政府在社会博弈中的角色与作用——一个基于霍布斯、洛克理论的模型分析

文章基于霍布斯和洛克的理论框架,讨论了政府在社会博弈中的角色和作用,并且阐发了社会博弈中政府与公民所面临的策略选择及均衡结果的社会意义,尤其对于社会契约关系中退出机制的安排和由此引发的重新谈判问题进行了深入的思考,为进一步研究关于社会契约的治理及其结构性安排等问题奠定了基础.     

Default Service Auctions

In February 2002, New Jersey completed a market process whereby the utilities were able to purchase one-year forward contracts to ensure energy needs for their default service customers for a one-year period. The auction was the first application of the simultaneous descending clock auction to power procurement. We chose this auction format to fit the specific needs of the New Jersey Electric Discount and Energy Competition Act and the New Jersey Board of Public Utilities mandate for a competitive bidding process to procure the electricity to meet the electric utilities default service obligations.     

中美政府采购制度之比较与借鉴

美国是世界上政府采购制度最完善的国家之一,其发展历程与管理模式对于政府采购尚处于起步阶段的中国来说,颇具实践上的借鉴意义。中国应加快建设政府采购法律体系,扩大政府采购的规模和范围,适当扩大部门集中采购的范围,构建覆盖全国的政府采购电子交易平台,建立自律与他律相结合的监管机制。     

Sequential versus Bundle Auctions for Recurring Procurement

We compare sequential and bundle procurement auctions in a framework of successive procurement situations, where current success positively or negatively affects future market opportunities. We find that in bundle auctions procurement cost is lower and less risky than in sequential standard auctions, but still higher than in the optimal sequential auction. Only a sequential second price auction leads to the efficient outcome.     

‘An Incomplete Contract Approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance’ – Commitment vs. Flexibility

In this paper, we take an incomplete contract approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance between the European Commission (EC) and any heavily debt member state, Greece in particular. Incomplete contract approach makes possible to put a long process of Eurozone Fiscal Governance into an extensive form game in which a renegotiation procedure is incorporated. We theoretically reveal the conflict of interests between the EC (Germany) and Greece over the Greek debt repayment plan proposed in 2015. We show that the Greek’s position is consistent with incomplete contract theory, but that the EC (Germany) does not allow the renegotiation for restructuring for growth-oriented debt repayment program proposed by the Greek government because the EC (Germany) judges that the commitment effect (on fiscal austerity) is greater than the flexibility one (pro-growth effect). This will undoubtedly provide a novel and interesting approach to Eurozone Fiscal Governance.     

企业战略联盟的稳定性研究——基于不完全契约理论的视角

本文在总结企业战略联盟稳定性理论研究的基础上,从不完全契约理论的视角出发,运用不完全契约理论的GHM模型对企业战略联盟的稳定性进行分析,并在此基础上提出联盟不完全契约治理的一些思考。     

我国高校实施政府采购制度存在的问题及其对策

我国《政府采购法》颁布实施以来,高等学校的基建工程和教学仪器设备等物资采购逐步纳入了政府采购的范围,而传统采购模式下物权管理混乱、资金使用率和采购透明度不高、采购预算盲目等问题得到了初步解决.但由于政府采购在高校推行的时间较短、缺乏经验,存在亟待解决的问题.因此,应结合高校当前采购工作的特点,规范政府采购行为,建立配套的资金管理模式,做好年度预算编制,提高资金使用效率,使政府采购工作更好地为教学科研服务.     

Competition in the economic crisis: Analysis of procurement auctions

We study the effects of the recent economic crisis on firms׳ bidding behavior and markups in sealed bid auctions. Using data from Austrian construction procurements, we estimate bidders׳ construction costs within a private value auction model. We find that markups of all bids submitted decrease by 1.5 percentage points in the recent economic crisis, markups of winning bids decrease by 3.3 percentage points. We also find that without the government stimulus package this decrease would have been larger. These two pieces of evidence point to pro-cyclical markups.     

基于采购协议价格的VMI协调机制研究

供应商管理库存（VMI）是供应链上库存管理的一种新思路。在VMI模式下,供应商共享零售商的库存信息,从整体上进行决策以降低供应链的总体成本。但由于商承担了零售商的库存管理,获得的利润可能会减少,从而造成其责任和利益的不统一。基于单一供应商和单一零售商的两阶段模型,假定顾客需求随机并且允许缺货,在分析VMI实施前后双方利润变化的基础上,提出了协议价格这种供应链协调机制,以保证VMI的有效实施。     

政府采购支持自主创新的经济学分析

自主创新是中国政府的国家战略,政府采购被视为落实这一战略的重要手段.从经济学上分析,由于外部效应的存在,自主创新需要政府扶持;而政府采购以其独特的内在效应,成为支持自主创新的有效手段.     

