Are analysts' cash flow forecasts useful?

This study provides evidence that the cost of equity capital decreases with the number of analysts who issue both cash flow and earnings forecasts (cash analysts). The evidence also shows that cash analysts reduce information asymmetry and predict long‐term earnings more accurately than analysts who issue only earnings forecasts. Taken together, these findings suggest that cash analysts provide market participants with high‐quality information and, as a result, firms benefit from cash analyst coverage in the form of a reduced cost of equity capital.     

Do investors care about corporate taxes?

This paper conducts a comprehensive examination of the link between corporation tax payment and financial performance in the UK. We find no discernible link between tax rates and stock returns for the UK, no matter how tax payment is measured. This is true throughout the sample period and for both customer-facing and non-customer-facing companies. However, allowing for industry norms and a host of firm characteristics, companies with lower effective tax rates have significantly higher levels of stock market risk. Firms that are reported in the newspapers in a negative way in relation to their level of corporation tax payment experience small negative stock returns, which are partially reversed within a month. However, the initial negative effects and subsequent rebound are both more pronounced for smaller companies. News announcements of the potential involvement of a firm in a corporate inversion (expatriation) result in steeper and much longer-lasting falls in share prices, whereas news stories of a more general nature relating to a firm's tax avoidance or tax payments have little noticeable effect.     

How does investor relations disclosure affect analysts' forecasts?

We study the relationship between investor relations disclosure and analyst forecast properties in Australian firms, a setting dominated by small firms with limited analyst coverage and requiring continuous disclosure of price sensitive information. We find increasing disclosure in the time period investigated is associated with greater accuracy in firms disclosing fewer items. Disclosure was unrelated to forecast dispersion, possibly due to the low analyst following. In periods of uncertainty, the investor relations awards effectively discriminated quality from quantity of disclosure. These findings highlight the importance of active communication with analysts, particularly in firms providing less disclosure and during periods of uncertainty.     

Do financial analysts' long-term growth forecasts matter? Evidence from stock recommendations and career outcomes

Prior literature portrays long-term growth (LTG) forecasts as nonsensical from a valuation perspective. Instead, we hypothesize that LTG forecasts signal high effort and ability to analyze firms' long-term prospects. We document stronger market response to stock recommendation revisions of analysts who publish accompanying LTG forecasts. We also hypothesize and find that these analysts are less likely to leave the profession or move to smaller brokerage houses. Consistent with Reg. FD's intention to promote fundamental analysis of long-term earnings prospects, post-Reg. FD observations drive our results. Overall, we identify previously undocumented benefits accruing to analysts who publish LTG forecasts.     

Do tax benefits conferred to Sub-S banks affect their deposit or loan rates?

Positive economics predicts that Sub-S banks, with no taxes paid at the corporate level, will price their products lower than otherwise identical C corporation banks in a competitive environment. Alternatively, if banks price bundle their products, Sub-S tax benefits might have little (no) effect on product rates. The empirical analysis finds that Sub-S deposit (loan) rates are equal to or lower (higher) than similar C corporation bank rates. Thus, there is little evidence of any tax benefits accruing to Sub-S bank customers. In contrast, tax-exempt credit unions do offer higher deposit rates and lower loan rates than C corporation banks.     

Do banks overstate their Value-at-Risk?

This paper is the first empirical study of banks’ risk management systems based on non-anonymous daily Value-at-Risk (VaR) and profit-and-loss data. Using actual data from the six largest Canadian commercial banks, we uncover evidence that banks exhibit a systematic excess of conservatism in their VaR estimates. The data used in this paper have been extracted from the banks’ annual reports using an innovative Matlab-based data extraction method. Out of the 7354 trading days analyzed in this study, there are only two exceptions, i.e. days when the actual loss exceeds the disclosed VaR, whereas the expected number of exceptions with a 99% VaR is 74. For each sample bank, we extract from historical VaRs a risk-overstatement coefficient, ranging between 19 and 79%. We attribute VaR overstatement to several factors, including extreme cautiousness and underestimation of diversification effects when aggregating VaRs across business lines and/or risk categories. We also discuss the economic and social cost of reporting inflated VaRs.     

Do banks fuel climate change?

Do climate-oriented regulatory policies affect the flow of credit towards polluting firms? We match loan-level data to firm-level greenhouse gas emissions to assess the impact of the Paris Agreement. We find that, following this agreement, European banks reallocated credit away from polluting firms in relative terms. Specifically, euro area banks’ loan share to more polluting firms decreased by about 3percentage points compared to less polluting (or “green”) firms after the 2015 Paris Agreement (COP21). This result is stronger for banks that are well capitalized, have lower credit quality, and are less profitable.     

