies in East Germany

We analyse the impact of public subsidies on private sector research and development (R&D) activity for a sample of East German firms. Using propensity score matching, our empirical results indicate that subsidized firms indeed show a higher level of R&D intensity (R&D expenditures relative to total turnover) and a higher probability for patent application compared with non‐subsidized firms. We find that, on average, the R&D intensity increases from 1.5% to 3.9%. The probability of patent application rises from 20% to 40%. These results closely match earlier empirical findings for East Germany. Given the fact that the East German innovation system is particularly driven by small‐ and medium‐sized enterprises (SMEs), we draw special attention to the effectiveness of R&D subsidies for this latter subgroup. Here, no specific empirical evidence is available so far. Our findings indicate that policy effectiveness also holds for private R&D activity of SMEs, with the highest increase in terms of R&D intensity being estimated for microbusinesses with up to ten employees.     

Soviet subsidization of Eastern Europe: The primacy of economics over politics?

The level and distribution of Soviet subsidies to various East European countries, which Marrese and Vaňous attribute in their book Soviet Subsidization of Trade with Eastern Europe: A Soviet Perspective to political considerations, are explained here as, for the most part, the normal outcomes of the economic integration of a bloc with relative resource endowment differing from those obtaining in the rest of the world. The statistical methods used by Marrese and Various to calculate the subsidies are also criticized.     

R&D subsidies in a model of growth with dynamic market structure

This paper presents the effects of an R&D subsidy in a Schumpeterian general equilibrium model with rich industry dynamics. R&D subsidies raise the long-run growth rate, but they also raise the level of industry concentration. In the model firms compete for market share through process R&D endogenously determining the market structure within and across industries. Endogeneity of the market structure allows for analysis of changes in the moments of the firm size distribution in response to policy. R&D subsidies primarily benefit large incumbent firms who increase their innovation rates creating a greater technological barrier to entry. Concentration increases with fewer firms and a higher variance in the market shares. In general equilibrium, the greater distortions in the product market cause the wage rate to fall which leads to increased turnover rates. In addition, the analysis demonstrates that the model captures a large number of empirical regularities described in the industrial organization literature, but absent from most endogenous growth models. These features, such as entering firms are small relative to incumbents, the hazard rate of exit is negatively related to firm size, and large firms spend more on R&D than small firms play important roles in understanding the impact of R&D subsidies on the economy.