Who provides the capital for Chinese growth: the public or the private sector?

We focus on the role of the government in the provision of investment in China, through the medium of a Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium model of the economy in which the form of the production function reflects this governmental role. Using indirect inference, we estimate and test for the elasticity of substitution between government and nongovernment capital in both Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) and Cobb–Douglas technologies. The results underscore the strong substitution relationship between government and nongovernment capital from 1949, supporting CES rather than the Cobb–Douglas technology. They also show that the orientation of public investment changed after the start of the ‘Socialist Market Economy’ in 1992: government capital became more complementary to nongovernment capital as it focused more on infrastructure and withdrew from industrial production, intervening only in times of crisis, for stabilization purposes, indirectly via the state banks.     

Is tied aid bad for the recipient countries?

This paper examines the welfare effects of the exclusivity of foreign aid taking consideration of donor countries' strategic and self-interested economic motivations. Based on an oligopolistic model with strategic interactions between firms and governments providing foreign aid, we demonstrate that a higher exclusivity of foreign aid, taking the form of tied aid, increases the equilibrium amount of aid and the social welfare of the recipient country when the foreign aid policies are decided in a non-cooperative fashion between donor countries. However, when donor countries coordinate aid policies to maximize joint-welfare including recipient country's welfare, the lower exclusivity of foreign aid, taking the form of untied aid, will increase the equilibrium amount of aid and the global social welfare. The results implicate that when a credible enforcement mechanism for the cooperative regime for foreign aid is not available, tied aid is welfare dominant policy for both donor and recipient countries than untied aid.     

Saving the public from the private? Incentives and outcomes in dual practice

We consider a monopoly physician offering free public treatment and, if allowed, a private treatment for which patients have to pay out of pocket. While patients differ in the propensity to benefit from private treatment it always yields better health outcomes than public treatment but is also more costly in terms of money and time. We study the physician's supply of private care and allocation of time costs across public and private patients and contrast these with the first‐best allocation. To increase the willingness‐to‐pay for private treatment the physician shifts time costs to public patients. While this turns out to be socially optimal, the resulting positive network effect leads to an over‐provision of private care if time costs are sufficiently high. A second‐best allocation arises when the health authority sets public reimbursement but has no control over private provision. Depending on the welfare weight the health authority attaches to physician profits, a ban of dual practice may improve on the second‐best allocation. Notably, a ban benefits not only public patients but also private patients with a moderate propensity to benefit from private care.     

Public–private wage differentials in Turkey: public policy or market dynamics?

We evaluate public–private sector wage differentials by gender in Turkey between the years 2005 and 2013. Using micro data from Household Labor Force Surveys we find a positive premium for low wage earners and a penalty of working in the public sector at the higher end of the distribution. Although the penalty has not disappeared, the price effect has increased at both ends of the distribution. The increase at the lower tail is attributed to a higher price effect in the public sector, whereas at the higher tail it has been a result of a relatively uneven wage increase in the private sector along the distribution, rather than an explicit public wage policy.     

Does the reliability of institutions affect public good contributions? Evidence from a laboratory experiment

Reliable institutions, i.e., institutions that live up to the norms that agents expect them to keep foster cooperative behavior. We experimentally confirm this hypothesis in a public goods game with a salient norm that cooperation was socially demanded and corruption ought not to occur. When nevertheless corruption attempts came up, groups that were told that ‘the system’ had fended off the attempts made considerably higher contributions to the public good than groups that learned that attempts only did not affect their payoffs or that were not exposed to corruption at all.     

Child abuse: Does public enforcement crowd out private vigilance?

We investigate whether increased public reporting of child abuse crowds out private reporting. We find, despite theoretical models suggesting significant crowding out, that public and private reports have risen nearly equiproportionately and that crowding out is small and not significant.     

Why did the Austro-Hungarian Empire collapse? A public choice perspective

In this paper, we seek to identify causes of the disintegration of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. We note that great salience was attached to issues of self-governance and autonomy of the numerous ethnic groups living within the Empire. From a public choice perspective, the Empire was an over-centralised state and there were clear gains from federalising it. However, such federalisation was not feasible because of the collective action problem arising in bargaining with the central government. Furthermore, the move towards the war economy and the empowerment of the executive state provided the last drop leading to the exit of ethnic minorities from the monarchy and to the ultimate demise of the Empire.