Are banks happy when managers go long? The information content of managers’ vested option holdings for loan pricing

While traditional finance theory holds that managers with option-laden incentive contracts may favor equity at the expense of debt, a risk-averse manager may be more likely to retain vested in-the-money options if the manager has private information that the firm's risk-adjusted performance will be better. It follows that vested option holdings should be positively associated with credit quality. In support of this, we find that vested option holdings have a strong negative association with loan pricing, especially for informationally sensitive loans, and also predict higher cash flows and credit ratings, a greater distance to default, and lower equity volatility.     

Do banks price their informational monopoly?

Theory suggests that banks’ private information lets them hold up borrowers for higher interest rates. Since new information about a firm is revealed at the time of its bond IPO, it follows that banks will be forced to adjust their loan interest rates downwards after firms undertake their bond IPO. We test this hypothesis and find that firms are able to borrow at lower interest rates after their bond IPO. Importantly, firms that get their first credit rating at the time of their bond IPO benefit from larger interest rate savings than those that already had a credit rating. These findings provide support for the hypothesis that banks price their informational monopoly. We also find that it is costly for firms to enter the public bond market.     

Are analysts’ earnings forecasts more accurate when accompanied by cash flow forecasts?

We examine whether analysts’ earnings forecasts are more accurate when they also issue cash flow forecasts. We find that (i) analysts’ earnings forecasts issued together with cash flow forecasts are more accurate than those not accompanied by cash flow forecasts, and (ii) analysts’ earnings forecasts reflect a better understanding of the implications of current earnings for future earnings when they are accompanied by cash flow forecasts. These results are consistent with analysts adopting a more structured and disciplined approach to forecasting earnings when they also issue cash flow forecasts. Finally, we find that more accurate cash flow forecasts decrease the likelihood of analysts being fired, suggesting that cash flow forecast accuracy is relevant to analysts’ career outcomes.     

Do investors care about credit ratings? An analysis through the cycle

We investigate how the credit cycle affects the link between bond spreads and credit ratings. Using a simple model of the credit assessment process, we show that when the debt market is more opaque, the information content of ratings deteriorates, creating an incentive for investors to increase the amount spent on private information. We test this hypothesis empirically. Results show that when market opaqueness (proxied by the spread between Aaa- and Baa-rated bonds) increases, the explanatory power of ratings and other control variables deteriorates as investors increasingly price in non-public information.     

Do financial markets care about SRI? Evidence from mergers and acquisitions

Mergers and acquisitions offer a framework for shedding new light on the stock market performance of socially responsible investments (SRI). We use Innovest’s Intangible Value Assessment (IVA) ratings as a measure of firms’ ability to cope with social and environmental risks. The IVA ratings allow us to uncover a positive relation between acquirer gains and the level of the target’s social and environmental risk management practices. Our findings suggest that the stock market rewards the acquirer for making socially and environmentally responsible investments. We also document that the environmental and social performance of the acquirer increases following the acquisition of a SRI aware target. These results are consistent with acquirer learning from the target’s SRI practices and experiences.     

Do public banks have a competitive advantage?

Public banks are often blamed to possess an unfair competitive advantage in the form of lower funding costs due to a state guarantee on their deposits. However, public and private banks tend to differ not only in their funding costs, but also in the way they deal with borrowers in financial distress. The model presented in this paper shows that if banks differ in these two characteristics, a separation of borrowers may result, with public banks lending to risky firms and private banks lending to safe firms. This separation can explain differences in the lending behavior and performance of public and private banks as observed in the market. Interestingly, the separation may persist even when funding costs are equal, implying that an abolition of state guarantees will not necessarily lead to identical performance of the two types of banks.     

Do small businesses still prefer community banks?

We formulate and test hypotheses about the role of bank type – small versus large, single-market versus multimarket, and local versus nonlocal banks – in banking relationships. The conventional paradigm suggests that “community banks” – small, single-market, local institutions – are better able to form strong relationships with informationally opaque small businesses, while “megabanks” – large, multimarket, nonlocal institutions – tend to serve more transparent firms. Using the 2003 Survey of Small Business Finance (SSBF), we conduct two sets of tests. First, we test for the type of bank serving as the “main” relationship bank for small businesses with different firm and owner characteristics. Second, we test for the strength of these main relationships by examining the probability of an exclusive relationship and main bank relationship length as functions of main bank type and financial fragility, as well as firm and owner characteristics. The results are often not consistent with the conventional paradigm, perhaps because of changes in lending technologies and deregulation of the banking industry.     