进入权、声誉与服务外包组织治理——一个非对称信息的不完全契约模型

服务外包作为一种介于市场和企业之间的中间组织形态,在人力资本密集型的服务交易治理中有其独到的优势。本文基于进入权和声誉两种治理机制,从静态和动态两个层面为服务外包组织治理搭建了一个框架模型。在静态模型中,通过对市场、外包和企业三种组织的比较制度分析得出,虽然三种组织形式都不可能达到社会最优的专用性人力资本投资激励水平,但基于进入权治理的服务外包组织可以得到次优的激励效果。在动态模型中,通过引入不对称信息和声誉机制,证明了在长期合作条件下,服务外包组织可获得社会最优的专用性人力资本投资激励水平。     

Creating competition out of thin air: An experimental study of right-to-choose auctions

This paper presents an experimental study of a mechanism that is commonly used to sell multiple heterogeneous goods. The novel feature of this procedure is that instead of selling each good in a separate auction, the seller executes a single auction in which buyers, who may be interested in completely different goods, compete for the right to choose a good. We provide experimental evidence that a Right-to-Choose (RTC) auction can generate more revenue than the theoretically optimal auction. Moreover, in contrast to the “optimal” auction, the RTC auction is approximately efficient in the sense that the surplus it generates is close to the maximal one. Furthermore, a seller who would like to retain some of his goods can generate more revenue with a restricted RTC auction in which not all rights-to-choose are sold, than with the theoretically optimal auction.     

基于政府采购支持自主创新目的的企业自主创新能力评价体系研究

政府采购支持自主创新是政府增强国内企业自主创新能力的重要政策措施之一,该措施的顺利实施必然要求政府建立企业自主创新能力评价体系,以对不同企业的自主创新实力和潜力进行评价。本文基于企业自主创新能力与研发能力、生产能力和营销能力的关系,构建了基于政府采购支持自主创新目的的企业自主创新能力评价指标体系。     

政府采购与企业创新的作用关系及边界条件探究[ ]——来自Meta分析的证据

针对政府采购与企业创新的作用关系和研究分歧,以创新链划分企业创新活动,对41篇文献进行Meta分析发现：政府采购与技术研发中度正相关,与成果转化强正相关;融资约束与信号传递在政府采购与技术研发关系中具有部分中介作用,且信号传递部分中介了政府采购与成果转化的关系。文化背景仅负向调节了政府采购与技术研发的关系,产业类型对这一关系具有正向调节作用;政府采购协定（GPA）参与方属性及其与长期导向的交互均正向调节政府采购与企业创新的关系;数据特征负向调节政府采购与企业创新的关系。以上结论验证并拓展了相关研究,为企业创新管理研究和政府采购政策设计提供了参考。     

高校政府采购中的风险及其防范

作为政府采购的重要组成部分,高校政府采购在其发展过程中面临着更多的风险,如时间风险、预算风险、信息风险、价格风险、腐败风险等。因此,分析这些风险形成的成因,采取灵活多样的采购方式,强化预算编制,提高信息透明度,辅之以加强监督检查,才能更有效地强化对高校政府采购风险的控制与管理。     

中国经济发展中的中央与地方政府边界研究——基于不完全契约理论的视角

本文从不完全契约理论的视角分析了中央政府和地方政府的关系,并且基于此从经济效率的角度分析了中央政府与地方政府的边界.我们的分析表明,集权会损害地方政府的积极性,分权会提高地方政府的积极性;中央政府究竟是采用集权还是采用分权,除了要考虑中央政府和地方政府相互之间的外部性外,还要考虑基准到底是中央政府的效用函数还是社会总效用函数.中央政府和地方政府的边界会随着经济的发展而不断变迁,这个变迁过程是一个效率改进的过程.     

Multiple-unit English auctions

This paper examines the outcome of an ascending-price multiple-unit auction. Two bidders, facing continuous, downward-sloping demand functions, participate in the auction of some divisible objects. The auctioneer starts the process by announcing an initial price and asking both bidders to submit sealed-bids of desired quantities. The auctioneer increases the price until the total amount bid for is less than the total supply. We compute the outcome of this auction game under full information and suggest that this mechanism may not maximize expected revenue.