Do risk and competition trigger conditional cooperation? Evidence from public good experiments

We investigate the effect of intra-group competition and risk marginal per capita returns on subjects' cooperative behavior in a one-shot public good game—following the well-known approach proposed by Fischbacher, Gächter, and Fehr (2001) and extending the Colasante et al. (2018, 2019) parametrization. We study the interaction between environment and social preferences and test the existence of a causal relationship of risk and competition over cooperative behavior when an individual's benefit of the public good is heterogeneous and uncertain. Our results report experimental evidence about competition fostering cooperative behavior leading to a rise in contribution for all the subjects regardless of their social preferences. However, risk has a detrimental effect on cooperative behavior due to encouraging free riding.     

Does innovation help the good or the poor performing firms?

Using firm-level innovation data we find surprising results on the benefits of innovation. Only manufacturing firms with below average productivity growth are likely to benefits significantly from successful innovation, while faster growing firms do not gain additional benefits from innovating.     

Is diversity good or bad? Evidence from eSports teams analysis

We use eSports data to construct an empirical model to measure the effect of diversity on team performance. Different kinds of diversities are considered, diversity of culture, diversity of language and diversity of skill. Our main results are that cultural diversity is beneficial for team performance: the absence of diversity reduces performance by 30%. However, language and experience diversity negatively affect results. Taking the difference in the results into account, we conclude that firms should not thoughtlessly maximize team diversity: different kinds of diversity have different integration and communication costs.     

Is the value of an environmental public good sensitive to the providing institution?

In this paper we examine whether stated preferences and Willingness To Pay estimates, obtained in a choice experiment, are sensitive to the institutional context in which the good under evaluation is provided. Specifically, we examine the effects on valuation from employing two different institutions, an authority under the supervision of the National government and an authority under the supervision of an international body, the European Commission, as responsible for the design and implementation of a forest restoration project following a split sample approach. We find that coefficients of the utility model and Willingness To Pay estimates for all attributes are not statistically different between the two treatments. This is so despite the significant differences in the trust levels reported for the two institutions. We speculate that our results reflect the significance of the environmental good to the citizens given its local nature and the sheer size of the fire disaster.     

Is NGO aid not so different after all? Comparing the allocation of Swiss aid by private and official donors

Being closer to the poor, NGOs are widely believed to provide better targeted aid than state agencies. But empirical evidence is largely lacking. We contribute to closing this gap by drawing on an exceptionally detailed Swiss database that covers different forms of NGO aid and several official aid benchmarks. The Tobit estimations account for both altruistic and selfish aid motivations. Whether or not NGOs provide better targeted aid depends on the source of NGO funding as well as the choice of the official benchmark. In contrast to widespread belief, however, the allocation of self-financed NGO aid reveals striking similarities to the allocation of official Swiss development aid.     

Hospital utilization in mixed public–private system: evidence from Australian hospital data

This article investigates whether patients who used a mixture of private and public hospital care have higher total hospital utilization than those who exclusively used either public or private hospital care. Using Australian hospital administrative data of heart disease patients, we found that those who used a mixture of private and public care had the highest total hospital utilization. Our findings are robust to how utilization is measured and endogeneity between utilization and hospital type choice.     

Do remittances and foreign aid augment the gross savings: Bangladesh,India and Philippines perspective?

Savings is considered to be a principal determinant to achieve long-run economic growth. Remittances and foreign aid are two important foreign capital inflows to meet the savings deficiency of developing nations. The objective of this study is to investigate the long-run impact of remittance to stimulate savings in remittance recipient countries. This paper contributes to the macroeconomic impact of remittance through a comparative study on Bangladesh, India and Philippines that positioned among the top ten largest remittance recipient countries from 2008 and onwards. The analysis makes use of an annual time series data over the period of 1980–2015. The Johansen cointegration test suggested long-run cointegrating relationship of remittance and foreign aid on gross savings. The test result suggests positive effect of remittances on gross savings for Bangladesh and Philippines although an insignificant negative effect for India. However, foreign aid has significant negative long-run impact in all the three cases. Government policy should focus on leveraging remittance flows to facilitate savings and investment for capital accumulation.     