Discussion of “Are earnings forecasts more accurate when accompanied by cash flow forecasts?”

Call et al. (Rev Account Stud 2009, this issue) demonstrate that, relative to analysts who issue earnings but not cash flow forecasts, analysts who issue both forecasts (i) produce relatively more accurate earnings forecasts, (ii) have a better understanding of the persistence of current earnings, and (iii) are less likely to get fired. In my discussion, I highlight some general challenges facing research on analyst cash flow forecasts, demonstrate the diminishing difference in the relative accuracy over time (including its compete elimination by 2004), and examine the sensitivity of some of the evidence in Call et al. (2009) to the age of the forecast and to the presence of extreme bad-news earnings surprises.     

Forecasting exchange rates: Do banks know better?

We first evaluate the performance of major commercial banks in forecasting future spot exchange rates, using the random-walk model as the benchmark. We then investigate the sources of forecast errors, and the forecasting tendencies of banks. Our analysis is based on the forecasts made for the US dollar exchange rates of the British pound (BP), German mark (DM), Swiss franc (SF), and Japanese yen (JY), over 3-, 6-, 9-, and 12-month forecast horizons. Key findings include: first, a majority of banks shows some evidence of outperforming the random-walk model for the three currencies other than the JY. Second, the imperfect correlation between predicted and actual exchange rate changes is the dominant source of prediction errors of banks. Third, the home-country bank generally forecasts the country's currency rate more accurately than the other banks, suggesting a degree of information asymmetry. Fourth, the forecasts of a majority of banks exhibit a bandwagon type effect. That is, most banks are momentum forecasters, tending to extrapolate the recent currency changes. Interestingly, a “contrarian” bank is found to outperform the other banks.     

Do investment banks listen to their own analysts?

To what extent conflicts of interest affect the investment value of sell-side analyst research is an ongoing debate. We approach this issue from a new direction by investigating how asset-management divisions of investment banks use stock recommendations issued by their own analysts. Based on holdings changes around initiations, upgrades, and downgrades from 1993 to 2003, we find that these bank-affiliated investors follow recommendations from sell-side analysts in general, increasing (decreasing) their relative holdings following positive (negative) recommendations. More importantly, these investors respond more strongly to recommendations issued by their own analysts than to those issued by analysts affiliated with other banks, especially for recommendations on small and low-analyst-coverage firms. Thus, we find that investment banks “eat their own cooking,” showing that these presumably sophisticated institutional investors view sell-side recommendations as having investment value, particularly when the recommendations come from their own analysts.     

Do post-restatement firms care about financial credibility? Evidence from the pre- and post-SOX eras

This study examines whether negative-market-reaction firms in the year following restatement announcements adopt more conservative financial reporting to respond to their financial reporting credibility crisis, especially in the post-SOX era. Using Basu’s (1997) measure of conservatism, we find that negative-market-reaction firms in the year following restatement announcements report their financial statements more conservatively in the post-SOX era, as the market reaction following restatement announcements becomes more severe. We also find that as the negative market restatement reaction becomes more severe, negative-market-reaction firms using a Big N auditor in the year following financial restatements report their financial statements more conservatively in the post-SOX era.     

Do banks really monitor? Evidence from CEO succession decisions

We demonstrate that banks play an important monitoring role in CEO succession that is not observed for other types of lenders, particularly public bondholders. There is a stronger relation between cash flow performance and forced CEO turnover for firms issuing bank debt during the year of CEO turnover than for firms not issuing bank debt, and bank debt issuance increases the likelihood of external CEO succession. The stock price reaction to CEO succession is higher when bank monitoring is prevalent. Our results are consistent with theories of relationship banking that propose a valuable monitoring role for well informed, incentivized bank lenders.     

Multiple banking relationships: Do SMEs mistrust their banks?

This paper focuses on the determinants of the use of multiple banking relationships by SMEs. We exploit the results of an original survey conducted on a sample of French SMEs in December 2012. We first provide evidence that access to multiple banking relationships is influenced by firms’ characteristics. We find that larger, high-performing and innovative firms are more likely to develop multiple banking relationships. More originally, relying on the management literature, we also highlight the explanatory power of trust from the perspective of the CEO: when the CEO mistrusts the firm’s main bank, the firm will be more likely to engage in multiple banking relationships.