Courses or individual counselling: does job search assistance work?

How does labour market policy affect welfare recipients and long-term unemployed people? We investigate whether job search assistance (JSA) helps disadvantaged individuals to find jobs and whether courses or individual counselling is more successful in reaching this goal. To evaluate individual employment effects, we apply a quasi-experimental design and construct suitable comparison groups using propensity score matching methods. We compare participants to nonparticipants as well as participants of both schemes directly. Our article benefits from access to rich administrative data from the German Federal Employment Agency. When comparing participants to nonparticipants, results suggest that the individual JSA does not affect participants’ employment prospects at all and that the course JSA even decreased their employment chances. At the same time, differences in these effects can be ascribed to programme design differences and to differences in the groups of participants. Therefore, we compare both programmes directly to each other, that is, we use the other programme participants as a comparison group, respectively. We found some evidence that individual JSA performs better than course JSA.     

When do better schools raise housing prices? Evidence from Paris public and private schools

In this paper, we investigate how housing prices react to the quality of education offered by neighboring public and private schools. The organization of secondary schooling in the city of Paris, which combines residence-based assignment to public schools with a well-developed and almost entirely publicly funded private school system, offers a valuable empirical context for analyzing how private schools affect the capitalization of public school performance in housing prices. Using comprehensive data on both schools and real estate transactions over the period 1997–2004, we develop a matching framework to carefully compare sales across school attendance boundaries. We find that a standard deviation increase in public school performance raises housing prices by 1.4 to 2.4%. Moreover, we show that the capitalization of public school performance in the price of real estate shrinks as the availability of private schools increases in the neighborhood. Our results confirm the predictions of general equilibrium models of school choice that private schools, by providing an advantageous outside option to parents, tend to mitigate the impact of public school performance on housing prices.     

Changing aid regimes? U.S. foreign aid from the Cold War to the War on Terror

This paper explores how U.S. bilateral economic aid has changed over time, focusing on how the recent era-in which the War on Terror has played a prominent role in the Bush administration's aid policy-differs from previous eras. In particular, has the renewed geopolitical role of aid coincided with a reduction of aid to the poorest countries or less weight on need in U.S. aid allocation decisions? We start with an analysis of annual U.S. aid budgets from 1955 to 2006. Controlling for domestic political and economic conditions, we find that the War on Terror's effect on the aid budget is significantly larger than is immediately apparent. To explore how the emphasis on need may have changed over time, we use country-level panel data on aid allocations to 119 countries across the same time period. This shows that U.S. aid flows-for the poorest as well as other developing countries-increased with the War on Terror. However, after rising for 35 years, the emphasis placed on need has been falling steadily for core aid recipients during the War on Terror.     

On the reduced macroeconomic volatility of the Australian economy: Good policy or good luck?

The Australian economy has experienced various changes in macroeconomic conditions over the past four decades. These changes have been associated with reduced volatility in key macroeconomic variables: CPI inflation, real GDP and the TWI measured real exchange rate. In light of this fact, my objective in this paper is to determine whether this reduction is associated with good policy or good luck. To this end, I estimate a time varying structural VAR model that is identified with theoretically consistent sign restrictions from a small open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model. The primary result is that both non-systematic and systematic monetary policy have changed over the past four decades. In particular, non-systematic responses of inflation, real GDP and the exchange rate have increased since the adoption of a flexible exchange rate in 1983, while systematic responses of the cash rate to inflation have experienced various changes in intensities, exhibiting a trend towards a more passive behaviour since the 2007/08 financial crisis. Taken together, these results suggest that the reduction in macroeconomic volatility is associated with good policy.     

Does the crowding-in effect of public spending on private consumption undermine neoclassical models?

Empirical evidence from vector autoregressions (VARs) showing that public spending shocks crowd in private consumption has been seen as evidence against standard neoclassical models of the business cycle. We show that a standard real business cycle model in which all agents including the government optimize is compatible with the results from the empirical literature. A VAR estimated using artificial data simulated from the model indicates that, under standard assumptions to identify public spending shocks, an increase in public spending is associated with an increase in private consumption and the real wage. The implied impulse responses are qualitatively and quantitatively similar to those in the empirical literature.